. The operator runs a process on
a machine that anonymizes mail sent to him with certain
characteristics that distinguish it from his regular incoming mail
(typically fields in the header). One has been implemented as a
PERL script running on UNIX. Several of these are in existence
currently but sites and software currently somewhat unstable; they
may be in operation outside of system administrator knowledge.
The remailers don't generally support anonymous return addresses.
Mail that is incorrectly addressed is received by the operator.
Generally the user of the remailer has to disavow any
responsibility for the messages forwarded through his system,
although actually may be held liable regardless.
These approaches have several serious disadvantages and weaknesses:
- The anonymous server approach requires maintaining a mapping of
anonymous ID's to real addresses that must be maintained
indefinitely. One alternative is to allow `deallocation' of
aliases at the request of the user, but this has not been
implemented yet.
- Although an unlikely scenario, traffic to any of these sites could
conceivably be monitored from the `outside', necessitating the
use of cryptography for basic protection,.
- Local administrators can shut them down either out of caprice or
under pressure from local, network, or government agencies.
- Unscrupulous providers of the services can monitor the traffic
that goes through them.
- Some remailers keep logs that may be inspected.
- The cypherpunk approach tends to be highly unstable because these
operators are basically network users who do not own the
equipment and are accountable to their own system
administrators, who may be unaware of the use and unsympathetic
to the philosophy of anonymity when the operation is discovered,
regarding it as illicit use.
- In all cases, a high degree of trust is placed in the anonymous
server operator by the user.
Currently the most direct route to anonymity involves using SMTP
protocols to submit a message directly to a server with arbitrary
field information. This practice, not uncommon to hackers, and the
approach used by remailers, is generally viewed with hostility by
most system administrators. Information in the header routing data
and logs of network port connection information may be retained
that can be used to track the originating site. In practice, this
is generally infeasible and rarely carried out. Some
administrators on the network will contact local administrators to
request a message be tracked and its writer admonished or punished
more severely (such as revoking the account), all of this actually
happening occasionally but infrequently.
What is `anonymous posting'?
Anonymous servers have been established as well for anonymous Usenet
posting with all the associated caveats above (monitored traffic,
capricious or risky local circumstances, logging). Make sure to
test the system at least once by e.g. anonymous posting to
misc.test (however some operators don't recommend this because many
sites `autorespond' to test messages, possibly causing the
anonymous server to allocate anonymous IDs for those machines).
Another direct route involves using NNTP protocols to submit a
message directly to a newserver with arbitrary field information.
This practice, not uncommon to hackers, is also generally viewed
with hostility by most system administrators, and similar
consequences can ensue.
See also:
- Anonymity on the Internet FAQ, rtfm.mit.edu:
/pub/usenet/news.answers/net-anonymity.
- ``Censorship Fights Heat Up on Academic Networks'', W. M.
Bulkeley, Wall St. Journal, May 24 1993 p. B1.
- ``A Computer Program That Can Censor Electronic Messages Sets
Off a Furor'', D. L. Wilson, Chronicle of Higher Education,
May 12, 1993 p. A25.
- Information Week, May 31 1993 pg. 84 summarizes the Wall St.
Journal article.
Why is anonymity (un)stable on the internet?
As noted, many factors compromise the anonymity currently available
to the general internet community, and these services should be
used with great caution. To summarize, the technology is in its
infancy and current approaches are unrefined, unreliable, and not
completely trustworthy. No standards have been established and
troubling situations of loss of anonymity and bugs in the software
are prevalent. Here are some encountered and potential bugs:
- One anonymous remailer reallocated already allocated anonymous
return addresses.
- Others passed signature information embedded in messages
unaltered.
- Address resolution problems resulting in anonymized mail bounced
to a remailer are common.
- Forgeries to the anonymous server itself are a problem, possibly
allowing unauthorized users to potentially glean anon ID - email
address mappings in the alias file. This can be remedied with
the use of passwords.
- Infinite mail loops are possible with chaining remailers.
Source code is being distributed, tested, and refined for these
systems, but standards are progressing slowly and weakly. The
field is not likely to improve considerably without official
endorsement and action by network agencies. The whole idea is
essentially still in its infancy and viewed with suspicion and
distrust by many on the internet, seen as illegitimate or favorable
to criminality. The major objection to anonymity over regular
internet use is the perceived lack of `accountability' to system
operators, i.e. invulnerability to account restrictions resulting
from outside complaints. System adminstrators at some sites have
threatened to filter anonymous news postings generated by the
prominent servers from their redistribution flows. This may only
have the effect of encouraging server operators to create less
characteristically detectable headers. Probably the least
problematic approach, and the most traditional to Usenet, is for
individual users to deal with anonymous mail however they prefer,
e.g. ignoring it or filtering it with kill files.
What is the future of anonymity on the internet?
New anonymous protocols effectively serve to significantly increase
safeguards of anonymity. For example, the same mechanism that
routes email over multiple hosts, thereby threatening its privacy,
can also be used to guarantee it. In a scheme called `chaining' an
anonymous message is passed through multiple anonymous servers
before reaching a destination. In this way generally multiple
links of the chain have to be `broken' for security to be
compromised. Re-encryption at each link makes this scenario even
more unlikely. Even more significantly the anonymous remailers
could be spread over the internet globally so that local weaknesses
(such as corrupt governments or legal wiretapping within a nation)
would be more unlikely to sacrifice overall security by message
tracing. However, remailers run by corrupt operators are possible.
The future of anonymous services on the internet is, at this time,
highly uncertain and fraught with peril. While specific groups seem
to benefit significantly from anonymous posting capabilities, many
feel that unlimited newsgroup scope for anonymous posting is a
disruptive and dangerous idea and detracts from discussions in
`serious' groups. The introduction of unlimited group anonymity
may have fundamental repercussions on Usenet conventions and
distribution mechanisms such as moderated and `alt' groups have had
in the past. For example, as part of new group creation, the
charter may specify whether `anonymous' posting is (un)welcome.
Nevertheless, the widespread introduction and use of anonymity may
be inevitable. Based on traffic statistics, anonymous services are
in huge demand. Pervasive and readily available anonymity could
carry significant and unforeseen social consequences. However, if
its use is continued to be generally regarded as subversive it may
be confined to the underground. The ramifications of the
widespread introduction of anonymity to Usenet are still largely
unknown. It is unclear whether it will provoke signficant amounts
of new traffic or, instead of expansion, cause a shift where a
greater portion of existing traffic is anonymized. Conceivably the
services could play a role in influencing future mainstream social
acceptance of Usenet.
