Title:   The History of Rome, Vol. III

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The History of Rome, Vol. III

Livy



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Table of Contents

The History of Rome, Vol. III............................................................................................................................1

Livy ..........................................................................................................................................................1

Book 21. From Saguntum to the Trebia..................................................................................................1

Book 22. The Disaster of Cannae..........................................................................................................31

Book 23. Hannibal at Capua..................................................................................................................64

Book 24. The Revolution in Syracuse...................................................................................................92

Book 25. The Fall of Syracuse .............................................................................................................119


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The History of Rome, Vol. III

Livy

Translated by Reverend Canon Roberts

Book 21. From Saguntum to the Trebia 

Book 22. The Disaster of Cannae 

Book 23. Hannibal at Capua 

Book 24. The Revolution in Syracuse 

Book 25. The Fall of Syracuse  

Book 21. From Saguntum to the Trebia

I consider myself at liberty to commence what is only a section of my history with a prefatory remark such as

most writers have placed at the very beginning of their works, namely, that the war I am about to describe is

the most memorable of any that have ever been waged, I mean the war which the Carthaginians, under

Hannibal's leadership, waged with Rome. No states, no nations ever met in arms greater in strength or richer

in resources; these Powers themselves had never before been in so high a state of efficiency or better

prepared to stand the strain of a long war; they were no strangers to each other's tactics after their experience

in the first Punic War; and so variable were the fortunes and so doubtful the issue of the war that those who

were ultimately victorious were in the earlier stages brought nearest to ruin. And yet, great as was their

strength, the hatred they felt towards each other was almost greater. The Romans were furious with

indignation because the vanquished had dared to take the offensive against their conquerors; the

Carthaginians bitterly resented what they regarded as the tyrannical and rapacious conduct of Rome. The

prime author of the war was Hamilcar. There was a story widely current that when, after bringing the African

War to a close, he was offering sacrifices before transporting his army to Spain, the boy Hannibal, nine years

old, was coaxing his father to take him with him, and his father led him up to the altar and made him swear

with his hand laid on the victim that as soon as he possibly could he would show himself the enemy of Rome.

The loss of Sicily and Sardinia vexed the proud spirit of the man, for he felt that the cession of Sicily had

been made hastily in a spirit of despair, and that Sardinia had been filched by the Romans during the troubles

in Africa, who, not content with seizing it, had imposed an indemnity as well.

Smarting under these wrongs, he made it quite clear from his conduct of the African War which followed

immediately upon the conclusion of peace with Rome, and from the way in which he strengthened and

extended the rule of Carthage during the nine years' war with Spain, that he was meditating a far greater war

than any he was actually engaged in, and that had he lived longer it would have been under his command that

the Carthaginians effected the invasion of Italy, which they actually carried out under Hannibal. The death of

Hamilcar, occurring as it did most opportunely, and the tender years of Hannibal delayed the war. Hasdrubal,

coming between father and son, held the supreme power for eight years. He is said to have become a

favourite of Hamilcar's owing to his personal beauty as a boy; afterwards he displayed talents of a very

different order, and became his soninlaw. Through this connection he was placed in power by the

influence of the Barcine party, which was unduly preponderant with the soldiers and the common people, but

his elevation was utterly against the wishes of the nobles. Trusting to policy rather than to arms, he did more

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to extend the empire of Carthage by forming connections with the petty chieftains and winning over new

tribes by making friends of their leading men than by force of arms or by war. But peace brought him no

security. A barbarian whose master he had put to death murdered him in broad daylight, and when seized by

the bystanders he looked as happy as though he had escaped. Even when put to the torture, his delight at the

success of his attempt mastered his pain and his face wore a smiling expression. Owing to the marvellous tact

he had shown in winning over the tribes and incorporating them into his dominions, the Romans had renewed

the treaty with Hasdrubal. Under its terms, the River Ebro was to form the boundary between the two

empires, and Saguntum, occupying an intermediate position between them, was to be a free city.

There was no hesitation shown in filling his place. The soldiers led the way by bringing the young Hannibal

forthwith to the palace and proclaiming him their commanderinchief amidst universal applause. Their

action was followed by the plebs. Whilst little more than a boy, Hasdrubal had written to invite Hannibal to

come to him in Spain, and the matter had actually been discussed in the senate. The Barcines wanted

Hannibal to become familiar with military service; Hanno, the leader of the opposite party, resisted this.

"Hasdrubal's request," he said, "appears a reasonable one, and yet I do not think we ought to grant it" This

paradoxical utterance aroused the attention of the whole senate. He continued: "The youthful beauty which

Hasdrubal surrendered to Hannibal's father he considers he has a fair claim to ask for in return from the son.

It ill becomes us, however, to habituate our youths to the lust of our commanders, by way of military training.

Are we afraid that it will be too long before Hamilcar's son surveys the extravagant power and the pageant of

royalty which his father assumed, and that there will be undue delay in our becoming the slaves of the despot

to whose soninlaw our armies have been bequeathed as though they were his patrimony? I, for my part,

consider that this youth ought to be kept at home and taught to live in obedience to the laws and the

magistrates on an equality with his fellowcitizens; if not, this small fire will some day or other kindle a vast

conflagration."

Hanno's proposal received but slight support, though almost all the best men in the council were with him,

but as usual, numbers carried the day against reason. No sooner had Hannibal landed in Spain than he became

a favourite with the whole army. The veterans thought they saw Hamilcar restored to them as he was in his

youth; they saw the same determined expression the same piercing eyes, the same cast of features. He soon

showed, however, that it was not his father's memory that helped him most to win the affections of the army.

Never was there a character more capable of the two tasks so opposed to each other of commanding and

obeying; you could not easily make out whether the army or its general were more attached to him. Whenever

courage and resolution were needed Hasdrubal never cared to entrust the command to any one else; and there

was no leader in whom the soldiers placed more confidence or under whom they showed more daring. He

was fearless in exposing himself to danger and perfectly selfpossessed in the presence of danger. No amount

of exertion could cause him either bodily or mental fatigue; he was equally indifferent to heat and cold; his

eating and drinking were measured by the needs of nature, not by appetite; his hours of sleep were not

determined by day or night, whatever time was not taken up with active duties was given to sleep and rest,

but that rest was not wooed on a soft couch or in silence, men often saw him lying on the ground amongst the

sentinels and outposts, wrapped in his military cloak. His dress was in no way superior to that of his

comrades; what did make him conspicuous were his arms and horses. He was by far the foremost both of the

cavalry and the infantry, the first to enter the fight and the last to leave the field. But these great merits were

matched by great vicesinhuman cruelty, a perfidy worse than Punic, an utter absence of truthfulness,

reverence, fear of the gods, respect for oaths, sense of religion. Such was his character, a compound of virtues

and vices. For three years he served under Hasdrubal, and during the whole time he never lost an opportunity

of gaining by practice or observation the experience necessary for one who was to be a great leader of men.

From the day when he was proclaimed commanderinchief, he seemed to regard Italy as his assigned field

of action, and war with Rome as a duty imposed upon him. Feeling that he ought not to delay operations, lest

some accident should overtake him as in the case of his father and afterwards of Hasdrubal, he decided to

attack the Saguntines. As an attack on them would inevitably set the arms of Rome in motion, he began by


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invading the Olcades, a tribe who were within the boundaries but not under the dominion of Carthage. He

wished to make it appear that Saguntum was not his immediate object, but that he was drawn into a war with

her by the force of circumstances, by the conquest, that is, of all her neighbours and the annexation of their

territory. Cartala, a wealthy city and the capital of the tribe, was taken by storm and sacked; the smaller cities,

fearing a similar fate, capitulated and agreed to pay an indemnity. His victorious army enriched with plunder

was marched into winter quarters in New Carthage. Here, by a lavish distribution of the spoils and the

punctual discharge of all arrears of pay, he secured the allegiance of his own people and of the allied

contingents.

At the beginning of spring he extended his operations to the Vaccaei, and two of their cities, Arbocala and

Hermandica, were taken by assault. Arbocala held out for a considerable time, owing to the courage and

numbers of its defenders; the fugitives from Hermandica joined hands with those of the Olcades who had

abandoned their countrythis tribe had been subjugated the previous yearand together they stirred up the

Carpetani to war. Not far from the Tagus an attack was made upon Hannibal as he was returning from his

expedition against the Vaccaei, and his army, laden as it was with plunder, was thrown into some confusion.

Hannibal declined battle and fixed his camp by the side of the river; as soon as there was quiet and silence

amongst the enemy, he forded the stream. His entrenchments had been carried just far enough to allow room

for the enemy to cross over, and he decided to attack them during their passage of the river. He instructed his

cavalry to wait until they had actually entered the water and then to attack them; his forty elephants he

stationed on the bank. The Carpetani together with the contingents of the Olcades and Vaccaei numbered

altogether 100,000 men, an irresistible force had they been fighting on level ground. Their innate

fearlessness, the confidence inspired by their numbers, their belief that the enemy's retreat was due to fear, all

made them look on victory as certain, and the river as the only obstacle to it. Without any word of command

having been given, they raised a universal shout and plunged, each man straight in front of him, into the river.

A huge force of cavalry descended from the opposite bank, and the two bodies met in midstream. The

struggle was anything but an equal one. The infantry, feeling their footing insecure, even where the river was

fordable, could have been ridden down even by unarmed horsemen, whereas the cavalry, with their bodies

and weapons free and their horses steady even in the midst of the current, could fight at close quarters or not,

as they chose. A large proportion were swept down the river, some were carried by cross currents to the other

side where the enemy were, and were trampled to death by the elephants. Those in the rear thought it safest to

return to their own side, and began to collect together as well as their fears allowed them, but before they had

time to recover themselves Hannibal entered the river with his infantry in battle order and drove them in

flight from the bank. He followed up his victory by laying waste their fields, and in a few days was able to

receive the submission of the Carpetani There was no part of the country beyond the Ebro which did not now

belong to the Carthaginians, with the exception of Saguntum.

War had not been formally declared against this city, but there were already grounds for war. The seeds of

quarrel were being sown amongst her neighbours, especially amongst the Turdetani. When the man who had

sown the seed showed himself ready to aid and abet the quarrel, and his object plainly was not to refer the

question to arbitration, but to appeal to force, the Saguntines sent a deputation to Rome to beg for help in a

war which was inevitably approaching. The consuls for the time being were P. Cornelius Scipio and Tiberius

Sempronius Longus. After introducing the envoys they invited the senate to declare its opinion as to what

policy should be adopted. It was decided that commissioners should be sent to Spain to investigate the

circumstances, and if they considered it necessary they were to warn Hannibal not to interfere with the

Saguntines, who were allies of Rome; then they were to cross over to Africa and lay before the Carthaginian

council the complaints which they had made. But before the commission was despatched news came that the

siege of Saguntum had, to every one's surprise, actually commenced. The whole position of affairs required

to be reconsidered by the senate; some were for assigning Spain and Africa as separate fields of action for the

two consuls, and thought that the war ought to be prosecuted by land and sea; others were for confining the

war solely to Hannibal in Spain; others again were of opinion that such an immense task ought not to be

entered upon hastily, and that they ought to await the return of the commission from Spain. This latter view


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seemed the safest and was adopted, and the commissioners, P. Valerius Flaccus and Q. Baebius Tamphilus,

were despatched without further delay to Hannibal. If he refused to abandon hostilities they were to proceed

to Carthage to demand the surrender of the general to answer for his breach of treaty.

During these proceedings in Rome the siege of Saguntum was being pressed with the utmost vigour. That city

was by far the most wealthy of all beyond the Ebro; it was situated about a mile from the sea. It is said to

have been founded by settlers from the island of Zacynthus, with an admixture of Rutulians from Ardea. In a

short time, however, it had attained to great prosperity, partly through its land and seaborne commerce,

partly through the rapid increase of its population, and also through the maintenance of a high standard of

political integrity which led it to act with a loyalty towards its allies that brought about its ruin. After carrying

his ravages everywhere throughout the territory, Hannibal attacked the city from three separate points. There

was an angle of the fortifications which looked down on a more open and level descent than the rest of the

ground surrounding the city, and here he decided to bring up his vineae to allow the battering rams to be

placed against the walls. But although the ground to a considerable distance from the walls was sufficiently

level to admit of the vineae being brought up, they found when they had succeeded in doing this that they

made no progress. A huge tower overlooked the place, and the wall, being here more open to attack, had been

carried to a greater height than the rest of the fortifications. As the position was one of especial danger, so the

resistance offered by a picked body of defenders was of the most resolute character. At first they confined

themselves to keeping the enemy back by the discharge of missiles and making it impossible for them to

continue their operations in safety. As time went on, however, their weapons no longer flashed on the walls

or from the tower, they ventured on a sortie and attacked the outposts and siege works of the enemy. In these

irregular encounters the Carthaginians lost nearly as many men as the Saguntines. Hannibal himself,

approaching the wall somewhat incautiously, fell with a severe wound in his thigh from a javelin, and such

was the confusion and dismay that ensued that the vineae and siege works were all but abandoned.

For a few days, until the general's wound was healed, there was a blockade rather than an active siege, and

during this interval, though there was a respite from fighting, the construction of siege works and approaches

went on uninterruptedly. When the fighting was resumed it was fiercer than ever. In spite of the difficulties of

the ground the vineae were advanced and the battering rams placed against the walls. The Carthaginians had

the superiority in numbersthere were said to have been 150,000 fighting menwhilst the defenders, obliged

to keep watch and ward everywhere, were dissipating their strength and finding their numbers unequal to the

task. The walls were now being pounded by the rams, and in many places had been shaken down. One part

where a continuous fall had taken place laid the city open; three towers in succession, and the whole of the

wall between them fell with a tremendous crash. The Carthaginians looked upon the town as already captured

after that fall, and both sides rushed through the breach as though the wall had only served to protect them

from each other. There was nothing of the desultory fighting which goes on when cities are stormed, as each

side gets an opportunity of attacking the other. The two bodies of combatants confronted one another in the

space between the ruined wall and the houses of the city in as regular formation as though they had been in an

open field. On the one side there was the courage of hope, on the other the courage of despair. The

Carthaginians believed that with a little effort on their part the city would be theirs; the Saguntines opposed

their bodies as a shield for their fatherland now stripped of its walls; not a man relaxed his foothold for fear of

letting an enemy in through the spot which he had left open. So the hotter and closer the fighting became the

greater grew the number of wounded, for no missile fell ineffectively amongst the crowded ranks. The

missile used by the Saguntines was the phalarica, a javelin with a shaft smooth and round up to the head,

which, as in the pilum, was an iron point of square section. The shaft was wrapped in tow and then smeared

with pitch; the iron head was three feet long and capable of penetrating armour and body alike. Even if it only

stuck in the shield and did not reach the body it was a most formidable weapon, for when it was discharged

with the tow set on fire the flame was fanned to a fiercer heat by its passage through the air, and it forced the

soldier to throw away his shield and left him defenceless against the sword thrusts which followed.


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The conflict had now gone on for a considerable time without any advantage to either side; the courage of the

Saguntines was rising as they found themselves keeping up an unhopedfor resistance, whilst the

Carthaginians, unable to conquer, were beginning to look upon themselves as defeated. Suddenly the

defenders, raising their battleshout, forced the enemy back to the debris of the ruined wall; there, stumbling

and in disorder, they were forced still further back and finally driven in rout and flight to their camp.

Meantime it was announced that envoys had arrived from Rome. Hannibal sent messengers down to the

harbour to meet them and inform them that it would be unsafe for them to advance any further through so

many wild tribes now in arms, and also that Hannibal in the present critical position of affairs had no time to

receive embassies. It was quite certain that if they were not admitted they would go to Carthage. He therefore

forestalled them by sending messengers with a letter addressed to the heads of the Barcine party, to warn his

supporters and prevent the other side from making any concessions to Rome.

The result was that, beyond being received and heard by the Carthaginian senate, the embassy found its

mission a failure. Hanno alone, against the whole senate, spoke in favour of observing the treaty, and his

speech was listened to in silence out of respect to his personal authority, not because his hearers approved of

his sentiments. He appealed to them in the name of the gods, who are the witnesses and arbiters of treaties,

not to provoke a war with Rome in addition to the one with Saguntum. "I urged you," he said, "and warned

you not to send Hamilcar's son to the army. That man's spirit, that man's offspring cannot rest; as long as any

single representative of the blood and name of Barca survives our treaty with Rome will never remain

unimperilled. You have sent to the army, as though supplying fuel to the fire, a young man who is consumed

with a passion for sovereign power, and who recognises that the only way to it lies in passing his life

surrounded by armed legions and perpetually stirring up fresh wars. It is you, therefore, who have fed this fire

which is now scorching you. Your armies are investing Saguntum, which by the terms of the treaty they are

forbidden to approach; before long the legions of Rome will invest Carthage, led by the same generals under

the same divine guidance under which they avenged our breach of treaty obligations in the late war. Are you

strangers to the enemy, to yourselves, to the fortunes of each nation? That worthy commander of yours

refused to allow ambassadors who came from allies, on behalf of allies, to enter his camp, and set at naught

the law of nations. Those men, repulsed from a place to which even an enemy's envoys are not refused

access, have come to us; they ask for the satisfaction which the treaty prescribes; they demand the surrender

of the guilty party in order that the State may clear itself from all taint of guilt. The slower they are to take

action, the longer they are in commencing war, so much the more persistence and determination, I fear, will

they show when war has begun. Remember the Aegates and Eryx, and all you had to go through for

fourandtwenty years. This boy was not commanding then, but his father, Hamilcara second Mars as his

friends would have us believe. But we broke the treaty then as we are breaking it now; we did not keep our

hands off Tarentum or, which is the same thing, off Italy then any more than we are keeping our hands off

Saguntum now, and so gods and men combined to defeat us, and the question in dispute, namely, which

nation had broken the treaty, was settled by the issue of the war, which, like an impartial judge, left the

victory on the side which was in the right. It is against Carthage that Hannibal is now bringing up his vineae

and towers, it is Carthage whose walls he is shaking with his battering rams. The ruins of Saguntumwould

that I might prove a false prophetwill fall on our heads, and the war which was begun with Saguntum will

have to be carried on with Rome.

"'Shall we then surrender Hannibal?' some one will say. I am quite aware that as regards him my advice will

have little weight, owing to my differences with his father, but whilst I was glad to hear of Hamilcar's death,

for if he were alive we should already be involved in war with Rome, I feel nothing but loathing and

detestation for this youth, the mad firebrand who is kindling this war. Not only do I hold that he ought to be

surrendered as an atonement for the broken treaty, but even if no demand for his surrender were made I

consider that he ought to be deported to the farthest corner of the earth, exiled to some spot from which no

tidings of him, no mention of his name, could reach us, and where it would be impossible for him to disturb

the welfare and tranquillity of our State. This then is what I propose: 'That a commission be at once

despatched to Rome to inform the senate of our compliance with their demands, and a second to Hannibal


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ordering him to withdraw his army from Saguntum and then surrendering him to the Romans in accordance

with the terms of the treaty, and I also propose that a third body of commissioners be sent to make reparation

to the Saguntines.'"

When Hanno sat down no one deemed it necessary to make any reply, so completely was the senate, as a

body, on the side of Hannibal. They accused Hanno of speaking in a tone of more uncompromising hostility

than Flaccus Valerius, the Roman envoy, had assumed. The reply which it was decided to make to the Roman

demands was that the war was started by the Saguntines not by Hannibal, and that the Roman people would

commit an act of injustice if they took the part of the Saguntines against their ancient allies, the

Carthaginians. Whilst the Romans were wasting time in despatching commissioners, things were quiet round

Saguntum. Hannibal's men were worn out with the fighting and the labours of the siege, and after placing

detachments on guard over the vineae and other military engines, he gave his army a few days' rest. He

employed this interval in stimulating the courage of his men by exasperating them against the enemy, and

firing them by the prospect of rewards. After he had given out in the presence of his assembled troops that the

plunder of the city would go to them, they were all in such a state of excitement that had the signal been

given then and there it seemed impossible for anything to withstand them. As for the Saguntines, though they

had a respite from fighting for some days, neither meeting attacks nor making any, they worked at their

defences so continuously by day and night that they completed a fresh wall at the place where the fall of the

former wall had laid the town open.

The assault was recommenced with greater vigour than ever. In every direction confused shouts and clamour

resounded, so that it was difficult to ascertain where to render assistance most promptly or where it was most

needed. Hannibal was present in person to encourage his men, who were bringing up a tower on rollers which

overtopped all the fortifications of the city. Catapults and ballistae had been put in position on each of the

stories, and after it had been brought up to the walls it swept them clear of the defenders. Seizing his

opportunity, Hannibal told off about 500 African troops to undermine the wall with pickaxes, an easy task,

as the stones were not fixed with cement but with layers of mud between the courses in the ancient fashion of

construction. More of it consequently fell than had been dug away, and through the gaping ruin the columns

of armed warriors marched into the city. They seized some high ground, and after massing their catapults and

ballistae there they enclosed it with a wall so as to have a fortified position actually within the city which

could dominate it like a citadel. The Saguntines on their side carried an inside wall round the portion of the

city not yet captured. Both sides kept up their fortifying and fighting with the utmost energy, but by having to

defend the interior portion of the city the Saguntines were continually reducing its dimensions. In addition to

this there was a growing scarcity of everything as the siege was prolonged, and the anticipations of outside

help were becoming fainter; the Romans, their one hope, were so far away, whilst all immediately round

them was in the hands of the enemy. For a few days their drooping spirits were revived by the sudden

departure of Hannibal on an expedition against the Oretani and the Carpetani. The rigorous way in which

troops were being levied in these two tribes had created great excitement, and they had kept the officers who

were superintending the levy practically prisoners. A general revolt was feared, but the unexpected swiftness

of Hannibal's movements took them by surprise and they abandoned their hostile attitude.

The attack on Saguntum was not slackened; Maharbal, the son of Himilco, whom Hannibal had left in

command, carried on operations with such energy that the general's absence was not felt by either friends or

foes. He fought several successful actions, and with the aid of three battering rams brought down a

considerable portion of the wall, and on Hannibal's return showed him the place all strewn with the

newlyfallen wall. The army was at once led to an assault on the citadel; a desperate fight began, with heavy

losses on both sides, and a part of the citadel was captured. Attempts were now made in the direction of

peace, though with but faint hopes of success. Two men undertook the task, Alco, a Saguntine, and Alorcus, a

Spaniard. Alco, thinking that his prayers might have some effect, crossed over without the knowledge of the

Saguntines to Hannibal at night. When he found that he gained nothing by his tears, and that the conditions

offered were such as a victor exasperated by resistance would insist upon, harsh and severe, he laid aside the


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character of a pleader and remained with the enemy as a deserter, alleging that any one who advocated peace

on such terms would be put to death. The conditions were that restitution should be made to the Turdetani, all

the gold and silver should be delivered up, and the inhabitants should depart with one garment each and take

up their abode wherever the Carthaginians should order them. As Alco insisted that the Saguntines would not

accept peace on these terms, Alorcus, convinced, as he said, that when everything else has gone courage also

goes, undertook to mediate a peace on those conditions. At that time he was one of Hannibal's soldiers, but he

was recognised as a guest friend by the city of Saguntum. He started on his mission, gave up his weapon

openly to the guard, crossed the lines, and was at his request conducted to the praetor of Saguntum. A crowd,

drawn from all classes of society, soon gathered, and after a way had been cleared through the press, Alorcus

was admitted to an audience of the senate. He addressed them in the following terms:

"If your fellowtownsman, Alco, had shown the same courage in bringing back to you the terms on which

Hannibal will grant peace that he showed in going to Hannibal to beg for peace, this journey of mine would

have been unnecessary. I have not come to you either as an advocate for Hannibal or as a deserter. But as he

has remained with the enemy either through your fault or his ownhis own if his fears were only feigned,

yours if those who report what is true have to answer for their livesI have come to you out of regard to the

old ties of hospitality which have so long subsisted between us, that you may not be left in ignorance of the

fact that there do exist terms on which you can secure peace and the safety of your lives. Now, that it is for

your sake alone and not on behalf of any one else that I say what I am saying before you is proved by the fact

that as long as you had the strength to maintain a successful resistance, and as long as you had any hopes of

help from Rome, I never breathed a word about making peace. But now that you have no longer anything to

hope for from Rome, now that neither your arms nor your walls suffice to protect you, I bring you a peace

forced upon you by necessity rather than recommended by the fairness of its conditions. But the hopes, faint

as they are, of peace rest upon your accepting as conquered men the terms which Hannibal as conqueror

imposes and not looking upon what is taken from you as a positive loss, since everything is at the victor's

mercy, but regarding what is left to you as a free gift from him. The city, most of which he has laid in ruins,

the whole of which he has all but captured, he takes from you; your fields and lands he leaves you; and he

will assign you a site where you can build a new town. He orders all the gold and silver, both that belonging

to the State and that owned by private individuals, to be brought to him; your persons and those of your wives

and children he preserves inviolate on condition that you consent to leave Saguntum with only two garments

apiece and without arms. These are the demands of your victorious enemy, and heavy and bitter as they are,

your miserable plight urges you to accept them. I am not without hope that when everything has passed into

his power he will relax some of these conditions, but I consider that even as they are you ought to submit to

them rather than permit yourselves to be butchered and your wives and children seized and carried off before

your eyes."

A large crowd had gradually collected to listen to the speaker, and the popular Assembly had become

mingled with the senate, when without a moment's warning the leading citizens withdrew before any reply

was given. They collected all the gold and silver from public and private sources and brought it into the

forum, where a fire had already been kindled, and flung it into the flames, and most of them thereupon leaped

into the fire themselves. The terror and confusion which this occasioned throughout the city was heightened

by the noise of a tumult in the direction of the citadel. A tower after much battering had fallen, and through

the breach created by its fall a Carthaginian cohort advanced to the attack and signalled to their commander

that the customary outposts and guards had disappeared and the city was unprotected. Hannibal thought that

he ought to seize the opportunity and act promptly. Attacking it with his full strength, he took the place in a

moment. Orders had been given that all the adult males were to be put to death; a cruel order, but under the

circumstances inevitable, for whom would it have been possible to spare when they either shut themselves up

with their wives and children and burnt their houses over their heads, or if they fought, would not cease

fighting till they were killed?


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An enormous amount of booty was found in the captured city. Although most of it had been deliberately

destroyed by the owners, and the enraged soldiers had observed hardly any distinctions of age in the universal

slaughter, whilst all the prisoners that were taken were assigned to them, still, it is certain that a considerable

sum was realised by the sale of the goods that were seized, and much valuable furniture and apparel was sent

to Carthage. Some writers assert that Saguntum was taken in the eighth month of the siege, and that Hannibal

led his force from there to New Carthage for the winter, his arrival in Italy occurring five months later. In this

case it is impossible for P. Cornelius and Ti. Sempronius to have been the consuls to whom the Saguntine

envoys were sent at the beginning of the siege and who afterwards, whilst still in office, fought with

Hannibal, one of them at the Ticinus, both shortly afterwards at the Trebia. Either all the incidents occurred

within a much shorter period or else it was the capture of Saguntum, not the beginning of the siege, which

occurred when those two entered upon office. For the battle of the Trebia cannot have fallen so late as the

year when Cn. Servilius and C. Flaminius were in office, because C. Flaminius entered upon his consulship at

Ariminum, his election taking place under the consul Tiberius Sempronius, who came to Rome after the

battle of the Trebia to hold the consular elections, and, after they were over, returned to his army in winter

quarters.

The commissioners who had been sent to Carthage, on their return to Rome, reported that everything

breathed a hostile spirit. Almost on the very day they returned the news arrived of the fall of Saguntum, and

such was the distress of the senate at the cruel fate of their allies, such was their feeling of shame at not

having sent help to them, such their exasperation against the Carthaginians and their alarm for the safety of

the Statefor it seemed as though the enemy were already at their gatesthat they were in no mood for

deliberating, shaken as they were by so many conflicting emotions. There were sufficient grounds for alarm.

Never had they met a more active or a more warlike enemy, and never had the Roman republic been so

lacking in energy or so unprepared for war. The operations against the Sardinians, Corsicans, and Histrians,

as well as those against the Illyrians, had been more of an annoyance than a training for the soldiers of Rome;

whilst with the Gauls there had been desultory fighting rather than regular warfare. But the Carthaginians, a

veteran enemy which for threeandtwenty years had seen hard and rough service amongst the Spanish

tribes, and had always been victorious, trained under a general of exceptional ability, were now crossing the

Ebro fresh from the sack of a most wealthy city, and were bringing with them all those Spanish tribes, eager

for the fray. They would rouse the various Gaulish tribes, who were always ready to take up arms; there

would be the whole world to fight against; the battleground would be Italy; the struggle would take place

before the walls of Rome.

The seat of the campaigns had already been decided; the consuls were now ordered to draw lots. Spain fell to

Cornelius, Africa to Sempronius. It was resolved that six legions should be raised for that year, the allies were

to furnish such contingents as the consuls should deem necessary, and as large a fleet as possible was to be

fitted out; 24,000 Roman infantry were called up and 1800 cavalry; the allies contributed 40,000 infantry and

4400 cavalry, and a fleet of 220 ships of war and 20 light galleys was launched. The question was then

formally submitted to the Assembly, Was it their will and pleasure that war should be declared against the

people of Carthage? When this was decided, a special service of intercession was conducted; the procession

marched through the streets of the city offering prayers at the various temples that the gods would grant a

happy and prosperous issue to the war which the people of Rome had now ordered. The forces were divided

between the consuls in the following way: To Sempronius two legions were assigned, each consisting of

4000 infantry and 300 cavalry, and 16,000 infantry and 1800 cavalry from the allied contingents. He was also

provided with 160 warships and 12 light galleys. With this combined land and sea force he was sent to Sicily,

with instructions to cross over to Africa if the other consul succeeded in preventing the Carthaginian from

invading Italy. Cornelius, on the other hand, was provided with a smaller force, as L. Manlius, the praetor,

was himself being despatched to Gaul with a fairly strong detachment. Cornelius was weakest in his ships; he

had only 60 warships, for it was never supposed that the enemy would come by sea or use his navy for

offensive purposes. His land force was made up of two Roman legions, with their complement of cavalry,

and 14,000 infantry from the allies with 1600 cavalry. The province of Gaul1 was held by two Roman legions


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and 10,000 allied infantry with 600 Roman and 1000 allied cavalry. This force was ultimately employed in

the Punic War.

When these preparations were completed, the formalities necessary before entering upon war required that a

commission should be despatched to Carthage. Those selected were men of age and experienceQ. Fabius,

M. Livius, L. Aemilius, C. Licinius, and Q. Baebius. They were instructed to inquire whether it was with the

sanction of the government that Hannibal had attacked Saguntum, and if, as seemed most probable, the

Carthaginians should admit that it was so and proceed to defend their action, then the Roman envoys were to

formally declare war upon Carthage. As soon as they had arrived in Carthage they appeared before the senate.

Q. Fabius had, in accordance with his instructions, simply put the question as to the responsibility of the

government, when one of the members present said: "The language of your previous deputation was

peremptory enough when you demanded the surrender of Hannibal on the assumption that he was attacking

Saguntum on his own authority, but your language now, so far at least, is less provocative, though in effect

more overbearing. For on that occasion it was Hannibal whose action you denounced and whose surrender

you demanded, now you are seeking to extort from us a confession of guilt and insist upon obtaining instant

satisfaction, as from men who admit they are in the wrong. I do not, however, consider that the question is

whether the attack on Saguntum was an act of public policy or only that of a private citizen, but whether it

was justified by circumstances or not. It is for us to inquire and take proceedings against a citizen when he

has done anything on his own authority; the only point for you to discuss is whether his action was

compatible with the terms of the treaty. Now, as you wish us to draw a distinction between what our generals

do with the sanction of the State and what they do on their own initiative, you must remember that the treaty

with us was made by your consul, C. Lutatius, and whilst it contained provisions guarding the interests of the

allies of both nations, there was no such provision for the Saguntines, for they were not your allies at the

time. But, you will say, by the treaty concluded with Hasdrubal, the Saguntines are exempted from attack. I

shall meet that with your own arguments. You told us that you refused to be bound by the treaty which your

consul, C. Lutatius, concluded with us, because it did not receive the authorisation of either the senate or the

Assembly. A fresh treaty was accordingly made by your government. Now, if no treaties have any binding

force for you unless they have been made with the authority of your senate or by order of your Assembly, we,

on our side, cannot possibly be bound by Hasdrubal's treaty, which he made without our knowledge. Drop all

allusions to Saguntum and the Ebro, and speak out plainly what has long been secretly hatching in your

minds." Then the Roman, gathering up his toga, said, "Here we bring you war and peace, take which you

please." He was met by a defiant shout bidding him give whichever he preferred, and when, letting the folds

of his toga fall, he said that he gave them war, they replied that they accepted war and would carry it on in the

same spirit in which they accepted it.

This straightforward question and threat of war seemed to be more consonant with the dignity of Rome than a

wordy argument about treaties; it seemed so previous to the destruction of Saguntum, and still more so

afterwards. For had it been a matter for argument, what ground was there for comparing Hasdrubal's treaty

with the earlier one of Lutatius? In the latter it was expressly stated that it would only be of force if the

people approved it, whereas in Hasdrubal's treaty there was no such saving clause. Besides, his treaty had

been silently observed for many years during his lifetime, and was so generally approved that, even after its

author's death, none of its articles were altered. But even if they took their stand upon the earlier treatythat

of Lutatiusthe Saguntines were sufficiently safeguarded by the allies of both parties being exempted from

hostile treatment, for nothing was said about "the allies for the time being" or anything to exclude "any who

should be hereafter taken into alliance." And since it was open to both parties to form fresh alliances, who

would think it a fair arrangement that none should be received into alliance whatever their merits, or that

when they had been received they should not be loyally protected, on the understanding that the allies of the

Carthaginians should not be induced to revolt, or if they deserted their allies on their own accord were not to

be received into alliance by the others?


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The Roman envoys in accordance with their instructions went on to Spain for the purpose of visiting the

different tribes and drawing them into alliance with Rome, or at least detaching them from the Carthaginians.

The first they came to were the Borgusii, who were tired of Punic domination and gave them a favourable

reception, and their success here excited a desire for change amongst many of the tribes beyond the Ebro.

They came next to the Volciani, and the response they met with became widely known throughout Spain and

determined the rest of the tribes against an alliance with Rome. This answer was given by the senior member

of their national council in the following terms: "Are you not ashamed, Romans, to ask us to form friendship

with you in preference to the Carthaginians, seeing how those who have done so have suffered more through

you, their allies, cruelly deserting them than through any injury inflicted on them by the Carthaginians? I

advise you to look for allies where the fall of Saguntum has never been heard of; the nations of Spain see in

the ruins of Saguntum a sad and emphatic warning against putting any trust in alliances with Rome." They

were then peremptorily ordered to quit the territory of the Volciani, and from that time none of the councils

throughout Spain gave them a more favourable reply. After this fruitless mission in Spain they crossed over

into Gaul.

Here a strange and appalling sight met their eyes; the men attended the council fully armed, such was the

custom of the country. When the Romans, after extolling the renown and courage of the Roman people and

the greatness of their dominion, asked the Gauls not to allow the Carthaginian invaders a passage through

their fields and cities, such interruption and laughter broke out that the younger men were with difficulty kept

quiet by the magistrates and senior members of the council. They thought it a most stupid and impudent

demand to make, that the Gauls, in order to prevent the war from spreading into Italy, should turn it against

themselves and expose their own lands to be ravaged instead of other people's. After quiet was restored the

envoys were informed that the Romans had rendered them no service, nor had the Carthaginians done them

any injury to make them take up arms either on behalf of the Romans or against the Carthaginians. On the

other hand, they heard that men of their race were being expelled from Italy, and made to pay tribute to

Rome, and subjected to every other indignity. Their experience was the same in all the other councils of Gaul,

nowhere did they hear a kindly or even a tolerably peaceable word till they reached Massilia. There all the

facts which their allies had carefully and honestly collected were laid before them; they were informed that

the interest of the Gauls had already been secured by Hannibal, but even he would not find them very

tractable, with their wild and untamable nature, unless the chiefs were also won over with gold, a thing which

as a nation they were most eager to procure. After thus traversing Spain and the tribes of Gaul the envoys

returned to Rome not long after the consuls had left for their respective commands. They found the whole

City in a state of excitement; definite news had been received that the Carthaginians had crossed the Ebro,

and every one was looking forward to war.

After the capture of Saguntum, Hannibal withdrew into winter quarters at New Carthage. Information

reached him there of the proceedings at Rome and Carthage, and he learnt that he was not only the general

who was to conduct the war, but also the sole person who was responsible for its outbreak. As further delay

would be most inexpedient, he sold and distributed the rest of the plunder, and calling together those of his

soldiers who were of Spanish blood, he addressed them as follows: "I think, soldiers, that you yourselves

recognise that now that we have reduced all the tribes in Spain we shall either have to bring our campaigns to

an end and disband our armies or else we must transfer our wars to other lands. If we seek to win plunder and

glory from other nations, then these tribes will enjoy not only the blessings of peace, but also the fruits of

victory. Since, therefore, there await us campaigns far from home, and it is uncertain when you will again see

your homes and all that is dear to you, I grant a furlough to every one who wishes to visit his friends. You

must reassemble at the commencement of spring, so that we may, with the kindly help of the gods, enter upon

a war which will bring us immense plunder and cover us with glory." They all welcomed the opportunity, so

spontaneously offered, of visiting their homes after so long an absence, and in view of a still longer absence

in the future. The winter's rest, coming after their past exertions, and soon to be followed by greater ones,

restored their faculties of mind and body and strengthened them for fresh trials of endurance.


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In the early days of spring they reassembled according to orders. After reviewing the whole of the native

contingents, Hannibal left for Gades, where he discharged his vows to Hercules, and bound himself by fresh

obligations to that deity in case his enterprise should succeed. As Africa would be open to attack from the

side of Sicily during his land march through Spain and the two Gauls into Italy, he decided to secure that

country with a strong garrison. To supply their place he requisitioned troops from Africa, a lightarmed force

consisting mainly of slingers. By thus transferring Africans to Spain and Spaniards to Africa, the soldiers of

each nationality would be expected to render more efficient service, as being practically under reciprocal

obligations. The force he despatched to Africa consisted of 13,850 Spanish infantry furnished with oxhide

bucklers, and 870 Balearic slingers, with a composite body of 1200 cavalry drawn from numerous tribes. This

force was destined partly for the defence of Carthage, partly to hold the African territory. At the same time

recruiting officers were sent to various communities; some 4000 men of good family were called up who

were under orders to be conveyed to Carthage to strengthen its defence, and also to serve as hostages for the

loyalty of their people.

Spain also had to be provided for, all the more so as Hannibal was fully aware that Roman commissioners

had been going all about the country to win over the leading men of the various tribes. He placed it in charge

of his energetic and able brother, Hasdrubal, and assigned him an army mainly composed of African

troops11,850 native infantry, 300 Ligurians, and 500 Balearics. In addition to this body of infantry there

were 450 Libyphoenician cavalrythese are a mixed race of Punic and aboriginal African descentsome 1800

Numidians and Moors, dwellers on the shore of the Mediterranean, and a small mounted contingent of 300

Ilergetes raised in Spain. Finally, that his land force might be complete in all its parts, there were twentyone

elephants. The protection of the coast required a fleet, and as it was natural to suppose that the Romans would

again make use of that arm in which they had been victorious before, Hasdrubal had assigned to him a fleet of

57 warships, including 50 quinqueremes, 2 quadriremes, and 5 triremes, but only 32 quinqueremes and the 5

triremes were ready for sea. From Gades he returned to the winter quarters of his army at New Carthage, and

from New Carthage he commenced his march on Italy. Passing by the city of Onusa, he marched along the

coast to the Ebro. The story runs that whilst halting there he saw in a dream a youth of godlike appearance

who said that he had been sent by Jupiter to act as guide to Hannibal on his march to Italy. He was

accordingly to follow him and not to lose sight of him or let his eyes wander. At first, filled with awe, he

followed him without glancing round him or looking back, but as instinctive curiosity impelled him to

wonder what it was that he was forbidden to gaze at behind him, he could no longer command his eyes. He

saw behind him a serpent of vast and marvellous bulk, and as it moved along trees and bushes crashed down

everywhere before it, whilst in its wake there rolled a thunderstorm. He asked what the monstrous portent

meant, and was told that it was the devastation of Italy; he was to go forward without further question and

allow his destiny to remain hidden.

Gladdened by this vision he proceeded to cross the Ebro, with his army in three divisions, after sending men

on in advance to secure by bribes the goodwill of the Gauls dwelling about his crossingplace, and also to

reconnoitre the passes of the Alps. He brought 90,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry over the Ebro. His next

step was to reduce to submission the Ilergetes, the Bargusii, and the Ausetani, and also the district of

Lacetania, which lies at the foot of the Pyrenees. He placed Hanno in charge of the whole coastline to

secure the passes which connect Spain with Gaul, and furnished him with an army of 10,000 infantry to hold

the district, and 1000 cavalry. When his army commenced the passage of the Pyrenees and the barbarians

found that there was truth in the rumour that they were being led against Rome, 3000 of the Carpetani

deserted. It was understood that they were induced to desert not so much by the prospect of the war as by the

length of the march and the impossibility of crossing the Alps. As it would have been hazardous to recall

them, or to attempt to detain them by force, in case the quick passions of the rest of the army should be

roused, Hannibal sent back to their homes more than 7000 men who, he had personally discovered, were

getting tired of the campaign, and at the same time he gave out that the Carpetani had also been sent back by

him.


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Then, to prevent his men from being demoralised by further delay and inactivity, he crossed the Pyrenees

with the remainder of his force and fixed his camp at the town of Iliberri. The Gauls were told that it was

against Italy that war was being made, but as they had heard that the Spaniards beyond the Pyrenees had been

subjugated by force of arms, and strong garrisons placed in their towns, several tribes, fearing for their

liberty, were roused to arms and mustered at Ruscino. On receiving the announcement of this movement,

Hannibal, fearing delay more than hostilities, sent spokesmen to their chiefs to say that he was anxious for a

conference with them, and either they might come nearer to Iliberri, or he would approach Ruscino to

facilitate their meeting, for he would gladly receive them in his camp or would himself go to them without

loss of time. He had come into Gaul as a friend not a foe, and unless the Gauls compelled him he would not

draw his sword till he reached Italy. This was the proposal made through the envoys, but when the Gauls had,

without any hesitation, moved their camp up to Iliberri, they were effectually secured by bribes and allowed

the army a free and unmolested passage through their territory under the very walls of Ruscino.

No intelligence, meanwhile, had reached Rome beyond the fact reported by the Massilian envoys, namely

that Hannibal had crossed the Ebro. No sooner was this known than the Boii, who had been tampering with

the Insubres, rose in revolt, just as though he had already crossed the Alps, not so much in consequence of

their old standing enmity against Rome as of her recent aggressions. Bodies of colonists were being settled on

Gaulish territory in the valley of the Po, at Placentia and Cremona, and intense irritation was produced.

Seizing their arms they made an attack on the land, which was being actually surveyed at the time, and

created such terror and confusion that not only the agricultural population, but even the three Roman

commissioners who were engaged in marking out the holdings, fled to Mutina, not feeling themselves safe

behind the walls of Placentia. The commissioners were C. Lutatius, C. Servilius, and M. Annius. There is no

doubt as to the name Lutatius, but instead of Annius and Servilius some annalists have Manlius Acilius and

C. Herennius, whilst others give P. Cornelius Asina and C. Papirius Maso. There is also doubt as to whether

it was the envoys who had been sent to the Boii to remonstrate with them that were maltreated, or the

commissioners upon whom an attack was made whilst surveying the ground. The Gauls invested Mutina, but

as they were strangers to the art of conducting sieges, and far too indolent to set about the construction of

military works, they contented themselves with blockading the town without inflicting any injury on the

walls. At last they pretended that they were ready to discuss terms of peace, and the envoys were invited by

the Gaulish chieftains to a conference. Here they were arrested, in direct violation not only of international

law but of the safeconduct which had been granted for the occasion. Having made them prisoners the Gauls

declared that they would not release them until their hostages were restored to them.

When news came that the envoys were prisoners and Mutina and its garrison in jeopardy, L. Manlius, the

praetor, burning with anger, led his army in separate divisions to Mutina. Most of the country was

uncultivated at that time and the road went through a forest. He advanced without throwing out scouting

parties and fell into an ambush, out of which, after sustaining considerable loss, he made his way with

difficulty on to more open ground. Here he entrenched himself, and as the Gauls felt it would be hopeless to

attack him there, the courage of his men revived, though it was tolerably certain that as many as 500 had

fallen. They recommenced their march, and as long as they were going through open country there was no

enemy in view; when they reentered the forest their rear was attacked and great confusion and panic created.

They lost 700 men and six standards. When they at last got out of the trackless and entangled forest there was

an end to the terrifying tactics of the Gauls and the wild alarm of the Romans. There was no difficulty in

repelling attacks when they reached the open country and made their way to Tannetum, a place near the Po.

Here they hastily entrenched themselves, and, helped by the windings of the river and assisted by the Brixian

Gauls, they held their ground against an enemy whose numbers were daily increasing.

When the intelligence of this sudden outbreak reached Rome and the senate became aware that they had a

Gaulish war to face in addition to the war with Carthage, they ordered C. Atilius, the praetor, to go to the

relief of Manlius with a Roman legion and 5000 men who had been recently enlisted by the consul from

among the allies. As the enemy, afraid to meet these reinforcements, had retired, Atilius reached Tannetum


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without any fighting. After raising a fresh legion in place of the one which had been sent away with the

praetor, P. Cornelius Scipio set sail with sixty warships and coasted along by the shores of Etruria and

Liguria, and from there past the mountains of the Salyes until he reached Marseilles. Here he disembarked his

troops at the first mouth of the Rhone to which he camethe river flows into the sea through several

mouthsand formed his entrenched camp, hardly able yet to believe that Hannibal had surmounted the

obstacle of the Pyrenees. When, however, he understood that he was already contemplating crossing the

Rhone, feeling uncertain as to where he would meet him and anxious to give his men time to recover from the

effects of the voyage, he sent forward a picked force of 300 cavalry accompanied by Massilian guides and

friendly Gauls to explore the country in all directions and if possible to discover the enemy.

Hannibal had overcome the opposition of the native tribes by either fear or bribes and had now reached the

territory of the Volcae. They were a powerful tribe, inhabiting the country on both sides of the Rhone, but

distrusting their ability to stop Hannibal on the side of the river nearest to him, they determined to make the

river a barrier and transported nearly all the population to the other side, on which they prepared to offer

armed resistance. The rest of the river population and those of the Volcae even, who still remained in their

homes, were induced by presents to collect boats from all sides and to help in constructing others, and their

efforts were stimulated by the desire to get rid as soon as possible of the burdensome presence of such a vast

host of men. So an enormous number of boats and vessels of every kind, such as they used in their journeys

up and down the river, was got together; new ones were made by the Gauls by hollowing out the trunks of

trees, then the soldiers themselves, seeing the abundance of timber and how easily they were made, took to

fashioning uncouth canoes, quite content if only they would float and carry burdens and serve to transport

themselves and their belongings.

Everything was now ready for the crossing, but the whole of the opposite bank was held by mounted and

unmounted men prepared to dispute the passage. In order to dislodge them Hannibal sent Hanno, the son of

Bomilcar, with a division, consisting mainly of Spaniards, a day's march up the river. He was to seize the first

chance of crossing without being observed, and then lead his men by a circuitous route behind the enemy and

at the right moment attack them in the rear. The Gauls who were taken as guides informed Hanno that about

25 miles upstream a small island divided the river in two, and the channel was of less depth in consequence.

When they reached the spot they hastily cut down the timber and constructed rafts on which men and horses

and other burdens could be ferried across. The Spaniards had no trouble; they threw their clothes on to skins

and placing their leather shields on the top they rested on these and so swam across. The rest of the army was

ferried over on rafts, and after making a camp near the river they took a day's rest after their labours of

boatmaking and the nocturnal passage, their general in the meantime waiting anxiously for an opportunity

of putting his plan into execution. The next day they set out on their march, and lighting a fire on some rising

ground they signalled by the column of smoke that they had crossed the river and were not very far away. As

soon as Hannibal received the signal he seized the occasion and at once gave the order to cross the river. The

infantry had prepared rafts and boats, the cavalry mostly barges on account of the horses. A line of large

boats was moored across the river a short distance upstream to break the force of the current, and

consequently the men in the smaller boats crossed over in smooth water. Most of the horses were towed

astern and swam over, others were carried in barges, ready saddled and bridled so as to be available for the

cavalry the moment they landed.

The Gauls flocked together on the bank with their customary whoops and war songs, waving their shields

over their heads and brandishing their javelins. They were somewhat dismayed when they saw what was

going on in front of them; the enormous number of large and small boats, the roar of the river, the confused

shouts of the soldiers and boatmen, some of whom were trying to force their way against the current, whilst

others on the bank were cheering their comrades who were crossing. Whilst they were watching all this

movement with sinking hearts, still more alarming shouts were heard behind them; Hanno had captured their

camp. Soon he appeared on the scene, and they were now confronted by danger from opposite quartersthe

host of armed men landing from the boats and the sudden attack which was being made on their rear. For a


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time the Gauls endeavoured to maintain the conflict in both directions, but finding themselves losing ground

they forced their way through where there seemed to be least resistance and dispersed to their various

villages. Hannibal brought over the rest of his force undisturbed, and, without troubling himself any further

about the Gauls, formed his camp.

In the transport of the elephants I believe different plans were adopted; at all events, the accounts of what

took place vary considerably. Some say that after they had all been collected on the bank the worsttempered

beast amongst them was teased by his driver, and when he ran away from it into the water the elephant

followed him and drew the whole herd after it, and as they got out of their depth they were carried by the

current to the opposite bank. The more general account, however, is that they were transported on rafts; as

this method would have appeared the safest beforehand so it is most probable that it was the one adopted.

They pushed out into the river a raft 200 feet long and 50 feet broad, and to prevent it from being carried

downstream, one end was secured by several stout hawsers to the bank. It was covered with earth like a

bridge in order that the animals, taking it for solid ground, would not be afraid to venture on it. A second raft,

of the same breadth but only 100 feet long and capable of crossing the river, was made fast to the former. The

elephants led by the females were driven along the fixed raft, as if along a road, until they came on to the

smaller one. As soon as they were safely on this it was cast off and towed by light boats to the other side of

the river. When the first lot were landed others were brought over in the same way. They showed no fear

whilst they were being driven along the fixed raft; their fright began when they were being carried into

midchannel on the other raft which had been cast loose. They crowded together, those on the outside

backing away from the water, and showed considerable alarm until their very fears at the sight of the water

made them quiet. Some in their excitement fell overboard and threw their drivers, but their mere weight kept

them steady, and as they felt their way into shallow water they succeeded in getting safely to land.

While the elephants were being ferried across, Hannibal sent 500 Numidian horse towards the Romans to

ascertain their numbers and their intentions. This troop of horse encountered the 300 Roman cavalry who, as I

have already stated, had been sent forward from the mouth of the Rhone. It was a much more severe fight

than might have been expected from the number of combatants. Not only were there many wounded but each

side lost about the same number of killed, and the Romans, who were at last completely exhausted, owed

their victory to a panic among the Numidians and their consequent flight. Of the victors as many as 160 fell,

not all Romans, some were Gauls; whilst the vanquished lost more than 200. This action with which the war

commenced was an omen of its final result, but though it portended the final victory of Rome it showed that

the victory would not be attained without much bloodshed and repeated defeats. The forces drew off from the

field and returned to their respective commanders. Scipio found himself unable to form any definite plans

beyond what were suggested to him by the movements of the enemy. Hannibal was undecided whether to

resume his march to Italy or to engage the Romans, the first army to oppose him. He was dissuaded from the

latter course by the arrival of envoys from the Boii and their chief, Magalus. They came to assure Hannibal of

their readiness to act as guides and take their share in the dangers of the expedition, and they gave it as their

opinion that he ought to reserve all his strength for the invasion of Italy and not fritter any of it away

beforehand. The bulk of his army had not forgotten the previous war and looked forward with dismay to

meeting their old enemy, but what appalled them much more was the prospect of an endless journey over the

Alps, which rumour said was, to those at all events who had never tried it, a thing to be dreaded.

When Hannibal had made up his mind to go forward and lose no time in reaching Italy, his goal, he ordered a

muster of his troops and addressed them in tones of mingled rebuke and encouragement. "I am astonished,"

he said, "to see how hearts that have been always dauntless have now suddenly become a prey to fear. Think

of the many victorious campaigns you have gone through, and remember that you did not leave Spain before

you had added to the Carthaginian empire all the tribes in the country washed by two widely remote seas. The

Roman people made a demand for all who had taken part in the siege of Saguntum to be given up to them,

and you, to avenge the insult, have crossed the Ebro to wipe out the name of Rome and bring freedom to the

world. When you commenced your march, from the setting to the rising sun, none of you thought it too much


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for you, but now when you see that by far the greater part of the way has been accomplished; the passes of

the Pyrenees, which were held by most warlike tribes, surmounted; the Rhone, that mighty stream, crossed in

the face of so many thousand Gauls, and the rush of its waters checkednow that you are within sight of the

Alps, on the other side of which lies Italy, you have become weary and are arresting your march in the very

gates of the enemy. What do you imagine the Alps to be other than lofty mountains? Suppose them to be

higher than the peaks of the Pyrenees, surely no region in the world can touch the sky or be impassable to

man. Even the Alps are inhabited and cultivated, animals are bred and reared there, their gorges and ravines

can be traversed by armies. Why, even the envoys whom you see here did not cross the Alps by flying

through the air, nor were their ancestors native to the soil. They came into Italy as emigrants looking for a

land to settle in, and they crossed the Alps often in immense bodies with their wives and children and all their

belongings. What can be inaccessible or insuperable to the soldier who carries nothing with him but his

weapons of war? What toils and perils you went through for eight months to effect the capture of Saguntum!

And now that Rome, the capital of the world, is your goal, can you deem anything so difficult or so arduous

that it should prevent you from reaching it? Many years ago the Gauls captured the place which

Carthaginians despair of approaching; either you must confess yourselves inferior in courage and enterprise

to a people whom you have conquered again and again, or else you must look forward to finishing your

march on the ground between the Tiber and the walls of Rome."

After this rousing appeal he dismissed them with orders to prepare themselves by food and rest for the march.

The next day they advanced up the left bank of the Rhone towards the central districts of Gaul, not because

this was the most direct route to the Alps, but because he thought that there would be less likelihood of the

Romans meeting him, for he had no desire to engage them before he arrived in Italy. Four days' marching

brought him to the "Island." Here the Isere and the Rhone, flowing down from different points in the Alps,

enclose a considerable extent of land and then unite their channels; the district thus enclosed is called the

"Island." The adjacent country was inhabited by the Allobroges, a tribe who even in those days were second

to none in Gaul in power and reputation. At the time of Hannibal's visit a quarrel had broken out between two

brothers who were each aspiring to the sovereignty. The elder brother, whose name was Brancus, had hitherto

been the chief, but was now expelled by a party of the younger men, headed by his brother, who found an

appeal to violence more successful than an appeal to right. Hannibal's timely appearance on the scene led to

the question being referred to him; he was to decide who was the legitimate claimant to the kingship. He

pronounced in favour of the elder brother, who had the support of the senate and the leading men. In return

for this service he received assistance in provisions and supplies of all kinds, especially of clothing, a

pressing necessity in view of the notorious cold of the Alps. After settling the feud amongst the Allobroges,

Hannibal resumed his march. He did not take the direct course to the Alps, but turned to the left towards the

Tricastini; then, skirting the territory of the Vocontii, he marched in the direction of the Tricorii. Nowhere did

he meet with any difficulty until he arrived at the Durance. This river, which also takes its rise in the Alps, is

of all the rivers of Gaul the most difficult to cross. Though carrying down a great volume of water, it does not

lend itself to navigation, for it is not kept in by banks, but flows in many separate channels. As it is constantly

shifting its bottom and the direction of its currents, the task of fording it is a most hazardous one, whilst the

shingle and boulders carried down make the foothold insecure and treacherous. It happened to be swollen by

rain at the time, and the men were thrown into much disorder whilst crossing it, whilst their fears and

confused shouting added considerably to their difficulties.

Three days after Hannibal had left the banks of the Rhone, P. Cornelius Scipio arrived at the deserted camp

with his army in battle order, ready to engage at once. When, however, he saw the abandoned lines and

realised that it would be no easy matter to overtake his opponent after he had got such a long start, he

returned to his ships. He considered that the easier and safer course would be to meet Hannibal as he came

down from the Alps. Spain was the province allotted to him, and to prevent its being entirely denuded of

Roman troops he sent his brother Cneius Scipio with the greater part of his army to act against Hasdrubal, not

only to keep the old allies and win new ones, but to drive Hasdrubal out of Spain. He himself sailed for

Genoa with a very small force, intending to defend Italy with the army lying in the valley of the Po. From the


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Durance Hannibal's route lay mostly through open level country, and he reached the Alps without meeting

with any opposition from the Gauls who inhabited the district. But the sight of the Alps revived the terrors in

the minds of his men. Although rumour, which generally magnifies untried dangers, had filled them with

gloomy forebodings, the nearer view proved much more fearful. The height of the mountains now so close,

the snow which was almost lost in the sky, the wretched huts perched on the rocks, the flocks and herds

shrivelled and stunted with the cold, the men wild and unkempt, everything animate and inanimate stiff with

frost, together with other sights dreadful beyond descriptionall helped to increase their alarm.

As the head of the column began to climb the nearest slopes, the natives appeared on the heights above; had

they concealed themselves in the ravines and then rushed down they would have caused frightful panic and

bloodshed. Hannibal called a halt and sent on some Gauls to examine the ground, and when he learnt that

advance was impossible in that direction he formed his camp in the widest part of the valley that he could

find; everywhere around the ground was broken and precipitous. The Gauls who had been sent to reconnoitre

got into conversation with the natives, as there was little difference between their speech or their manners,

and they brought back word to Hannibal that the pass was only occupied in the daytime, at nightfall the

natives all dispersed to their homes. Accordingly, at early dawn he began the ascent as though determined to

force the pass in broad daylight, and spent the day in movements designed to conceal his real intentions and

in fortifying the camp on the spot where they had halted. As soon as he observed that the natives had left the

heights and were no longer watching his movements, he gave orders, with the view of deceiving the enemy,

for a large number of fires to be lighted, larger in fact than would be required by those remaining in camp.

Then, leaving the baggage with the cavalry and the greater part of the infantry in camp, he himself with a

specially selected body of troops in light marching order rapidly moved out of the defile and occupied the

heights which the enemy had held.

The following day the rest of the army broke camp in the grey dawn and commenced its march. The natives

were beginning to assemble at their customary post of observation when they suddenly became aware that

some of the enemy were in possession of their stronghold right over their heads, whilst others were advancing

on the path beneath. The double impression made on their eyes and imagination kept them for a few moments

motionless, but when they saw the column falling into disorder mainly through the horses becoming

frightened, they thought that if they increased the confusion and panic it would be sufficient to destroy it. So

they charged down from rock to rock, careless as to whether there were paths or not, for they were familiar

with the ground. The Carthaginians had to meet this attack at the same time that they were struggling with the

difficulties of the way, and as each man was doing his best for himself to get out of the reach of danger, they

were fighting more amongst themselves than against the natives. The horses did the most mischief; they were

terrified at the wild shouts, which the echoing woods and valleys made all the louder, and when they

happened to be struck or wounded they created terrible havoc amongst the men and the different baggage

animals. The road was flanked by sheer precipices on each side, and in the crowding together many were

pushed over the edge and fell an immense depth. Amongst these were some of the soldiers; the heavilyladen

baggage animals rolled over like falling houses. Horrible as the sight was, Hannibal remained quiet and kept

his men back for some time, for fear of increasing the alarm and confusion, but when he saw that the column

was broken and that the army was in danger of losing all its baggage, in which case he would have brought

them safely through to no purpose, he ran down from his higher ground and at once scattered the enemy. At

the same time, however, he threw his own men into still greater disorder for the moment, but it was very

quickly allayed now that the passage was cleared by the flight of the natives. In a short time the whole army

had traversed the pass, not only without any further disturbance, but almost in silence. He then seized a

fortified village, the head place of the district, together with some adjacent hamlets, and from the food and

cattle thus secured he provided his army with rations for three days. As the natives, after their first defeat, no

longer impeded their march, whilst the road presented little difficulty, they made considerable progress

during those three days.


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They now came to another canton which, considering that it was a mountain district, had a considerable

population. Here he narrowly escaped destruction, not in fair and open fighting, but by the practices which he

himself employedfalsehood and treachery. The head men from the fortified villages, men of advanced age,

came as a deputation to the Carthaginian and told him that they had been taught by the salutary example of

other people's misfortunes to seek the friendship of the Carthaginians rather than to feel their strength. They

were accordingly prepared to carry out his orders; he would receive provisions and guides, and hostages as a

guarantee of good faith. Hannibal felt that he ought not to trust them blindly nor to meet their offer with a flat

refusal, in case they should become hostile. So he replied in friendly terms, accepted the hostages whom they

placed in his hands, made use of the provisions with which they supplied him on the march, but followed

their guides with his army prepared for action, not at all as though he were going through a peaceable or

friendly country. The elephants and cavalry were in front, he himself followed with the main body of the

infantry, keeping a sharp and anxious lookout in all directions. Just as they reached a part of the pass where

it narrowed and was overhung on one side by a wall of rock, the barbarians sprang up from ambush on all

sides and assailed the column in front and rear, at close quarters, and at a distance by rolling huge stones

down on it. The heaviest attack was made in the rear, and as the infantry faced round to meet it, it became

quite obvious that if the rear of the column had not been made exceptionally strong, a terrible disaster must

have occurred in that pass. As it was, they were in the greatest danger, and within an ace of total destruction.

For whilst Hannibal was hesitating whether to send his infantry on into the narrow part of the passfor whilst

protecting the rear of the cavalry they had no reserves to protect their own rearthe mountaineers, making a

flank charge, burst through the middle of the column and held the pass so that Hannibal had to spend that one

night without his cavalry or his baggage.

The next day, as the savages attacked with less vigour, the column closed up, and the pass was surmounted,

not without loss, more, however, of baggage animals than of men. From that time the natives made their

appearance in smaller numbers and behaved more like banditti than regular soldiers; they attacked either front

or rear just as the ground gave them opportunity, or as the advance or halt of the column presented a chance

of surprise. The elephants caused considerable delay, owing to the difficulty of getting them through narrow

or precipitous places; on the other hand, they rendered that part of the column safe from attack where they

were, for the natives were unaccustomed to the sight of them and had a great dread of going too near them.

Nine days from their commencing the ascent they arrived at the highest point of the Alps, after traversing a

region mostly without roads and frequently losing their way either through the treachery of their guides or

through their own mistakes in trying to find the way for themselves. For two days they remained in camp on

the summit, whilst the troops enjoyed a respite from fatigue and fighting. Some of the baggage animals which

had fallen amongst the rocks and had afterwards followed the track of the column came into camp. To add to

the misfortunes of the wornout troops, there was a heavy fall of snowthe Pleiads were near their

settingand this new experience created considerable alarm. In the early morning of the third day the army

recommenced its heavy march over ground everywhere deep in snow. Hannibal saw in all faces an expression

of listlessness and despondency. He rode on in front to a height from which there was a wide and extensive

view, and halting his men, he pointed out to them the land of Italy and the rich valley of the Po lying at the

foot of the Alps. "You are now," he said, "crossing the barriers not only of Italy, but of Rome itself.

Henceforth all will be smooth and easy for you; in one or, at the most, two battles, you will be masters of the

capital and stronghold of Italy." Then the army resumed its advance with no annoyance from the enemy

beyond occasional attempts at plunder. The remainder of the march, however, was attended with much

greater difficulty than they had experienced in the ascent, for the distance to the plains on the Italian side is

shorter, and therefore the descent is necessarily steeper. Almost the whole of the way was precipitous,

narrow, and slippery, so that they were unable to keep their footing, and if they slipped they could not recover

themselves; they kept falling over each other, and the baggage animals rolled over on their drivers.

At length they came to a much narrower pass which descended over such sheer cliffs that a lightarmed

soldier could hardly get down it even by hanging on to projecting roots and branches. The place had always

been precipitous, and a landslip had recently carried away the road for 1000 feet. The cavalry came to a halt


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here as though they had arrived at their journey's end, and whilst Hannibal was wondering what could be

causing the delay he was informed that there was no passage. Then he went forward to examine the place and

saw that there was nothing for it but to lead the army by a long circuitous route over pathless and untrodden

snow. But this, too, soon proved to be impracticable. The old snow had been covered to a moderate depth by

a fresh fall, and the first comers planted their feet firmly on the new snow, but when it had become melted

under the tread of so many men and beasts there was nothing to walk on but ice covered with slush. Their

progress now became one incessant and miserable struggle. The smooth ice allowed no foothold, and as they

were going down a steep incline they were still less able to keep on their legs, whilst, once down, they tried in

vain to rise, as their hands and knees were continually slipping. There were no stumps or roots about for them

to get hold of and support themselves by, so they rolled about helplessly on the glassy ice and slushy snow.

The baggage animals as they toiled along cut through occasionally into the lowest layer of snow, and when

they stumbled they struck out their hoofs in their struggles to recover themselves and broke through into the

hard and congealed ice below, where most of them stuck as though caught in a gin.

At last, when men and beasts alike were worn out by their fruitless exertions, a camp was formed on the

summit, after the place had been cleared with immense difficulty owing to the quantity of snow that had to be

removed. The next thing was to level the rock through which alone a road was practicable. The soldiers were

told off to cut through it. They built up against it an enormous pile of tall trees which they had felled and

lopped, and when the wind was strong enough to blow up the fire they set light to the pile. When the rock

was red hot they poured vinegar upon it to disintegrate it. After thus treating it by fire they opened a way

through it with their tools, and eased the steep slope by winding tracks of moderate gradient, so that not only

the baggage animals but even the elephants could be led down. Four days were spent over the rock, and the

animals were almost starved to death, for the heights are mostly bare of vegetation and what herbage there is

is buried beneath the snow. In the lower levels there were sunny valleys and streams flowing through woods,

and spots more deserving of human inhabitants. Here the beasts were turned loose to graze, and the troops,

worn out with their engineering, were allowed to rest. In three days more they reached the open plains and

found a pleasanter country and pleasanter people living in it

Such, in the main, was the way in which they reached Italy, five months, according to some authorities, after

leaving New Carthage, fifteen days of which were spent in overcoming the difficulties of the Alps. The

authorities are hopelessly at variance as to the number of the troops with which Hannibal entered Italy. The

highest estimate assigns him 100,000 infantry and 20,000 cavalry; the lowest puts his strength at 20,000

infantry and 6000 cavalry. L. Cincius Alimentus tells us that he was taken prisoner by Hannibal, and I should

be most inclined to accept his authority if he had not confused the numbers by adding in the Gauls and

Ligurians; if these are included there were 80,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry. It is, however, more probable

that these joined Hannibal in Italy, and some authorities actually assert this. Cincius also states that he had

heard Hannibal say that subsequently to his passage of the Rhone he lost 36,000 men, besides an immense

number of horses and other animals. The first people he came to were the Taurini, a semiGarlic tribe. As

tradition is unanimous on this point I am the more surprised that a question should be raised as to what route

Hannibal took over the Alps, and that it should be generally supposed that he crossed over the Poenine range,

which is said to have derived its name from that circumstance. Coelius asserts that he crossed by the

Cremonian range. These two passes, however, would not have brought him to the Taurini but through the

Salassi, a mountain tribe, to the Libuan Gauls. It is highly improbable that those routes to Gaul were available

at that time, and in any case the Poenine route would have been closed by the semiGerman tribes who

inhabited the district. And it is perfectly certain, if we accept their authority, that the Seduni and Veragri, who

inhabit that range, say that the name of Poenine was not given to it from any passage of the Carthaginians

over it but from the deity Poeninus, whose shrine stands on the highest point of the range.

It was a very fortunate circumstance for Hannibal at the outset of his campaign that the Taurini, the first

people he came to, were at war with the Insubres. But he was unable to bring his army into the field to assist

either side, for it was whilst they were recovering from the ills and misfortunes which had gathered upon


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them that they felt them most. Rest and idleness instead of toil, plenty following upon starvation, cleanliness

and comfort after squalor and emaciation, affected their filthy and wellnigh bestialised bodies in various

ways. It was this state of things which induced P. Cornelius Scipio, the consul, after he had arrived with his

ships at Pisa and taken over from Manlius and Atilius an army of raw levies disheartened by their recent

humiliating defeats, to push on with all speed to the Po that he might engage the enemy before he had

recovered his strength. But when he reached Placentia Hannibal had already left his encampment and taken

by storm one of the cities of the Taurini, their capital, in fact, because they would not voluntarily maintain

friendly relations with him. He would have secured the adhesion of the Gauls in the valley of the Po, not by

fear but by their own choice, if the sudden arrival of the consul had not taken them by surprise whilst they

were waiting for a favourable moment to revolt. Just at the time of Scipio's arrival, Hannibal moved out of

the country of the Taurini, for, seeing how undecided the Gauls were as to whose side they should take, he

thought that if he were on the spot they would follow him. The two armies were now almost within sight of

one another, and the commanders who were confronting each other, though not sufficiently acquainted with

each other's military skill, were even then imbued with mutual respect and admiration. Even before the fall of

Saguntum the name of Hannibal was on all men's lips in Rome, and in Scipio Hannibal recognised a great

leader, seeing that he had been chosen beyond all others to oppose him. This mutual esteem was enhanced by

their recent achievements; Scipio, after Hannibal had left him in Gaul, was in time to meet him on his descent

from the Alps; Hannibal had not only dared to attempt but had actually accomplished the passage of the Alps.

Scipio, however, made the first move by crossing the Po and shifting his camp to the Ticinus. Before leading

his men into battle he addressed them in a speech full of encouragement, in the following terms:

"If, soldiers, I were leading into battle the army which I had with me in Gaul, there would have been no need

for me to address you. For what encouragement would those cavalry need who had won such a brilliant

victory over the enemy's cavalry at the Rhone or those legions of infantry with whom I pursued this same

enemy, who by his running away and shirking an engagement acknowledged that I was his conqueror? That

army, raised for service in Spain, is campaigning under my brother, Cn. Scipio, who is acting as my deputy in

the country which the senate and people of Rome have assigned to it. In order, therefore, that you might have

a consul to lead you against Hannibal and the Carthaginians, I have volunteered to command in this battle,

and as I am new to you and you to me I must say a few words to you. "Now as to the character of the enemy

and the kind of warfare which awaits you. You have to fight, soldiers, with the men whom you defeated in

the former war by land and sea, from whom you have exacted a war indemnity for the last twenty years, and

from whom you wrested Sicily and Sardinia as the prizes of war. You, therefore, will go into this battle with

the exultation of victors, they with the despondency of the vanquished. They are not going to fight now

because they are impelled by courage but through sheer necessity; unless indeed you suppose that, after

shirking a contest when their army was at its full strength, they have gained more confidence now that they

have lost twothirds of their infantry and cavalry in their passage over the Alps, now that those who survive

are fewer than those who have perished. "'Yes,' it may be said, 'they are few in number, but they are strong in

courage and physique, and possess a power of endurance and vigour in attack which very few can withstand.'

No, they are only semblances or rather ghosts of men, worn out with starvation, cold, filth, and squalor,

bruised and enfeebled amongst the rocks and precipices, and, what is more, their limbs are frostbitten, their

thews and sinews cramped with cold, their frames shrunk and shrivelled with frost, their weapons battered

and shivered, their horses lame and out of condition. This is the cavalry, this the infantry with whom you are

going to fight; you will not have an enemy but only the last vestiges of an enemy to meet. My only fear is that

when you have fought it will appear to be the Alps that have conquered Hannibal. But perhaps it was right

that it should be so, and that the gods, without any human aid, should begin and all but finish this war with a

people and their general who have broken treaties, and that to us, who next to the gods have been sinned

against, it should be left to complete what they began.

"I am not afraid of any one thinking that I am saying this in a spirit of bravado for the sake of putting you in

good heart, whilst my real feelings and convictions are far otherwise. I was at perfect liberty to go with my

army to Spain, for which country I had actually started, and which was my assigned province. There I should


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have had my brother to share my plans and dangers; I should have had Hasdrubal rather than Hannibal as my

foe, and undoubtedly a less serious war on my hands. But as I was sailing along the coast of Gaul I heard

tidings of this enemy, and at once landed, and after sending on cavalry in advance moved up to the Rhone. A

cavalry action was foughtthat was the only arm I had the opportunity of employingand I defeated the

enemy. His infantry were hurrying away like an army in flight, and as I could not come up with them

overland, I returned to my ships with all possible speed, and after making a wide circuit by sea and land have

met this dreaded foe almost at the foot of the Alps. Does it seem to you that I have unexpectedly fallen in

with him whilst I was anxious to decline a contest and not rather that I am meeting him actually on his track

and challenging and dragging him into action? I shall be glad to learn whether the earth has suddenly within

the last twenty years produced a different breed of Carthaginans, or whether they are the same as those who

fought at the Aegates, and whom you allowed to depart from Eryx on payment of eighteen denarii a head, and

whether this Hannibal is, as he gives out, the rival of Hercules in his journeys, or whether he has been left by

his father to pay tax and tribute and to be the slave of the Roman people. If his crime at Saguntum were not

driving him on, he would surely have some regard, if not for his conquered country, at all events for his house

and his father, and the treaties signed by that Hamilcar who at the order of our consul withdrew his garrison

from Eryx, who with sighs and groans accepted the hard conditions imposed on the conquered Carthaginians,

and who agreed to evacuate Sicily and pay a war indemnity to Rome. And so I would have you, soldiers,

fight not merely in the spirit which you are wont to show against other foes, but with feelings of indignant

anger as though you saw your own slaves bearing arms against you. When they were shut up in Eryx we

might have inflicted the most terrible of human punishments and starved them to death; we might have taken

our victorious fleet across to Africa, and in a few days destroyed Carthage without a battle. We granted

pardon to their prayers, we allowed them to escape from the blockade, we agreed to terms of peace with those

whom we had conquered, and afterwards when they were in dire straits through the African war we took

them under our protection, To requite us for these acts of kindness they are following the lead of a young

madman and coming to attack our fatherland. I only wish this struggle were for honour alone and not for

safety. It is not about the possession of Sicily and Sardinia, the old subjects of dispute, but for Italy that you

have to fight. There is no second army at our back to oppose the enemy if we fall to win, there are no more

Alps to delay his advance while a fresh army can be raised for defence. Here it is, soldiers, that we have to

resist, just as though we were fighting before the walls of Rome. Every one of you must remember that he is

using his arms to protect not himself only but also his wife and little children; nor must his anxiety be

confined to his home, he must realise, too, that the senate and people of Rome are watching our exploits

today. What our strength and courage are now here, such will be the fortune of our City yonder and of the

empire of Rome."

Such was the language which the consul used towards the Romans. Hannibal thought that the courage of his

men ought to be roused by deeds first rather than by words. After forming his army into a circle to view the

spectacle, he placed in the centre some Alpine prisoners in chains, and when some Gaulish arms had been

thrown down at their feet he ordered an interpreter to ask if any one of them was willing to fight if he were

freed from his chains and received arms and a horse as the reward of victory. All to a man demanded arms

and battle, and when the lot was cast to decide who should fight, each wished that he might be the one whom

Fortune should select for the combat. As each man's lot fell, he hastily seized his arms full of eagerness and

exultant delight, amidst the congratulations of his comrades and danced after the custom of his country. But

when they began to fight, such was the state of feeling not only amongst the men who had accepted this

condition, but amongst the spectators generally that the good fortune of those who died bravely was lauded

quite as much as that of those who were victorious.

After his men had been impressed by watching several pairs of combatants Hannibal dismissed them, and

afterwards summoned them round him, when he is reported to have made the following speech: "Soldiers,

you have seen in the fate of others an example how to conquer or to die. If the feelings with which you

watched them lead you to form a similar estimate of your own fortunes we are victors. That was no idle

spectacle but a picture, as it were, of your own condition. Fortune, I am inclined to think has bound you in


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heavier chains and imposed upon you a sterner necessity than on your captives. You are shut in on the right

hand and on the left by two seas, and you have not a single ship in which to make your escape; around you

flows the Po, a greater river than the Rhone and a more rapid one; the barrier of the Alps frowns upon you

behind, those Alps which you could hardly cross when your strength and vigour were unimpaired. Here,

soldiers, on this spot where you have for the first time encountered the enemy you must either conquer or die.

The same Fortune which has imposed upon you the necessity of fighting also holds out rewards of victory,

rewards as great as any which men are wont to solicit from the immortal gods. Even if we were only going to

recover Sicily and Sardinia, possessions which were wrested from our fathers, they would be prizes ample

enough to satisfy us. Everything that the Romans now possess, which they have won through so many

triumphs, all that they have amassed, will become yours, together with those who own it. Come then, seize

your arms and with the help of heaven win this splendid reward. You have spent time enough in hunting

cattle on the barren mountains of Lusitania and Celtiberia, and finding no recompense for all your toils and

dangers; now the hour has come for you to enter upon rich and lucrative campaigns and to earn rewards

which are worth the earning, after your long march over all those mountains and rivers, and through all those

nations in arms. Here Fortune has vouchsafed an end to your toils, here she will vouchsafe a reward worthy

of all your past services.

"Do not think because the war, being against Rome, bears a great name, that therefore victory will be

correspondingly difficult. Many a despised enemy has fought a long and costly fight; nations and kings of

high renown have been beaten with a very slight effort. For, setting aside the glory which surrounds the name

of Rome, what point is there in which they can be compared to you? To say nothing of your twenty years'

campaigning earned on with all your courage, all your good fortune, from the pillars of Hercules, from the

shores of the ocean, from the furthest corners of the earth, through the midst of all the most warlike peoples

of Spain and Gaul, you have arrived here as victors. The army with which you will fight is made up of raw

levies who were beaten, conquered, and hemmed in by the Gauls this very summer, who are strangers to their

general, and he a stranger to them. I, reared as I was, almost born, in the headquarters tent of my father, a

most distinguished general, I, who have subjugated Spain and Gaul, who have conquered not only the Alpine

tribes, but, what is a much greater task, the Alps themselvesam I to compare myself with this six months'

general who has deserted his own army, who, if any one were to point out to him the Romans and the

Carthaginians after their standards were removed, would, I am quite certain, not know which army he was in

command of as consul? I do not count it a small matter, soldiers, that there is not a man amongst you before

whose eyes I have not done many a soldierly deed, or to whom I, who have witnessed and attested his

courage, could not recount his own gallant exploits and the time and place where they were performed. I was

your pupil before I was your commander, and I shall go into battle surrounded by men whom I have

commended and rewarded thousands of times against those who know nothing of each other, who are mutual

strangers.

"Wherever I turn my eyes I see nothing but courage and strength, a veteran infantry, a cavalry, regular and

irregular alike, drawn from the noblest tribes, you, our most faithful and brave allies, you, Carthaginians, who

are going to fight for your country, inspired by a most righteous indignation. We are taking the aggressive,

we are descending in hostile array into Italy, prepared to fight more bravely and more fearlessly than our foe

because he who attacks is animated by stronger hopes and greater courage than he who meets the attack.

Besides, we are smarting from a sense of injustice and humiliation. First they demanded me, your general, as

their victim, then they insisted that all of you who had taken part in the siege of Saguntum should be

surrendered; had you been given up they would have inflicted upon you the most exquisite tortures. That

outrageously cruel and tyrannical nation claims everything for itself, makes everything dependent on its will

and pleasure; they think it right to dictate with whom we are to make war or peace. They confine and enclose

us within mountains and rivers as boundaries, but they do not observe the limits which they themselves have

fixed. 'Do not cross the Ebro, see that you have nothing to do with the Saguntines.' 'But Saguntum is not on

the Ebro.' 'You must not move a step anywhere.' 'Is it a small matter, your taking from me my oldest

provinces, Sicily and Sardinia? Will you cross over into Spain as well, and if I withdraw from there, will you


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cross over into Africa? Do I say, will cross over? You have crossed over.' They have sent the two consuls for

this year, one to Africa, the other to Spain. There is nothing left to us anywhere except what we claim by

force of arms. Those may be allowed to be cowards and dastards who have something to fall back upon,

whom their own land, their own territory will receive as they flee through its safe and peaceful roads; you

must of necessity be brave men, every alternative between victory and death has been broken off by the

resolve of despair, and you are compelled either to conquer, or if Fortune wavers, to meet death in battle

rather than in flight. If you have all made up your minds to this, I say again you are victors, no keener weapon

has been put into men's hands by the immortal gods than a contempt for death."

After the fighting spirit of both armies had been roused by these harangues, the Romans threw a bridge over

the Ticinus and constructed a blockhouse for its defence. Whilst they were thus occupied, the Carthaginian

sent Maharbal with a troop of 500 Numidian horse to ravage the lands of the allies of Rome, but with orders

to spare those of the Gauls as far as possible, and to win over their chiefs to his side. When the bridge was

completed the Roman army crossed over in the territory of the Insubres and took up a position five miles

from Ictumuli, where Hannibal had his camp. As soon as he saw that a battle was imminent, he hastily

recalled Maharbal and his troopers. Feeling that he could never say enough by way of admonition and

encouragement to his soldiers, he ordered an assembly, and before the whole army offered definite rewards in

the hope of which they were to fight. He said that he would give them land wherever they wished, in Italy,

Africa, or Spain, which would be free from all taxation for the recipient and for his children; if any preferred

money to land, he would satisfy his desires; if any of the allies wished to become Carthaginian citizens he

would give them the opportunity; if any preferred to return to their homes he would take care that their

circumstances should be such that they would never wish to exchange them with any of their countrymen. He

even promised freedom to the slaves who followed their masters, and to the masters, for every slave freed,

two more as compensation. To convince them of his determination to carry out these promises, he held a

lamb with his left hand and a flint knife in his right and prayed to Jupiter and the other gods, that, if he broke

his word and forswore himself they would slay him as he had slain the lamb. He then crushed the animal's

head with the flint. They all felt then that the gods themselves would guarantee the fulfilment of their hopes,

and looked upon the delay in bringing on an action as delay in gaining their desires; with one mind and one

voice they clamoured to be led into battle.

The Romans were far from showing this alacrity. Amongst other causes of alarm they had been unnerved by

some portents which had happened lately. A wolf had entered the camp and after worrying all it met had got

away unhurt. A swarm of bees, too, had settled on a tree which overhung the headquarters tent. After the

necessary propitiation had been made Scipio moved out with a force of cavalry and lightarmed javelin men

towards the enemy's camp to get a nearer view and to ascertain the number and nature of his force. He fell in

with Hannibal who was also advancing with his cavalry to explore the neighbourhood. Neither body at first

saw the other; the first indication of a hostile approach was given by the unusually dense cloud of dust which

was raised by the tramp of so many men and horses. Each party halted and made ready for battle. Scipio

placed the javelin men and the Gaulish cavalry in the front, the Roman horse and the heavy cavalry of the

allies as reserves. Hannibal formed his centre with his regular cavalry, and posted the Numidians on the

flanks. Scarcely had the battle shout been raised before the javelin men retired to the second line amongst the

reserves. For some time the cavalry kept up an equal fight, but as the footsoldiers became mixed up with the

mounted men they made their horses unmanageable, many were thrown or else dismounted where they saw

their comrades in difficulty, until the battle was mainly fought on foot. Then the Numidians on the flanks

wheeled round and appeared on the rear of the Romans, creating dismay and panic amongst them. To make

matters worse the consul was wounded and in danger; he was rescued by the intervention of his son who was

just approaching manhood. This was the youth who afterwards won the glory of bringing this war to a close,

and gained the soubriquet of Africanus for his splendid victory over Hannibal and the Carthaginians. The

javelin men were the first to be attacked by the Numidians and they fled in disorder, the rest of the force, the

cavalry, closed round the consul, shielding him as much by their persons as by their arms, and returned to

camp in orderly retirement. Caelius assigns the honour of saving the consul to a Ligurian slave, but I would


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rather believe that it was his son; the majority of authors assert this and the tradition is generally accepted.

This was the first battle with Hannibal, and the result made it quite clear that the Carthaginian was superior in

his cavalry, and consequently that the open plains which stretch from the Po to the Alps were not a suitable

battlefield for the Romans. The next night accordingly, the soldiers were ordered to collect their baggage in

silence, the army moved away from the Ticinus and marched rapidly to the Po, which they crossed by the

pontoon bridge which was still intact, in perfect order and without any molestation by the enemy. They

reached Placentia before Hannibal knew for certain that they had left the Ticinus; however, he succeeded in

capturing some 600, who were loitering on his side of the Po, and were slowly unfastening the end of the

bridge. He was unable to use the bridge for crossing, as the ends had been unfastened and the whole was

floating downstream. According to Caelius, Mago with the cavalry and Spanish infantry at once swam

across, whilst Hannibal himself took his army across higher up the river where it was fordable, the elephants

being stationed in a row from bank to bank to break the force of the current. Those who know the river will

hardly believe this for it is highly improbable that the cavalry could have stood against so violent a river

without damage to their horses and arms, even supposing that the Spaniards had been carried across by their

inflated skins, and it would have required a march of many days to find a ford in the Po where an army

loaded with baggage could be taken across. I attach greater weight to those authorities who state that it took

them at least two days to find a spot where they could throw a bridge over the river, and that it was there that

Mago's cavalry and the Spanish light infantry crossed. Whilst Hannibal was waiting near the river to give

audience to deputations from the Gauls, he sent his heavy infantry across, and during this interval Mago and

his cavalry advanced a day's march from the river in the direction of the enemy at Placentia. A few days later

Hannibal entrenched himself in a position six miles from Placentia, and the next day he drew out his army in

battle order in full view of the enemy and gave him the opportunity of fighting.

The following night a murderous outbreak took place amongst the Gaulish auxiliaries in the Roman camp;

there was, however, more excitement and confusion than actual loss of life. About 2000 infantry and 200

horsemen massacred the sentinels and deserted to Hannibal. The Carthaginian gave them a kind reception and

sent them to their homes with the promise of great rewards if they would enlist the sympathies of their

countrymen on his behalf. Scipio saw in this outrage a signal of revolt for all the Gauls, who, infected by the

madness of this crime, would at once fly to arms, and though still suffering severely from his wound, he left

his position in the fourth watch of the following night, his army marching in perfect silence, and shifted his

camp close to the Trebia on to higher ground where the hills were impracticable for cavalry. He was less

successful in escaping the notice of the enemy than he had been at the Ticinus, Hannibal sent first the

Numidians, then afterwards the whole of his cavalry in pursuit and would have inflicted disaster upon the rear

of the column at all events, had not the Numidians been tempted by their desire for plunder to turn aside to

the deserted Roman camp. Whilst they were wasting their time in prying into every corner of the camp,

without finding anything worth waiting for, the enemy slipped out of their hands, and when they caught sight

of the Romans they had already crossed the Trebia and were measuring out the site for their camp. A few

stragglers whom they caught on their side the river were killed. Unable any longer to endure the irritation of

his wound, which had been aggravated during the march, and also thinking that he ought to wait for his

colleaguehe had already heard that he had been recalled from SicilyScipio selected what seemed the safest

position near the river, and formed a standing camp which was strongly entrenched. Hannibal had encamped

not far from there, and in spite of his elation at his successful cavalry action he felt considerable anxiety at the

shortness of supplies which, owing to his marching through hostile territory where no stores were provided,

became more serious day by day. He sent a detachment to the town of Clastidium where the Romans had

accumulated large quantities of corn. Whilst they were preparing to attack the place they were led to hope

that it would be betrayed to them. Dasius, a Brundisian, was commandant of the garrison, and he was induced

by a moderate bribe of 400 gold pieces to betray Clastidium to Hannibal. The place was the granary of the

Carthaginians while they were at the Trebia. No cruelty was practiced on the garrison, as Hannibal was

anxious to win a reputation for clemency at the outset.


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.The war on the Trebia had for the time being come to a standstill, but military and naval actions were taking

place around Sicily and the islands fringing Italy, both under the conduct of Sempronius and also before his

arrival. Twenty quinqueremes with a thousand soldiers on board had been despatched by the Carthaginians to

Italy, nine of them to Liparae, eight to the island of Vulcanus, and three had been carried by the currents into

the Straits of Messana. These were sighted from Messana, and Hiero, the King of Syracuse, who happened to

be there at the time waiting for the consul, despatched twelve ships against them, and they were taken without

any opposition and brought into the harbour of Messana. It was ascertained from the prisoners, that besides

the fleet of twenty ships to which they belonged which had sailed for Italy thirtyfive quinqueremes were

also on the way to Sicily with the object of stirring up the old allies of Carthage. Their main anxiety was to

secure Lilybaeum, and the prisoners were of opinion that the storm which had separated them from the rest

had also driven that fleet up to the Aegates. The king communicated this information just as he had received

it to M. Aemilius, the praetor, whose province Sicily was, and advised him to throw a strong garrison into

Lilybaeum. The praetor at once sent envoys and military tribunes to the neighbouring states to urge them to

take measures for selfdefence. Lilybaeum especially was engrossed in preparations for war; orders were

issued for the seamen to carry ten days' rations on board that there might be no delay in setting sail when the

signal was given; and men were despatched along the coast to look out for the approach of the hostile fleet.

So it came to pass that although the Carthaginians had purposely lessened the speed of their vessels, so that

they might approach Lilybaeum before daylight, they were descried in the offing owing to there being a

moon all night, and also because they were coming with their sails set. Instantly the signal was given by the

lookout men; in the town there was the cry, "To arms," and the ships were manned. Some of the soldiers

were on the walls and guarding the gates, others were on board the ships. As the Carthaginians saw that they

would have to deal with people who were anything but unprepared, they stood out from the harbour till

daylight, and spent the time in lowering their masts and preparing for action. When it grew light they put out

to sea that they might have sufficient room for fighting, and that the enemy's ships might be free to issue from

the harbour. The Romans did not decline battle, encouraged as they were by the recollection of their former

conflicts in this very place, and full of confidence in the numbers and courage of their men.

When they had sailed out to sea the Romans were eager to come to close quarters and make a handtohand

fight of it; the Carthaginians, on the other hand, sought to avoid this and to succeed by maneuvering and not

by direct attack; they preferred to make it a battle of ships rather than of soldiers. For their fleet was amply

provided with seamen, but only scantily manned by soldiers, and whenever a ship was laid alongside one of

the enemy's they were very unequally matched in fighting men. When this became generally known, the

spirits of the Romans rose as they realised how many of their military were on board, whilst the

Carthaginians lost heart when they remembered how few they had. Seven of their ships were captured in a

very short time, the rest took to flight. In the seven ships there were 1700 soldiers and sailors, amongst them

three members of the Carthaginian nobility. The Roman fleet returned undamaged into port, with the

exception of one which had been rammed, but even that was brought in. Immediately after this battle Tiberius

Sempronius, the consul, arrived at Messana before those in the town had heard of it. King Hiero went to meet

him at the entrance of the Straits with his fleet fully equipped and manned, and went on board the consul's

vessel to congratulate him on having safely arrived with his fleet and his army, and to wish him a prosperous

and successful passage to Sicily. He then described the condition of the island and the movements of the

Carthaginians, and promised to assist the Romans now in his old age with the same readiness which he had

shown as a young man in the former war; he should supply the seamen and soldiers with corn and clothing

gratis. He also told the consul that Lilybaeum and the cities on the coast were in great danger, some were

anxious to effect a revolution. The consul saw that there must be no delay in his sailing for Lilybaeum; he

started at once and the king accompanied him with his fleet.

At Lilybaeum Hiero and his fleet bade him farewell, and the consul, after leaving the praetor to see to the

defence of the coast of Sicily, crossed over to Malta which was held by the Carthaginians. Hamilcar, the son

of Gisgo, who was in command of the garrison, surrendered the island and his men, a little under 2000 in

number. A few days later he returned to Lilybaeum, and the prisoners, with the exception of the three nobles,


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were sold by auction. After satisfying himself as to the security of that part of Sicily, the consul sailed to the

Insulae Vulcani, as he heard that the Carthaginian fleet was anchored there. No enemy, however, was found

in the neighbourhood, for they had left for Italy to ravage the coastal districts, and after laying waste the

territory of Vibo they were threatening the city. Whilst he was returning to Sicily the news of these

depredations reached the consul, and at the same time a despatch was handed to him from the senate

informing him of Hannibal's presence in Italy and ordering him to come to his colleague's assistance as soon

as possible. With all these causes for anxiety weighing upon him, the consul at once embarked his army and

despatched it up the Adriatic to Ariminum. He furnished Sex. Pomponius, his legate, with twentyfive ships

of war, and entrusted to him the protection of the Italian coast and the territory of Vibo, and made up the fleet

of M. Aemilius, the praetor, to fifty vessels. After making these arrangements for Sicily, he started for Italy

with ten ships, and cruising along the coast reached Ariminum. From there he marched to the Trebia and

effected a junction with his colleague.

The fact that both consuls and all the available strength that Rome possessed were now brought up to oppose

Hannibal, was a pretty clear proof that either that force was adequate for the defence of Rome or that all hope

of its defence must be abandoned. Nevertheless, one consul, depressed after his cavalry defeat, and also by

his wound, would rather that battle should be deferred. The other, whose courage had suffered no check and

was therefore all the more eager to fight, was impatient of any delay. The country between the Trebia and the

Po was inhabited by Gauls who in this struggle between two mighty peoples showed impartial goodwill to

either side, with the view, undoubtedly, of winning the victor's gratitude. The Romans were quite satisfied

with this neutrality if only it was maintained and the Gauls kept quiet, but Hannibal was extremely indignant,

as he was constantly giving out that he had been invited by the Gauls to win their freedom. Feelings of

resentment and, at the same time, a desire to enrich his soldiers with plunder prompted him to send 2000

infantry and 1000 cavalry, made up of Gauls and Numidians, mostly the latter, with orders to ravage the

whole country, district after district, right up to the banks of the Po. Though the Gauls had hitherto

maintained an impartial attitude, they were compelled in their need of help to turn from those who had

inflicted these outrages to those who they hoped would avenge them. They sent envoys to the consuls to beg

the Romans to come to the rescue of a land which was suffering because its people had been too loyal to

Rome. Cornelius Scipio did not consider that either the grounds alleged or the circumstances justified his

taking action. He regarded that nation with suspicion on account of their many acts of treachery, and even if

their past faithlessness could have been forgotten through lapse of time, he could not forget the recent

treachery of the Boii. Sempronius, on the other hand, was of opinion that the most effective means of

preserving the fidelity of their allies was to defend those who first asked for their help. As his colleague still

hesitated, he sent his own cavalry supported by about a thousand javelin men to protect the territory of the

Gauls on the other side of the Trebia. They attacked the enemy suddenly whilst they were scattered and in

disorder, most of them loaded with plunder, and after creating a great panic amongst them, and inflicting

severe losses upon them, they drove them in flight to their camp. The fugitives were driven back by their

comrades who poured in great numbers out of the camp, and thus reinforced they renewed the fighting. The

battle wavered as each side retired or pursued, and up to the last the action was undecided. The enemy lost

more men; the Romans claimed the victory.

To no one in the whole army did the victory appear more important or more decisive than to the consul

himself. What gave him especial pleasure was that he had proved superior in that arm in which his colleague

had been worsted. He saw that the spirits of his men were restored, and that there was no one but his

colleague who wished to delay battle; he believed that Scipio was more sick in mind than in body, and that

the thought of his wound made him shrink from the dangers of the battlefield. "But we must not be infected

by a sick man's lethargy. What will be gained by further delay, or rather, by wasting time? Whom are we

expecting as our third consul; what fresh army are we looking for? The camp of the Carthaginians is in Italy,

almost in sight of the City. They are not aiming at Sicily and Sardinia, which they lost after their defeats, nor

the Spain which lies on this side the Ebro; their sole object is to drive the Romans away from their ancestral

soil, from the land on which they were born. What groans our fathers would utter, accustomed as they were to


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warring round the walls of Carthage, if they could see us, their descendants, with two consuls and two

consular armies, cowering in our camp in the very heart of Italy, whilst the Carthaginian is annexing to his

empire all between the Alps and the Apennines." This was the way he spoke when sitting by his incapacitated

colleague, this the language he used before his soldiers as though he were haranguing the Assembly. He was

urged on, too, by the near approach of the time for the elections, and the fear that the war, if delayed, might

pass into the hands of the new consuls, as well as by the chance he had of monopolising all the glory of it

while his colleague was on the sick list. In spite, therefore, of the opposition of Cornelius he ordered the

soldiers to get ready for the coming battle.

Hannibal saw clearly what was the best course for the enemy to adopt, and had very little hope that the

consuls would do anything rash or illadvised. When, however, he found that what he had previously learnt

by hearsay was actually the case, namely, that one of the consuls was a man of impetuous and headstrong

character, and that he had become still more so since the recent cavalry action, he had very little doubt in his

own mind that he would have a favourable opportunity of giving battle. He was anxious not to lose a

moment, in order that he might fight whilst the hostile army was still raw and the better of the two generals

was incapacitated by his wound, and also whilst the Gauls were still in a warlike mood, for he knew that most

of them would follow him with less alacrity the further they were dragged from their homes. These and

similar considerations led him to hope that a battle was imminent, and made him desirous of forcing an

engagement if there was any holding back on the other side. He sent out some Gauls to reconnoitreas Gauls

were serving in both armies they could be most safely trusted to find out what he wantedand when they

reported that the Romans had prepared for battle, the Carthaginian began to look out for ground which would

admit of an ambuscade.

Between the two armies there was a stream with very high banks which were overgrown with marshy grass

and the brambles and brushwood which are generally found on waste ground. After riding round the place

and satisfying himself from personal observation that it was capable of concealing even cavalry, Hannibal,

turning to his brother Mago, said, "This will be the place for you to occupy. Pick out of our whole force of

cavalry and infantry a hundred men from each arm, and bring them to me at the first watch, now it is time for

food and rest." He then dismissed his staff. Presently Mago appeared with his 200 picked men. "I see here,"

said Hannibal, "the very flower of my army, but you must be strong in numbers as well as in courage. Each of

you therefore go and choose nine others like himself, from the squadrons and the maniples. Mago will show

you the place where you are to lie in ambuscade, you have an enemy who are blindly ignorant of these

practices in war." After sending Mago with his 1000 infantry and 1000 cavalry to take up his position,

Hannibal gave orders for the Numidian cavalry to cross the Trebia in the early dawn and ride up to the gates

of the Roman camp; then they were to discharge their missiles on the outposts and so goad the enemy on to

battle. When the fighting had once started they were gradually to give ground and draw their pursuers to their

own side of the river. These were the instructions to the Numidians; the other commanders, both infantry and

cavalry, were ordered to see that all their men had breakfast, after which they were to wait for the signal, the

men fully armed, the horses saddled and ready. Eager for battle, and having already made up his mind to

fight, Sempronius led out the whole of his cavalry to meet the Numidian attack, for it was in his cavalry that

he placed most confidence; these were followed by 6000 infantry and at last the whole of his force marched

on to the field. It happened to be the season of winter, a snowstorm was raging, and the district, situated

between the Alps and the Apennines, was rendered especially cold by the vicinity of rivers and marshes. To

make matters worse, men and horses alike had been hurriedly sent forward, without any food, without any

protection against the cold, so they had no heat in them and the chilling blasts from the river made the cold

still more severe as they approached it in their pursuit of the Numidians. But when they entered the water

which had been swollen by the night's rain and was then breast high, their limbs became stiff with cold, and

when they emerged on the other side they had hardly strength to hold their weapons; they began to grow faint

from fatigue and as the day wore on, from hunger.


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Hannibal's men, meanwhile, had made fires in front of their tents, oil had been distributed amongst the

maniples for them to make their joints and limbs supple and they had time for an ample repast. When it was

announced that the enemy had crossed the river they took their arms, feeling alert and active in mind and

body, and marched to battle. The Balearic and lightarmed infantry were posted in front of the standards;

they numbered about 8000; behind them the heavyarmed infantry, the mainstay and backbone of the army;

on the flanks Hannibal distributed the cavalry, and outside them, again, the elephants. When the consul saw

his cavalry, who had lost their order in the pursuit, suddenly meeting with an unsuspected resistance from the

Numidians, he recalled them by signal and received them within his infantry. There were 18,000 Romans,

20,000 Latin allies, and an auxiliary force of Cenomani, the only Gallic tribe which had remained faithful.

These were the forces engaged. The Balearics and light infantry opened the battle, but on being met by the

heavier legions they were rapidly withdrawn to the wings, an evolution which at once threw the Roman horse

into difficulties, for the 4000 wearied troopers had been unable to offer an effective resistance to 10,000 who

were fresh and vigorous, and now in addition they were overwhelmed by what seemed a cloud of missiles

from the light infantry. Moreover, the elephants, towering aloft at the ends of the line, terrified the horses not

only by their appearance but by their unaccustomed smell, and created widespread panic. The infantry battle,

as far as the Romans were concerned, was maintained more by courage than by physical strength, for the

Carthaginians, who had shortly before been getting themselves into trim, brought their powers fresh and

unimpaired into action, whilst the Romans were fatigued and hungry and stiff with cold. Still, their courage

would have kept them up had it been only infantry that they were fighting against. But the light infantry, after

repulsing the cavalry, were hurling their missiles on the flanks of the legions; the elephants had now come up

against the centre of the Roman line, and Mago and his Numidians, as soon as it had passed their ambuscade,

rose up in the rear and created a terrible disorder and panic. Yet in spite of all the dangers which surrounded

them, the ranks stood firm and immovable for some time, even, contrary to all expectation, against the

elephants. Some skirmishers who had been placed where they could attack these animals flung darts at them

and drove them off, and rushed after them, stabbing them under their tails, where the skin is soft and easily

penetrated.

Maddened with pain and terror, they were beginning to rush wildly on their own men, when Hannibal ordered

them to be driven away to the left wing against the auxiliary Gauls on the Roman right. There they instantly

produced unmistakable panic and flight, and the Romans had fresh cause for .alarm when they saw their

auxiliaries routed. They now stood fighting in a square, and about 10,000 of them, unable to escape in any

other direction, forced their way through the centre of the African troops and the auxiliary Gauls who

supported them and inflicted an immense loss on the enemy. They were prevented by the river from returning

to their camp, and the rain made it impossible for them to judge where they could best go to the assistance of

their comrades, so they marched away straight to Placentia. Then desperate attempts to escape were made on

all sides; some who made for the river were swept away by the current or caught by the enemy while

hesitating to cross; others, scattered over the fields in flight, followed the track of the main retreat and sought

Placentia; others, fearing the enemy more than the river, crossed it and reached their camp. The driving sleet

and the intolerable cold caused the death of many men and baggage animals, and nearly all the elephants

perished. The Carthaginians stopped their pursuit at the banks of the Trebia and returned to their camp so

benumbed with cold that they hardly felt any joy in their victory. In the night the men who had guarded the

camp, and the rest of the soldiers, mostly wounded, crossed the Trebia on rafts without any interference from

the Carthaginians, either because the roaring of the storm prevented them from hearing or because they were

unable to move through weariness and wounds and pretended that they heard nothing. Whilst the

Carthaginians were keeping quiet, Scipio led his army to Placentia and thence across the Po to Cremona, in

order that one colony might not be burdened with providing winter quarters for the two armies.

This defeat so unnerved people in Rome that they believed the enemy was already advancing to attack the

City, and that there was no help to be looked for, no hope of repelling him from their walls and gates. After

one consul had been beaten at the Ticinus the other was recalled from Sicily, and now both consuls and both

consular armies had been worsted. What fresh generals, men asked, what fresh legions could be brought to


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the rescue? Amidst this universal panic Sempronius arrived. He had slipped through the enemy's cavalry at

immense risk while they were dispersed in quest of plunder, and owed his escape rather to sheer audacity

than to cleverness, for he had little hope of eluding them or of successful resistance if he failed to do so. After

conducting the elections, which was the pressing need for the moment, he returned to winter quarters. The

consuls elected were Cneius Servilius and C. Flaminius. Even in their winter quarters the Romans were not

allowed much quiet; the Numidian horse were roaming in all directions, or where the ground was too rough

for them, the Celtiberians and Lusitanians. They were, therefore, cut off from supplies on every side, except

what were brought in ships on the Po. Near Placentia there was a place called Emporium, which had been

carefully fortified and occupied by a strong garrison. In the hope of capturing the place, Hannibal approached

with cavalry and lightarmed troops, and as he trusted mainly to secrecy for success, he marched thither by

night. But he did not escape the observation of the sentinels, and such a shouting suddenly arose that it was

actually heard at Placentia. By daybreak the consul was on the spot with his cavalry, having given orders for

the legions of infantry to follow in battle formation. A cavalry action followed in which Hannibal was

wounded, and his retirement from the field discomfited the enemy; the position was admirably defended.

After taking only a few days' rest, before his wound was thoroughly healed Hannibal proceeded to attack

Victumviae. During the Gaulish war this place had served as an emporium for the Romans; subsequently, as

it was a fortified place, a mixed population from the surrounding country had settled there in considerable

numbers, and now the terror created by the constant depredations had driven most of the people from the

fields into the town. This motley population, excited by the news of the energetic defence of Placentia, flew

to arms and went out to meet Hannibal. More like a crowd than an army they met him on his march, and as

on the one side there was nothing but an undisciplined mob, and on the other a general and soldiers who had

perfect confidence in each other, a small body routed as many as 35,000 men. The next day they surrendered

and admitted a Carthaginian garrison within their walls. They had just completed the surrender of their arms

in obedience to orders, when instructions were suddenly given to the victors to treat the city as though it had

been carried by storm, and no deed of blood, which on such occasions historians are wont to mention, was

left undone, so awful was the example set of every form of licentiousness and cruelty and brutal tyranny

towards the wretched inhabitants. Such were the winter operations of Hannibal.

The soldiers rested whilst the intolerable cold lasted; it did not, however, last long, and at the first doubtful

indications of spring Hannibal left his winter quarters for Etruria with the intention of inducing that nation to

join forces with him, either voluntarily or under compulsion. During his passage of the Apennines he was

overtaken by a storm of such severity as almost to surpass the horrors of the Alps. The rain was driven by the

wind straight into the men's faces, and either they had to drop their weapons or if they tried to struggle

against the hurricane it caught them and dashed them to the ground, so they came to a halt. Then they found

that it was stopping their respiration so that they could not breathe, and they sat down for a short time with

their backs to the wind. The heavens began to reverberate with terrific roar, and amidst the awful din

lightning flashed and quivered. Sight and sound alike paralysed them with terror. At last, as the force of the

gale increased owing to the rain having ceased, they saw that there was nothing for it but to pitch their camp

on the ground where they had been caught by the storm. Now all their labour had to begin over again, for

they could neither unroll anything nor fix anything, whatever was fixed did not stand, the wind tore

everything into shreds and carried it off. Soon the moisture in the upper air above the cold mountain peaks

froze and discharged such a shower of snow and hail that the men, giving up all further attempts, lay down as

best they could, buried beneath their coverings rather than protected by them. This was followed by such

intense cold that when any one attempted to rise out of that pitiable crowd of prostrate men and beasts it was

a long time before he could get up, for his muscles being cramped and stiff with cold, he could hardly bend

his limbs. At length, by exercising their arms and legs, they were able to move about, and began to recover

their spirits; here and there fires were lighted, and those who were most helpless turned to their colleagues for

help. They remained on that spot for two days like a force blockaded; many men and animals perished; of the

elephants which survived the battle of the Trebia they lost seven.


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After descending from the Apennines Hannibal advanced towards Placentia, and after a ten miles' march

formed camp. The following day he marched against the enemy with 12,000 infantry and 5000 cavalry.

Sempronius had by this time returned from Rome, and he did not decline battle. That day the two camps were

three miles distant from each other; the following day they fought, and both sides exhibited the most

determined courage, but the action was indecisive. At the first encounter the Romans were so far superior that

they not only conquered in the field, but followed the routed enemy to his camp and soon made an attack

upon it. Hannibal stationed a few men to defend the rampart and the gates, the rest he massed in the middle of

the camp, and ordered them to be on the alert and wait for the signal to make a sortie. It was now about three

o'clock; the Romans were worn out with their fruitless efforts as there was no hope of carrying the camp, and

the consul gave the signal to retire. As soon as Hannibal heard it and saw that the fighting had slackened and

that the enemy were retiring from the camp, he immediately launched his cavalry against them right and left,

and sallied in person with the main strength of his infantry from the middle of the camp. Seldom has there

been a more equal fight, and few would have been rendered more memorable by the mutual destruction of

both armies had the daylight allowed it to be sufficiently prolonged; as it was, night put an end to a conflict

which had been maintained with such determined courage. There was greater fury than bloodshed, and as the

fighting had been almost equal on both sides, they separated with equal loss. Not more than 600 infantry and

half that number of cavalry fell on either side, but the Roman loss was out of proportion to their numbers;

several members of the equestrian order and five military tribunes as well as three prefects of the allies were

killed. Immediately after the battle Hannibal withdrew into Liguria, and Sempronius to Luca. Whilst

Hannibal was entering Liguria, two Roman quaestors who had been ambushed and captured, C. Fulvius and

L. Lucretius, together with three military tribunes and five members of the equestrian order, most of them

sons of senators, were given up to him by the Gauls in order that he might feel more confidence in their

maintenance of peaceful relations, and their determination to give him active support.

While these events were in progress in Italy, Cn. Cornelius Scipio, who had been sent with a fleet and an

army to Spain, commenced operations in that country. Starting from the mouth of the Rhone, he sailed round

the eastward end of the Pyrenees and brought up at Emporiae. Here he disembarked his army, and beginning

with the Laeetani, he brought the whole of the maritime populations as far as the Ebro within the sphere of

Roman influence by renewing old alliances and forming new ones. He gained in this way a reputation for

clemency which extended not only to the maritime populations but to the more warlike tribes in the interior

and the mountain districts. He established peaceable relations with these, and more than that, he secured their

support in arms and several strong cohorts were enrolled from amongst them. The country on this side the

Ebro was Hanno's province, Hannibal had left him to hold it for Carthage. Considering that he ought to

oppose Scipio's further progress before the whole province was under Roman sway, he fixed his camp in full

view of the enemy and offered battle. The Roman general, too, thought that battle ought not to be delayed; he

knew he would have to fight both Hanno and Hasdrubal, and preferred dealing with each singly rather than

meeting them both at once.. The battle was not a hardfought one. The enemy lost 6000; 2000, including

those who were guarding the camp, were made prisoners; the camp itself was carried and the general with

some of his chiefs was taken; Cissis, a town near the camp, was successfully attacked. The plunder, however,

as it was a small place, was of little value, consisting mainly of the barbarians' household goods and some

worthless slaves. The camp, however, enriched the soldiers with the property belonging not only to the army

they had defeated but also to the one serving with Hannibal in Italy. They had left almost all their valuable

possessions on the other side of the Pyrenees, that they might not have heavy loads to carry.

Before he had received definite tidings of this defeat, Hasdrubal had crossed the Ebro with 8000 infantry and

1000 cavalry, hoping to encounter the Romans as soon as they landed, but after hearing of the disaster at

Cissis and the capture of the camp, he turned his route to the sea. Not far from Tarracona he found our

marines and seamen wandering at will through the fields, success as usual producing carelessness. Sending

his cavalry in all directions amongst them, he made a great slaughter and drove them pellmell to their ships.

Afraid to remain any longer in the neighbourhood lest he should be surprised by Scipio, he retreated across

the Ebro. On hearing of this fresh enemy Scipio came down by forced marches, and after dealing summary


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punishment to some of the naval captains, returned by sea to Emporiae, leaving a small garrison in Tarracona.

He had scarcely left when Hasdrubal appeared on the scene, and instigated the Ilergetes, who had given

hostages to Scipio, to revolt, and in conjunction with the warriors of that tribe ravaged the territories of those

tribes who remained loyal to Rome. This roused Scipio from his winter quarters, on which Hasdrubal again

disappeared beyond the Ebro, and Scipio invaded in force the territory of the Ilergetes, after the author of the

revolt had left them to their fate. He drove them all into Antanagrum, their capital, which he proceeded to

invest, and a few days later he received them into the protection and jurisdiction of Rome, after demanding an

increase in the number of hostages and inflicting a heavy fine upon them. From there he advanced against the

Ausetani, who lived near the Ebro and were also in alliance with the Carthaginians, and invested their city.

The Laeetani whilst bringing assistance to their neighbours by night were ambushed not far from the city

which they intended to enter. As many as 12,000 were killed, almost all the survivors threw away their arms

and fled to their homes in scattered groups all over the country. The only thing which saved the invested city

from assault and storm was the severity of the weather. For the thirty days during which the siege lasted the

snow was seldom less than four feet deep, and it covered up the mantlets and vineae so completely that it

even served as a sufficient protection against the firebrands which the enemy discharged from time to time.

At last, after their chief, Amusicus, had escaped to Hasdrubal's quarters, they surrendered and agreed to pay

an indemnity of twenty talents. The army returned to its winter quarters at Tarracona.

During this winter many portents occurred in Rome and the neighbourhood, or at all events, many were

reported and easily gained credence, for when once men's minds have been excited by superstitious fears they

easily believe these things. A sixmonthsold child, of freeborn parents, is said to have shouted "Io

Triumphe" in the vegetable market, whilst in the Forum Boarium an ox is reported to have climbed up of its

own accord to the third story of a house, and then, frightened by the noisy crowd which gathered, it threw

itself down. A phantom navy was seen shining in the sky; the temple of Hope in the vegetable market was

struck by lightning; at Lanuvium Juno's spear had moved of itself, and a crow had flown down to her temple

and settled upon her couch; in the territory of Amiternum beings in human shape and clothed in white were

seen at a distance, but no one came close to them; in the neighbourhood of Picenum there was a shower of

stones; at Caere the oracular tablets had shrunk in size; in Gaul a wolf had snatched a sentinel's sword from

its scabbard and run off with it. With regard to the other portents, the decemvirs were ordered to consult the

Sacred Books, but in the case of the shower of stones at Picenum a nine days' sacred feast was proclaimed, at

the close of which almost the whole community busied itself with the expiation of the others. First of all the

City was purified, and fullgrown victims were sacrificed to the deities named in the Sacred Books; an

offering of forty pounds' weight of gold was conveyed to Juno at Lanuvium, and the matrons dedicated a

bronze statue of that goddess on the Aventine. At Caere, where the tablets had shrunk, a lectisternium was

enjoined, and a service of intercession was to be rendered to Fortuna on Algidus. In Rome also a

lectisternium was ordered for Juventas and a special service of intercession at the temple of Hercules, and

afterwards one in which the whole population were to take part at all the shrines. Five fullgrown victims

were sacrificed to the Genius of Rome, and C. Atilius Serranus, the praetor, received instructions to

undertake certain vows which were to be discharged should the commonwealth remain in the same condition

for ten years. These ceremonial observances and vows, ordered in obedience to the Sacred Books, did much

to allay the religious fears of the people.

One of the consuls elect was C. Flaminius, and to him was assigned by lot the command of the legions at

Placentia. He wrote to the consul giving orders for the army to be in camp at Ariminum by the 15th of March.

The reason was that he might enter upon his office there, for he had not forgotten his old quarrels with the

senate, first as tribune of the people, then afterwards about his consulship, the election to which had been

declared illegal, and finally about his triumph. He further embittered the senate against him by his support of

C. Claudius; he alone of all the members was in favour of the measure which that tribune introduced. Under

its provisions no senator, no one whose father had been a senator, was allowed to possess a vessel of more

than 300 amphorae burden. This was considered quite large enough for the conveyance of produce from their

estates, all profit made by trading was regarded as dishonourable for the patricians. The question excited the


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keenest opposition and brought Flaminius into the worst possible odium with the nobility through his support

of it, but on the other hand made him a popular favourite and procured for him his second consulship.

Suspecting, therefore, that they would endeavour to detain him in the City by various devices, such as

falsifying the auspices or the delay necessitated by the Latin Festival, or other hindrances to which as consul

he was liable, he gave out that he had to take a journey, and then left the City secretly as a private individual

and so reached his province. When this got abroad there was a fresh outburst of indignation on the part of the

incensed senate; they declared that he was carrying on war not only with the senate but even with the

immortal gods. "On the former occasion," they said, "when he was elected consul against the auspices and we

recalled him from the very field of battle, he was disobedient to gods and men. Now he is conscious that he

has despised them and has fled from the Capitol and the customary recital of solemn vows. He refuses to

approach the temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus on the day of his entrance upon office, to see and consult

the senate, to whom he is so odious and whom he alone of all men detests, to proclaim the Latin Festival and

offer sacrifice to Jupiter Latiaris on the Alban Mount, to proceed to the Capitol and after duly taking the

auspices recite the prescribed vows, and from thence, vested in the paludamentum and escorted by lictors, go

in state to his province. He has stolen away furtively without his insignia of office, without his lictors, just as

though he were some menial employed in the camp and had quitted his native soil to go into exile. He thinks

it, forsooth, more consonant with the greatness of his office to enter upon it at Ariminum rather than in Rome,

and to put on his official dress in some wayside inn rather than at his own hearth and in the presence of his

own household gods." It was unanimously decided that he should be recalled, brought back if need be by

force, and compelled to discharge, on the spot, all the duties he owed to God and man before he went to the

army and to his province. Q. Terentius and M. Antistius were delegated for this task, but they had no more

influence with him than the despatch of the senate in his former consulship. A few days afterwards he entered

upon office, and whilst offering his sacrifice, the calf, after it was struck, bounded away out of the hands of

the sacrificing priests and bespattered many of the bystanders with its blood. Amongst those at a distance

from the altar who did not know what the commotion was about there was great excitement; most people

regarded it as a most alarming omen. Flaminius took over the two legions from Sempronius, the late consul,

and the two from C. Atilius, the praetor, and commenced his march to Etruria through the passes of the

Apennines.

End of Book 21

Book 22. The Disaster of Cannae

Spring was now coming on; Hannibal accordingly moved out of his winter quarters. His previous attempt to

cross the Apennines had been frustrated by the insupportable cold; to remain where he was would have been

to court danger. The Gauls had rallied to him through the prospect of booty and spoil, but when they found

that instead of plundering other people's territory their own had become the seat of war and had to bear the

burden of furnishing winter quarters for both sides, they diverted their hatred from the Romans to Hannibal.

Plots against his life were frequently hatched by their chiefs, and he owed his safety to their mutual

faithlessness, for they betrayed the plots to him in the same spirit of fickleness in which they had formed

them. He guarded himself from their attempts by assuming different disguises, at one time wearing a different

dress, at another putting on false hair. But these constant alarms were an additional motive for his early

departure from his winter quarters. About the same time Cn. Servilius entered upon his consulship at Rome,

on the 15th of March. When he had laid before the senate the policy which he proposed to carry out, the

indignation against C. Flaminius broke out afresh. "Two consuls had been elected, but as a matter of fact they

only had one. What legitimate authority did this man possess? What religious sanctions? Magistrates only

take these sanctions with them from home, from the altars of the State, and from their private altars at home

after they have celebrated the Latin Festival, offered the sacrifice on the Alban Mount, and duly recited the

vows in the Capitol. These sanctions do not follow a private citizen, nor if he has departed without them can

he obtain them afresh in all their fulness on a foreign soil."


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To add to the general feeling of apprehension, information was received of portents having occurred

simultaneously in several places. In Sicily several of the soldiers' darts were covered with flames; in Sardinia

the same thing happened to the staff in the hand of an officer who was going his rounds to inspect the

sentinels on the wall; the shores had been lit up by numerous fires; a couple of shields had sweated blood;

some soldiers had been struck by lightning; an eclipse of the sun had been observed; at Praeneste there had

been a shower of redhot stones; at Arpi shields had been seen in the sky and the sun had appeared to be

fighting with the moon; at Capena two moons were visible in the daytime; at Caere the waters ran mingled

with blood, and even the spring of Hercules had bubbled up with drops of blood on the water; at Antium the

ears of corn which fell into the reapers' basket were bloodstained; at Falerii the sky seemed to be cleft

asunder as with an enormous rift and all over the opening there was a blazing light; the oracular tablets

shrank and shrivelled without being touched and one had fallen out with this inscription, "MARS IS

SHAKING HIS SPEAR"; and at the same time the statue of Mars on the Appian Way and the images of the

Wolves sweated blood. Finally, at Capua the sight was seen of the sky on fire and the moon falling in the

midst of a shower of rain. Then credence was given to comparatively trifling portents, such as that certain

people's goats were suddenly clothed with wool, a hen turned into a cock, and a cock into a hen. After giving

the details exactly as they were reported to him and bringing his informants before the senate, the consul

consulted the House as to what religious observances ought to be proclaimed. A decree was passed that to

avert the evils which these portents foreboded, sacrifices should be offered, the victims to be both fullgrown

animals and sucklings, and also that special intercessions should be made at all the shrines for three days.

What other ceremonial was necessary was to be carried out in accordance with the instructions of the

decemvirs after they had inspected the Sacred Books and ascertained the will of the gods. On their advice it

was decreed that the first votive offering should be made to Jupiter in the shape of a golden thunderbolt

weighing fifty pounds, gifts of silver to Juno and Minerva, and sacrifices of fullgrown victims to Queen

Juno on the Aventine and Juno Sospita at Lanuvium, whilst the matrons were to contribute according to their

means and bear their gift to Queen Juno on the Aventine. A lectisternium was to be held, and even the

freedwomen were to contribute what they could for a gift to the temple of Feronia. When these instructions

had been carried out the decemvirs sacrificed fullgrown victims in the forum at Ardea, and finally in the

middle of December there was a sacrifice at the Temple of Saturn, a lectisternium was ordered (the senators

prepared the couch), and a public banquet. For a day and a night the cry of the Saturnalia resounded through

the City, and the people were ordered to make that day a festival and observe it as such for ever.

While the consul was occupied in these propitiatory ceremonies and also in the enrolment of troops,

information reached Hannibal that Flaminius had arrived at Arretium, and he at once broke up his winter

quarters. There were two routes into Etruria, both of which were pointed out to Hannibal; one was

considerably longer than the other but a much better road, the shorter route, which he decided to take, passed

through the marshes of the Arno, which was at the time in higher flood than usual. He ordered the Spaniards

and Africans, the main strength of his veteran army, to lead, and they were to take their own baggage with

them, so that, in case of a halt, they might have the necessary supplies; the Gauls were to follow so as to form

the centre of the column; the cavalry were to march last, and Mago and his Numidian light horse were to

close up the column, mainly to keep the Gauls up to the mark in case they fell out or came to a halt through

the fatigue and exertion of so long a march, for as a nation they were unable to stand that kind of thing. Those

in front followed wherever the guides led the way, through the deep and almost bottomless pools of water,

and though almost sucked in by the mud through which they were halfwading, halfswimming, still kept

their ranks. The Gauls could neither recover themselves when they slipped nor when once down had they the

strength to struggle out of the pools; depressed and hopeless they had no spirits left to keep up their bodily

powers. Some dragged their wornout limbs painfully along, others gave up the struggle and lay dying

amongst the baggage animals which were lying about in all directions. What distressed them most of all was

want of sleep, from which they had been suffering for four days and three nights. As everything was covered

with water and they had not a dry spot on which to lay their wearied bodies, they piled up the baggage in the

water and lay on the top, whilst some snatched a few minutes' needful rest by making couches of the heaps of

baggage animals which were everywhere standing out of the water. Hannibal himself, whose eyes were


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affected by the changeable and inclement spring weather, rode upon the only surviving elephant so that he

might be a little higher above the water. Owing, however, to want of sleep and the night mists and the malaria

from the marshes, his head became affected, and as neither place nor time admitted of any proper treatment,

he completely lost the sight of one eye.

After losing many men and beasts under these frightful .circumstances, he at last got clear of the marshes, and

as soon as he could find some dry ground he pitched his camp. The scouting parties he had sent out reported

that the Roman army was lying in the neighbourhood of Arretium. His next step was to investigate as

carefully as he possibly could all that it was material for him to knowwhat mood the consul was in, what

designs he was forming, what the character of the country and the kind of roads it possessed, and what

resources it offered for the obtaining of supplies. The district was amongst the most fertile in Italy; the plains

of Etruria, which extend from Faesulae to Arretium, are rich in corn and live stock and every kind of produce.

The consul's overbearing temper, which had grown steadily worse since his last consulship, made him lose all

proper respect and reverence even for the gods, to say nothing of the majesty of the senate and the laws, and

this selfwilled and obstinate side of his character had been aggravated by the successes he had achieved

both at home and in the field. It was perfectly obvious that he would not seek counsel from either God or

man, and whatever he did would be done in an impetuous and headstrong manner. By way of making him

show these faults of character still more flagrantly, the Carthaginian prepared to irritate and annoy him. He

left the Roman camp on his left, and marched in the direction of Faesulae to plunder the central districts of

Etruria. Within actual view of the consul he created as widespread a devastation as he possibly could, and

from the Roman camp they saw in the distance an extensive scene of fire and .massacre.

Flaminius had no intention of keeping quiet even if the enemy had done so, but now that he saw the

possessions of the allies of Rome plundered and pillaged almost before his very eyes, he felt it to be a

personal disgrace that an enemy should be roaming at will through Italy and advancing to attack Rome with

none to hinder him. All the other members of the council of war were in favour of a policy of safety rather

than of display; they urged him to wait for his colleague, that they might unite their forces and act with one

mind on a common plan, and pending his arrival they should check the wild excesses of the plundering

enemy with cavalry and the lightarmed auxiliaries. Enraged at these suggestions he dashed out of the

council and ordered the trumpets to give the signal for march and battle; exclaiming at the same time: "We

are to sit, I suppose, before the walls of Arretium, because our country and our household gods are here. Now

that Hannibal has slipped through our hands, he is to ravage Italy, destroy and burn everything in his way till

he reaches Rome, while we are not to stir from here until the senate summons C. Flaminius from Arretium as

they once summoned Camillus from Veii." During this outburst, he ordered the standards to be pulled up with

all speed and at the same time mounted his horse. No sooner had he done so than the animal stumbled and

fell and threw him over its head All those who were standing round were appalled by what they took to be an

evil omen at the beginning of a campaign, and their alarm was considerably increased by a message brought

to the consul that the standard could not be moved though the standardbearer had exerted his utmost

strength. He turned to the messenger and asked him: "Are you bringing a despatch from the senate, also,

forbidding me to go on with the campaign? Go, let them dig out the standard if their hands are too benumbed

with fear for them to pull it up." Then the column began its march. The superior officers, besides being

absolutely opposed to his plans, were thoroughly alarmed by the double portent, but the great body of the

soldiers were delighted at the spirit their general had shown; they shared his confidence without knowing on

what slender grounds it rested.

In order still further to exasperate his enemy and make him eager to avenge the injuries inflicted on the allies

of Rome, Hannibal laid waste with all the horrors of war the land between Cortona and Lake Trasumennus.

He had now reached a position eminently adapted for surprise tactics, where the lake comes up close under

the hills of Cortona. There is only a very narrow road here between the hills and the lake, as though a space

had been purposely left far it. Further on there is a small expanse of level ground flanked by hills, and it was

here that Hannibal pitched camp, which was only occupied by his Africans and Spaniards, he himself being


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in command. The Balearics and the rest of the light infantry he sent behind the hills; the cavalry, conveniently

screened by some low hills, he stationed at the mouth of the defile, so that when the Romans had entered it

they would be completely shut in by the cavalry, the lake, and the hills. Flaminius had reached the lake at

sunset. The next morning, in a still uncertain light, he passed through the defile, without sending any scouts

on to feel the way, and when the column began to deploy in the wider extent of level ground the only enemy

they saw was the one in front, the rest were concealed in their rear and above their heads. When the

Carthaginian saw his object achieved and had his enemy shut in between the lake and the hills with his forces

surrounding them, he gave the signal for all to make a simultaneous attack, and they charged straight down

upon the point nearest to them. The affair was all the more sudden and unexpected to the Romans because a

fog which had risen from the lake was denser on the plain than on the heights; the bodies of the enemy on the

various hills could see each other well enough, and it was all the easier for them to charge all at the same

time. The shout of battle rose round the Romans before they could see clearly from whence it came, or

became aware that they were surrounded. Fighting began in front and flank before they could form line or get

their weapons ready or draw their swords.

In the universal panic, the consul displayed all the coolness that could be expected under the circumstances.

The ranks were broken by each man turning towards the discordant shouts; he reformed them as well as

time and place allowed, and wherever he could be seen or heard, he encouraged his men and bade them stand

and fight. "It is not by prayers or entreaties to the gods that you must make your way out," he said, "but by

your strength and your courage. It is the sword that cuts a path through the middle of the enemy, and where

there is less fear there is generally less danger." But such was the uproar and confusion that neither counsel

nor command could be heard, and so far was the soldier from recognising his standard or his company or his

place in the rank, that he had hardly sufficient presence of mind to get hold of his weapons and make them

available for use, and some who found them a burden rather than a protection were overtaken by the enemy.

In such a thick fog ears were of more use than eyes; the men turned their gaze in every direction as they heard

the groans of the wounded and the blows on shield or breastplate, and the mingled shouts of triumph and

cries of panic. Some who tried to fly ran into a dense body of combatants and could get no further; others

who were returning to the fray were swept away by a rush of fugitives. At last, when ineffective charges had

been made in every direction and they found themselves completely hemmed in, by the lake and the hills on

either side, and by the enemy in front and rear, it became clear to every man that his only hope of safety lay

in his own right hand and his sword. Then each began to depend upon himself for guidance and

encouragement, and the fighting began afresh, not the orderly battle with its three divisions of principes,

hastati, and triarii, where the fighting line is in front of the standards and the rest of the army behind, and

where each soldier is in his own legion and cohort and maniple. Chance massed them together, each man

took his place in front or rear as his courage prompted him, and such was the ardour of the combatants, so

intent were they on the battle, that not a single man on the field was aware of the earthquake which levelled

large portions of many towns in Italy, altered the course of swift streams, brought the sea up into the rivers,

and occasioned enormous landslips amongst the mountains.

For almost three hours the fighting went on; everywhere a desperate struggle was kept up, but it raged with

greater fierceness round the consul. He was followed by the pick of his army, and wherever he saw his men

hard pressed and in difficulties he at once went to their help. Distinguished by his armour he was the object of

the enemy's fiercest attacks, which his comrades did their utmost to repel, until an Insubrian horseman who

knew the consul by sighthis name was Ducariuscried out to his countrymen, "Here is the man who slew

our legions and laid waste our city and our lands! I will offer him in sacrifice to the shades of my foully

murdered countrymen." Digging spurs into his horse he charged into the dense masses of the enemy, and

slew an armourbearer who threw himself in the way as he galloped up lance in rest, and then plunged his

lance into the consul; but the triarii protected the body with their shields and prevented him from despoiling

it. Then began a general flight, neither lake nor mountain stopped the panicstricken fugitives, they rushed

like blind men over cliff and defile, men and arms tumbled pellmell on one another. A large number,

finding no avenue of escape, went into the water up to their shoulders; some in their wild terror even


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attempted to escape by swimming, an endless and hopeless task in that lake. Either their spirits gave way and

they were drowned, or else finding their efforts fruitless, they regained with great difficulty the shallow water

at the edge of the lake and were butchered in all directions by the enemy's cavalry who had ridden into the

water. About 6000 men who had formed the head of the line of march cut their way through the enemy and

cleared the defile, quite unconscious of all that had been going on behind them. They halted on some rising

ground, and listened to the shouting below and the clash of arms, but were unable, owing to the fog, to see or

find out what the fortunes of the fight were. At last, when the battle was over and the sun's heat had dispelled

the fog, mountain and plain revealed in the clear light the disastrous overthrow of the Roman army and

showed only too plainly that all was lost. Fearing lest they should be seen in the distance and cavalry be sent

against them, they hurriedly took up their standards and disappeared with all possible speed. Maharbal

pursued them through the night with the whole of his mounted force, and on the morrow, as starvation, in

addition to all their other miseries, was threatening them, they surrendered to Maharbal, on condition of being

allowed to depart with one garment apiece. This promise was kept with Punic faith by Hannibal, and he threw

them all into chains.

This was the famous battle at Trasumennus, and a disaster for Rome memorable as few others have been.

Fifteen thousand Romans were killed in action; 1000 fugitives were scattered all over Etruria and reached the

City by divers routes; 2500 of the enemy perished on the field, many in both armies afterwards of their

wounds. Other authors give the loss on each side as many times greater, but I refuse to indulge in the idle

exaggerations to which writers are far too much given, and what is more, I am supported by the authority of

Fabius, who was living during the war. Hannibal dismissed without ransom those prisoners who belonged to

the allies and threw the Romans into chains. He then gave orders for the bodies of his own men to be picked

out from the heaps of slain and buried; careful search was also made for the body of Flaminius that it might

receive honourable interment but it was not found. As soon as the news of this disaster reached Rome the

people flocked into the Forum in a great state of panic and confusion. Matrons were wandering about the

streets and asking those they met what recent disaster had been reported or what news was there of the army.

The throng in the Forum, as numerous as a crowded Assembly, flocked towards the Comitium and the

Senatehouse and called for the magistrates. At last, shortly before sunset, M. Pomponius, the praetor,

announced, "We have been defeated in a great battle." Though nothing more definite was heard from him, the

people, full of the reports which they had heard from one another, carried back to their homes the information

that the consul had been killed with the greater part of his army; only a few survived, and these were either

dispersed in flight throughout Etruria or had been made prisoners by the enemy.

The misfortunes which had befallen the defeated army were not more numerous than the anxieties of those

whose relatives had served under C. Flaminius, ignorant as they were of the fate of each of their friends, and

not in the least knowing what to hope for or what to fear. The next day and several days afterwards, a large

crowd, containing more women than men, stood at the gates waiting for some one of their friends or for news

about them, and they crowded round those they met with eager and anxious inquiries, nor was it possible to

get them away, especially from those they knew, until they had got all the details from first to last. Then as

they came away from their informants you might see the different expressions on their faces, according as

each had received good or bad news, and friends congratulating or consoling them as they wended their way

homewards. The women were especially demonstrative in their joy and in their grief. They say that one who

suddenly met her son at the gate safe and sound expired in his arms, whilst another who had received false

tidings of her son's death and was sitting as a sorrowful mourner in her house, no sooner saw him returning

than she died from too great happiness. For several days the praetors kept the senate in session from sunrise

to sunset, deliberating under what general or with what forces they could offer effectual resistance to the

victorious Carthaginian.

Before they had formed any definite plans, a fresh disaster was announced; 4000 cavalry under the command

of C. Centenius, the propraetor, had been sent by the consul Servilius to the assistance of his colleague. When

they heard of the battle at Trasumennus they marched into Umbria, and here they were surrounded and


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captured by Hannibal. The news of this occurrence affected men in very different ways. Some, whose

thoughts were preoccupied with more serious troubles, looked upon this loss of cavalry as a light matter in

comparison with the previous losses; others estimated the importance of the incident not by the magnitude of

the loss but by its moral effect. Just as where the constitution is impaired, any malady however slight is felt

more than it would be in a strong robust person, so any misfortune which befell the State in its present sick

and disordered condition must be measured not by its actual importance but by its effect on a State already

exhausted and unable to bear anything which would aggravate its condition. Accordingly the citizens took

refuge in a remedy which for a long time had not been made use of or required, namely the appointment of a

Dictator. As the consul by whom alone one could be nominated was absent, and it was not easy for a

messenger or a despatch to be sent through Italy, overrun as it was by the arms of Carthage, and as it would

have been contrary to all precedent for the people to appoint a Dictator, the Assembly invested Q. Fabius

Maximus with dictatorial powers and appointed M. Minucius Rufus to act as his Master of the Horse. They

were commissioned by the senate to strengthen the walls and towers of the City and place garrisons in

whatever positions they thought best, and cut down the bridges over the various rivers, for now it was a fight

for their City and their homes, since they were no longer able to defend Italy.

Hannibal marched in a straight course through Umbria as far as Spoletum, and after laying the country round

utterly waste, he commenced an attack upon the city which was repulsed with heavy loss. As a single colony

was strong enough to defeat his unfortunate attempt he was able to form some conjecture as to the difficulties

attending the capture of Rome, and consequently diverted his march into the territory of Picenum, a district

which not only abounded in every kind of produce but was richly stored with property which the greedy and

needy soldiers seized and plundered without restraint. He remained in camp there for several days during

which his soldiers recruited their strength after their winter campaigns and their journey across the marshes,

and a battle which though ultimately successful was neither without heavy loss nor easily won. When

sufficient time for rest had been allowed to men who delighted much more in plundering and destroying than

in ease and idleness, Hannibal resumed his march and devastated the districts of Praetutia and Hadria, then he

treated in the same way the country of the Marsi, the Marrucini, and the Peligni and the part of Apulia which

was nearest to him, including the cities of Arpi and Luceria. Cn. Servilius had fought some insignificant

actions with the Gauls and taken one small town, but when he heard of his colleague's death and the

destruction of his army, he was alarmed for the walls of his native City, and marched straight for Rome that

he might not be absent at this most critical juncture.

Q. Fabius Maximus was now Dictator for the second time. On the very day of his entrance upon office he

summoned a meeting of the senate, and commenced by discussing matters of religion. He made it quite clear

to the senators that C. Flaminius' fault lay much more in his neglect of the auspices and of his religious duties

than in bad generalship and foolhardiness. The gods themselves, he maintained, must be consulted as to the

necessary measures to avert their displeasure, and he succeeded in getting a decree passed that the decemvirs

should be ordered to consult the Sibylline Books, a course which is only adopted when the most alarming

portents have been reported. After inspecting the Books of Fate they informed the senate that the vow which

had been made to Mars in view of that war had not been duly discharged, and that it must be discharged

afresh and on a much greater scale. The Great Games must be vowed to Jupiter, a temple to Venus Erycina

and one to Mens; a lectisternium must be held and solemn intercessions made; a Sacred Spring must also be

vowed. All these things must be done if the war was to be a successful one and the republic remain in the

same position in which it was at the beginning of the war. As Fabius would be wholly occupied with the

necessary arrangements for the war, the senate with the full approval of the pontifical college ordered the

praetor, M. Aemilius, to take care that all these orders were carried out in good time.

After these resolutions had been passed in the senate the praetor consulted the pontifical college as to the

proper means of giving effect to them, and L. Cornelius Lentulus, the Pontifex Maximus, decided that the

very first step to take was to refer to the people the question of a "Sacred Spring," as this particular form of

vow could not be undertaken without the order of the people. The form of procedure was as follows: "Is it,"


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the praetor asked the Assembly, "your will and pleasure that all be done and performed in manner following?

That is to say, if the commonwealth of the Romans and the Quirites be preserved, as I pray it may be, safe

and sound through these present warsto wit, the war between Rome and Carthage and the wars with the

Gauls now dwelling on the hither side of the Alpsthen shall the Romans and Quirites present as an offering

whatever the spring shall produce from their flocks and herds, whether it be from swine or sheep or goats or

cattle, and all that is not already devoted to any other deity shall be consecrated to Jupiter from such time as

the senate and people shall order. Whosoever shall make an offering let him do it at whatsoever time and in

whatsoever manner he will, and howsoever he offers it, it shall be accounted to be duly offered. If the animal

which should have been sacrificed die, it shall be as though unconsecrated, there shall be no sin. If any man

shall hurt or slay a consecrated thing unwittingly he shall not be held guilty. If a man shall have stolen any

such animal, the people shall not bear the guilt, nor he from whom it was stolen. If a man offer his sacrifice

unwittingly on a forbidden day, it shall be accounted to be duly offered. Whether he do so by night or day,

whether he be slave or freeman, it shall be accounted to be duly offered. If any sacrifice be offered before the

senate and people have ordered that it shall be done, the people shall be free and absolved from all guilt

therefrom." To the same end the Great Games were vowed at a cost of 333,333 1/3 ases, and in addition 300

oxen to Jupiter, and white oxen and the other customary victims to a number of deities. When the vows had

been duly pronounced a litany of intercession was ordered, and not only the population of the City but the

people from the country districts, whose private interests were being affected by the public distress, went in

procession with their wives and children. Then a lectisternium was held for three days under the supervision

of the ten keepers of the Sacred Books. Six couches were publicly exhibited; one for Jupiter and Juno,

another for Neptune and Minerva, a third for Mars and Venus, a fourth for Apollo and Diana, a fifth for

Vulcan and Vesta, and the sixth for Mercury and Ceres. This was followed by the vowing of temples. Q.

Fabius Maximus, as Dictator, vowed the temple to Venus Erycina, because it was laid down in the Books of

Fate that this vow should be made by the man who possessed the supreme authority in the State. T. Otacilius,

the praetor, vowed the temple to Mens.

After the various obligations towards the gods had thus been discharged, the Dictator referred to the senate

the question of the policy to be adopted with regard to the war, with what legions and how many the senators

thought he ought to meet their victorious enemy. They decreed that he should take over the army from Cneius

Servilius, and further that he should enrol from amongst the citizens and the allies as many cavalry and

infantry as he considered requisite; all else was left to his discretion to take such steps as he thought desirable

in the interests of the republic. Fabius said that he would add two legions to the army which Servilius

commanded; these were raised by the Master of the Horse and he fixed a day for their assembling at Tibur. A

proclamation was also issued that those who were living in towns and strongholds that were not sufficiently

fortified should remove into places of safety, and that all the population settled in the districts through which

Hannibal was likely to march should abandon their farms, after first burning their houses and destroying their

produce, so that he might not have any supplies to fall back upon. He then marched along the Flaminian road

to meet the consul. As soon as he caught sight of the army in the neighbourhood of Ocriculum near the Tiber,

and the consul riding forward with some cavalry to meet him, he sent an officer to tell him that he was to

come to the Dictator without his lictors. He did so, and the way they met produced a profound sense of the

majesty of the dictatorship amongst both citizens and allies, who had almost by this time forgotten that

greatest of all offices. Shortly afterwards a despatch was handed in from the City stating that some transports

which were carrying supplies for the army in Spain had been captured by the Carthaginian fleet near the port

of Cosa. The consul was thereupon ordered to man the ships which were lying off Rome or at Ostia with full

complements of seamen and soldiers, and sail in pursuit of the hostile fleet and protect the coast of Italy. A

large force was raised in Rome, even freedmen who had children and were of the military age had been

sworn in. Out of these city troops, all under thirtyfive years of age were placed on board the ships, the rest

were left to garrison the City.

The Dictator took over the consul's army from Fulvius Flaccus, the second in command, and marched

through Sabine territory to Tibur, where he had ordered the newly raised force to assemble by the appointed


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day. From there he advanced to Praeneste, and taking a crosscountry route, came out on the Latin road.

From this point he proceeded towards the enemy, showing the utmost care in reconnoitring all the various

routes, and determined not to take any risks anywhere, except so far as necessity should compel him. The first

day he pitched his camp in view of the enemy not far from Arpi; the Carthaginian lost no time in marching

out his men in battle order to give him the chance of fighting. But when he saw that the enemy kept perfectly

quiet and that there were no signs of excitement in their camp, he tauntingly remarked that the spirits of the

Romans, those sons of Mars, were broken at last, the war was at an end, and they had openly foregone all

claim to valour and renown. He then returned into camp. But he was really in a very anxious state of mind,

for he saw that he would have to do with a very different type of commander from Flaminius or Sempronius;

the Romans had been taught by their defeats and had at last found a general who was a match for him. It was

the wariness not the impetuosity of the Dictator that was the immediate cause of his alarm; he had not yet

tested his inflexible resolution. He began to harass and provoke him by frequently shifting his camp and

ravaging the fields of the allies of Rome before his very eyes. Sometimes he would march rapidly out of sight

and then in some turn of the road take up a concealed position in the hope of entrapping him, should he come

down to level ground. Fabius kept on high ground, at a moderate distance from the enemy, so that he never

lost sight of him and never closed with him. Unless they were employed on necessary duty, the soldiers were

confined to camp. When they went in quest of wood or forage they went in large bodies and only within

prescribed limits. A force of cavalry and light infantry told off in readiness against sudden alarms, made

everything safe for his own soldiers and dangerous for the scattered foragers of the enemy. He refused to

stake everything on a general engagement, whilst slight encounters, fought on safe ground with a retreat close

at hand, encouraged his men, who had been demoralised by their previous defeats, and made them less

dissatisfied with their own courage and fortunes. But his sound and commonsense tactics were not more

distasteful to Hannibal than they were to his own Master of the Horse. Headstrong and impetuous in counsel

and with an ungovernable tongue, the only thing that prevented Minucius from making shipwreck of the State

was the fact that he was in a subordinate command. At first to a few listeners, afterwards openly amongst the

rank and file, he abused Fabius, calling his deliberation indolence and his caution cowardice, attributing to

him faults akin to his real virtues, and by disparaging his superiora vile practice which, through its often

proving successful, is steadily on the increasehe tried to exalt himself.

From the Hirpini Hannibal went across into Samnium; he ravaged the territory of Beneventum and captured

the city of Telesia. He did his best to exasperate the Roman commander, hoping that he would be so incensed

by the insults and sufferings inflicted on his allies that he would be able to draw him into an engagement on

level ground. Amongst the thousands of allies of Italian nationality who had been taken prisoners by

Hannibal at Trasumennus and dismissed to their homes were three Campanian knights, who had been allured

by bribes and promises to win over the affections of their countrymen. They sent a message to Hannibal to

the effect that if he would bring his army up to Campania there would be a good chance of his obtaining

possession of Capua. Hannibal was undecided whether to trust them or not, for the enterprise was greater than

the authority of those who advised it; however, they at last persuaded him to leave Samnium for Campania.

He warned them that they must make their repeated promises good by their acts, and after bidding them

return to him with more of their countrymen, including some of their chief men, he dismissed them. Some

who were familiar with the country told him that if he marched into the neighbourhood of Casinum and

occupied the pass, he would prevent the Romans from rendering assistance to their allies. He accordingly

ordered a guide to conduct him there. But the difficulty which the Carthaginians found in pronouncing Latin

names led to the guide understanding Casilinum instead of Casinum. Quitting his intended route, he came

down through the districts of Allifae, Callifae, and Cales on to the plains of Stella. When he looked round and

saw the country shut in by mountains and rivers he called the guide and asked him where on earth he was.

When he was told that he would that day have his quarters at Casilinum, he saw the mistake and knew that

Casinum was far away in quite another country. The guide was scourged and crucified in order to strike terror

into the others. After entrenching his camp he sent Maharbal with his cavalry to harry the Falernian land. The

work of destruction extended to the Baths of Sinuessa; the Numidians inflicted enormous losses, but the

panic and terror which they created spread even further. And yet, though everything was wrapped in the


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flames of war, the allies did not allow their terrors to warp them from their loyalty, simply because they were

under a just and equable rule, and rendered a willing obedience to their superiorsthe only true bond of

allegiance.

When Hannibal had encamped at the Vulturnus and the loveliest part of Italy was being reduced to ashes and

the smoke was rising everywhere from the burning farms, Fabius continued his march along the Massic range

of hills. For a few days the mutinous discontent amongst the troops had subsided, because they inferred from

the unusually rapid marching that Fabius was hastening to save Campania from being ravaged and plundered.

But when they reached the western extremity of the range and saw the enemy burning the farmsteads of the

colonists of Sinuessa and those in the Falernian district, while nothing was said about giving battle, the

feeling of exasperation was again roused, and studiously fanned by Minucius. "Are we come here" he would

ask, "to enjoy the sight of our murdered allies and the smoking ruins of their homes? Surely, if nothing else

appeals to us, ought we not to feel ashamed of ourselves as we see the sufferings of those whom our fathers

sent as colonists to Sinuessa that this frontier might be protected from the Samnite foe, whose homes are

being burnt not by our neighbours the Samnites but by a Carthaginian stranger from the ends of the earth who

has been allowed to come thus far simply through our dilatoriness and supineness? Have we, alas! so far

degenerated from our fathers that we calmly look on while the very country, past which they considered it an

affront for a Carthaginian fleet to cruise, has now been filled with Numidian and Moorish invaders? We who

only the other day in our indignation at the attack on Saguntum appealed not to men alone, but to treaties and

to gods, now quietly watch Hannibal scaling the walls of a Roman colony! The smoke from the burning

farms and fields is blown into our faces, our ears are assailed by the cries of our despairing allies who appeal

to us for help more than they do to the gods, and here are we marching an army like a herd of cattle through

summer pastures and mountain paths hidden from view by woods and clouds! If M. Furius Camillus had

chosen this method of wandering over mountain heights and passes to rescue the City from the Gauls which

has been adopted by this new Camillus, this peerless Dictator who has been found for us in our troubles, to

recover Italy from Hannibal, Rome would still be in the hands of the Gauls, and I very much fear that if we

go on dawdling in this way the City which our ancestors have so often saved will only have been saved for

Hannibal and the Carthaginians. But on the day that the message came to Veii that Camillus had been

nominated Dictator by senate and people, though the Janiculum was quite high enough for him to sit there

and watch the enemy, like the man and true Roman that he was, he came down into the plain. and in the very

heart of the City where the Busta Gallica are now he cut to pieces the legions of the Gauls, and the next day

he did the same beyond Gabii. Why, when years and years ago we were sent under the yoke by the Samnites

at the Caudine Forks, was it, pray, by exploring the heights of Samnium or by assailing and besieging Luceria

and challenging our victorious foe that L. Papirius Cursor took the yoke off Roman necks and placed it on the

haughty Samnite? What else but rapidity of action gave C. Lutatius the victory? The day after he first saw the

enemy he surprised their fleet laden with supplies and hampered by its cargo of stores and equipment. It is

mere folly to fancy that the war can be brought to an end by sitting still or making vows to heaven. Your duty

is to take your arms and go down and meet the enemy man to man. It is by doing and daring that Rome has

increased her dominion not by these counsels of sloth which cowards call caution." Minucius said all this

before a host of Roman tribunes and knights, as if he were addressing the Assembly, and his daring words

even reached the ears of the soldiery; if they could have voted on the question, there is no doubt that they

would have superseded Fabius for Minucius.

Fabius kept an equally careful watch upon both sides, upon his own men no less than upon the enemy, and he

showed that his resolution was quite unshaken. He was quite aware that his inactivity was making him

unpopular not only in his own camp, but even in Rome, nevertheless his determination remained unchanged

and he persisted in the same tactics for the rest of the summer, and Hannibal abandoned all hopes of the battle

which he had so anxiously sought for. It became necessary for him to look round for a suitable place to winter

in, as the country in which he was, a land of orchards and vineyards, was entirely planted with the luxuries

rather than the necessaries of life, and furnished supplies only for a few months not for the whole year.

Hannibal's movements were reported to Fabius by his scouts. As he felt quite certain that he would return by


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the same pass through which he had entered the district of Falernum, he posted a fairly strong detachment on

Mount Callicula and another to garrison Casilinum. The Vulturnus runs through the middle of this town and

forms the boundary between the districts of Falernum and Campania. He led his army back over the same

heights, having previously sent L. Hostilius Mancinus forward with 400 cavalry to reconnoitre. This man was

amongst the throng of young officers who had frequently listened to the fierce harangues of the Master of the

Horse. At first he advanced cautiously, as a scouting party should do, to get a good view of the enemy from a

safe position. But when he saw the Numidians roaming in all directions through the villages, and had even

surprised and killed some of them, he thought of nothing but fighting, and completely forgot the Dictator's

instructions, which were to go forward as far as he could safely and to retire before the enemy observed him.

The Numidians, attacking and retreating in small bodies, drew him gradually almost up to their camp, his

men and horses by this time thoroughly tired. Thereupon Carthalo, the general in command of the cavalry,

charged at full speed, and before they came within range of their javelins put the enemy to flight and pursued

them without slackening rein for nearly five miles. When Mancinus saw that there was no chance of the

enemy giving up the pursuit, or of his escaping them, he rallied his men and faced the Numidians, though

completely outnumbered and outmatched. He himself with the best of his riders was cut off, the rest resumed

their wild flight and reached Cales and ultimately by different bypaths returned to the Dictator. It so

happened that Minucius had rejoined Fabius on this day. He had been sent to strengthen the force holding the

defile which contracts into a narrow pass just above Terracina close to the sea. This was to prevent the

Carthaginian from utilising the Appian road for a descent upon the territory of Rome, when he left Sinuessa.

The Dictator and the Master of the Horse with their joint armies moved their camp on to the route which

Hannibal was expected to take. He was encamped two miles distant.

The next day the Carthaginian army began its march and filled the whole of the road between the two camps.

The Romans had taken up a position immediately below their entrenchments, on unquestionably more

advantageous ground, yet the Carthaginian came up with his cavalry and light infantry to challenge his

enemy. They made repeated attacks and retirements, but the Roman line kept its ground; the fighting was

slack and more satisfactory to the Dictator than to Hannibal; 200 Romans fell, and 800 of the enemy. It now

seemed as if Hannibal must be hemmed in. Capua and Samnium and all the rich land of Latium behind them

were furnishing the Romans with supplies, while the Carthaginian would have to winter amongst the rocks of

Formiae and the sands and marshes of Liternum and in gloomy forests. Hannibal did not fail to observe that

his own tactics were being employed against him. As he could not get out through Casilinum, and would

have to make for the mountains and cross the ridge of Callicula, he would be liable to be attacked by the

Romans whilst he was shut up in the valleys. To guard against this he decided upon a stratagem which,

deceiving the eyes of the enemy by its alarming appearance, would enable him to scale the mountains in a

night march without fear of interruption. The following was the ruse which he adopted. Torchwood

gathered from all the country round, and faggots of dry brushwood were tied on the horns of the oxen which

he was driving in vast numbers, both broken and unbroken to the plough, amongst the rest of the plunder

from the fields. About 2000 oxen were collected for the purpose. To Hasdrubal was assigned the task of

setting fire to the bundles on the horns of this herd as soon as darkness set in, then driving them up the

mountains and if possible mostly above the passes which were guarded by the Romans.

As soon as it was dark, the camp silently broke up; the oxen were driven some distance in front of the

column. When they had reached the foot of the mountains where the roads began to narrow, the signal was

given and the herds with their flaming horns were driven up the mountain side. The terrifying glare of the

flames shooting from their heads and the heat which penetrated to the root of their horns made the oxen rush

about as though they were mad. At this sudden scampering about, it seemed as though the woods and

mountains were on fire, and all the brushwood round became alight and the incessant but useless shaking of

their heads made the flames shoot out all the more, and gave the appearance of men running about in all

directions. When the men who were guarding the pass saw fires moving above them high up on the

mountains, they thought that their position was turned, and they hastily quitted it. Making their way up to the

highest points, they took the direction where there appeared to be the fewest flames, thinking this to be the


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safest road. Even so, they came across stray oxen separated from the herd, and at first sight they stood still in

astonishment at what seemed a preternatural sight of beings breathing fire. When it turned out to be simply a

human device they were still more alarmed at what they suspected was an ambuscade, and they took to flight.

Now they fell in with some of Hannibal's light infantry, but both sides shrank from a fight in the darkness and

remained inactive till daylight. In the meantime Hannibal had marched the whole of his army through the

pass, and after surprising and scattering some Roman troops in the pass itself, fixed his camp in the district of

Allifae.

Fabius watched all this confusion and excitement, but as he took it to be an ambuscade, and in any case

shrank from a battle in the night, he kept his men within their lines. As soon as it was light there was a battle

just under the ridge of the mountain where the Carthaginian light infantry were cut off from their main body

and would easily have been crushed by the Romans, who had considerably the advantage in numbers, had not

a cohort of Spaniards come up, who had been sent back by Hannibal to their assistance. These men were

more accustomed to the mountains and in better training for running amongst rocks and precipices, and being

both more lightly made and more lightly armed they could easily by their method of fighting baffle an enemy

drawn from the lowlands, heavily armed and accustomed to stationary tactics. At last they drew off from a

contest which was anything but an equal one. The Spaniards being almost untouched, the Romans having

sustained a heavy loss, each retired to their respective camps. Fabius followed on Hannibal's track through

the pass and encamped above Allifae in an elevated position and one of great natural strength. Hannibal

retraced his steps as far as the Peligni, ravaging the country as he went, as though his intention was to march

through Samnium upon Rome. Fabius continued to move along the heights, keeping between the enemy and

the City, neither avoiding nor attacking him. The Carthaginian left the Peligni, and marching back into

Apulia, reached Gereonium. This city had been abandoned by its inhabitants because a portion of the walls

had fallen into ruin. The Dictator formed an entrenched camp near Larinum. From there he was recalled to

Rome on business connected with religion. Before his departure he impressed upon the Master of the Horse,

not only as commanderinchief but as a friend giving good advice and even using entreaties, the necessity

of trusting more to prudence than to luck, and following his own example rather than copying Sempronius

and Flaminius. He was not to suppose that nothing had been gained now that the summer had been spent in

baffling the enemy, even physicians often gained more by not disturbing their patients than by subjecting

them to movement and exercises; it was no small advantage to have avoided defeat at the hands of a foe who

had been so often victorious and to have obtained a breathing space after such a series of disasters. With these

unheeded warnings to the Master of the Horse he started for Rome.

At the commencement of this summer war began in Spain both by land and sea. Hasdrubal added ten ships to

those which he had received from his brother, equipped and ready for action, and gave Himilco a fleet of

forty vessels. He then sailed from New Carthage, keeping near land, and with his army moving parallel along

the coast, ready to engage the enemy whether by sea or land. When Cn. Scipio learnt that his enemy had left

his winter quarters he at first adopted the same tactics, but on further consideration he would not venture on a

contest by land, owing to the immense reputation of the new auxiliaries. After embarking the pick of his army

he proceeded with a fleet of thirtyfive ships to meet the enemy. The day after leaving Tarraco he came to

anchor at a spot ten miles distant from the mouth of the Ebro. Two despatch boats belonging to Massilia had

been sent to reconnoitre, and they brought back word that the Carthaginian fleet was riding at anchor in the

mouth of the river and their camp was on the bank. Scipio at once weighed anchor and sailed towards the

enemy, intending to strike a sudden panic amongst them by surprising them whilst off their guard and

unsuspicious of danger.

There are in Spain many towers situated on high ground which are used both as lookouts and places of

defence against pirates. It was from there that the hostile ships were first sighted, and the signal given to

Hasdrubal; excitement and confusion prevailed in the camp on shore before it reached the ships at sea, as the

splash of the oars and other sounds of advancing ships were not yet heard, and the projecting headlands hid

the Roman fleet from view. Suddenly one mounted vidette after another from Hasdrubal galloped up with


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orders to those who were strolling about on the shore or resting in their tents, and expecting anything rather

than the approach of an enemy or battle that day, to embark with all speed and take their arms, for the Roman

fleet was now not far from the harbour. This order the mounted men were giving in all directions, and before

long Hasdrubal himself appeared with the whole of his army. Everywhere there was noise and confusion, the

rowers and the soldiers scrambled on board more like men flying from the shore than men going into action.

Hardly were all on board, when some unfastened the mooring ropes and drifted towards their anchors, others

cut their cables; everything was done in too much haste and hurry, the work of the seamen was hampered by

the preparations which the soldiers were making, and the soldiers were prevented from putting themselves in

fighting trim owing to the confusion and panic which prevailed amongst the seamen. By this time the

Romans were not only near at hand, they had actually lined up their ships for the attack. The Carthaginians

were paralysed quite as much by their own disorder as by the approach of the enemy, and they brought their

ships round for flight, after abandoning a struggle which it would be more true to say was attempted rather

than begun. But it was impossible for their widely extended line to enter the mouth of the river all at once,

and the ships were run ashore in all directions. Some of those on board got out through the shallow water,

others jumped on to the beach, with arms or without, and made good their escape to the army which was

drawn up ready for action along the shore. Two Carthaginian ships, however, were captured to begin with

and four sunk.

Though the Romans saw that the enemy were in force on land and that their army was extended along the

shore, they showed no hesitation in following up the enemy's panicstricken fleet. They secured all the ships

which had not staved their prows in on the beach, or grounded with their keels in the mud by fastening

hawsers to their sterns and dragging them into deep water. Out of forty vessels twentyfive were captured in

this way. This was not, however, the best part of the victory. Its main importance lay in the fact that this one

insignificant encounter gave the mastery of the whole of the adjacent sea. The fleet accordingly sailed to

Onusa, and there the soldiers disembarked, captured and plundered the place and then marched towards New

Carthage. They ravaged the entire country round, and ended by setting fire to the houses which adjoined the

walls and gates. Reembarking laden with plunder, they sailed to Longuntica, where they found a great

quantity of esparto grass which Hasdrubal had collected for the use of the navy, and after taking what they

could use they burnt the rest. They did not confine themselves to cruising along the coast, but crossed over to

the island of Ebusus, where they made a determined but unsuccessful attack upon the capital during the

whole of two days. As they found that they were only wasting time on a hopeless enterprise, they took to

plundering the country, and sacked and burnt several villages. Here they secured more booty than on the

mainland, and after placing it on board, as they were on the point of sailing away, some envoys came to

Scipio from the Balearic isles to sue for peace. From this point the fleet sailed back to the eastern side of the

province where envoys were assembled from all the tribes in the district of the Ebro, and many even from the

remotest parts of Spain. The tribes which actually acknowledged the supremacy of Rome and gave hostages

amounted to more than a hundred and twenty. The Romans felt now as much confidence in their army as in

their navy, and marched as far as the pass of Castulo. Hasdrubal retired to Lusitania where he was nearer to

the Atlantic.

It now seemed as though the remainder of the summer would be undisturbed, and it would have been so as far

as the Carthaginians were concerned. But the Spanish temperament is restless and fond of change, and after

the Romans had left the pass and retired to the coast, Mandonius and Indibilis, who had previously been chief

of the Ibergetes, roused their fellowtribesmen and proceeded to harry the lands of those who were in peace

and alliance with Rome. Scipio despatched a military tribune with some lightarmed auxiliaries to disperse

them, and after a trifling engagement, for they were undisciplined and without organisation, they were all put

to rout, some being killed or taken prisoners, and a large proportion deprived of their arms. This disturbance,

however, brought Hasdrubal, who was marching westwards, back to the defence of his allies on the south

side of the Ebro. The Carthaginians were in camp amongst the Ilergavonians; the Roman camp was at Nova,

when unexpected intelligence turned the tide of war in another direction. The Celtiberi, who had sent their

chief men as envoys to Scipio and had given hostages, were induced by his representations to take up arms


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and invade the province of New Carthage with a powerful army. They took three fortified towns by storm,

and fought two most successful actions with Hasdrubal himself, killing 15,000 of the enemy and taking 4000

prisoners with numerous standards.

This was the position of affairs when P. Scipio, whose command had been extended after he ceased to be

consul, came to the province which had been assigned to him by the senate. He brought a reinforcement of

thirty ships of war and 8000 troops, also a large convoy of supplies. This fleet, with its enormous column of

transports, excited the liveliest delight among the townsmen and their allies when it was seen in the distance

and finally reached the port of Tarracona. There the soldiers were landed and Scipio marched up country to

meet his brother; thenceforward they carried on the campaign with their united forces and with one heart and

purpose. As the Carthaginians were preoccupied with the Celtiberian war, the Scipios had no hesitation in

crossing the Ebro and, as no enemy appeared, marching straight to Saguntum, where they had been informed

that the hostages who had been surrendered to Hannibal from all parts of Spain were detained in the citadel

under a somewhat weak guard. The fact that they had given these pledges was the only thing that prevented

all the tribes of Spain from openly manifesting their leanings towards alliance with Rome; they dreaded lest

the price of their defection from Carthage should be the blood of their own children. From this bond Spain

was released by the clever but treacherous scheme of one individual.

Abelux was a Spaniard of high birth living at Saguntum, who had at one time been loyal to Carthage, but

afterwards, with the usual fickleness of barbarians, as the fortunes of Carthage changed so he changed his

allegiance. He considered that any one going over to the enemy without having something valuable to betray

was simply a worthless and disreputable individual, and so he made it his one aim to be of the greatest service

he could to his new allies. After making a survey of everything which Fortune could possibly put within his

reach, he made up his mind to effect the delivery of the hostages; that one thing he thought would do more

than anything else to win the friendship of the Spanish chieftains for the Romans. He was quite aware,

however, that the guardians of the hostages would take no step without the orders of Bostar, their

commanding officer, and so he employed his arts against Bostar himself. Bostar had fixed his camp outside

the city quite on the shore that he might bar the approach of the Romans on that side. After obtaining a secret

interview with him he warned him, as though he were unaware of it, as to the actual state of affairs. "Up to

this time," he said, "fear alone has kept the Spaniards loyal because the Romans were far away; now the

Roman camp is on our side the Ebro, a secure stronghold and refuge for all who want to change their

allegiance. Those, therefore, who are no longer restrained by fear must be bound to us by kindness and

feelings of gratitude." Bostar was greatly surprised, and asked him what boon could suddenly effect such

great results. "Send the hostages," was the reply, "back to their homes. That will evoke gratitude from their

parents, who are very influential people in their own country, and also from their fellowcountrymen

generally. Every one likes to feel that he is trusted; the confidence you place in others generally strengthens

their confidence in you. The service of restoring the hostages to their respective homes I claim for myself,

that I may contribute to the success of my plan by my own personal efforts, and win for an act gracious in

itself still more gratitude."

He succeeded in persuading Bostar, whose intelligence was not on a par with the acuteness which the other

Carthaginians showed. After this interview he went secretly to the enemy's outposts, and meeting with some

Spanish auxiliaries he was conducted by them into the presence of Scipio, to whom he explained what he

proposed to do. Pledges of good faith were mutually exchanged and the place and time for handing over the

hostages fixed, after which he returned to Saguntum. The following day he spent in receiving Bostar's

instructions for the execution of the project. It was agreed between them that he should go at night in order,

as he pretended, to escape the observation of the Roman outposts. He had already arranged with these as to

the hour at which he would come, and after awakening those who were in guard of the boys he conducted the

hostages, without appearing to be aware of the fact, into the trap which he had himself prepared. The outposts

conducted them into the Roman camp; all the remaining details connected with their restoration to their

homes were carried out as he had arranged with Bostar, precisely as if the business were being transacted m


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the name of Carthage. Yet though the service rendered was the same, the gratitude felt towards the Romans

was considerably greater than would have been earned by the Carthaginians, who had shown themselves

oppressive and tyrannical in the time of their prosperity, and now that they experienced a change of fortune

their act might have appeared to be dictated by fear. The Romans, on the other hand, hitherto perfect

strangers, had no sooner come into the country than they began with an act of clemency and generosity, and

Abelux was considered to have shown his prudence in changing his allies to such good purpose. All now

began with surprising unanimity to meditate revolt, and an armed movement would have begun at once had

not the winter set in, which compelled the Romans as well as the Carthaginians to retire to their quarters.

These were the main incidents of the campaign in Spain during the second summer of the Punic war. In Italy

the masterly inaction of Fabius had for a short time stemmed the tide of Roman disasters. It was a cause of

grave anxiety to Hannibal, for he fully realised that the Romans had chosen for their commanderinchief a

man who conducted war on rational principles and not by trusting to chance. But amongst his own people,

soldiers and civilians alike, his tactics were viewed with contempt, especially after a battle had been brought

about owing to the rashness of the Master of the Horse in the Dictator's absence which would be more

correctly described as fortunate rather than as successful. Two incidents occurred which made the Dictator

still more unpopular. One was due to the crafty policy of Hannibal. Some deserters had pointed out to him the

Dictator's landed property, and after all the surrounding buildings had been levelled to the ground he gave

orders for that property to be spared from fire and sword and all hostile treatment whatever in order that it

might be thought that there was some secret bargain between them. The second cause of the Dictator's

growing unpopularity was something which he himself did, and which at first bore an equivocal aspect

because he had acted without the authority of the senate, but ultimately it was universally recognised as

redounding very greatly to his credit. In carrying out the exchange of prisoners it had been agreed between

the Roman and the Carthaginian commanders, following the precedent of the first Punic war, that whichever

side received back more prisoners than they gave should strike a balance by paying two and a half pounds of

silver for each soldier they received in excess of those they gave. The Roman prisoners restored were two

hundred and fortyseven more than the Carthaginians. The question of this payment had been frequently

discussed in the senate, but as Fabius had not consulted that body before making the agreement there was

some delay in voting the money. The matter was settled by Fabius sending his son Quintus to Rome to sell

the land which had been untouched by the enemy; he thus discharged the obligation of the State at his own

private expense. When Hannibal burnt Gereonium after its capture, he left a few houses standing to serve as

granaries, and now he was occupying a standing camp before its walls. He was in the habit of sending out

two divisions to collect corn, he remained in camp with the third ready to move in any direction where he saw

that his foragers were being attacked.

The Roman army was at the time in the neighbourhood of Larinum, with Minucius in command, owing, as

stated above, to the Dictator having left for the City. The camp had been situated in a lofty and secure

position; it was now transferred to the plain, and more energetic measures more in harmony with the general's

temperament were being discussed; suggestions were made for an attack either on the dispersed parties of

foragers or on the camp now that it was left with a weak guard. Hannibal soon found out that the tactics of his

enemies had changed with the change of generals, and that they would act with more spirit than prudence,

and incredible as it may sound, though his enemy was in closer proximity to him, he sent out a whole division

of his army to collect corn, keeping the other two in camp. The next thing he did was to move his camp still

nearer the enemy, about two miles from Gereonium on rising ground within view of the Romans, so that they

might know that he was determined to protect his foragers in case of attack. From this position he was able to

see another elevated position still closer to the Roman camp, in fact looking down on it. There was no doubt

that if he were to attempt to seize it in broad daylight the enemy, having less distance to go, would be there

before him, so he sent a force of Numidians who occupied it during the night. The next day the Romans,

seeing how small a number were holding the position, made short work of them and drove them off and then

transferred their own camp there. By this time there was but a very small distance between rampart and

rampart, and even that was almost entirely filled with Roman troops, who were demonstrating in force to


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conceal the movements of cavalry and light infantry who had been sent through the camp gate farthest from

the enemy to attack his foragers, upon whom they inflicted severe losses. Hannibal did not venture upon a

regular battle because his camp was so weakly guarded that it could not have repelled an assault. Borrowing

the tactics of Fabius he began to carry on the campaign by remaining in almost complete inaction, and

withdrew his camp to its former position before the walls of Gereonium. According to some authors a pitched

battle was fought with both armies in regular formation; the Carthaginians were routed at the first onset and

driven to their camp; from there a sudden sortie was made and it was the Romans' turn to flee, and the battle

was once more restored by the sudden appearance of Numerius Decimus, the Samnite general. Decimus was,

as far as wealth and lineage go, the foremost man not only in Bovianum, his native place, but in the whole of

Samnium. In obedience to the Dictator's orders he was bringing into camp a force of 8000 foot and 500 horse,

and when he appeared in Hannibal's rear both sides thought that it was a reinforcement coming from Rome

under Q. Fabius. Hannibal, it is further stated, ordered his men to retire, the Romans followed them up, and

with the aid of the Samnites captured two of their fortified positions the same day; 6000 of the enemy were

killed and about 5000 of the Romans, yet though the losses were so evenly balanced an idle and foolish report

of a splendid victory reached Rome together with a despatch from the Master of the Horse which was still

more foolish.

This state of affairs led to constant discussions in the senate and the Assembly. Amidst the universal rejoicing

the Dictator stood alone; he declared that he did not place the slightest credence in either the report or the

despatch, and even if everything was as it was represented, he dreaded success more than failure. On this M.

Metilius, tribune of the plebs, said it was really becoming intolerable that the Dictator, not content with

standing in the way of any success being achieved when he was on the spot, should now be equally opposed

to it after it had been achieved in his absence. "He was deliberately wasting time in his conduct of the war in

order to remain longer in office as sole magistrate and retain his supreme command. One consul has fallen in

battle, the other has been banished far from Italy under pretext of chasing the Carthaginian fleet; two praetors

have their hands full with Sicily and Sardinia, neither of which provinces needs a praetor at all at this time;

M. Minucius, Master of the Horse, has been almost kept under guard to prevent him from seeing the enemy

or doing anything which savoured of war. And so, good heavens! not only Samnium, where we retreated

before the Carthaginians as though it were some territory beyond the Ebro, but even the country of Falernum,

have been utterly laid waste, while the Dictator was sitting idly at Casilinum, using the legions of Rome to

protect his own property. The Master of the Horse and the army, who were burning to fight, were kept back

and almost imprisoned within their lines; they were deprived of their arms as though they were prisoners of

war. At length, no sooner had the Dictator departed than, like men delivered from a blockade, they left their

entrenchments and routed the enemy and put him to flight. Under these circumstances I was prepared, if the

Roman plebs still possessed the spirit they showed in old days, to take the bold step of bringing in a measure

to relieve Q. Fabius of his command; as it is I shall propose a resolution couched in very moderate

terms'that the authority of the Master of the Horse be made equal to that of the Dictator.' But even if this

resolution is carried Q. Fabius must not be allowed to rejoin the army before he has appointed a consul in

place of C. Flaminius."

As the line which the Dictator was taking was in the highest degree unpopular, he kept away from the

Assembly. Even in the senate he produced an unfavourable impression when he spoke in laudatory terms of

the enemy and put down the disasters of the past two years to rashness and lack of generalship on the part of

the commanders. The Master of the Horse, he said, must be called to account for having fought against his

orders. If, he went on to say, the supreme command and direction of the war remained in his hands, he would

soon let men know that in the case of a good general Fortune plays a small part, intelligence and military skill

are the main factors. To have preserved the army in circumstances of extreme danger without any humiliating

defeat was in his opinion a more glorious thing than the slaughter of many thousands of the enemy. But he

failed to convince his audience, and after appointing M. Atilius Regulus as consul, he set off by night to

rejoin his army. He was anxious to avoid a personal altercation on the question of his authority, and left

Rome the day before the proposal was voted upon. At daybreak a meeting of the plebs was held to consider


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the proposal. Though the general feeling was one of hostility to the Dictator and goodwill towards the Master

of the Horse, few were found bold enough to give this feeling utterance and recommend a proposal which

after all was acceptable to the plebs as a body, and so, notwithstanding the fact that the great majority were in

favour of it, it lacked the support of men of weight and influence. One man was found who came forward to

advocate the proposal, C. Terentius Varro, who had been praetor the year before, a man of humble and even

mean origin. The tradition is that his father was a butcher who hawked his meat about and employed his son

in the menial drudgery of his trade.

The money made in this business was left to his son, who hoped that his fortune might help him to a more

respectable position in society. He decided to become an advocate, and his appearances in the Forum, where

he defended men of the lowest class by noisy and scurrilous attacks upon the property and character of

respectable citizens, brought him into notoriety and ultimately into office. After discharging the various

duties of the quaestorship, the two aedileships, plebeian and curule, and lastly those of the praetor, he now

aspired to the consulship. With this view he cleverly took advantage of the feeling against the Dictator to

court the gale of popular favour, and gained for himself the whole credit of carrying the resolution.

Everybody, whether in Rome or in the army, whether friend or foe, with the sole exception of the Dictator

himself, looked upon this proposal as intended to cast a slur on him. But he met the injustice done to him by

the people, embittered as they were against him, with the same dignified composure with which he had

previously treated the charges which his opponents had brought against him before the populace. While still

on his way he received a despatch containing the senatorial decree for dividing his command, but as he knew

perfectly well that an equal share of military command by no means implied an equal share of military skill,

he returned to his army with a spirit undismayed by either his fellowcitizens or the enemy.

Owing to his success and popularity Minucius had been almost unbearable before, but now that he had won

as great a victory over Fabius as over Hannibal, his boastful arrogance knew no bounds. "The man," he

exclaimed, "who was selected as the only general who would be a match for Hannibal has now, by an order

of the people, been put on a level with his second in command; the Dictator has to share his powers with the

Master of the Horse. There is no precedent for this in our annals, and it has been done in that very State in

which Masters of the Horse have been wont to look with dread upon the rods and axes of Dictators. So

brilliant have been my good fortune and my merits. If the Dictator persists in that dilatoriness and inaction

which have been condemned by the judgment of gods and men, I shall follow my good fortune wherever it

may lead me." Accordingly on his first meeting with Q. Fabius, he told him that the very first thing that had

to be settled was the method in which they should exercise their divided authority. The best plan, he thought,

would be for them each to take supreme command on alternate days, or, if he preferred it, at longer intervals.

This would enable whichever general was in command to meet Hannibal with tactics and strength equal to his

own should an opportunity arise of striking a blow. Q. Fabius met this proposal with a decided negative.

Everything, he argued, which his colleague's rashness might prompt would be at the mercy of Fortune;

though his command was shared with another, he was not wholly deprived of it; he would never therefore

voluntarily give up what power he still possessed of conducting operations with common sense and prudence,

and though he refused to agree to a division of days or periods of command, he was prepared to divide the

army with him and use his best foresight and judgment to preserve what he could as he could not save all. So

it was arranged that they should adopt the plan of the consuls and share the legions between them. The first

and fourth went to Minucius, Fabius retained the second and third. The cavalry and the contingents supplied

by the Latins and the allies were also divided equally between them. The Master of the Horse even insisted

upon separate camps.

Nothing that was going on amongst his enemies escaped the observation of Hannibal, for ample information

was supplied to him by deserters as well as by his scouts. He was doubly delighted, for he felt sure of

entrapping by his own peculiar methods the wild rashness of Minucius, and he saw that Fabius' skilful tactics

had lost half their strength. Between Minucius' camp and Hannibal's there was some rising ground, and

whichever side seized it would undoubtedly be able to render their adversaries' position less secure. Hannibal


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determined to secure it, and though it would have been worth while doing so without a fight, he preferred to

bring on a battle with Minucius, who, he felt quite sure, would hurry up to stop him. The entire intervening

country seemed, at a first glance, totally unsuited for surprise tactics, for there were no woods anywhere, no

spots covered with brushwood and scrub, but in reality it naturally lent itself to such a purpose, and all the

more so because in so bare a valley no stratagem of the kind could be suspected. In its windings there were

caverns, some so large as to be capable of concealing two hundred men. Each of these hidingplaces was

filled with troops, and altogether 5000 horse and foot were placed in concealment. In case, however, the

stratagem might be detected by some soldier's thoughtless movements, or the glint of arms in so open a

valley, Hannibal sent a small detachment to seize the rising ground already described in order to divert the

attention of the enemy. As soon as they were sighted, their small number excited ridicule, and every man

begged that he might have the task of dislodging them. Conspicuous amongst his senseless and hotheaded

soldiers the general sounded a general call to arms, and poured idle abuse and threats on the enemy. He sent

the light infantry first in open skirmishing order, these were followed by the cavalry in close formation, and

at last, when he saw that reinforcements were being brought up to the enemy, he advanced with the legions in

line. Hannibal on his side sent supports, both horse and foot, to his men wherever they were hard pressed, and

the numbers engaged steadily grew until he had formed his entire army into order of battle and both sides

were in full strength. The Roman light infantry moving up the hill from lower ground were the first to be

repulsed and forced back to the cavalry who were coming up behind them. They sought refuge behind the

front ranks of the legions, who alone amidst the general panic preserved their coolness and presence of mind.

Had it been a straightforward fight, man to man, they would to all appearance have been quite a match for

their foes, so much had their success, a few days previously, restored their courage. But the sudden

appearance of the concealed troops and their combined attack on both flanks and on the rear of the Roman

legions created such confusion and alarm that not a man had any spirit left to fight or any hope of escaping by

flight.

Fabius' attention was first drawn to the cries of alarm, then he observed in the distance the disordered and

broken ranks. "Just so," he exclaimed, "Fortune has overtaken his rashness, but not more quickly than I

feared. Fabius is his equal in command, but he has found out that Hannibal is his superior both in ability and

in success. However, this is not the time for censure or rebuke, advance into the field! Let us wrest victory

from the foe, and a confession of error from our fellowcitizens." By this time the rout had spread over a

large part of the field, some were killed, others looking round for the means of escape, when suddenly the

army of Fabius appeared as though sent down from heaven to their rescue. Before they came within range of

their missiles, before they could exchange blows, they checked their comrades in their wild flight and the

enemy in their fierce attack. Those who had been scattered hither and thither after their ranks were broken,

closed in from all sides and reformed their line; those who had kept together in their retreat wheeled round to

face the enemy, and, forming square, at one moment slowly retired, and at another shoulder to shoulder stood

their ground. The defeated troops and those who were fresh on the field had now practically become one line,

and they were commencing an advance on the enemy when the Carthaginian sounded the retreat, showing

clearly that whilst Minucius had been defeated by him he was himself vanquished by Fabius. The greater part

of the day had been spent in these varying fortunes of the field. On their return to camp Minucius called his

men together and addressed them thus: "Soldiers, I have often heard it said that the best man is he who

himself advises what is the right thing to do; next to him comes the man who follows good advice; but the

man who neither himself knows what counsel to give nor obeys the wise counsels of another is of the very

lowest order of intelligence. Since the first order of intelligence and capacity has been denied to us let us

cling to the second and intermediate one, and whilst we are learning to command, let us make up our minds

to obey him who is wise and far sighted. Let us join camp with Fabius. When we have carried the standards

to his tent where I shall salute him as 'Father,' a title which the service he has done us and the greatness of his

office alike deserve, you soldiers will salute as 'Patrons' those whose arms and right hands protected you a

little while ago. If this day has done nothing else for us, it has at all events conferred on us the glory of having

grateful hearts."


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The signal was given and the word passed to collect the baggage; they then proceeded in marching order to

the Dictator's camp much to his surprise and to the surprise of all who were round him. When the standards

had been stationed in front of his tribunal, the Master of the Horse stepped forward and addressed him as

"Father," and the whole of his troops saluted those who were crowding round them as "Patrons." He then

proceeded, "I have put you on a level, Dictator, with my parents as far as I can do so in words, but to them I

only owe my life, to you I owe my preservation and the safety of all these men. The decree of the plebs,

which I feel to be onerous rather than an honour, I am the first to repeal and annul, and with a prayer that it

may turn out well for you, for me, and for these armies of yours, for preserved and preserver alike, I place

myself again under your auspicious authority and restore to you these legions with their standards. I ask you,

as an act of grace, to order me to retain my office and these, each man of them, his place in the ranks." Then

each man grasped his neighbour's hand, and the soldiers were dismissed to quarters where they were

generously and hospitably entertained by acquaintances and strangers alike, and the day which had a short

time ago been dark and gloomy and almost marked by disaster and ruin became a day of joy and gladness.

When the report of this action reached Rome and was confirmed by despatches from both commanders, and

by letters from the rank and file of both armies, every man did his best to extol Maximus to the skies. His

reputation was quite as great with Hannibal and the Carthaginians; now at last they felt that the were warring

with Romans and on Italian soil. For the last two years they had felt such contempt for Roman generals and

Roman troops that they could hardly believe that they were at war with that nation of whom they had heard

such a terrible report from their fathers. Hannibal on his return from the field is reported to have said, "The

cloud which has so long settled on the mountain heights has at last burst upon us in rain and storm."

While these events were occurring in Italy, the consul., Cn. Servilius Geminus, with a fleet of 120 vessels,

visited Sardinia and Corsica and received hostages from both islands; from there he sailed to Africa. Before

landing on the mainland he laid waste the island of Menix and allowed the inhabitants of Cercina to save their

island from a similar visitation by paying an indemnity of ten talents of silver. After this he disembarked his

forces on the African coast and sent them, both soldiers and seamen, to ravage the country. They dispersed

far and wide just as though they were plundering uninhabited islands, and consequently their recklessness led

them into an ambuscade. Straggling in small parties, they were surrounded by large numbers of the enemy

who knew the country, whilst they were strangers to it, with the result that they were driven in wild flight and

with heavy loss back to their ships. After losing as many as a thousand menamongst them the quaestor

Sempronius Blaesusthe fleet hastily put to sea from shores lined with the enemy and held its course to

Sicily. Here it was handed over to T. Otacilius, in order that his second in command, P. Sura, might take it

back to Rome. Servilius himself proceeded overland through Sicily and crossed the Strait into Italy, in

consequence of a despatch from Q. Fabius recalling him and his colleague, M. Atilius, to take over the

armies, as his six months' tenure of office had almost expired. All the annalists, with one or two exceptions,

state that Fabius acted against Hannibal as Dictator; Caelius adds that he was the first Dictator who was

appointed by the people. But Caelius and the rest have forgotten that the right of nominating a Dictator lay

with the consul alone, and Servilius, who was the only consul at the time, was in Gaul. The citizens, appalled

by three successive defeats, could not endure the thought of delay, and recourse was had to the appointment

by the people of a man to act in place of a Dictator ("pro dictatore"). His subsequent achievements, his

brilliant reputation as a commander, and the exaggerations which his descendants introduced into the

inscription on his bust easily explain the belief which ultimately gained ground, that Fabius, who had only

been prodictator, was actually Dictator.

Fabius army was transferred to Atilius, Servilius Geminus took over the one which Minucius had

commanded. They lost no time in fortifying their winter quarters, and during the remainder of the autumn

conducted their joint operations in the most perfect harmony on the line which Fabius had laid down. When

Hannibal left his camp to collect supplies, they were conveniently posted at different spots to harass his main

body and cut off stragglers; but they refused to risk a general engagement, though the enemy employed every

artifice to bring one on. Hannibal was reduced to such extremities that he would have marched back into Gaul

had not his departure looked like flight. No chance whatever would have been left to him of feeding his army


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in that part of Italy if the succeeding consuls had persevered in the same tactics. When the winter had brought

the war to a standstill at Gereonium, envoys from Neapolis arrived in Rome. They brought with them into the

Senatehouse forty very heavy golden bowls, and addressed the assembled senators in the following terms:

"We know that the Roman treasury is being drained by the war, and since this war is being carried on for the

towns and fields of the allies quite as much as for the head and stronghold of Italy, the City of Rome and its

empire, we Neapolitans have thought it but right to assist the Roman people with the gold which has been left

by our ancestors for the enriching of our temples and for a reserve in time of need. If we thought that our

personal services would have been of any use we would just as gladly have offered them. The senators and

people of Rome will confer a great pleasure upon us if they look upon everything that belongs to the

Neapolitans as their own, and deign to accept from us a gift, the value and importance of which lie rather in

the cordial goodwill of those who gladly give it than in any intrinsic worth which it may itself possess." A

vote of thanks was passed to the envoys for their munificence and their care for the interests of Rome, and

one bowl, the smallest, was accepted.

About the same time a Carthaginian spy who for two years had escaped detection was caught in Rome, and

after both his hands were cut off, he was sent away. Twentyfive slaves who had formed a conspiracy in the

Campus Martius were crucified; the informer had his liberty given to him and 20,000 bronze ases.

Ambassadors were sent to Philip, King of Macedon, to demand the surrender of Demetrius of Pharos, who

had taken refuge with him after his defeat, and another embassy was despatched to the Ligurians to make a

formal complaint as to the assistance they had given the Carthaginian in men and money, and at the same

time to get a nearer view of what was going on amongst the Boii and the Insubres. Officials were also sent to

Pineus, King of Illyria, to demand payment of the tribute which was now in arrears, or, if he wished for an

extension of time, to accept personal securities for its payment. So, though they had an immense war on their

shoulders, nothing escaped the attention of the Romans in any part of the world, however distant. A religious

difficulty arose about an unfulfilled vow. On the occasion of the mutiny amongst the troops in Gaul two years

before, the praetor, L. Manlius, had vowed a temple to Concord, but up to that time no contract had been

made for its construction. Two commissioners were appointed for the purpose by M. Aemilius, the City

praetor, namely, C. Pupius and Caeso Quinctius Flamininus, and they entered into a contract for the building

of the temple within the precinct of the citadel. The senate passed a resolution that Aemilius should also write

to the consuls asking one of them, if they approved, to come to Rome to hold the consular elections, and he

would give notice of the elections for whatever day they fixed upon. The consuls replied that they could not

leave the army in the presence of the enemy without danger to the republic, it would be therefore better for

the elections to be held by an interrex than that a consul should be recalled from the front. The senate thought

it better for a Dictator to be nominated by the consul for the purpose of holding the elections. L. Veturius

Philo was nominated; he appointed Manlius Pomponius Matho his Master of the Horse. Their election was

found to be invalid, and they were ordered to resign office after holding it for four days; matters reverted to

an interregnum.

(216 B.C.)Servilius and Regulus had their commands extended for another year. The interreges appointed by

the senate were C. Claudius Cento, son of Appius, and P. Cornelius Asina. The latter conducted the elections

amidst a bitter struggle between the patricians and the plebs. C. Terentius Varro, a member of their own

order, had ingratiated himself with the plebs by his attacks upon the leading men in the State and by all the

tricks known to the demagogue. His success in shaking the influence of Fabius and weakening the authority

of the Dictator had invested him with a certain glory in the eyes of the mob, which was heightened by the

other's unpopularity, and they did their utmost to raise him to the consulship. The patricians opposed him

with their utmost strength, dreading lest it should become a common practice for men to attack them as a

means of rising to an equality with them. Q. Baebius Herennius, a relation of Varro's, accused not only the

senate, but even the augurs, because they had prevented the Dictator from carrying the elections through, and

by thus embittering public opinion against them, he strengthened the feeling in favour of his own candidate.

"It was by the nobility," he declared, "who had for many years been trying to get up a war, that Hannibal was

brought into Italy, and when the war might have been brought to a close, it was they who were


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unscrupulously protracting it. The advantage which M. Minucius gained in the absence of Fabius made it

abundantly clear that with four legions combined, a successful fight could be maintained, but afterwards two

legions had been exposed to slaughter at the hands of the enemy, and then rescued at the very last moment in

order that he might be called 'Father' and 'Patron' because he would not allow the Romans to conquer before

they had been defeated. Then as to the consuls; though they had it in their power to finish the war they had

adopted Fabius' policy and protracted it. This is the secret understanding that has been come to by all the

nobles, and we shall never see the end of the war till we have elected as our consul a man who is really a

plebeian, that is, one from the ranks. The plebeian nobility have all been initiated into the same mysteries;

when they are no longer looked down upon by the patricians, they at once begin to look down upon the plebs.

Who does not see that their one aim and object was to bring about an interregnum in order that the elections

might be controlled by the patricians? That was the object of the consuls in both staying with the army; then,

afterwards, because they had to nominate a Dictator against their will to conduct the elections, they had

carried their point by force, and the Dictator's appointment was declared invalid by the augurs. Well, they

have got their interregnum; one consulship at all events belongs to the Roman plebs; the people will freely

dispose of it and give it to the man who prefers an early victory to prolonged command."

Harangues like these kindled intense excitement amongst the plebs. There were three patrician candidates in

the field, P. Cornelius Merenda, L. Manlius Vulso, and M. Aemilius Lepidus; two plebeians who were now

ennobled, C. Atilius Serranus and Q. Aelius Paetus, one of whom was a pontiff, the other an augur. But the

only one elected was C. Terentius Varro, so that the elections for appointing his colleague were in his hands.

The nobility saw that his rivals were not strong enough, and they compelled L. Aemilius Paulus to come

forward. He had come off with a blasted reputation from the trial in which his colleague had been found

guilty, and he narrowly escaped, and for a long time stoutly resisted the proposal to become a candidate

owing to his intense dislike of the plebs. On the next election day, after all Varro's opponents had retired, he

was given to him not so much to be his colleague as to oppose him on equal terms. The elections of praetors

followed; those elected were Manlius Pomponius Matho and P. Furius Philus. To Philus was assigned the

jurisdiction over Roman citizens, to Pomponius the decision of suits between citizens and foreigners. Two

additional praetors were appointed, M. Claudius Marcellus for Sicily, and L. Postumius Albinus to act in

Gaul. These were all elected in their absence, and none of them, with the exception of Varro, were new to

office. Several strong and capable men were passed over, for at such a time it seemed undesirable that a

magistracy should be entrusted to new and untried men.

The armies were increased, but as to what additions were made to the infantry and cavalry, the authorities

vary so much, both as to the numbers and nature of the forces, that I should hardly venture to assert anything

as positively certain. Some say that 10,000 recruits were called out to make up the losses; others, that four

new legions were enrolled so that they might carry on the war with eight legions. Some authorities record that

both horse and foot in the legions were made stronger by the addition of 1000 infantry and 100 cavalry to

each, so that they contained 5000 infantry and 300 cavalry, whilst the allies furnished double the number of

cavalry and an equal number of infantry. Thus, according to these writers, there were 87,200 men in the

Roman camp when the battle of Cannae was fought. One thing is quite certain; the struggle was resumed with

greater vigour and energy than in former years, because the Dictator had given them reason to hope that the

enemy might be conquered. But before the newly raised legions left the City the decemvirs were ordered to

consult the Sacred Books owing to the general alarm which had been created by fresh portents. It was

reported that showers of stones had fallen simultaneously on the Aventine in Rome and at Aricia; that the

statues of the gods amongst the Sabines had sweated blood, and cold water had flowed from the hot springs.

This latter portent created more terror, because it had happened several times. In the colonnade near the

Campus several men had been killed by lightning. The proper expiation of these portents was ascertained

from the Sacred Books. Some envoys from Paestum brought golden bowls to Rome. Thanks were voted to

them as in the case of the Neapolitans, but the gold was not accepted.


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About the same time a fleet which had been despatched by Hiero arrived at Ostia with a large quantity of

supplies. When his officers were introduced into the senate they spoke in the following terms: "The news of

the death of the consul C. Flaminius and the destruction of his army caused so much distress and grief to

King Hiero that he could not have been more deeply moved by any disaster which could happen either to

himself personally or to his kingdom. Although he well knows that the greatness of Rome is almost more to

be admired in adversity than in prosperity, still, notwithstanding that, he has sent everything with which good

and faithful allies can assist their friends in time of war, and he earnestly intreats the senate not to reject his

offer. To begin with, we are bringing, as an omen of good fortune, a golden statue of Victory, weighing two

hundred and twenty pounds. We ask you to accept it and keep it as your own for ever. We have also brought

300,000 pecks of wheat and 200,000 of barley that you may not want provisions, and we are prepared to

transport as much more as you require to any place that you may decide upon. The king is quite aware that

Rome does not employ any legionary soldiers or cavalry except Romans and those belonging to the Latin

nation, but he has seen foreigners serving as light infantry in the Roman camp. He has, accordingly, sent

1000 archers and slingers, capable of acting against the Balearics and Moors and other tribes who fight with

missile weapons." They supplemented these gifts by suggesting that the praetor to whom Sicily had been

assigned should take the fleet over to Africa so that the country of the enemy, too, might be visited by war,

and less facilities afforded him for sending reinforcements to Hannibal. The senate requested the officers to

take back the following reply to the king: Hiero was a man of honour and an exemplary ally; he had been

consistently loyal all through, and had on every occasion rendered most generous help to Rome, and for that

Rome was duly grateful. The gold which had been offered by one or two cities had not been accepted, though

the Roman people were very grateful for the offer. They would, however, accept the statue of Victory as an

omen for the future, and would give and consecrate a place for her in the Capitol in the temple of Jupiter

Optimus Maximus. Enshrined in that stronghold she will be gracious and propitious, constant and steadfast to

Rome. The archers and slingers and the corn were handed over to the consuls. The fleet which T. Otacilius

had with him in Sicily was strengthened by the addition of twentyfive quinqueremes, and permission was

given him to cross over to Africa if he thought it would be in the interest of the republic.

After completing the enrolment the consuls waited a few days for the contingents furnished by the Latins and

the allies to come in. Then a new departure was made; the soldiers were sworn in by the military tribunes. Up

to that day there had only been the military oath binding the men to assemble at the bidding of the consuls

and not to disband until they received orders to do so. It had also been the custom among the soldiers, when

the infantry were formed into companies of 100, and the cavalry into troops of 10, for all the men in each

company or troop to take a voluntary oath to each other that they would not leave their comrades for fear or

for flight, and that they would not quit the ranks save to fetch or pick up a weapon, to strike an enemy, or to

save a comrade. This voluntary covenant was now changed into a formal oath taken before the tribunes.

Before they marched out of the City, Varro delivered several violent harangues, in which he declared that the

war had been brought into Italy by the nobles, and would continue to feed on the vitals of the republic if there

were more generals like Fabius; he, Varro, would finish off the war the very day he caught sight of the

enemy. His colleague, Paulus, made only one speech, in which there was much more truth than the people

cared to hear. He passed no strictures on Varro, but he did express surprise that any general, whilst still in the

City before he had taken up his command, or become acquainted with either his own army or that of the

enemy, or gained any information as to the lie of the country and the nature of the ground, should know in

what way he should conduct the campaign and be able to foretell the day on which he would fight a decisive

battle with the enemy. As for himself, Paulus said that he would not anticipate events by disclosing his

measures, for, after all, circumstances determined measures for men much more than men made

circumstances subservient to measures. He hoped and prayed that such measures as were taken with due

caution and foresight might turn out successful; so far rashness, besides being foolish, had proved disastrous.

He made it quite clear that he would prefer safe to hasty counsels, and in order to strengthen him in this

resolve Fabius is said to have addressed him on his departure in the following terms:


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" L. Aemilius, if you were like your colleague or, if you had a colleague like yourselfand I would that it

were somy address would be simply a waste of words. For if you were both good consuls, you would,

without any suggestions from me, do everything that the interests of the State or your own sense of honour

demanded; if you were both alike bad, you would neither listen to anything I had to say, nor take any advice

which I might offer. As it is, when I look at your colleague and consider what sort of a man you are, I shall

address my remarks to you. I can see that your merits as a man and a citizen will effect nothing if one half of

the commonwealth is crippled and evil counsels possess the same force and authority as good ones. You are

mistaken, L. Paulus, if you imagine that you will have less difficulty with C. Terentius than with Hannibal; I

rather think the former will prove a more dangerous enemy than the latter. With the one you will only have to

contend in the field, the opposition of the other you will have to meet everywhere and always. Against

Hannibal and his legions you will have your cavalry and infantry, when Varro is in command he will use

your own men against you. I do not want to bring ill luck on you by mentioning the illstarred Flaminius, but

this I must say that it was only after he was consul and had entered upon his province and taken up his

command that he began to play the madman, but this man was insane before he stood for the consulship and

afterwards while canvassing for it, and now that he is consul, before he has seen the camp or the enemy he is

madder than ever. If he raises such storms amongst peaceful civilians as he did just now by bragging about

battles and battlefields, what will he do, think you, when he is talking to armed menand those young

menwhere words at once lead to action. And yet if he carries out his threat and brings on an action at once,

either I am utterly ignorant of military science, of the nature of this war, of the enemy with whom we are

dealing, or else some place or other will be rendered more notorious by our defeat than even Trasumennus.

As we are alone, this is hardly a time for boasting, and I would rather be thought to have gone too far in

despising glory than in seeking it, but as a matter of fact, the only rational method of carrying on war against

Hannibal is the one which I have followed. This is not only taught us by experienceexperience the teacher

of foolsbut by reasoning which has been and will continue to be unchanged as long as the conditions remain

the same. We are carrying on war in Italy, in our own country on our own soil, everywhere round us are

citizens and allies, they are helping us with men, horses, supplies, and they will continue to do so, for they

have proved their loyalty thus far to us in our adversity; and time and circumstance are making us more

efficient, more circumspect, more selfreliant. Hannibal, on the other hand, is in a foreign and hostile land,

far from his home and country, confronted everywhere by opposition and danger; nowhere by land or sea can

he find peace; no cities admit him within their gates, no fortified towns; nowhere does he see anything which

he can call his own, he has to live on each day's pillage: he has hardly a third of the army with which he

crossed the Ebro; he has lost more by famine than by the sword, and even the few he has cannot get enough

to support life. Do you doubt then, that if we sit still we shall get the better of a man who is growing weaker

day by day, who has neither supplies nor reinforcements nor money? How long has he been sitting before the

walls of Gereonium, a poor fortress in Apulia, as though they were the walls of Carthage? But I will not

sound my own praises even before you. See how the late consuls, Cn. Servilius and Atilius, fooled him. This,

L. Paulus, is the only safe course to adopt, and it is one which your fellow citizens will do more to make

difficult and dangerous for you than the enemy will. For your own soldiers will want the same thing as the

enemy; Varro though he is a Roman consul will desire just what Hannibal the Carthaginian commander

desires. You must hold your own singlehanded against both generals. And you will hold your own if you

stand your ground firmly against public gossip and private slander, if you remain unmoved by false

misrepresentations and your colleague's idle boasting. It is said that truth is far too often eclipsed but never

totally extinguished. The man who scorns false glory will possess the true. Let them call you a coward

because you are cautious, a laggard because you are deliberate, unsoldierly because you are a skilful general.

I would rather have you give a clever enemy cause for fear than earn the praise of foolish compatriots.

Hannibal will only feel contempt for a man who runs all risks, he will be afraid of one who never takes a rash

step. I do not advise you to do nothing, but I do advise you to be guided in what you do by common sense

and reason and not by chance. Never lose control of your forces and yourself; be always prepared, always on

the alert; never fail to seize an opportunity favourable to yourself, and never give a favourable opportunity to

the enemy. The man who is not in a hurry will always see his way clearly; haste blunders on blindly."


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The consul's reply was far from being a cheerful one, for he admitted that the advice given was true, but not

easy to put into practice. If a Dictator had found his Master of the Horse unbearable, what power or authority

would a consul have against a violent and headstrong colleague? "In my first consulship," he said, "I escaped,

badly singed, from the fire of popular fury. I hope and pray that all may end successfully, but if any

mischance befalls us I shall expose myself to the weapons of the enemy sooner than to the verdict of the

enraged citizens." With these words Paulus, it is said, set forward, escorted by the foremost men amongst the

patricians; the plebeian consul was attended by his plebeian friends, more conspicuous for their numbers than

for the quality of the men who composed the crowd. When they came into camp the recruits and the old

soldiers were formed into one army, and two separate camps were formed, the new camp, which was the

smaller one, being nearer to Hannibal, while in the old camp the larger part of the army and the best troops

were stationed. M. Atilius, one of the consuls of the previous year, pleaded his age and was sent back to

Rome; the other, Geminus Servilius, was placed in command of the smaller camp with one Roman legion and

2000 horse and foot of the allies. Although Hannibal saw that the army opposed to him was half as large

again as it had been he was hugely delighted at the advent of the consuls. For not only was there nothing left

out of his daily plunder, but there was nothing left anywhere for him to seize, as all the corn, now that the

country was unsafe, had been everywhere stored in the cities. Hardly ten days' rations of corn remained, as

was afterwards discovered, and the Spaniards were prepared to desert, owing to the shortness of supplies, if

only the Romans had waited till the time was ripe.

An incident occurred which still further encouraged Varro's impetuous and headstrong temperament. Parties

were sent to drive off the foragers; a confused fight ensued owing to the soldiers rushing forward without any

preconcerted plan or orders from their commanders, and the contest went heavily against the Carthaginians.

As many as 1700 of them were killed, the loss of the Romans and the allies did not amount to more than 100.

The consuls commanded on alternate days, and that day happened to be Paulus' turn. He checked the victors

who were pursuing the enemy in great disorder, for he feared an ambuscade. Varro was furious, and loudly

exclaimed that the enemy had been allowed to slip out of their hands, and if the pursuit had not been stopped

the war could have been brought to a close. Hannibal did not very much regret his losses, on the contrary he

believed that they would serve as a bait to the impetuosity of the consul and his newlyraised troops, and that

he would be more headstrong than ever. What was going on in the enemy's camp was quite as well known to

him as what was going on in his own; he was fully aware that there were differences and quarrels between the

commanders, and that twothirds of the army consisted of recruits. The following night he selected what he

considered a suitable position for an ambuscade, and marched his men out of camp with nothing but their

arms, leaving all the property, both public and private, behind in the camp. He then concealed the force

behind the hills which enclosed the valley, the infantry to the left and the cavalry to the right, and took the

baggage train through the middle of the valley, in the hope of surprising the Romans whilst plundering the

apparently deserted camp and hampered with their plunder. Numerous fires were left burning in the camp in

order to create the impression that he wished to keep the consuls in their respective positions until he had

traversed a considerable distance in his retreat. Fabius had been deceived by the same stratagem the previous

year.

As it grew light the pickets were seen to have been withdrawn, then on approaching nearer the unusual

silence created surprise. When it was definitely learnt that the camp was empty the men rushed in a body to

the commanders' quarters with the news that the enemy had fled in such haste that they left the tents standing,

and to secure greater secrecy for their flight had also left numerous fires burning. Then a loud shout arose

demanding that the order should be given to advance, and that the men should be led in pursuit, and that the

camp should be plundered forthwith. The one consul behaved as though he were one of the clamorous crowd;

the other, Paulus, repeatedly asserted the need of caution and circumspection. At last, unable to deal with the

mutinous crowd and its leader in any other way, he sent Marius Statilius with his troop of Lucanian horse to

reconnoitre. When he had ridden up to the gates of the camp he ordered his men to halt outside the lines, he

himself with two of his troopers entered the camp and after a careful and thorough examination he brought

back word that there was certainly a trick somewhere, the fires were left on the side of the camp which


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fronted the Romans, the tents were standing open with all the valuables exposed to view, in some parts he had

seen silver lying about on the paths as though it had been put there for plunder. So far from deterring the

soldiers from satisfying their greed, as it was intended to do, this report only inflamed it, and a shout arose

that if the signal was not given they would go on without their generals. There was no lack of a general,

however, for Varro instantly gave the signal to advance. Paulus, who was hanging back, received a report

from the keeper of the sacred chickens that they had not given a favourable omen, and he ordered the report

to be at once carried to his colleague as he was just marching out of the camp gates. Varro was very much

annoyed, but the recollection of the disaster which overtook Flaminius and the naval defeat which the consul

Claudius sustained in the first Punic war made him afraid of acting in an irreligious spirit. It seemed as

though the gods themselves on that day delayed, if they did actually do away, the fatal doom which was

impending over the Romans. For it so happened that whilst the soldiers were ignoring the consul's order for

the standards to be carried back into camp, two slaves, one belonging to a trooper from Formiae, the other to

one from Sidicinum, who had been captured with the foraging parties when Servilius and Atilius were in

command, had that day escaped to their former masters. They were taken before the consul and told him that

the whole of Hannibal's army was lying behind the nearest hills. The opportune arrival of these men restored

the authority of the consuls, though one of them in his desire to be popular had weakened his authority by his

unscrupulous connivance at breaches of discipline.

When Hannibal saw that the illconsidered movement which the Romans had commenced was not recklessly

carried out to its final stage, and that his ruse had been detected, he returned to camp. Owing to the want of

corn he was unable to remain there many days, and fresh plans were continually cropping up, not only

amongst the soldiers, who were a medley of all nations, but even in the mind of the general himself. Murmurs

gradually swelled into loud and angry protests as the men demanded their arrears of pay, and complained of

the starvation which they were enduring, and in addition, a rumour was started that the mercenaries, chiefly

those of Spanish nationality, had formed a plot to desert. Even Hannibal himself, it is said, sometimes

thought of leaving his infantry behind and hurrying with his cavalry into Gaul. With these plans being

discussed and this temper prevailing amongst the men, he decided to move into the warmer parts of Apulia,

where the harvest was earlier and where, owing to the greater distance from the enemy, desertion would be

rendered more difficult for the fickleminded part of his force. As on the previous occasion, he ordered

campfires to be lighted, and a few tents left where they could be easily seen, in order that the Romans,

remembering a similar stratagem, might be afraid to move. However, Statilius was again sent to reconnoitre

with his Lucanians, and he made a thorough examination of the country beyond the camp and over the

mountains. He reported that he had caught a distant view of the enemy in line of march, and the question of

pursuit was discussed. As usual, the views of the two consuls were opposed, but almost all present supported

Varro, not a single voice was given in favour of Paulus, except that of Servilius, consul in the preceding year.

The opinion of the majority of the council prevailed, and so, driven by destiny, they went forward to render

Cannae famous in the annals of Roman defeats. It was in the neighbourhood of this village that Hannibal had

fixed his camp with his back to the Sirocco which blows from Mount Vultur and fills the arid plains with

clouds of dust. This arrangement was a very convenient one for his camp, and it proved to be extremely

advantageous afterwards, when he was forming his order of battle, for his own men, with the wind behind

them, blowing only on their backs, would fight with an enemy who was blinded by volumes of dust.

The consuls followed the Carthaginians, carefully examining the roads as they marched, and when they

reached Cannae and had the enemy in view they formed two entrenched camps separated by the same interval

as at Gereonium, and with the same distribution of troops in each camp. The river Aufidus, flowing past the

two camps, furnished a supply of water which the soldiers got as they best could, and they generally had to

fight for it. The men in the smaller camp, which was on the other side of the river, had less difficulty in

obtaining it, as that bank was not held by the enemy. Hannibal now saw his hopes fulfilled, that the consuls

would give him an opportunity of fighting on ground naturally adapted for the movements of cavalry, the arm

in which he had so far been invincible, and accordingly he placed his army in order of battle, and tried to

provoke his foe to action by repeated charges of his Numidians. The Roman camp was again disturbed by a


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mutinous soldiery and consuls at variance, Paulus bringing up against Varro the fatal rashness of Sempronius

and Flaminius, Varro retorting by pointing to Fabius as the favourite model of cowardly and inert

commanders, and calling gods and men to witness that it was through no fault of his that Hannibal had

acquired, so to speak, a prescriptive right to Italy; he had had his hands tied by his colleague; his soldiers,

furious and eager for fight, had had their swords and arms taken away from them. Paulus, on the other hand,

declared that if anything happened to the legions flung recklessly and betrayed into an illconsidered and

imprudent action, he was free from all responsibility for it, though he would have to share in all the

consequences. "See to it," he said to Varro, "that those who are so free and ready with their tongues are

equally so with their hands in the day of battle."

Whilst time was thus being wasted in disputes instead of deliberation, Hannibal withdrew the bulk of his

army, who had been standing most of the day in order of battle, into camp. He sent his Numidians, however,

across the river to attack the parties who were getting water for the smaller camp. They had hardly gained the

opposite bank when with their shouting and uproar they sent the crowd flying in wild disorder, and galloping

on as far as the outpost in front of the rampart, they nearly reached the gates of the camp. It was looked upon

as such an insult for a Roman camp to be actually terrorised by irregular auxiliaries that one thing, and one

thing alone, held back the Romans from instantly crossing the river and forming their battle linethe supreme

command that day rested with Paulus. The following day Varro, whose turn it now was, without any

consultation with his colleague, exhibited the signal for battle and led his forces drawn up for action across

the river. Paulus followed, for though he disapproved of the measure, he was bound to support it. After

crossing, they strengthened their line with the force in the smaller camp and completed their formation. On

the right, which was nearest to the river, the Roman cavalry were posted, then came the infantry; on the

extreme left were the cavalry of the allies, their infantry were between them and the Roman legions. The

javelin men with the rest of the lightarmed auxiliaries formed the front line. The consuls took their stations

on the wings, Terentius Varro on the left, Aemilius Paulus on the right.

As soon as it grew light Hannibal sent forward the Balearics and the other light infantry. He then crossed the

river in person and as each division was brought across he assigned it its place in the line. The Gaulish and

Spanish horse he posted near the bank on the left wing in front of the Roman cavalry; the right wing was

assigned to the Numidian troopers. The centre consisted of a strong force of infantry, the Gauls and Spaniards

in the middle, the Africans at either end of them. You might fancy that the Africans were for the most part a

body of Romans from the way they were armed, they were so completely equipped with the arms, some of

which they had taken at the Trebia, but the most part at Trasumennus. The Gauls and Spaniards had shields

almost of the same shape their swords were totally different, those of the Gauls being very long and without a

point, the Spaniard, accustomed to thrust more than to cut, had a short handy sword, pointed like a dagger.

These nations, more than any other, inspired terror by the vastness of their stature and their frightful

appearance: the Gauls were naked above the waist, the Spaniards had taken up their position wearing white

tunics embroidered with purple, of dazzling brilliancy. The total number of infantry in the field was 40,000,

and there were 10,000 cavalry. Hasdrubal was in command of the left wing, Maharbal of the right; Hannibal

himself with his brother Mago commanded the centre. It was a great convenience to both armies that the sun

shone obliquely on them, whether it was that they had purposely so placed themselves, or whether it

happened by accident, since the Romans faced the north, the Carthaginans the South. The wind, called by the

inhabitants the Vulturnus, was against the Romans, and blew great clouds of dust into their faces, making it

impossible for them to see in front of them.

When the battle shout was raised the auxiliaries ran forward, and the battle began with the light infantry.

Then the Gauls and Spaniards on the left engaged the Roman cavalry on the right; the battle was not at all

like a cavalry fight, for there was no room for maneuvering, the river on the one side and the infantry on the

other hemming them in, compelled them to fight face to face. Each side tried to force their way straight

forward, till at last the horses were standing in a closely pressed mass, and the riders seized their opponents

and tried to drag them from their horses. It had become mainly a struggle of infantry, fierce but short, and the


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Roman cavalry was repulsed and fled. Just as this battle of the cavalry was finished, the infantry became

engaged, and as long as the Gauls and Spaniards kept their ranks unbroken, both sides were equally matched

in strength and courage. At length after long and repeated efforts the Romans closed up their ranks, echeloned

their front, and by the sheer weight of their deep column bore down the division of the enemy which was

stationed in front of Hannibal's line, and was too thin and weak to resist the pressure. Without a moment's

pause they followed up their broken and hastily retreating foe till they took to headlong flight. Cutting their

way through the mass of fugitives, who offered no resistance, they penetrated as far as the Africans who were

stationed on both wings, somewhat further back than the Gauls and Spaniards who had formed the advanced

centre. As the latter fell back the whole front became level, and as they continued to give ground it became

concave and crescentshaped, the Africans at either end forming the horns. As the Romans rushed on

incautiously between them, they were enfiladed by the two wings, which extended and closed round them in

the rear. On this, the Romans, who had fought one battle to no purpose, left the Gauls and Spaniards, whose

rear they had been slaughtering, and commenced a fresh struggle with the Africans. The contest was a very

onesided one, for not only were they hemmed in on all sides, but wearied with the previous fighting they

were meeting fresh and vigorous opponents.

By this time the Roman left wing, where the allied cavalry were fronting the Numidians, had become

engaged, but the fighting was slack at first owing to a Carthaginian stratagem. About 500 Numidians,

carrying, besides their usual arms and missiles, swords concealed under their coats of mail, rode out from

their own line with their shields slung behind their backs as though they were deserters, and suddenly leaped

from their horses and flung their shields and javelins at the feet of their enemy. They were received into their

ranks, conducted to the rear, and ordered to remain quiet. While the battle was spreading to the various parts

of the field they remained quiet, but when the eyes and minds of all were wholly taken up with the fighting

they seized the large Roman shields which were lying everywhere amongst the heaps of slain and

commenced a furious attack upon the rear of the Roman line. Slashing away at backs and hips, they made a

great slaughter and a still greater panic and confusion. Amidst the rout and panic in one part of the field and

the obstinate but hopeless struggle in the other, Hasdrubal, who was in command of that arm, withdrew some

Numidians from the centre of the right wing, where the fighting was feebly kept up, and sent them m pursuit

of the fugitives, and at the same time sent the Spanish and Gaulish horse to the aid of the Africans, who were

by this time more wearied by slaughter than by fighting.

Paulus was on the other side of the field. In spite of his having been seriously wounded at the commencement

of the action by a bullet from a sling, he frequently encountered Hannibal with a compact body of troops, and

in several places restored the battle. The Roman cavalry formed a bodyguard round him, but at last, as he

became too weak to manage his horse, they all dismounted. It is stated that when some one reported to

Hannibal that the consul had ordered his men to fight on foot, he remarked, "I would rather he handed them

over to me bound hand and foot.'' Now that the victory of the enemy was no longer doubtful this struggle of

the dismounted cavalry was such as might be expected when men preferred to die where they stood rather

than flee, and the victors, furious at them for delaying the victory, butchered without mercy those whom they

could not dislodge. They did, however, repulse a few survivors exhausted with their exertions and their

wounds. All were at last scattered, and those who could regained their horses for flight. Cn. Lentulus, a

military tribune, saw, as he rode by, the consul covered with blood sitting on a boulder. "Lucius Aemilius,"

he said, "the one man whom the gods must hold guiltless of this day's disaster, take this horse while you have

still some strength left, and I can lift you into the saddle and keep by your side to protect you. Do not make

this day of battle still more fatal by a consul's death, there are enough tears and mourning without that." The

consul replied: "Long may you live to do brave deeds, Cornelius, but do not waste in useless pity the few

moments left in which to escape from the hands of the enemy. Go, announce publicly to the senate that they

must fortify Rome and make its defence strong before the victorious enemy approaches, and tell Q. Fabius

privately that I have ever remembered his precepts in life and in death. Suffer me to breathe my last among

my slaughtered soldiers, let me not have to defend myself again when I am no longer consul, or appear as the

accuser of my colleague and protect my own innocence by throwing the guilt on another." During this


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conversation a crowd of fugitives came suddenly upon them, followed by the enemy, who, not knowing who

the consul was, overwhelmed him with a shower of missiles. Lentulus escaped on horseback in the rush.

Then there was flight in all directions; 7000 men escaped to the smaller camp, 10,000 to the larger, and about

2000 to the village of Cannae. These latter were at once surrounded by Carthalo and his cavalry, as the

village was quite unfortified. The other consul, who either by accident or design had not joined any of these

bodies of fugitives, escaped with about fifty cavalry to Venusia; 45,500 infantry, 2700 cavalryalmost an

equal proportion of Romans and alliesare said to have been killed. Amongst the number were both the

quaestors attached to the consuls, L. Atilius and L. Furius Bibulcus, twentynine military tribunes, several

exconsuls, expraetors, and exaediles (amongst them are included Cn. Servilius Geminus and M.

Minucius, who was Master of the Horse the previous year and, some years before that, consul), and in

addition to these, eighty men who had either been senators or filled offices qualifying them for election to the

senate and who had volunteered for service with the legions. The prisoners taken in the battle are stated to

have amounted to 3000 infantry and 1500 cavalry.

Such was the battle of Cannae, a battle as famous as the disastrous one at the Allia; not so serious in its

results, owing to the inaction of the enemy, but more serious and more horrible in view of the slaughter of the

army. For the flight at the Allia saved the army though it lost the City, whereas at Cannae hardly fifty men

shared the consul's flight, nearly the whole army met their death in company with the other consul. As those

who had taken refuge in the two camps were only a defenceless crowd without any leaders, the men in the

larger camp sent a message to the others asking them to cross over to them at night when the enemy, tired

after the battle and the feasting in honour of their victory, would be buried in sleep. Then they would go in

one body to Canusium. Some rejected the proposal with scorn. "Why," they asked, "cannot those who sent

the message come themselves, since they are quite as able to join us as we to join them? Because, of course,

all the country between us is scoured by the enemy and they prefer to expose other people to that deadly peril

rather than themselves." Others did not disapprove of the proposal, but they lacked courage to carry it out. P.

Sempronius Tuditanus protested against this cowardice. "Would you," he asked, "rather be taken prisoners by

a most avaricious and ruthless foe and a price put upon your heads and your value assessed after you have

been asked whether you are a Roman citizen or a Latin ally, in order that another may win honour from your

misery and disgrace? Certainly not, if you are really the fellowcountrymen of L. Aemilius, who chose a

noble death rather than a life of degradation, and of all the brave men who are lying in heaps around him.

But, before daylight overtakes us and the enemy gathers in larger force to bar our path, let us cut our way

through the men who in disorder and confusion are clamouring at our gates. Good swords and brave hearts

make a way through enemies, however densely they are massed. If you march shoulder to shoulder you will

scatter this loose and disorganised force as easily as if nothing opposed you. Come then with me, all you who

want to preserve yourselves and the State." With these words he drew his sword, and with his men in close

formation marched through the very midst of the enemy. When the Numidians hurled their javelins on the

right, the unprotected side, they transferred their shields to their right arms, and so got clear away to the

larger camp As many as 600 escaped on this occasion, and after another large body had joined them they at

once left the camp and came through safely to Canusium. This action on the part of defeated men was due to

the impulse of natural courage or of accident rather than to any concerted plan of their own or any one's

generalship.

Hannibal's officers all surrounded him and congratulated him on his victory, and urged that after such a

magnificent success he should allow himself and his exhausted men to rest for the remainder of the day and

the following night. Maharbal, however, the commandant of the cavalry, thought that they ought not to lose a

moment. "That you may know," he said to Hannibal, "what has been gained by this battle I prophesy that in

five days you will be feasting as victor in the Capitol. Follow me; I will go in advance with the cavalry; they

will know that you are come before they know that you are coming." To Hannibal the victory seemed too

great and too joyous for him to realise all at once. He told Maharbal that he commended his zeal, but he

needed time to think out his plans. Maharbal replied: "The gods have not given all their gifts to one man. You

know how to win victory, Hannibal, you do not how to use it." That day's delay is believed to have saved the


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City and the empire. The next day, as soon as it grew light, they set about gathering the spoils on the field and

viewing the carnage, which was a ghastly sight even for an enemy. There all those thousands of Romans were

lying, infantry and cavalry indiscriminately as chance had brought them together in the battle or the flight.

Some covered with blood raised themselves from amongst the dead around them, tortured by their wounds

which were nipped by the cold of the morning, and were promptly put an end to by the enemy. Some they

found lying with their thighs and knees gashed but still alive; these bared their throats and necks and bade

them drain what blood they still had left. Some were discovered with their heads buried in the earth, they had

evidently suffocated themselves by making holes in the ground and heaping the soil over their faces. What

attracted the attention of all was a Numidian who was dragged alive from under a dead Roman lying across

him; his ears and nose were torn, for the Roman with hands too powerless to grasp his weapon had, in his

mad rage, torn his enemy with his teeth, and while doing so expired.

After most of the day had been spent in collecting the spoils, Hannibal led his men to the attack on the

smaller camp and commenced operations by throwing up a breastwork to cut off their water supply from the

river. As, however, all the defenders were exhausted by toil and want of sleep, as well as by wounds, the

surrender was effected sooner than he had anticipated. They agreed to give up their arms and horses, and to

pay for each Roman three hundred "chariot pieces," for each ally two hundred, and for each officer's servant

one hundred, on condition that after the money was paid they should be allowed to depart with one garment

apiece. Then they admitted the enemy into the camp and were all placed under guard, the Romans and the

allies separately. Whilst time was being spent there, all those in the larger camp, who had sufficient strength

and courage, to the number of 4000 infantry and 200 cavalry, made their escape to Canusium, some in a

body, others straggling through the fields, which was quite as safe a thing to do. Those who were wounded

and those who had been afraid to venture surrendered the camp on the same terms as had been agreed upon in

the other camp. An immense amount of booty was secured, and the whole of it was made over to the troops

with the exception of the horses and prisoners and whatever silver there might be. Most of this was on the

trappings of the horses, for they used very little silver plate at table, at all events when on a campaign.

Hannibal then ordered the bodies of his own soldiers to be collected for burial; it is said that there were as

many as 8000 of his best troops. Some authors state that he also had a search made for the body of the Roman

consul, which he buried. Those who had escaped to Canusium were simply allowed shelter within its walls

and houses, but a highborn and wealthy Apulian lady, named Busa, assisted them with corn and clothes and

even provisions for their journey. For this munificence the senate, at the close of the war, voted her public

honours

Although there were four military tribunes on the spotFabius Maximus of the first legion, whose father had

been lately Dictator, L. Publicius Bibulus and Publius Cornelius Scipio of the second legion, and Appius

Claudius Pulcher of the third legion, who had just been aedilethe supreme command was by universal

consent vested in P. Scipio, who was quite a youth, and Appius Claudius. They were holding a small council

to discuss the state of affairs when P. Furius Philus, the son of an exconsul, informed them that it was

useless for them to cherish ruined hopes; the republic was despaired of and given over for lost; some young

nobles with L. Caecilius Metellus at their head were turning their eyes seaward with the intention of

abandoning Italy to its fate and transferring their services to some king or other. This evil news, terrible as it

was and coming fresh on the top of all their other disasters, paralysed those who were present with wonder

and amazement. They thought that a council ought to be summoned to deal with it, but young Scipio, the

general destined to end this war, said that it was no business for a council. In such an emergency as that they

must dare and act, not deliberate. "Let those," he cried, "who want to save the republic take their arms at once

and follow me. No camp is more truly a hostile camp than one in which such treason is meditated." He started

off with a few followers to the house where Metellus was lodging, and finding the young men about whom

the report had been made gathered there in council, he held his naked sword over the heads of the

conspirators and uttered these words: "I solemnly swear that I will not abandon the Republic of Rome, nor

will I suffer any other Roman citizen to do so; if I knowingly break my oath, then do thou, O Jupiter Optimus

Maximus, visit me, my home, my family, and my estate with utter destruction. I require you, L. Caecilius,


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and all who are here present, to take this oath. Whoever will not swear let him know that this sword is drawn

against him." They were in as great a state of fear as though they saw the victorious Hannibal amongst them,

and all took the oath and surrendered themselves into Scipio's custody.

Whilst these things were happening at Canusium, as many as 4500 infantry and cavalry, who had been

dispersed in flight over the country, succeeded in reaching the consul at Venusia. The inhabitants received

them with every mark of kindness and distributed them all amongst their households to be taken care of. They

gave each of the troopers a toga and a tunic and twentyfive "chariot pieces," and to each legionary ten

pieces, and whatever arms they required. All hospitality was shown them both by the government and by

private citizens, for the people of Venusia were determined not to be outdone in kindness by a lady of

Canusium. But the large number of men, which now amounted to something like 10,000, made the burden

imposed upon Busa much heavier. For Appius and Scipio, on hearing that the consul was safe, at once sent to

him to inquire what amount of foot and horse he had with him, and also whether he wanted the army to be

taken to Venusia or to remain at Canusium. Varro transferred his forces to Canusium, and now there was

something like a consular army; it seemed as though they would defend themselves successfully behind their

walls if not in the open field. The reports which reached Rome left no room for hope that even these remnants

of citizens and allies were still surviving; it was asserted that the army with its two consuls had been

annihilated and the whole of the forces wiped out. Never before, while the City itself was still safe, had there

been such excitement and panic within its walls. I shall not attempt to describe it, nor will I weaken the

reality by going into details. After the loss of the consul and the army at Trasumennus the previous year, it

was not wound upon wound but multiplied disaster that was now announced. For according to the reports two

consular armies and two consuls were lost; there was no longer any Roman camp, any general, any single

soldier in existence; Apulia, Samnium, almost the whole of Italy lay at Hannibal's feet. Certainly there is no

other nation that would not have succumbed beneath such a weight of calamity. One might, of course,

compare the naval defeat of the Carthaginians at the Aegates, which broke their power to such an extent that

they gave up Sicily and Sardinia and submitted to the payment of tribute and a war indemnity; or, again, the

battle which they lost in Africa, in which Hannibal himself was crushed. But there is no point of comparison

between these and Cannae, unless it be that they were borne with less fortitude.

P. Furius Philus and M. Pomponius, the praetors, called a meeting of the senate to take measures for the

defence of the City, for no doubt was felt that after wiping out the armies the enemy would set about his one

remaining task and advance to attack Rome. In the presence of evils the extent of which, great as they were,

was still unknown, they were unable even to form any definite plans, and the cries of wailing women

deafened their ears, for as the facts were not yet ascertained the living and the dead were being

indiscriminately bewailed in almost every house. Under these circumstances Q. Fabius Maximus gave it as

his opinion that swift horsemen should be sent along the Appian and Latin roads to make inquiries of those

they met, for there would be sure to be fugitives scattered about the country, and bring back tidings as to what

had befallen the consuls and the armies, and if the gods out of compassion for the empire had left any

remnant of the Roman nation, to find out where those forces were. And also they might ascertain whither

Hannibal had repaired after the battle, what plans he was forming, what he was doing or likely to do. They

must get some young and active men to find out these things, and as there were hardly any magistrates in the

City, the senators must themselves take steps to calm the agitation and alarm which prevailed. They must

keep the matrons out of the public streets and compel them to remain indoors; they must suppress the loud

laments for the dead and impose silence on the City; they must see that all who brought tidings were taken to

the praetors, and that the citizens should, each in his own house, wait for any news which affected them

personally. Moreover, they must station guards at the gates to prevent any one from leaving the City, and they

must make it clear to every man that the only safety he can hope for lies in the City and its walls. When the

tumult has once been hushed, then the senate must be again convened and measures discussed for the defence

of the City.


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This proposal was unanimously carried without any discussion. After the crowd was cleared out of the Forum

by the magistrates and the senators had gone in various directions to allay the agitation, a despatch at last

arrived from C. Terentius Varro. He wrote that L. Aemilius was killed and his army cut to pieces; he himself

was at Canusium collecting the wreckage that remained from this awful disaster; there were as many as

10,000 soldiers, irregular, unorganised; the Carthaginian was still at Cannae, bargaining about the prisoners'

ransom and the rest of the plunder in a spirit very unlike that of a great and victorious general. The next thing

was the publication of the names of those killed, and the City was thrown into such universal mourning that

the annual celebration of the festival of Ceres was suspended, because it is forbidden to those in mourning to

take part in it, and there was not a single matron who was not a mourner during those days. In order that the

same cause might not prevent other sacred observances from being duly honoured, the period of mourning

was limited by a senatorial decree to thirty days. When the agitation was quieted and the senate resumed its

session, a fresh despatch was received, this time from Sicily. T. Otacilius, the propraetor, announced that

Hiero's kingdom was being devastated by a Carthaginian fleet, and when he was preparing to render him the

assistance he asked for, he received news that another fully equipped fleet was riding at anchor off the

Aegates, and when they heard that he was occupied with the defence of the Syracusan shore they would at

once attack Lilybaeum and the rest of the Roman province. If, therefore, the senate wished to retain the king

as their ally and keep their hold on Sicily, they must fit out a fleet.

When the despatches from the consul and the praetor had been read it was decided that M. Claudius, who was

commanding the fleet stationed at Ostia, should be sent to the army at Canusium and instructions forwarded

to the consul requesting him to hand over his command to the praetor and come to Rome as soon as he

possibly could consistently with his duty to the republic. For, over and above these serious disasters,

considerable alarm was created by portents which occurred. Two Vestal virgins, Opimia and Floronia, were

found guilty of unchastity. One was buried alive, as is the custom, at the Colline Gate, the other committed

suicide. L. Cantilius, one of the pontifical secretaries, now called "minor pontiffs," who had been guilty with

Floronia, was scourged in the Comitium by the Pontifex Maximus so severely that he died under it. This act

of wickedness, coming as it did amongst so many calamities, was, as often happens, regarded as a portent,

and the decemvirs were ordered to consult the Sacred Books. Q. Fabius Pictor was sent to consult the oracle

of Delphi as to what forms of prayer and supplication they were to use to propitiate the gods, and what was to

be the end of all these terrible disasters. Meanwhile, in obedience to the Books of Destiny, some strange and

unusual sacrifices were made, human sacrifices amongst them. A Gaulish man and a Gaulish woman and a

Greek man and a Greek woman were buried alive under the Forum Boarium. They were lowered into a stone

vault, which had on a previous occasion also been polluted by human victims, a practice most repulsive to

Roman feelings.

When the gods were believed to be duly propitiated, M. Claudius Marcellus sent from Ostia 1500 men who

had been enrolled for service with the fleet to garrison Rome; the naval legion (the third) he sent on in

advance with the military tribunes to Teanum Sidicinum, and then, handing the fleet over to his colleague, P.

Furius Philus, hastened on by forced marches a few days later to Canusium. On the authority of the senate M.

Junius was nominated Dictator and Ti. Sempronius Master of the Horse. A levy was ordered, and all from

seventeen years upwards were enrolled, some even younger; out of these recruits four legions were formed

and 1000 cavalry. They also sent to the Latin confederacy and the other allied states to enlist soldiers

according to the terms of their treaties. Armour, weapons, and other things of the kind were ordered to be in

readiness, and the ancient spoils gathered from the enemy were taken down from the temples and colonnades.

The dearth of freemen necessitated a new kind of enlistment; 8000 sturdy youths from amongst the slaves

were armed at the public cost, after they had each been asked whether they were willing to serve or no. These

soldiers were preferred, as there would be an opportunity of ransoming them when taken prisoners at a lower

price.

After his great success at Cannae, Hannibal made his arrangements more as though his victory were a

complete and decisive one than as if the war were still going on. The prisoners were brought before him and


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separated into two groups; the allies were treated as they had been at the Trebia and at Trasumennus, after

some kind words they were dismissed without ransom; the Romans, too, were treated as they had never been

before, for when they appeared before him he addressed them in quite a friendly way. He had no deadly feud,

he told them, with Rome, all he was fighting for was his country's honour as a sovereign power. His fathers

had yielded to Roman courage, his one object now was that the Romans should yield to his good fortune and

courage. He now gave the prisoners permission to ransom themselves; each horseman at 500 "chariot pieces"

and each footsoldier at 300, and the slaves at 100 per head. This was somewhat more than the cavalry had

agreed to when they surrendered, but they were only too glad to accept any terms. It was settled that they

should elect ten of their number to go to the senate at Rome, and the only guarantee required was that they

should take an oath to return. They were accompanied by Carthalo, a Carthaginian noble, who was to sound

the feelings of the senators, and if they were inclined towards peace he was to propose terms. When the

delegates had left the camp, one of them, a man of an utterly unRoman temper, returned to the camp, as if

he had forgotten something, and in this way hoped to free himself from his oath. He rejoined his comrades

before nightfall. When it was announced that the party were on their way to Rome a lictor was despatched to

meet Carthalo and order him in the name of the Dictator to quit the territory of Rome before night.

The Dictator admitted the prisoners' delegates to an audience of the senate. Their leader, M. Junius, spoke as

follows: "Senators: we are every one of us aware that no State has held its prisoners of war of less account

than our own, but, unless we think our case a better one than we have any right to do, we would urge that

none have ever fallen into the hands of the enemy who were more deserving of consideration than we are. For

we did not give up our arms during the battle from sheer cowardice; standing on the heaps of the slain we

kept up the struggle till close on night, and only then did we retire into camp; for the remainder of the day and

all through the night we defended our entrenchments; the following day we were surrounded by the

victorious army and cut off from the water, and there was no hope whatever now of our forcing our way

through the dense masses of the enemy. We did not think it a crime for some of Rome's soldiers to survive

the battle of Cannae, seeing that 50,000 men had been butchered there, and therefore in the very last resort we

consented to have a price fixed for our ransom and surrendered to the enemy those arms which were no

longer of the slightest use to us. Besides, we had heard that our ancestors had ransomed themselves from the

Gauls with gold, and that your fathers, sternly as they set themselves against all conditions of peace, did

nevertheless send delegates to Tarentum to arrange the ransom of the prisoners. But neither the battle at the

Alia against the Gauls nor that at Heraclea against Pyrrhus was disgraced by the actual losses sustained so

much as by the panic and flight which marked them. The plains of Cannae are covered by heaps of Roman

dead, and we should not be here now if the enemy had not lacked arms and strength to slay us. There are

some amongst us who were never in the battle at all, but were left to guard the camp, and when it was

surrendered they fell into the hands of the enemy. I do not envy the fortune or the circumstances of any man,

whether he be a fellowcitizen or a fellowsoldier, nor would I wish it to be said that I had glorified myself

by depreciating others, but this I will say, not even those who fled from the battle, mostly without arms, and

did not stay their flight till they had reached Venusia or Canusium, can claim precedence over us or boast that

they are more of a defence to the State than we are. But you will find both in them and in us good and gallant

soldiers, only we shall be still more eager to serve our country because it will be through your kindness that

we shall have been ransomed and restored to our fatherland. You have enlisted men of all ages and of every

condition; I hear that eight thousand slaves are armed. Our number is no less, and it will not cost more to

ransom us than it did to purchase them, but if I were to compare ourselves as soldiers with them, I should be

offering an insult to the name of Roman. I should think, senators, that in deciding upon a matter like this, you

should also take into consideration, if you are disposed to be too severe, to what sort of an enemy you are

going to abandon us. Is it to a Pyrrhus, who treated his prisoners as though they were his guests? Is it not

rather to a barbarian, and what is worse, a Carthaginian, of whom it is difficult to judge whether he is more

rapacious or more cruel? Could you see the chains, the squalor, the disgusting appearance of your

fellowcitizens, the sight would, I am sure, move you no less than if, on the other hand, you beheld your

legions lying scattered over the plains of Cannae. You can behold the anxiety and the tears of our kinsmen as

they stand in the vestibule of your House and await your reply. If they are in such anxiety and suspense about


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us and about those who are not here, what, think you, must be the feelings of the men themselves whose life

and liberty are at stake? Why, good heavens! even if Hannibal, contrary to his nature, chose to be kind to us,

we should still think life not worth living after you had decided that we did not deserve to be ransomed. Years

ago the prisoners who were released by Pyrrhus without ransom returned to Rome, but they returned in

company with the foremost men of the State who had been sent to effect their ransom. Am I to return to my

native country as a citizen not thought worth three hundred coins ? Each of us has his own feelings, senators.

I know that my life and person are at stake, but I dread more the peril to my good name, in case we depart

condemned and repulsed by you; for men will never believe that you grudged the cost."

No sooner had he finished than a tearful cry arose from the crowd in the comitium; they stretched their hands

towards the Senatehouse and implored the senators to give them back their children, their brothers, and their

relations. Fear and affection had brought even women amongst the crowd of men who thronged the Forum.

After the strangers had withdrawn the debate commenced in the senate. There was great difference of

opinion; some said that they ought to be ransomed at the expense of the State, others were of opinion that no

public expense ought to be incurred, but they ought not to be prevented from defraying the cost from private

sources, and in cases where ready money was not available it should be advanced from the treasury on

personal security and mortgages. When it came to the turn of T. Manlius Torquatus, a man of oldfashioned

and, some thought, excessive strictness, to give his opinion, he is said to have spoken in these terms: "If the

delegates had confined themselves to asking that those who are in the hands of the enemy might be ransomed,

I should have stated my opinion in few words without casting reflections on any of them, for all that would

have been necessary would be to remind you that you should maintain the custom and usage handed down

from our forefathers by setting an example necessary for military discipline. But as it is, since they have

almost treated their surrender to the enemy as a thing to be proud of, and think it right that they should

receive more consideration than the prisoners taken in the field or those who reached Venusia and Canusium,

or even the consul himself, I will not allow you to remain in ignorance of what actually happened. I only wish

that the facts which I am about to allege could be brought before the army at Canusium, which is best able to

testify to each man's courage or cowardice, or at least that we had before us P. Sempronius Tuditanus, for if

these men had followed him they would at this moment be in the Roman camp, not prisoners in the hands of

the foe.

"The enemy had nearly all returned to their camp, tired out with fighting, to make merry over their victory,

and these men had the night clear for a sortie. Seven thousand men could easily have made a sortie, even

through dense masses of the enemy, but they did not make any attempt to do so on their own initiative, nor

would they follow any one else. Nearly the whole night through P. Sempronius Tuditanus was continually

warning them and urging them to follow him, whilst only a few of the enemy were watching their camp,

whilst all was quiet and silent, whilst the night could still conceal their movements; before it was light they

could reach safety and be protected by the cities of our allies. If he had spoken as that military tribune P.

Decius spoke in the days of our fathers, or as Calpurnius Flamma, in the first Punic war, when we were

young men, spoke to his three hundred volunteers whom he was leading to the capture of a height situated in

the very centre of the enemy's position: 'Let us,' he exclaimed, 'die, my men, and by our death rescue our

blockaded legions from their peril'if, I say, P. Sempronius had spoken thus, I should not regard you as men,

much less as Romans, if none had come forward as the comrade of so brave a man. But the way he pointed

out to you led to safety quite as much as to glory, he would have brought you back to your country, your

parents, your wives, and your children. You have not courage enough to save yourselves; what would you do

if you had to die for your country? All round you on that day were lying fifty thousand dead, Romans and

allies. If so many examples of courage did not inspire you, nothing ever will. If such an awful disaster did not

make you hold your lives cheap, none will ever do so. It is whilst you are free men, with all your rights as

citizens, that you must show your love for your country, or rather, while it is your country and you are its

citizens. Now you are showing that love too late, your rights forfeited, your citizenship renounced, you have

become the slaves of the Carthaginians. Is money going to restore you to the position which you have lost

through cowardice and crime? You would not listen to your own countryman Sempronius when he bade you


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seize your arms and follow him, you did listen shortly afterwards to Hannibal when he bade you give up your

arms and betray your camp. But why do I only charge these men with cowardice when I can prove them

guilty of actual crime? For not only did they refuse to follow him when he gave them good advice, but they

tried to stop him and keep him back, until a body of truly brave men drew their swords and drove back the

cowards. P. Sempronius had actually to force his way through his own countrymen before he could do so

through the enemy! Would our country care to have such as these for her citizens when, had all those who

fought at Cannae been like them, she would not have had amongst them a single citizen worth the name! Out

of seven thousand men in arms there were six hundred who had the courage to force their way, and returned

to their country free men with arms in their hands. The enemy did not stop these six hundred, how safe the

way would have been, do you not think? for a force of almost two legions. You would have today, senators,

at Canusium 20,000 brave loyal soldiers; but as for these men, how can they possibly be good and loyal

citizens? And as to their being 'brave,' they do not even themselves assert thatunless, indeed, some one

chooses to imagine that whilst they were trying to stop the others from making the sortie, they were really

encouraging them, or that, fully aware that their own timidity and cowardice was the cause of their becoming

slaves, they feel no grudge towards the others for having won both safety and glory through their courage.

Though they might have got away in the dead of the night, they preferred to skulk in their tents and wait for

the daylight and with it the enemy. But you will say, if they lacked courage to leave the camp they had

courage enough to defend it bravely; blockaded for several days and nights, they protected the rampart with

their arms, and themselves with the rampart; at last, after going to the utmost lengths of endurance and

daring, when every support of life failed, and they were so weakened by starvation that they had not strength

to bear the weight of their arms, they were in the end conquered by the necessities of nature more than by the

force of arms. What are the facts? At daybreak the enemy approached the rampart; within two hours, without

trying their fortune in any conflict, they gave up their arms and themselves. This, you see, was their two days'

soldiership. When duty called them to keep their line and fight they fled to their camp, when they ought to

have fought at the rampart they surrendered their camp; they are useless alike in the field and in the camp.

Am I to ransom you? When you ought to have made your way out of the camp you hesitated and remained

there, when it was obligatory for you to remain there and defend the camp with your arms you gave up camp,

arms, and yourselves to the enemy. No, senators, I do not think that those men ought to be ransomed any

more than I should think it right to surrender to Hannibal the men who forced their way out of the camp

through the midst of the enemy and by that supreme act of courage restored themselves to their fatherland."

Although most of the senators had relations among the prisoners, there were two considerations which

weighed with them at the close of Manlius' speech. One was the practice of the State which from early times

had shown very little indulgence to prisoners of war. The other was the amount of money that would be

required, for they were anxious that the treasury should not be exhausted, a large sum having been already

paid out in purchasing and arming the slaves, and they did not wish to enrich Hannibal who, according to

rumour, was in particular need of money. When the melancholy reply was given that the prisoners were not

ransomed, the prevailing grief was intensified by the loss of so many citizens, and the delegates were

accompanied to the gates by a weeping and protesting crowd. One of them went to his home because he

considered himself released from his vow by his pretended return to the camp. When this became known it

was reported to the senate, and they unanimously decided that he should be arrested and conveyed to

Hannibal under a guard furnished by the State. There is another account extant as to the fate of the prisoners.

According to this tradition ten came at first, and there was a debate in the senate as to whether they should be

allowed within the City or not; they were admitted on the understanding that the senate would not grant them

an audience. As they stayed longer than was generally expected, three other delegates arrivedL. Scribonius,

C. Calpurnius, and L. Manliusand a relative of Scribonius who was a tribune of the plebs made a motion in

the senate to ransom the prisoners. The senate decided that they should not be ransomed, and the three who

came last returned to Hannibal, but the ten remained in Rome. They alleged that they had absolved

themselves from their oath because after starting on their journey they had returned to Hannibal under the

pretext of reviewing the list of the prisoners' names. The question of surrendering them was hotly debated in

the senate, and those in favour of this course were beaten by only a few votes. Under the next censors,


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however, they were so crushed beneath every mark of disgrace and infamy that some of them immediately

committed suicide; the others not only avoided the Forum for all their after life, but almost shunned the light

of day and the faces of men. It is easier to feel astonishment at such discrepancies amongst our authorities

than to determine what is the truth.

How far that disaster surpassed previous ones is shown by one simple fact. Up to that day the loyalty of our

allies had remained unshaken, now it began to waver, for no other reason, we may be certain, than that they

despaired of the maintenance of our empire. The tribes who revolted to the Carthaginians were the Atellani,

the Calatini, the Hirpini, a section of the Apulians, all the Samnite cantons with the exception of the Pentri,

all the Bruttii and the Lucanians. In addition to these, the Uzentini and almost the whole of the coast of

Magna Graecia, the people of Tarentum Crotona and Locri, as well as all Cisalpine Gaul. Yet, in spite of all

their disasters and the revolt of their allies, no one anywhere in Rome mentioned the word "Peace," either

before the consul's return or after his arrival when all the memories of their losses were renewed. Such a lofty

spirit did the citizens exhibit in those days that though the consul was coming back from a terrible defeat for

which they knew he was mainly responsible, he was met by a vast concourse drawn from every class of

society, and thanks were formally voted to him because he "had not despaired of the republic." Had he been

commanderinchief of the Carthaginians there was no torture to which he would not have been subjected.

End of Book 22

Book 23. Hannibal at Capua

Immediately after the battle of Cannae and the capture and plunder of the Roman camp, Hannibal moved out

of Apulia into Samnium, in consequence of an invitation he had received from a man named Statius Trebius,

who promised to hand over Compsa to him if he would visit the territory of the Hirpini. Trebius was a native

of Compsa, a man of note amongst his people, but his influence was less than that of the faction of the

Mopsii, a family which owed its predominance to the favour and support of Rome. After the report of the

battle of Cannae had reached the town, and Trebius was telling everybody that Hannibal was coming, the

Mopsian party left the city. It was then peacefully handed over to the Carthaginian and a garrison placed in it.

There Hannibal left all his booty and his baggage, and then forming his army into two divisions, gave Mago

the command of one and retained the other himself. He gave Mago instructions to receive the submission of

the cities in the district which were revolting from Rome and to compel those which were hanging back to

revolt, whilst he himself marched through the Campanian district towards the Lower Sea with the view of

attacking Neapolis so that he might have a city accessible from the sea. When he entered the confines of

Neapolis he placed some of his Numidians wherever he conveniently could in ambuscade, for the roads are

mostly deep, with many unseen windings. The others he ordered to ride up to the gates driving ostentatiously

before them the plunder they had collected from the fields. As they appeared to be a small and disorganised

force, a troop of cavalry came out against them, they were drawn on by the retreating Numidians into the

ambuscade and surrounded. Not a man would have escaped had not the proximity of the sea, and some ships,

mostly fishing vessels, which they saw not far from the shore, afforded a means of escape to those who were

good swimmers. Several young nobles, however, were either taken or killed in the skirmish, amongst them

Hegeas, the commandant of the cavalry, who fell whilst following the retreating foe too incautiously. The

aspect of the walls deterred the Carthaginian from attacking the city; they by no means offered facilities for

an assault.

From there he directed his march towards Capua. This city had become demoralised by a long course of

prosperity and the indulgence of Fortune, but most of all by the universal corruption produced by the wild

excesses of a populace who exercised their liberty without any restraint. Pacuvius Calavius had got the senate

of Capua entirely in his own power and that of the populace. He was a noble, and at the same time a favourite

with the people, but he had gained his influence and power by resorting to base practices. He happened to be

chief magistrate in the year in which the defeat at Trasumennus occurred, and knowing the hatred which the


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populace had long felt towards the senate, he thought it highly probable that they would seize their

opportunity, create a violent revolution, and, if Hannibal with his victorious army should visit their

neighbourhood, murder the senators and hand over Capua to him. Bad as the man was, he was not utterly

abandoned, since he preferred to play the autocrat in a commonwealth which was constitutionally sound

rather than in one that was ruined, and he knew that no political constitution could be sound where there was

no council of state. He embarked on a plan by which he could save the senate and at the same time render it

completely subservient to himself and to the populace. He summoned a meeting of the senate and

commenced his speech by saying that any idea of a revolt from Rome would have been quite repugnant to

him had it not been a necessity, seeing that he had children by the daughter of Appius Claudius and had given

his own daughter in marriage to M. Livius in Rome. "But," he went on, "there is a much more serious and

formidable danger impending, for the populace are not simply contemplating beginning their revolt from

Rome by banishing the senate from the city, they mean to murder the senators and then hand over the city to

Hannibal and the Carthaginians. It is in my power to save you from this peril if you will put yourselves in my

hands, and, forgetting all our past quarrels, trust me." Overcome by their fears they all placed themselves in

his hands. "I will," he then said, "shut you in your House, and whilst appearing myself to participate in their

act by approving of designs which I should in vain attempt to oppose, I will discover a way of safety for you.

Take any guarantee in this matter which you please." When he had given the guarantee he went out and

ordered the doors to be fastened, and left a guard in the vestibule to prevent any one from entering or leaving

without his orders.

Next, he called an assembly of the people and addressed them thus: "You have often wished, citizens of

Capua, that you had the power to execute summary justice on the unscrupulous and infamous senate. You can

do so now safely, and none can call you to account. You need not risk your lives in desperate attempts to

force the houses of individual senators guarded as they are by their clients and slaves; take them as they now

are, locked up in the Senatehouse, all by themselves, unarmed. Do not be in a hurry, do nothing rashly. I

will put you in a position to pass sentence of life and death so that each of them in turn may pay the penalty

he deserves. But whatever you do see that you do not go too far in satisfying your feelings of resentment,

make the security and welfare of the State your first consideration. For, as I understand it, it is these particular

senators that you hate, you do not want to go without a senate altogether; for you must either have a king

which is an abomination, or a senate, which is the only consultative body that can exist in a free

commonwealth. So you have to do two things at once, remove the old senate and choose a fresh one. I shall

order the senators to be summoned one by one and I shall take your opinion as to their fate, and whatever

decision you arrive at shall be carried out. But before punishment is inflicted on any one found guilty you

must choose a strong and energetic man to take his place as senator." He then sat down, and after the names

of the senators had been cast into the urn he ordered the man whose name was drawn first to be brought out

of the Senatehouse. As soon as they heard the name they all shouted that he was a worthless scoundrel and

richly deserved to be punished. Then Pacuvius said: "I see clearly what you think of this man, in place of a

worthless scoundrel you must choose a worthy and honest man as senator. For a few minutes there was

silence as they were unable to suggest a better man. Then one of them, laying aside his diffidence, ventured

to suggest a name, and a greater clamour than ever arose. Some said they had never heard of him, others

imputed to him shameful vices and humble birth, sordid poverty, and a low class of occupation or trade. A

still more violent demonstration awaited the second and third senators who were summoned, and it was

obvious that while they intensely disliked the man, they had no one to put in his place. It was no use

mentioning the same names again and again, for it only led to everything that was bad being said about them

and the succeeding names were those of people much more low born and unknown than those which were

first suggested. So the crowd dispersed saying to one another that the evils they were best acquainted with

were the easiest to bear.

The senate had to thank Pacuvius for its life, and it was much more under his control than under that of the

populace. By common consent he now wielded supreme power and needed no armed support. Henceforth the

senators, forgetting their rank and independence, flattered the populace, saluted them courteously, invited


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them as guests, received them at sumptuous banquets, undertook their cases, always appeared on their side,

and when they were trying suits they always decided the actions in a way to secure the favour of the mob. In

fact, the proceedings in the senate were exactly as though it had been a popular assembly. The city had

always been disposed to luxury and extravagance, not only through the weakness of the character of its

citizens, but also through the superabundance of the means of enjoyment and the incitements to every kind of

pleasure which land or sea could furnish, and now, owing to the obsequiousness of the nobility and the

licence of the populace, it was becoming so demoralised that the sensuality and extravagance which prevailed

exceeded all bounds. They treated the laws, the magistrates, the senate with equal contempt, and now after

the defeat of Cannae they began to feel contempt for the one thing which they had hitherto held in some

respectthe power of Rome. The only circumstances which prevented them from immediately revolting were

the old established right of intermarriage which had led to many of their illustrious and powerful families

becoming connected with Rome and the fact that several citizens were serving with the Romans. The

strongest tie of this nature was the presence of three hundred cavalry, from the noblest families in Capua, in

Sicily, whither they had been specially sent by the Roman authorities to garrison the island. The parents and

relatives of these troopers succeeded after much difficulty in getting envoys sent to the Roman consul.

The consul had not yet started for Canusium; they found him and his scanty, insufficiently armed force still at

Venusia, an object calculated to arouse the deepest compassion in trusty allies, and nothing but contempt

amongst arrogant and treacherous ones like the Campanians. The consul made matters worse and increased

the contempt felt for himself and his fortunes by revealing too plainly and openly the extent of the disaster.

When the envoys assured him that the senate and people of Capua were much grieved that any mischance had

happened to the Romans and expressed their readiness to supply all that was needed for the war, he replied:

"In bidding us requisition from you what we need for the war you have preserved the tone in which we speak

to allies instead of suiting your language to the actual state of our circumstances. For what was left us at

Cannae that we should wish what is lackingas though we still possessed somethingto be made up by our

allies? Are we to ask you to furnish infantry as though we still possessed any cavalry? Are we to say that we

want money, as though that were the only thing we want? Fortune has not even left us anything which we can

supplement. Legions, cavalry, arms, standards, men and horses, money, suppliesall have gone either on the

battlefield or when the two camps were lost the following day. So then, men of Capua, you have not to help

us in the war but almost to undertake the war for us. Call to mind how once when your forefathers were

driven in hurried flight within their walls in dread of the Sidicine as well as the Samnite we took them under

our protection at Saticula, and how the war which then commenced with the Samnites on your behalf was

kept up by us with all its changeful fortunes for nearly a century. Besides all this you must remember that

after you had surrendered we gave you a treaty on equal terms, we allowed you to retain your own laws,

andwhat was, before our defeat at Cannae at all events, the greatest privilegewe granted our citizenship to

most of you and made you members of our commonwealth. Under these circumstances, men of Capua, you

ought to realise that you have suffered this defeat as much as we have, and to feel that we have a common

country to defend. It is not with the Samnites or the Etruscans that we have to do; if they deprived us of our

power it would still be Italians who would hold it. But the Carthaginian is dragging after him an army that is

not even made up of natives of Africa, he has collected a force from the furthest corners of the earth, from the

ocean straits, and the Pillars of Hercules, men devoid of any sense of right, destitute of the condition, and

almost of the speech of men. Savage and barbarous by nature and habit, their general has made them still

more brutal by building up bridges and barriers with human bodies andI shudder to say itteaching them to

feed on human flesh. What man, if he were merely a native of Italy, would not be horrified at the thought of

looking upon men who feast upon what it is impious even to touch as his lords and masters, looking to Africa

and above all to Carthage for his laws, and having to submit to Italy becoming a dependency of the

Numidians and the Moors? It will be a splendid thing, men of Capua, if the dominion of Rome, which has

collapsed in defeat, should be saved and restored by your loyalty, your strength. I think that in Campania you

can raise 30,000 infantry and 4000 cavalry; you have already sufficient money and corn. If you show a

loyalty corresponding to your means Hannibal will not feel that he has conquered or that the Romans are

vanquished."


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After this speech of the consul's, the envoys were dismissed. As they were on their way home, one of their

number, Vibius Virrius, told them that the time had come when the Campanians could not only recover the

territory wrongfully taken from them by the Romans, but even achieve the dominion over Italy. They could

make a treaty with Hannibal on any terms they chose, and there was no disputing the fact that when the war

was over and Hannibal after his conquest returned with his army to Africa, the sovereignty over Italy would

fall to the Campanians. They all agreed with what Virrius said, and they gave such an account of their

interview with the consul as to make everybody think that the very name of Rome was blotted out. The

populace and a majority of the senate began at once to prepare for a revolt; it was owing to the exertions of

the senior members that the crisis was staved off for a few days. At last the majority carried their point, and

the same envoys who had been to the Roman consul were now sent to Hannibal. I find it stated in some

annalists that before they started or it was definitely decided to revolt, envoys were sent from Capua to Rome

to demand as the condition of their rendering assistance that one consul should be a Campanian, and amidst

the indignation which this demand aroused the envoys were ordered to be summarily ejected from the

Senatehouse, and a lictor told off to conduct them out of the City with orders not to remain a single day on

Roman territory. As, however, this demand is too much like one made by the Latins in earlier times, and

Caelius amongst others would not have omitted to mention it without good reason, I will not venture to vouch

for the truth of the statement.

The envoys came to Hannibal and negotiated a peace with him on the following terms: No Carthaginian

commander or magistrate was to have any jurisdiction over the citizens of Capua nor was any Campanian

citizen to be obliged to serve in any military or other capacity against his will; Capua was to retain its own

magistrates and its own laws; and the Carthaginian was to allow them to choose three hundred Romans out of

his prisoners of war whom they were to exchange for the Campanian troopers who were serving in Sicily.

These were the terms agreed upon, but the Campanians went far beyond the stipulations in their criminal

excesses. The populace seized officers in command of our allies and other Roman citizens, some whilst

occupied with their military duties, others whilst engaged in their private business, and ordered them to be

shut up in the baths on the presence of keeping them in safe custody; unable to breathe owing to the heat and

fumes they died in great agony. Decius Magius was a man who, if his fellowcitizens had been rational,

would have gained very great authority with them. He did his best to prevent these crimes and to stop the

envoys from going to Hannibal. When he heard that troops were being sent by Hannibal to garrison the city,

he protested most earnestly against their being admitted and referred, as warning examples, to the tyranny of

Pyrrhus and the wretched servitude into which the Tarentines fell. After they were admitted he urged that

they should be expelled, or what was better, if the Capuans wished to clear themselves by a deed which

would be remembered from their guilt in revolting from ancient allies and bloodrelations, let them put the

Carthaginian garrison to death and be once more friends with Rome.

When this was reported to Hannibalfor there was no secrecy about Magius' actionhe sent to summon him

to his camp. Magius sent a spirited refusal; Hannibal, he said, had no legal authority over a citizen of Capua.

The Carthaginian, furious at the rebuff, ordered the man to be thrown into chains and brought to him.

Fearing, however, on second thoughts, that the use of force might create a tumult and feelings once aroused

might lead to a sudden outbreak, he sent a message to Marius Blossius, the chief magistrate of Capua, that he

would be there on the morrow, and started with a small escort for the city. Marius called the people together

and gave public notice that they should assemble in a body with their wives and children and go to meet

Hannibal. The whole population turned out, not because they were ordered, but because the mob were

enthusiastic in favour of Hannibal, and were eager to see a commander famous for so many victories. Decius

Magius did not go to meet him, nor did he shut himself up at home, as this might have implied a

consciousness of guilt; he strolled leisurely about the Forum with his son and a few of his clients, whilst the

whole city was in a state of wild excitement at seeing and welcoming Hannibal. When he had entered the city

Hannibal asked that the senate should be convened at once. The leading Campanians, however, implored him

not to transact any serious business then, but to give himself up to the joyous celebration of a day which had

been made such a happy one by his arrival. Though he was naturally impulsive in his anger, he would not


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begin with a refusal, and spent most of the day in viewing the city.

He stayed with two brothers, Sthenius and Pacuvius, men distinguished for their high birth and wealth.

Pacuvius Calavius, whom we have already mentioned, the leader of the party which brought the city over to

the Carthaginians, brought his young son to the house. The youth was closely attached to Decius Magius, and

had stood up most resolutely with him for the alliance with Rome and against any terms with the

Carthaginians, and neither the changing over of the city to the other side nor the authority of his father had

been able to shake his resolution. Pacuvius dragged him away from Magius' side and now sought to obtain

Hannibal's pardon for the youth by intercessions rather than by any attempts at exculpation. He was

overcome by the father's prayers and tears and went so far as to order him to be invited to a banquet to which

none were to be admitted but his hosts and Vibellius Taureas, a distinguished soldier. The banquet began

early in the day, and was not at all in accordance with Carthaginian customs or military discipline, but as was

natural in a city, still more in a house full of wealth and luxury, the table was furnished with every kind of

dainty and delicacy. Young Calavius was the only one who could not be persuaded to drink, though his hosts

and occasionally Hannibal invited him; he excused himself on the ground of health, and his father alleged as

a further reason his not unnatural excitement under the circumstances. It was nearly sunset when the guests

rose. Young Calavius accompanied his father out of the banquet chamber and when they had come to a

retired spot in the garden behind the house, he stopped and said: "I have a plan to propose to you, father, by

which we shall not only obtain pardon for the Romans for our offence in revolting to Hannibal, but also

possess much more influence and prestige in Capua than we have ever done before." When his father asked

him in great surprise what his plan was, he threw his toga back from his shoulder and showed him a sword

belted on to his side. "Now," he said, "this very moment will I ratify our treaty with Rome in Hannibal's

blood. I wanted you to know first, in case you would rather be away when the deed is done."

The old man, beside himself with terror at what he saw and heard, as though he were actually witnessing the

act his son had spoken of, exclaimed: "I pray and beseech you, my son, by all the sacred bonds which unite

parents and children, not to insist upon doing and suffering everything that is horrible before your father's

eyes. It is only a few hours ago that we pledged our faith, swearing by all the gods and joining hand to hand,

and do you want us, when we have just separated after friendly talk, to arm those hands, consecrated by such

a pledge, against him? Have you risen from the hospitable board to which you were invited by Hannibal with

only two others out of all Capua that you may stain that board with your host's blood? I, your father, was able

to make Hannibal friendly towards my son, am I powerless to make my son friendly towards Hannibal? But

let nothing sacred hold you back, neither the plighted word, nor religious obligation, nor filial affection; dare

infamous deeds, if they do not bring ruin as well as guilt upon us. But what then? Are you going to attack

Hannibal singlehanded? What of that throng of free men and slaves with all their eyes intent on him alone?

What of all those right hands? Will they hang down listlessly during that act of madness? Armed hosts cannot

bear even to gaze on the face of Hannibal, the Roman people dread it, and will yon endure it? Though other

help be lacking, will you have the courage to strike me, me your father, when I interpose myself to protect

Hannibal? And yet it is through my breast that you must pierce his. Suffer yourself to be deterred here rather

than vanquished there. Let my prayers prevail with you as they have already today prevailed for you." By

this time the youth was in tears, and seeing this, the father flung his arms round him, clung to him with

kisses, and persisted in his entreaties until he made his son lay aside his sword and give his word that he

would do nothing of the kind. Then the son spoke: "I must pay to my father the dutiful obedience which I

owe to my country. I am indeed grieved on your account for you have to bear the guilt of a threefold betrayal

of your country; first when you instigated the revolt from Rome, secondly when you urged peace with

Hannibal, and now once more when you are the one let and hindrance in the way of restoring Capua to the

Romans. Do you, my country, receive this sword with which I armed myself in your defence when I entered

the stronghold of the enemy." With these words he flung the sword over the garden wall into the public road,

and to allay all suspicions returned to the banqueting room.


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The following day there was a full meeting of the senate to hear Hannibal. At first his tone was very gracious

and winning; he thanked the Capuans for preferring his friendship to alliance with Rome, and amongst other

magnificent promises he assured them that Capua would soon be the head of all Italy and that Rome, in

common with all the other nationalities, would have to look to her for their laws. Then his tone changed.

There was one man, he thundered, who was outside the friendship of Carthage and the treaty they had made

with him, a man that was not, and ought not to be called a CampanianDecius Magius. He demanded his

surrender and asked that this matter should be discussed and a decision arrived at before he left the House.

They all voted for surrendering the man, though a great many thought that he did not deserve such a cruel fate

and felt that a long step had been taken in the abridgment of their rights and liberties. On leaving the

Senatehouse Hannibal took his seat on the magistrates' tribunal and ordered Decius Magius to be arrested,

brought before him, and put on his defence, alone and unbefriended. The high spirit of the man was still

unquelled, he said that by the terms of the treaty this could not be insisted on, but he was at once placed in

irons and ordered to be conducted to the camp, followed by a lictor. As long as his head was uncovered he

was incessantly haranguing and shouting to the crowds round him: "You have got the liberty, you

Campanians, that you asked for. In the middle of the Forum, in the broad daylight, with you looking on, I a

man second to none in Capua am being hurried off in chains to death. Could any greater outrage have been

committed if the city had been taken? Go and meet Hannibal, decorate your city, make the day of his arrival a

public holiday that you may enjoy the spectacle of this triumph over a fellowcitizen! As the mob appeared

to be moved by these outbursts, his head was muffled up and orders were given to hurry him more quickly

outside the city gate. In this way he was brought into the camp and then at once put on board a ship and sent

to Carthage. Hannibal's fear was that if any disturbance broke out in Capua in consequence of such

scandalous treatment the senate might repent of having surrendered their foremost citizen, and if they sent to

ask for his restoration he would either offend his new allies by refusing the first request they made, or, if he

granted it, would have in Capua a fomenter of disorder and sedition. The vessel was driven by a storm to

Cyrenae which was then under a monarchy. Here Magius fled for sanctuary to the statue of King Ptolemy,

and his guards conveyed him to the King of Alexandria. After he had told him how he had been thrown into

chains by Hannibal in defiance of all treaty rights, he was liberated from his fetters and permission accorded

to him to go to Rome or Capua, whichever he preferred. Magius said that he would not be safe at Capua, and

as there was at that time war between Rome and Capua, he would be living in Rome more like a deserter than

a guest. There was no place where he would sooner live than under the rule of the man whom he had known

as the champion and asserter of his freedom.

During these occurrences Q. Fabius Pictor returned home from his mission to Delphi. He read the response of

the oracle from a manuscript, in which were contained the names of the gods and goddesses to whom

supplications were to be made, and the forms to be observed in making them. This was the closing paragraph:

"If ye act thus, Romans, your estate will be better and less troubled, your republic will go forward as ye

would have it, and the victory in the war will belong to the people of Rome. When your commonwealth is

prosperous and safe send to Pythian Apollo a gift from the gains you have earned and honour him with your

substance out of the plunder, the booty, and the spoils. Put away from you all wanton and godless living." He

translated this from the Greek as he read it, and when he had finished reading he said that as soon as he left

the oracle he offered sacrifice with wine and incense to all the deities who were named, and further that he

was instructed by the priest to go on board wearing the same laurel garland in which he had visited the oracle

and not to lay it aside till he got to Rome. He stated that he had carried out all his instructions most carefully

and conscientiously, and had laid the garland on the altar of Apollo. The senate passed a decree that the

sacrifices and intercessions which were enjoined should be carefully performed at the earliest opportunity.

During these occurrences in Rome and Italy, Mago, Hamilcar's son, had arrived at Carthage with the news of

the victory of Cannae. He had not been sent by his brother immediately after the battle, but had been detained

for some days in receiving into alliance Bruttian communities as they successively revolted. When he

appeared before the senate he unfolded the story of his brother's successes in Italy, how he had fought pitched

battles with six commandersinchief, four of whom were consuls and two a Dictator and his Master of


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Horse, and how he had killed about 200,000 of the enemy and taken more than 50,000 prisoners. Out of four

consuls two had fallen, of the two survivors one was wounded and the other, after losing the whole of his

army, had escaped with fifty men. The Master of the Horse, whose powers were those of a consul, had been

routed and put to flight, and the Dictator, because he had never fought an action, was looked upon as a

matchless general. The Bruttians and Apulians, with some of the Samnite and Lucanian communities, had

gone over to the Carthaginians. Capua, which was not only the chief city of Campania, but now that the

power of Rome had been shattered at Cannae was the head of Italy, had surrendered to Hannibal. For all these

great victories he felt that they ought to be truly grateful and public thanksgivings ought to be offered to the

immortal gods.

As evidence that the joyful tidings he brought were true, he ordered a quantity of gold rings to be piled up in

the vestibule of the Senatehouse, and they formed such a great heap that, according to some authorities, they

measured more than three modii; the more probable account, however, is that they did not amount to more

than one modius. He added by way of explanation, to show how great the Roman losses had been, that none

but knights, and amongst them only the highest in rank, wore that ornament. The main purport of his speech

was that the nearer Hannibal's chances were of bringing the war to a speedy close the more need there was to

render him every possible assistance; he was campaigning far from home, in the midst of a hostile country;

vast quantities of corn were being consumed and much money expended, and all those battles, whilst they

destroyed the armies of the enemy, at the same time wasted very appreciably the forces of the victor.

Reinforcements, therefore, must be sent, money must be sent to pay the troops, and supplies of corn to the

soldiers who had done such splendid service for Carthage. Amidst the general delight with which Mago's

speech was received, Himilco, a member of the Barcine party, thought it a favourable moment for attacking

Hanno. "Well, Hanno," he began, "do you still disapprove of our commencing a war against Rome? Give

orders for Hannibal to be surrendered, put your veto upon all thanksgivings to the gods after we have

received such blessings, let us hear the voice of a Roman senator in the Senatehouse of Carthage?"

Then Hanno spoke to the following effect: "Senators, I would have kept silence on the present occasion, for I

did not wish on a day of universal rejoicing to say anything which might damp your happiness. But as a

senator has asked me whether I still disapprove of the war we have commenced against Rome, silence on my

part would show either insolence or cowardice; the one implies forgetfulness of the respect due to others, the

other of one's own selfrespect. My reply to Himilco is this: I have never ceased to disapprove of the war, nor

shall I ever cease to censure your invincible general until I see the war ended upon conditions that are

tolerable. Nothing will banish my regret for the old peace that we have broken except the establishment of a

new one. Those details which Mago has proudly enumerated make Himilco and the rest of Hannibal's caucus

very happy; they might make me happy too, for a successful war, if we choose to make a wise use of our

good fortune, will bring us a more favourable peace. If we let this opportunity slip, when we are in a position

to offer rather than submit to terms of peace, I fear that our rejoicing will become extravagant and finally turn

out to be groundless. But even now, what is it that you are rejoicing at? 'I have slain the armies of the enemy;

send me troops.' What more could you ask for, if you had been defeated? 'I have captured two of the enemy's

camps, filled, of course, with plunder and supplies; send me corn and money.' What more could you want if

you had been despoiled, stripped of your own camp? And that I may not be the only one to be surprised at

your delightfor as I have answered Himilco, I have a perfect right to ask questions in my turnI should be

glad if either Himilco or Mago would tell me, since, you say, the battle of Cannae has all but destroyed the

power of Rome and the whole of Italy is admittedly in revolt, whether, in the first place, any single

community of the Latin nation has come over to us, and, secondly, whether a single man out of the

thirtyfive Roman tribes has deserted to Hannibal." Mago answered both questions in the negative. "Then

there are still," Hanno continued, "far too many of the enemy left. But I should like to know how much

courage and confidence that vast multitude possess."

Mago said he did not know. "Nothing," replied Hanno, "is easier to find out. Have the Romans sent any

envoys to Hannibal to sue for peace? Has any rumour reached your ears of any one even mentioning the word


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'peace' in Rome?" Again Mago replied in the negative. "Well, then," said Hanno, "we have as much work

before us in this war as we had on the day when Hannibal first set foot in Italy. Many of us are still alive who

can remember with what changeful fortunes the first Punic war was fought. Never did our cause appear to be

prospering more by sea and land than immediately before the consulship of C. Lutatius and A. Postumius.

But in their year of office we were utterly defeated off the Aegates. But if (which heaven forfend!) fortune

should now turn to any extent, do you hope to obtain when you are defeated a peace which no one offers to

give you now that you are victorious? If any one should ask my opinion about offering or accepting terms of

peace I would say what I thought. But if the question before us is simply whether Mago's demands should be

granted, I do not think that we are concerned with sending supplies to a victorious army, much less do I

consider that they ought to be sent if we are being deluded with false and empty hopes." Very few were

influenced by Hanno's speech. His wellknown dislike of the Barcas deprived his words of weight and they

were too much preoccupied with the delightful news they had just heard to listen to anything which would

make them feel less cause for joy. They fancied that if they were willing to make a slight effort the war would

soon be over. A resolution was accordingly passed with great enthusiasm to reinforce Hannibal with 4000

Numidians, 40 elephants, and 500 talents of silver. Bostar also was sent with Mago into Spain to raise 20,000

infantry and 4000 cavalry to make good the losses of the armies in Italy and Spain.

As usual, however, in seasons of prosperity, these measures were executed with great remissness and

dilatoriness. The Romans, on the other hand, were kept from being dilatory by their native energy and still

more by the necessities of their position. The consul did not fail in any single duty which he had to perform,

nor did the Dictator show less energy. The force now available comprised the two legions which had been

enrolled by the consuls at the beginning of the year, a levy of slaves and the cohorts which had been raised in

the country of Picenum and Cisalpine Gaul. The Dictator decided to still further increase his strength by

adopting a measure to which only a country in an almost hopeless state could stoop, when honour must yield

to necessity. After duly discharging his religious duties and obtaining the necessary permission to mount his

horse, he published an edict that all who had been guilty of capital offences or who were in prison for debt

and were willing to serve under him would by his orders be released from punishment and have their debts

cancelled. 6000 men were raised in this way, and he armed them with the spoils taken from the Gauls and

which had been carried in the triumphal procession of C. Flaminius. He then started from the City with

25,000 men. After taking over Capua, and making another fruitless appeal to the hopes and fears of Neapolis,

Hannibal marched into the territory of Nola. He did not at once treat it in a hostile manner as he was not

without hope that the citizens would make a voluntary surrender, but if they delayed, he intended to leave

nothing undone which could cause them suffering or terror. The senate, especially its leading members, were

faithful supporters of the Roman alliance, the populace as usual were all in favour of revolting to Hannibal;

they conjured up the prospect of ravaged fields and a siege with all its hardships and indignities; nor were

there wanting men who were actively instigating a revolt. The senate were afraid that if they openly opposed

the agitation they would not be able to withstand the popular excitement, and they found a means of putting

off the evil day by pretending to go with the mob. They represented that they were in favour of revolting to

Hannibal, but nothing was settled as to the conditions on which they were to enter into a new treaty and

alliance. Having thus gained time, they sent delegates in great haste to Marcellus Claudius the praetor, who

was with his army at Casilinum, to inform him of the critical position of Nola, how their territory was in

Hannibal's hand, and the city would be in the possession of the Carthaginians unless it received succour. and

how the senate, by telling the populace that they might revolt when they pleased. had made them less in a

hurry to do so. Marcellus thanked the delegates and told them to adhere to the same policy and postpone

matters till he arrived. He then left Casilinum for Caiatia and from there he marched across the Vulturnus,

through the districts of Saticula and Trebia, over the hills above Suessula, and so arrived at Nola.

On the approach of the Roman praetor the Carthaginian evacuated the territory of Nola and marched down to

the coast close to Neapolis, as he was anxious to secure a seaport town to which there might be a safe passage

for ships coming from Africa. When, however, he learnt that Neapolis was held by a Roman officer, M.

Junius Silanus, who had been invited by the Neapolitans, he left Naples, as he had left Nola, and went to


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Nuceria. He spent some time in investing the place, often attacking it, and often making tempting proposals

to the chief men of the place and to the leaders of the populace, but all to no purpose. At last famine did its

work, and he received the submission of the town, the inhabitants being allowed to depart without arms and

with one garment apiece. Then, to keep up his character of being friendly to all the Italian nationalities except

the Romans, he held out honours and rewards to those who consented to remain in his service. Not a single

man was tempted by the prospect; they all dispersed, wherever they had friends, or wherever each man's

fancy led him, amongst the cities of Campania, mainly Nola and Neapolis. About thirty of their senators, and,

as it happened, their principal ones, endeavoured to enter Capua, but were refused admission because they

had closed their gates against Hannibal. They accordingly went on to Cumae. The plunder of Nuceria was

given to the soldiers, the city itself was burnt.

Marcellus retained his hold on Nola quite as much by the support of its leading men as by the confidence he

felt in his troops. Fears were entertained as to the populace and especially L. Bantius. This enterprising young

man was at that time almost the most distinguished among the allied cavalry, but the knowledge that he had

attempted revolt and his fear of the Roman praetor were driving him on to betray his country or, if he found

no means of doing that, to become a deserter. He had been discovered lying halfdead on a heap of bodies on

the field of Cannae, and after being taken the utmost care of, Hannibal sent him home loaded with presents.

His feelings of gratitude for such kindness made him wish to place the government of Nola in the hands of

the Carthaginian, and his anxiety and eagerness for a revolution attracted the observation of the praetor. As it

was necessary either to restrain the youth by punishment or to win him by kindness, the praetor chose the

latter course, preferring to secure such a brave and enterprising youth as a friend rather than to lose him to the

enemy. He invited him to come and see him and spoke to him most kindly. "You can easily understand," he

told him, "that many of your countrymen are jealous of you, from the fact that not a single citizen of Nola has

pointed out to me your many distinguished military services. But the bravery of a man who has served in a

Roman camp cannot be hidden. Many of your fellowsoldiers tell me what a young hero you are, and how

many perils and dangers you have undergone in defence of the safety and honour of Rome. I am told that you

did not give up the struggle on the field of Cannae until you were buried almost lifeless, beneath a falling

mass of men and horses and arms. May you long live to do still more gallant deeds! With me you will gain

every honour and reward, and you will find that the more you are in my company the more will it lead to your

profit and promotion." The young man was delighted with these promises. The praetor made him a present of

a splendid charger and authorised the quaestor to pay him 500 silver coins; he also instructed his lictors to

allow him to pass whenever he wished to see him.

The highspirited youth was so completely captivated by the attention Marcellus paid him that for the future

none among the allies of Rome gave her more efficient or more loyal help. Hannibal once more moved his

camp from Nuceria to Nola, and when he appeared before its gates the populace again began to look forward

to revolting. As the enemy approached Marcellus retired within the walls, not because he feared for his camp,

but because he would not give any opportunity to the large number of citizens who were bent on betraying

their city. Both armies now began to prepare for battle; the Romans before the walls of Nola and the

Carthaginians in front of their camp. Slight skirmishes took place between the city and the camp with varying

success, as the generals would not prohibit their men from going forward in small parties to offer defiance to

the enemy nor would they give the signal for a general action. Day after day the two armies took up their

respective stations in this way, and during this time the leading citizens of Nola informed Marcellus that

nocturnal interviews were taking place between the populace and the Carthaginians, and that it had been

arranged that when the Roman army had passed out of the gates they should plunder their baggage and kits,

then close the gates and man the walls so that having become masters of their city and government they might

forthwith admit the Carthaginians instead of the Romans.

On receiving this information Marcellus warmly thanked the Nolan senators and made up his mind to try the

fortune of a battle before any disturbances arose in the city. He formed his army into three divisions and

stationed them at the three gates which faced the enemy, he ordered the baggage to follow close behind, and


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the campservants, sutlers, and disabled soldiers were to carry stakes. At the centre gate he posted the

strongest part of the legions and the Roman cavalry, at the two on either side he stationed the recruits, the

light infantry, and the cavalry of the allies. The Nolans were forbidden to approach the walls or gates and a

special reserve was placed in charge of the baggage to prevent any attack upon it whilst the legions were

engaged in the battle. In this formation they remained standing inside the gates. Hannibal had his troops

drawn up for battle, as he had had for several days, and remained in this position till late in the day. At first it

struck him with surprise that the Roman army did not move outside the gates and that not a single soldier

appeared on the walls. Then, supposing that the secret interviews had been betrayed and that his friends were

afraid to move, he sent back a portion of his troops to their camp with orders to bring all the appliances for

attacking the town as soon as possible to the front of the line. He felt fairly confident that if he attacked them

whilst thus hesitating the populace would raise some disturbance in the town. Whilst his men were hurrying

up to the front ranks, each to his allotted task, and the whole line was approaching the walls, Marcellus

ordered the gates to be suddenly flung open, the attack sounded, and the battle shout raised; the infantry,

followed by the cavalry, were to attack with all the fury possible. They had already carried enough confusion

and alarm into the enemies' centre when P. Valerius Flaccus and C. Aurelius, divisional commanders, burst

out from the other two gates and charged. The sutlers and campservants and the rest of the troops who were

guarding the baggage joined in the shouting, and this made the Carthaginians, who had been despising the

fewness of their numbers, think that it was a large army. I would hardly venture to assert, as some authorities

do, that 2800 of the enemy were killed, and that the Romans did not lose more than 500. But whether the

victory was as great as that or not, I do not think that an action more important in its consequences was

fought during the whole war, for it was more difficult for those who conquered to escape being defeated by

Hannibal than it was afterwards to conquer him.

As there was no hope of his getting possession of Nola, Hannibal withdrew to Acerrae. No sooner had he

departed than Marcellus shut the gates and posted guards to prevent any one from leaving the city. He then

opened a public inquiry in the forum into the conduct of those who had been holding secret interviews with

the enemy. Above seventy were found guilty of treason and beheaded and their property confiscated. Then,

after handing the government over to the senate, he left with his entire force and took up a position above

Suessula, where he encamped. At first the Carthaginian tried to persuade the men of Acerrae to make a

voluntary surrender, but when he found that their loyalty remained unshaken he made preparations for a siege

and an assault. The Acerrans possessed more courage than strength, and when they saw that the blockade was

being carried round their walls and that it was hopeless to attempt any further defence, they decided to escape

before the enemies' line of circumvallation was closed, and stealing away in the dead of night through any

unguarded gaps in the earthworks they fled, regardless of roads or paths, as chance or design led them. They

escaped to those cities of Campania which they had every reason to believe had not changed their allegiance.

After plundering and burning Acerrae Hannibal marched to Casilinum in consequence of information he

received of the Dictator's march on Capua with his legions. He was apprehensive that the proximity of the

Roman army might create a counterrevolution in Capua. At that time Casilinum was held by 500

Praenestines with a few Roman and Latin troops, who had gone there when they heard of the disaster at

Cannae. The levy at Praeneste had not been completed by the appointed day, and these men started from

home too late to be of use at Cannae. They reached Casilinum before news of the disaster arrived, and, joined

by Romans and allies, they advanced in great force. Whilst on the march they heard of the battle and its result

and returned to Casilinum. Here, suspected by the Campanians and fearing for their own safety, they passed

some days in forming and evading plots. When they were satisfied that Capua was in revolt and that Hannibal

would be admitted, they massacred the townsmen of Casilinum at night and took possession of the part of the

city on this side of the Vulturnusthe river divides the city in twoand held it as a Roman garrison. They

were joined also by a cohort of Perusians numbering 460 men who were driven to Casilinum by the same

intelligence that sent the Praenestines there a few days previously. The force was quite adequate for the small

circuit of walls, protected, too, as they were on one side by the river, but the scarcity of corn made even that

number appear too large.


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When Hannibal was now not far from the place he sent on in advance a troop of Gaetulians under an officer

named Isalca, to try and get a parley with the inhabitants and persuade them by fair words to open their gates

and admit a Carthaginian detachment to hold the town. If they refused, they were to use force and make an

attack, wherever it seemed feasible, on the place. When they approached the walls the town was so silent that

they thought it was deserted, and taking it for granted that the inhabitants had fled through fear they began to

force the gates and break down the bars. Suddenly the gates were thrown open and two cohorts which had

been standing inside ready for action dashed out and made a furious charge, utterly discomfiting the enemy.

Maharbal was sent with a stronger force to their assistance, but even he was unable to withstand the

impetuosity of the cohorts. At last Hannibal pitched his camp before the walls, and made preparations for

assaulting the little town and its small garrison with the combined strength of his entire army. After

completing the circle of his investing lines he began to harass and annoy the garrison, and in this way lost

some of his most daring soldiers who were hit with missiles from the wall and turrets. On one occasion when

the defenders were taking the aggressive in a sortie he nearly cut them off with his elephants and drove them

in hasty flight into the city; the loss, considering their numbers, was quite severe enough, and more would

have fallen had not night intervened. The next day there was a general desire to begin the assault. The

enthusiasm of the men had been kindled by the offer of a "mural crown" of gold and also by the way in which

the general himself remonstrated with the men who had taken Saguntum for their slackness in attacking a

little fortress situated in open country, and also reminded them one and all of Cannae, Trasumennus, and the

Trebia. The vineae were brought up and mines commenced, but the various attempts of the enemy were

opposed with equal strength and skill by the defenders, the allies of Rome; they created defences against the

vineae, intercepted their mines with countermines, and met all their attacks above ground or below with

steady resistance until at last Hannibal for very shame gave up his project. He contented himself with

fortifying his camp and leaving a small force to defend it, so that it might not be supposed that the siege was

entirely abandoned; after which he settled in Capua as his winter quarters.

There he kept his army under shelter for the greater part of the winter. A long and varied experience had

inured that army to every form of human suffering, but it had not been habituated to or had any experience of

ease and comfort. So it came about that the men whom no pressure of calamity had been able to subdue fell

victims to a prosperity too great and pleasures too attractive for them to withstand, and fell all the more

utterly the more greedily they plunged into new and untried delights. Sloth, wine, feasting, women, baths, and

idle lounging, which became every day more seductive as they became more habituated to them, so enervated

their minds and bodies that they were saved more by the memory of past victories than by any fighting

strength they possessed now. Authorities in military matters have regarded the wintering at Capua as a greater

mistake on the part of Hannibal than his not marching straight to Rome after his victory at Cannae. For his

delay at that time might be looked upon as only postponing his final victory but this may be considered as

having deprived him of the strength to win victory. And it certainly did look as if he left Capua with another

army altogether; it did not retain a shred of its former discipline. A large number who had become entangled

with women went back there, and as soon as they took to tents again and the fatigue of marching and other

military toils had to be endured their strength and spirits alike gave way just as though they were raw recruits.

From that time all through the summer campaign a large number left the standards without leave, and Capua

was the only place where the deserters sought to hide themselves.

However, when the mild weather came, Hannibal led his army out of their winter quarters and marched back

to Casilinum. Although the assault had been suspended, the uninterrupted investment had reduced the

townsfolk and the garrison to the extremity of want. Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus was in command of the

Roman camp, as the Dictator had to leave for Rome to take the auspices afresh. Marcellus was equally

anxious to assist the besieged garrison, but he was detained by the Vulturnus being in flood, and also by the

entreaties of the people of Nola and Acerrae who feared the Campanians in case the Romans withdrew their

protection. Gracchus simply watched Casilinum, for the Dictator had given strict orders that no active

operations should be undertaken in his absence. He therefore kept quiet, though the reports from Casilinum

might easily have been too much for any man's patience. It was stated as a fact that some, unable to endure


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starvation any longer, had flung themselves from the walls, others had stood there unarmed and exposed their

defenceless bodies to the missiles of the enemy. These tidings sorely tried his patience, for he durst not fight

against the Dictator's orders, and he saw that he would have to fight if he were seen getting corn into the

place, and there was no chance of getting it in without being seen. He gathered in a supply of corn from all

the fields round and filled a number of casks with it, and then sent a messenger to the chief magistrate at

Casilinum asking him to pick up the casks which the river carried down. The next night, while all were

intently watching the river, after their hopes had been raised by the Roman messenger, the casks floated down

in the middle of the stream; and the corn was divided in equal shares amongst them all. The same thing

happened on the two following days; they were sent off by night and reached their destination; so far they had

escaped the notice of the enemy. Then, owing to the perpetual rain, the river became more rapid than usual

and the cross currents carried the casks to the bank which the enemy were guarding. They caught sight of

them as they stuck amongst the osier beds which grew on the bank and a report was made to Hannibal in

consequence of which greater caution was observed and a closer watch was kept, so that nothing could be

sent by the Vulturnus to the city without being detected. Nuts, however, were scattered on the river from the

Roman camp; these floated down the midstream and were caught in baskets. At last things came to such a

pitch that the inhabitants tried to chew the leather straps and hides which they tore from their shields, after

softening them in boiling water, nor did they refuse mice and other animals; they even dug up from the

bottom of their walls grass and roots of all sorts. When the enemy had ploughed up all the grass outside the

walls they sowed it with rape, which made Hannibal exclaim: "Am I to sit here before Casilinum until these

seeds have grown?" and whereas he had never allowed any terms of surrender to be mentioned in his hearing,

he now consented to proposals for the ransom of all the freeborn citizens. The price agreed upon was seven

ounces of gold for each person. When their liberty was guaranteed they surrendered, but were kept in custody

till all the gold was paid, then in strict observance of the terms they were released. This is much more likely

to be true than that after they had left cavalry were sent after them and put them all to death. The great

majority were Praenestines. Out of the 570 who formed the garrison not less than half had perished by sword

and famine, the rest returned in safety to Praeneste with their commanding officer, M. Anicius, who had

formerly been a notary. To commemorate the event his statue was set up in the forum of Praeneste, wearing a

coat of mail with a toga over it and having the head veiled. A bronze plate was affixed with this inscription:

"Marcus Anicius has discharged the vow he made for the safety of the garrison of Casilinum." The same

inscription was affixed to the three images standing in the temple of Fortune.

The town of Casilinum was given back to the Campanians, and a garrison of 700 men from Hannibal's army

was placed in it in case the Romans should attack it after Hannibal's departure. The senate decreed that

double pay and an exemption for five years from further service should be granted to the Praenestine troops.

They were also offered the full Roman citizenship, but they preferred not to change their status as citizens of

Praeneste. There is more obscurity as to what happened to the Perusians, as there is no light thrown upon it

by any monument of their own or any decree of the senate. The people of Petelia, who alone of all the Bruttii

had remained friendly to Rome, were now attacked not only by the Carthaginians, who were overrunning that

district, but also by the rest of the Bruttii who had adopted the opposite policy. Finding themselves helpless in

the presence of all these dangers, they sent envoys to Rome to ask for support. The senate told them that they

must look after themselves, and on hearing this they broke into tears and entreaties and flung themselves on

the floor of the vestibule. Their distress excited the deep sympathy of both senate and people, and the praetor,

M. Aemilius asked the senators to reconsider their decision. After making a careful survey of the resources of

the empire, they were compelled to admit that they were powerless to protect their distant allies. They

advised the envoys to return home and now that they had proved their loyalty to the utmost they must adopt

such measures as their present circumstances demanded. When the result of their mission was reported to the

Petelians, their senate was so overcome by grief and fear that some were in favour of deserting the city and

seeking refuge wherever they could, others thought that as they had been abandoned by their old allies they

had better join the rest of the Bruttii and surrender to Hannibal. The majority, however, decided that no rash

action should be taken, and that the question should be further debated. When the matter came up the next

day a calmer tone prevailed and their leading statesmen persuaded them to collect all their produce and


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possessions from the fields and put the city and the walls into a state of defence.

About this time despatches arrived from Sicily and Sardinia. The one sent from T. Otacilius, the propraetor

commanding in Sicily, was read in the senate. It stated in effect that P. Furius had reached Lilybaeum with

his fleet; that he himself was seriously wounded and his life in great danger; that the soldiers and sailors had

no pay or corn given them from day to day, nor was there any means of procuring any, and he strongly urged

that both should be sent as soon as possible, and that, if the senate agreed, one of the new praetors should be

sent to succeed him. The despatch from A. Cornelius Mammula dealt with the same difficulty as to pay and

corn. The same reply was sent to both; there was no possibility of sending either, and they were instructed to

make the best arrangements they could for their fleets and armies. T. Otacilius sent envoys to Hiero, the one

man whom Rome could fall back upon, and received in reply as much money as he needed and a six months'

supply of corn. In Sicily the allied cities sent generous contributions. Even in Rome, too, the scarcity of

money was felt and a measure was carried by M. Minucius, one of the tribunes of the plebs, for the

appointment of three finance commissioners. The men appointed were: L. Aemilius Papus, who had been

consul and censor; M. Atilius Regulus, who had been twice consul, and L. Scribonius Libo, one of the

tribunes of the plebs. Marcus and Caius Atilius, two brothers, were appointed to dedicate the temple of

Concord which L. Manlius had vowed during his praetorship. Three new pontiffs were also chosenQ.

Caecilius Metellus, Q. Fabius Maximus, and Q. Fulvius Flaccusin the place of P. Scantinius who had died,

and of L. Aemilius Paulus, the consul, and Q. Aelius Paetus, both of whom fell at Cannae.

When the senate had done their bestso far as human wisdom could do soto make good the losses which

Fortune had inflicted in such an uninterrupted series of disasters, they at last turned their attention to the

emptiness of the Senatehouse and the small number of those who attended the national council. There had

been no revision of the roll of the senate since L. Aemilius and C. Flaminius were censors, though there had

been such heavy losses amongst the senators during the last five years on the field of battle, as well as from

the fatalities and accidents to which all are liable. In compliance with the unanimous wish, the subject was

brought forward by the praetor, M. Aemilius, in the absence of the Dictator, who after the loss of Casilinum

had rejoined the army. Sp. Carvilius spoke at considerable length about the dearth of senators, and also the

very small number of citizens from whom senators could be chosen. He went on to say that for the purpose of

filling up the vacancies, and also of strengthening the union between the Latins and Rome, he should strongly

urge that the full citizenship be granted to two senators out of each Latin city, to be approved by the senate,

and that these men should be chosen into the senate in the place of those who had died. The senate listened to

these proposals with quite as much impatience as they had previously felt at the demand of the Latins. A

murmur of indignation went through the House. T. Manlius in particular was heard asserting that there was

even still one man of the stock to which that consul belonged who once in the Capitol threatened that he

would kill with his own hand any Latin whom he saw sitting in the senate. Q. Fabius Maximus declared that

no proposal had ever been mooted in the senate at a more inopportune time than this; it had been thrown out

at a moment when the sympathies of their allies were wavering and their loyalty doubtful, and it would make

them more restless than ever; those rash inconsiderate words uttered by one man ought to be stifled by the

silence of all men. Whatever secret or sacred matter had at any time imposed silence on that House, this most

of all must be concealed, buried, forgotten, considered as never having been uttered. All further allusion to

the subject was accordingly suppressed. It was ultimately decided to nominate as Dictator a man who had

been censor before, and was the oldest man living who had held that office, in order that the roll of senators

might be revised. C. Terentius was recalled to nominate the Dictator. Leaving a garrison in Apulia he

returned to Rome by forced marches, and the night after his arrival nominated, in accordance with ancient

custom M. Fabius Buteo to act as Dictator for six months without any Master of the Horse.

Accompanied by his lictors, Fabius mounted the rostra and made the following speech: "I do not approve of

there being two Dictators at the same time, a thing wholly unprecedented, nor of there being a Dictator

without a Master of the Horse, nor of the censorial powers being entrusted to one individual and that for the

second time, nor of the supreme authority being placed in the hands of a Dictator for six months unless he has


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been created to wield executive powers. These irregularities may perhaps be necessary at this juncture, but I

shall fix a limit to them. I shall not remove from the roll any of those whom C. Flaminius and L. Aemilius,

the last censors, placed on it, I shall simply order their names to be transcribed and read out, as I do not

choose to allow the power of judging and deciding upon the reputation or character of a senator to rest with

any single individual. I shall fill up the places of those who are dead in such a way as to make it clear that

preference is given to rank and not to persons." After the names of the old senate had been read out, Fabius

began his selection. The first chosen were men who, subsequent to the censorship of L. Aemilius and C.

Flaminius, had filled a curule office, but were not yet in the senate, and they were taken according to the

order of their previous appointments. They were followed by those who had been aediles, tribunes of the

plebs, or quaestors. Last of all came those who had not held office, but had the spoils of an enemy set up in

their houses or had received a "civic crown." In this way names were added to the senatorial roll, amidst

general approbation. Having completed his task he at once laid down his Dictatorship and descended from the

rostra as a private citizen. He ordered the lictors to cease their attendance and mingled with the throng of

citizens who were transacting their private business, deliberately idling his time away in order that he might

not take the people out of the Forum to escort him home. The public interest in him, however, did not slacken

through their having to wait, and a large crowd escorted him to his house. The following night the consul

made his way back to the army, without letting the senate know, as he did not want to be detained in the City

for the elections.

The next day the senate, on being consulted by M. Pomponius, the praetor, passed a decree to write to the

Dictator, asking him, if the interests of the State permitted, to come to Rome to conduct the election of fresh

consuls. He was to bring with him his Master of the Horse and M. Marcellus, the praetor, so that the senate

might learn from them on the spot in what condition the affairs of the Republic were, and form their plans

accordingly. On receiving the summons they all came, after leaving officers in command of the legions. The

Dictator spoke briefly and modestly about himself; he gave most of the credit to Tiberius Sempronius

Gracchus, his Master of the Horse, and then gave notice of the elections. The consuls elected were L.

Postumius for the third timehe was elected in his absence, as he was then administering the province of

Gauland Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, Master of the Horse, and at that time curule aedile also. Then the

praetors were elected. They were M. Valerius Laevinus, for the second time, Appius Claudius Pulcher, Q.

Fulvius Flaccus, and Q. Mucius Scaevola. After the various magistrates had been elected the Dictator

returned to his army in winter quarters at Teanum. The Master of the Horse was left in Rome; as he would be

entering upon office in a few days, it was desirable for him to consult the senate about the enrolment and

equipment of the armies for the year.

While these matters were engrossing attention a fresh disaster was announced, for Fortune was heaping one

disaster upon another this year. It was reported that L. Postumius, the consul elect, and his army had been

annihilated in Gaul. There was a wild forest called by the Gauls Litana, and through this the consul was to

conduct his army. The Gauls cut through the trees on both sides of the road in such a way that they remained

standing as long as they were undisturbed, but a slight pressure would make them fall. Postumius had two

Roman legions, and he had also levied a force from the country bordering on the Upper Sea, sufficiently large

to bring the force with which he entered the hostile territory up to 2s,000 men. The Gauls had posted

themselves round the outskirts of the forest, and as soon as the Roman army entered they pushed the sawn

trees on the outside, these fell upon those next to them, which were tottering and hardly able to stand upright,

until the whole mass fell in on both sides and buried in one common ruin arms and men and horses. Hardly

ten men escaped, for when most of them hail been crushed to death by the trunks or broken branches of the

trees, the remainder, panicstruck at the unexpected disaster, were killed by the Gauls who surrounded the

forest. Out of the whole number only very few were made prisoners, and these, whilst trying to reach a bridge

over the river, were intercepted by the Gauls who had already seized it. It was there that Postumius fell whilst

fighting most desperately to avoid capture. The Boii stripped the body of its spoils and cut off the head, and

bore them in triumph to the most sacred of their temples. According to their custom they cleaned out the skull

and covered the scalp with beaten gold; it was then used as a vessel for libations and also as a drinking cup


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for the priest and ministers of the temple. The plunder, too, which the Gauls secured was as great as their

victory, for although most of the animals had been buried beneath the fallen trees, the rest of the booty, not

having been scattered in flight, was found strewn along the whole line where the army lay.

When the news of this disaster arrived the whole community was in such a state of alarm that the shops were

shut up and a solitude like that of night pervaded the City. Under these circumstances the senate instructed

the aediles to make a round of the City and order the citizens to reopen their shops and lay aside the aspect

of public mourning. Ti. Sempronius then convened the senate, and addressed them in a consolatory and

encouraging tone. "We," he said, "who were not crushed by the overthrow at Cannae must not lose heart at

smaller calamities. If we are successful, as I trust we shall be, in our operations against Hannibal and the

Carthaginians, we can safely leave the war with the Gauls out of account for the present; the gods and the

Roman people will have it in their power to avenge that act of treachery. It is with regard to the Carthaginians

and the armies with which the war is to be carried on that we have now to deliberate and decide." He first

gave details as to the strength of infantry and cavalry, and the proportion in each of Roman and allied troops,

which made up the Dictator's army; Marcellus followed with similar details as to his own force. Then inquiry

was made of those who were acquainted with the facts as to the strength of the force with C. Terentius Varro

in Apulia. No practical method suggested itself for bringing up the two consular armies to sufficient strength

for such an important war. So in spite of the justifiable resentment which was generally felt they decided to

discontinue the campaign in Gaul for that year. The Dictator's army was assigned to the consul. It was

decided that those of Marcellus' troops who were involved in the flight from Cannae should be transported to

Sicily to serve there as long as the war continued in Italy. All the least efficient in the Dictator's army were

also to be removed there, no period of service being fixed in their case, except that they must each serve out

their time. The two legions raised in the City were allocated to the other consul who should succeed L.

Postumius; and it was arranged that he should be elected as soon as favourable auspices could be obtained.

The two legions in Sicily were to be recalled at the earliest possible moment, and the consul to whom the

legions from the City had been assigned was to take out of those what men he required. C. Terentius had his

command extended for another year, and no reduction was to be made in the army with which he was

protecting Apulia.

Whilst these preparations were going on in Italy, the war in Spain was being carried on with as much energy

as ever and, so far, in favour of the Romans. The two Scipios, Publius and Cnaeus, had divided their forces

between them, Cnaeus was to operate on land and Publius by sea. Hasdrubal, the Carthaginian commander,

did not feel himself strong enough in either arm, and kept himself safe by taking up strong positions at a

distance from the enemy; until, in response to his many earnest appeals for reinforcements, 4000 infantry and

1000 cavalry were sent to him from Africa. Then, recovering his confidence, he moved nearer the enemy, and

gave orders for the fleet to be put into readiness to protect the islands and the coast. In the very middle of his

preparations for a fresh campaign he was dismayed by news of the desertion of the naval captains. After they

had been heavily censured for their cowardice in abandoning the fleet at the Ebro they had never been very

loyal either to their general or to the cause of Carthage. These deserters had started an agitation amongst the

tribe of the Tartesii and had induced several cities to revolt, and one they had actually taken by storm. The

war was now diverted from the Romans to this tribe, and Hasdrubal entered their territories with an invading

army. Chalbus, a distinguished general amongst them, was encamped with a strong force before the walls of a

city which he had captured a few days before, and Hasdrubal determined to attack him. He sent forward

skirmishers to draw the enemy into an engagement and told off a part of his cavalry to lay waste the

surrounding country and pick up stragglers. There was confusion in the camp and panic and bloodshed in the

fields, but when they had regained the camp from all directions their fears so suddenly left them that they

became emboldened, not only to defend their camp, but even to take the aggressive against the enemy. They

burst in a body out of their camp, executing war dances after their manner, and this unexpected daring on

their part carried terror into the hearts of the enemy, who had shortly before been challenging them.

Hasdrubal thereupon withdrew his force to a fairly lofty hill, which was also protected by a river which

served as a barrier. He retired his skirmishers and his scattered cavalry also to this same position. Not,


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however, feeling sufficiently protected by either hill or river he strongly entrenched himself. Several

skirmishes took place between the two sides who were alternately frightening and fearing each other, and the

Numidian trooper proved to be no match for the Spaniard, nor were the darts of the Moor very effective

against the oxhide shields of the natives, who were quite as rapid in their movements and possessed more

strength and courage.

When they found that though they rode up to the Carthaginian lines they could not entice the enemy into

action, whilst an attack upon the camp was a far from easy matter, they successfully assaulted the town of

Ascua, where Hasdrubal had stored his corn and other supplies on entering their territories, and became

masters of all the country round. Now there was no longer any discipline amongst them, whether on the

march or in camp. Hasdrubal soon became aware of this, and seeing that success had made them careless, he

urged his men to attack them whilst they were scattered away from their standards; he himself meanwhile

descended from the hill and marched with his men in attack formation straight to their camp. News of his

approach was brought by men rushing in from the lookout stations and outposts and there was a general call

to arms. As each man seized his weapons he hurried with the others into battle, without order or formation, or

word of command or standards. The foremost of them were already engaged, whilst others were still running

up in small groups and some had not yet left the camp. Their reckless daring, however, at first checked the

enemy, but soon, finding that whilst loose and scattered themselves, they were charging an enemy in close

formation, and that their scanty numbers imperilled their safety, they looked round at one another, and as they

were being repulsed in every direction they formed a square. Standing close together with their shields

touching they were gradually driven into such a close mass that they had hardly room to use their weapons,

and for a great part of the day were simply cut down by the enemy who completely surrounded them. A very

few cut their way out and made for the woods and hills. The camp was abandoned in the same panic and the

whole tribe made their surrender the following day. But they did not remain quiet long, for just after this

battle an order was received from Carthage for Hasdrubal to lead his army as soon as he could into Italy. This

became generally known throughout Spain and the result was that there was a universal feeling in favour of

Rome. Hasdrubal at once sent a despatch to Carthage pointing out what mischief the mere rumour of his

departure had caused, and also that if he did really leave Spain it would pass into the hands of the Romans

before he crossed the Ebro. He went on to say that not only had he neither a force nor a general to leave in his

place, but the Roman generals were men whom he found it difficult to oppose even when his strength was

equal to theirs. If, therefore, they were at all anxious to retain Spain they should send a man with a powerful

army to succeed him, and even though all went well with his successor he would not find it an easy province

to govern.

Although this despatch made a great impression on the senate, they decided that as Italy demanded their first

and closest attention, the arrangements about Hannibal and his forces must not be altered. Himilco was sent

with a large and wellappointed army and an augmented fleet to hold and defend Spain by sea and land. As

soon as he had brought his military and naval forces across he formed an entrenched camp, hauled his ships

up on the beach and surrounded them with a rampart. After providing for the safety of his force he started

with a picked body of cavalry, and marching as rapidly as possible, and being equally on the alert whether

passing through doubtful or through hostile tribes, succeeded in reaching Hasdrubal. After laying before him

the resolutions and instructions of the senate and being in his turn shown in what way the war was to be

managed in Spain, he returned to his camp. He owed his safety most of all to the speed at which he travelled,

for he had got clear of each tribe before they had time for any united action. Before Hasdrubal commenced

his march, he levied contributions on all the tribes under his rule, for he was quite aware that Hannibal had

secured a passage through some tribes by paying for it, and had obtained his Gaulish auxiliaries simply by

hiring them. To commence such a march without money would hardly bring him to the Alps. The

contributions were therefore hurriedly called in and after receiving them he marched down to the Ebro. When

the resolutions of the Carthaginians and Hasdrubal's march were reported to the Roman generals, the two

Scipios at once put aside all other matters and made preparations to meet him at the outset with their joint

forces and stop his further progress. They believed that if Hannibal, who singlehanded was almost too much


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for Italy, were joined by such a general as Hasdrubal and his Spanish army it would mean the end of the

Roman empire. With so much to make them anxious they concentrated their forces at the Ebro and crossed

the river. They deliberated for some considerable time as to whether they should meet him, army against

army, or whether it would be enough for them to hinder his proposed march by attacking the tribes in alliance

with the Carthaginians. The latter plan seemed the best, and they made preparations for attacking a city which

from its proximity to the river was called Hibera, the wealthiest city in that country. As soon as Hasdrubal

became aware of this, instead of going to the assistance of his allies he proceeded to attack a city which had

recently put itself under the protection of Rome. On this the Romans abandoned the siege which they had

begun and turned their arms against Hasdrubal himself.

For some days they remained encamped at a distance of about five miles from each other, and though

frequent skirmishes took place there was no general action. At last on the same day, as though by previous

agreement, the signal was given on both sides and they descended with their entire forces on to the plain. The

Roman line was in three divisions. Some of the light infantry were posted between the leading ranks of the

legions, the rest amongst those behind; the cavalry closed the wings. Hasdrubal strengthened his centre with

his Spaniards, on the right wing he posted the Carthaginians, on the left the Africans and the mercenaries, the

Numidian horse he stationed in front of the Carthaginian infantry, and the rest of the cavalry in front of the

Africans. Not all the Numidian horse, however, were on the right wing, but only those who were trained to

manage two horses at the same time like circusriders and, when the battle was at the hottest, were in the

habit of jumping off the wearied horse on to the fresh one, such were the agility of the riders and the docility

of the horses.

These were the dispositions on each side, and whilst the two armies were standing ready to engage, their

commanders felt almost equally confident of victory, for neither side was much superior to the other either in

the numbers or the quality of the troops. With the men themselves it was far otherwise. Though the Romans

were fighting far away from their homes their generals had no difficulty in making them realise that they

were fighting for Italy and for Rome. They knew that it hung upon the issue of that fight whether they were to

see their homes again or not, and they resolutely determined either to conquer or to die. The other army

possessed nothing like the same determination, for they were most of them natives of Spain and would rather

be defeated in Spain than win the victory and be dragged to Italy. At the first onset, almost before they had

hurled their javelins, the centre gave ground, and when the Romans came on in a tremendous charge they

turned and fled. The brunt of the fighting now fell upon the wings; the Carthaginians pressed forward on the

right, the Africans on the left, and slowly wheeling round attacked the advancing Roman infantry on both

flanks. But the whole force had now concentrated on the centre, and forming front in both directions beat

back the attack on their flanks. So two separate actions were going on. The Romans, having already repulsed

Hasdrubal's centre, and having the advantage as regarded both the numbers and the strength of their men,

proved themselves undoubtedly superior on both fronts. A very large number of the enemy fell in these two

attacks, and had not their centre taken to hasty flight almost before the battle began, very few would have

survived out of their whole army. The cavalry took no part whatever in the fighting, for no sooner did the

Moors and Numidians see the centre of the line giving way than they fled precipitately, leaving the wings

exposed, and even driving the elephants before them. Hasdrubal waited to see the final issue of the battle and

then escaped out of the slaughter with a few followers. The camp was seized and plundered by the Romans.

This battle secured for Rome all the tribes who were wavering and deprived Hasdrubal of all hopes of taking

his army to Italy or even of remaining with anything like safety in Spain. When the contents of the despatch

from the Scipios was made known in Rome, the gratification felt was not so much on account of the victory

as that Hasdrubal's march into Italy was at an end.

During these incidents in Spain, Petelia in Bruttium was taken by Himilco, one of Hannibal's lieutenants,

after a siege which lasted several months. That victory cost the Carthaginians heavy losses in both killed and

wounded, for the defenders only yielded after they had been starved out. They had consumed all their corn

and eaten every kind of animal whether ordinarily used as food or not, and at last kept themselves alive by


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eating leather and grass and roots and the soft bark of trees and leaves picked from shrubs. It was not until

they had no longer strength to stand on the walls or to bear the weight of their armour that they were subdued.

After the capture of Petelia the Carthaginian marched his army to Consentia. The defence here was less

obstinate and the place surrendered in a few days. About the same time an army of Bruttians invested the

Greek city of Croton. At one time this city had been a military power, but it had been overtaken by so many

and such serious reverses that its whole population was now reduced to less than 2000 souls. The enemy

found no difficulty in gaining possession of a city so denuded of defenders; the citadel alone was held, after

some had sought refuge there from the massacre and confusion which followed the capture of the city. Locri

also went over to the Bruttians and Carthaginians after the aristocracy of the city had betrayed the populace.

The people of Rhegium alone in all that country remained loyal to the Romans and kept their independence to

the end.

The same change of feeling extended to Sicily and even the house of Hiero did not altogether shrink from

deserting Rome. Gelo, the eldest son of the family, treating with equal contempt his aged father and the

alliance with Rome, after the defeat of Cannae, went over to the Carthaginians. He was arming the natives

and making friendly overtures to the cities in alliance with Rome and would have brought about a revolution

in Sicily had he not been removed by the hand of death, a death so opportune that it cast suspicion even on

his father. Such were the serious occurrences in Italy, Africa, Sicily, and Spain during the year (216 B.C.).

Towards the close of the year Q. Fabius Maximus asked the senate to allow him to dedicate the temple of

Venus Erycina which he had vowed when Dictator. The senate passed a decree that Tiberius Sempronius the

consulelect should immediately upon his entering office propose a resolution to the people that Q. Fabius be

one of the two commissioners appointed to dedicate the temple. After the death of M. Aemilius Lepidus, who

had been augur and twice consul, his three sons, Lucius, Marcus, and Quintus, celebrated funeral games in

his honour for three days and exhibited twentytwo pairs of gladiators in the Forum. The curule aediles, C.

Laetorius and Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, consul elect, who during his aedileship had been Master of the

Horse, celebrated the Roman Games; the celebration lasted three days. The Plebeian Games given by the

aediles Marcus Aurelius Cotta and Marcus Claudius Marcellus were solemnised three times. The third year of

the Punic war had run its course when Ti. Sempronius entered on his consulship on March 15. The praetors

were Q. Fulvius Flaccus, who had been previously censor and twice consul, and M. Valerius Laevinus; the

former exercised jurisdiction over citizens, the latter over foreigners. App. Claudius Pulcher had the province

of Sicily allotted to him, Q. Mucius Scaevola that of Sardinia. The people made an order investing M.

Marcellus with the powers of a proconsul, because he was the only one out of the Roman commanders who

had gained any successes in Italy since the disaster at Cannae.

The first day the senate met for business at the Capitol they passed a decree that the wartax for that year

should be doubled, and that half the whole amount should be collected at once to furnish pay for all the

soldiers, except those who had been present at Cannae. As regarded the armies they decreed that Ti.

Sempronius should fix a day on which the two City legions were to muster at Cales, and that they should

march from there to Claudius' camp above Suessula. The legions there, mostly made up from the army which

fought at Cannae, were to be transferred by App. Claudius Pulcher to Sicily and the legions in Sicily were to

be brought to Rome. M. Claudius Marcellus was sent to take command of the army which had been ordered

to assemble at Cales and he received orders to conduct it to Claudius' camp. Ti. Maecilius Croto was sent by

App. Claudius to take over the old army and conduct it to Sicily. At first people waited in silent expectation

for the consul to hold an Assembly for the election of a colleague, but when they saw that M. Marcellus,

whom they particularly wished to have as consul this year after his brilliant success as praetor, was kept out

of the way, murmurs began to be heard in the Senatehouse. When the consul became aware of this he said,

"It is to the interest of the State, senators, that M. Claudius has gone into Campania to effect the exchange of

armies, and it is equally to the interest of the State that notice of election should not be given until he has

discharged the commission entrusted to him and returned home, so that you may have for your consul the

man whom the circumstances of the republic call for and whom you most of all wish for." After this nothing

more was said about the election till Marcellus returned.


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Meanwhile the two commissioners were appointed for the dedication of temples: T. Otacilius Crassus

dedicated the temple to Mens, Q. Fabius Maximus the one to Venus Erycina. Both are on the Capitol,

separated only by a water channel. In the case of the three hundred Campanian knights, who after loyally

serving their time in Sicily had now come to Rome, a proposal was made to the people that they should

receive the full rights of Roman citizenship and should be entered on the roll of the burghers of Cumae,

reckoning from the day previous to the revolt of the Campanians from Rome. The main reason for this

proposal was their declaration that they did not know to what people they belonged, as they had abandoned

their old country and had not yet been admitted as citizens into that to which they had returned. On Marcellus'

return from the army notice was given of the election of a consul in the place of L. Postumius. Marcellus was

elected by a quite unanimous vote in order that he might take up his magistracy at once. Whilst he was

assuming the duties of the consulship thunder was heard; the augurs were summoned and gave it as their

opinion that there was some informality in his election. The patricians spread a report that as that was the first

time that two plebeian consuls were elected together, the gods were showing their displeasure. Marcellus

resigned his office and Q. Fabius Maximus was appointed in his place; this was his third consulship. This

year the sea appeared to be on fire; at Sinuessa a cow brought forth a colt; the statues in the temple of Juno

Sospita at Lanuvium sweated blood and a shower of stones fell round the temple. For this portent there were

the usual nine days' religious observances; the other portents were duly expiated.

The consuls divided the armies between them; the army at Teanum which M. Junius the Dictator had been

commanding passed to Fabius, Sempronius took command of the volunteer slaves there and 25,000 troops

furnished by the allies; the legions which had returned from Sicily were assigned to M. Valerius the praetor;

M. Claudius was sent to the army which was in camp above Suessa to protect Nola; the praetors went to their

respective provinces in Sicily and Sardinia. The consuls issued a notice that whenever the senate was

summoned the senators and all who had the right of speaking in the senate should meet at the Capena gate.

The praetors whose duty it was to hear cases set up their tribunals near the public bathing place and ordered

all litigants to answer to their recognisances at that place, and there they administered justice during the year.

In the meanwhile the news was brought to Carthage that things had gone badly in Spain and that almost all

the communities in that country had gone over to Rome. Mago, Hannibal's brother, was preparing to transport

to Italy a force of 12,000 infantry, 1500 cavalry, and 20 elephants, escorted by a fleet of 60 warships. On the

receipt of this news, however, some were in favour of Mago, with such a fleet and army as he had, going to

Spain instead of Italy, but whilst they were deliberating there was a sudden gleam of hope that Sardinia might

be recovered. They were told that "there was only a small Roman army there, the old praetor, A. Cornelius,

who knew the province well, was leaving and a fresh one was expected; the Sardinians, too, were tired of

their long subjection, and during the last twelve months the government had been harsh and rapacious and

had crushed them with a heavy tax and an unfair exaction of corn. Nothing was wanting but a leader to head

their revolt. "This report was brought by some secret agents from their leaders, the prime mover in the matter

being Hampsicora, the most influential and wealthy man amongst them at that time. Perturbed by the news

from Spain, and at the same time elated by the Sardinian report, they sent Mago with his fleet and army to

Spain and selected Hasdrubal to conduct the operations in Sardinia, assigning to him a force about as large as

the one they had furnished to Mago.

After they had transacted all the necessary business in Rome the consuls began to prepare for war. Ti.

Sempronius gave his soldiers notice of the date when they were to assemble at Sinuessa, and Q. Fabius, after

previously consulting the senate, issued a proclamation warning every one to convey the corn from their

fields into the fortified cities by the first day of the following June, all those who failed to do so would have

their land laid waste, their farms burnt, and they themselves would be sold into slavery. Even the praetors

who had been appointed to administer the law were not exempted from military duties. It was decided that

Valerius should be sent to Apulia to take over the army from Terentius: when the legions came from Sicily he

was to employ them mainly for the defence of that district and send the army of Terentius under one of his

lieutenants to Tarentum. A fleet of twentyfive vessels was also supplied him for the protection of the coast

between Brundisium and Tarentum. A fleet of equal strength was assigned to Q. Fulvius, the praetor in


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charge of the City, for the defence of the coast near Rome. C. Terentius, as proconsul, was commissioned to

raise a force in the territory of Picenum to defend that part of the country. Lastly, T. Otacilius Crassus was

despatched to Sicily, after he had dedicated the temple of Mens, with full powers as propraetor to take

command of the fleet.

This struggle between the most powerful nations in the world was attracting the attention of all men, kings

and peoples alike, and especially of Philip, the King of Macedon, as he was comparatively near to Italy,

separated from it only by the Ionian Sea. When he first heard the rumour of Hannibal's passage of the Alps,

delighted as he was at the outbreak of war between Rome and Carthage, he was still undecided, till their

relative strength had been tested, which of the two he would prefer to have the victory. But after the third

battle had been fought and the victory rested with the Carthaginians for the third time, he inclined to the side

which Fortune favoured and sent ambassadors to Hannibal. Avoiding the ports of Brundisium and Tarentum

which were guarded by Roman ships, they landed near the temple of Juno Lacinia. Whilst traversing Apulia

on their way to Capua they fell into the midst of the Roman troops who were defending the district, and were

conducted to Valerius Laevinus, the praetor, who was encamped near Luceria. Xenophanes, the head of the

legation, explained, without the slightest fear or hesitation, that he had been sent by the king to form a league

of friendship with Rome, and that he was conveying his instructions to the consuls and senate and people.

Amidst the defection of so many old allies, the praetor was delighted beyond measure at the prospect of a

new alliance with so illustrious a monarch, and gave his enemies a most hospitable reception. He assigned

them an escort, and pointed out carefully what route they should take, what places and passes were held by

the Romans and what by the enemy. Xenophanes passed through the Roman troops into Campania and thence

by the nearest route reached Hannibal's camp. He made a treaty of friendship with him on these terms: King

Philip was to sail to Italy with as large a fleet as possiblehe was, it appears, intending to fit out two hundred

shipsand ravage the coast, and carry on war by land and sea to the utmost of his power; when the war was

over the whole of Italy, including Rome itself, was to be the possession of the Carthaginians and Hannibal,

and all the plunder was to go to Hannibal; when the Carthaginians had thoroughly subdued Italy they were to

sail to Greece and make war upon such nations as the king wished; the cities on the mainland and the islands

lying off Macedonia were to form part of Philip's kingdom.

These were, in effect, the terms on which the treaty was concluded between the Carthaginian general and the

King of Macedon. On their return the envoys were accompanied by commissioners sent by Hannibal to

obtain the king's ratification of the treaty: they were Gisgo, Bostar, and Mago. They reached the spot near the

temple of Juno Lacinia, where they had left their ship moored in a hidden creek, and set sail for Greece.

When they were out to sea they were descried by the Roman fleet which was guarding the Calabrian coast.

Valerius Flaccus sent some light boats to chase and bring back the strange vessel. At first the king's men

attempted flight, but finding that they were being overhauled they surrendered to the Romans. When they

were brought before the admiral of the fleet he questioned them as to who they were, where they had come

from, and whither they were sailing. Xenophanes, who had so far been very lucky, began to make up a tale;

he said that he had been sent by Philip to Rome and had succeeded in reaching M. Valerius, as he was the

only person he could get to safely; he had not been able to go through Campania as it was beset by the

enemy's troops. Then the Carthaginian dress and manner of Hannibal's agents aroused suspicion, and on

being questioned their speech betrayed them. Their comrades were at once taken aside and terrified by

threats, a letter from Hannibal to Philip was discovered, and also the articles of agreement between the King

of Macedon and the Carthaginian general. When the investigation was completed, it seemed best to carry the

prisoners and their companions as soon as possible to the senate at Rome or to the consuls, wherever they

were. Five of the swiftest ships were selected for the purpose and L. Valerius Antias was placed in charge of

the expedition with instructions to distribute the envoys amongst the ships under guard and to be careful that

no conversation was allowed amongst them or any communication of plans.

During this time A. Cornelius Mammula on leaving his province made a report on the condition of Sardinia.

All, he said, were contemplating war and revolt; Q. Mucius, who had succeeded him, had been affected by


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the unhealthy climate and impure water and had fallen into an illness which was tedious rather than

dangerous, and would make him for some considerable time unfit to bear the responsibilities of war. The

army, too, which was quartered there, though strong enough for the occupation of a peaceable province, was

quite inadequate for the war which seemed likely to break out. The senate made a decree that Q. Fulvius

Flaccus should raise a force of 5000 infantry and 400 cavalry and arrange for its immediate transport to

Sardinia, and further that he should send whom he considered the most suitable man, invested with full

powers, to conduct operations until Mucius recovered his health. He selected T. Manlius Torquatus, who had

been twice consul as well as censor, and during his consulship had subdued the Sardinians. About the same

time a Carthaginian fleet which had been despatched to Sardinia under the command of Hasdrubul, surnamed

"the Bald," was caught in a storm and driven on the Balearic Isles. So much damage was caused, not only to

the rigging but also to the hulls, that the vessels were hauled ashore and a considerable time was spent in

repairing them.

In Italy the war had been less vigorously conducted since the battle of Cannae; for the strength of the one side

was broken and the temper of the other enervated. Under these circumstances the Campanians made an

attempt by themselves to become masters of Cumae. They first tried persuasion, but as they could not

succeed in inducing them to revolt from Rome, they decided to employ stratagem. All the Campanians held a

sacrificial service at stated intervals at Hamae. They informed the Cumans that the Campanian senate was

going there, and they asked the Cuman senate also to be present in order to come to a common understanding,

so that both peoples might have the same allies and the same enemies. They also promised that they would

have an armed force there, to guard against any danger from either Romans or Carthaginians. Although the

Cumans suspected a plot, they made no difficulty about going, for they thought that by thus consenting they

would be able to conceal a maneuver of their own. The consul Tiberius Sempronius had in the meanwhile

purified his army at Sinuessa, the appointed rendezvous, and after crossing the Vulturnus pitched his camp

near Liternum. As there was nothing for them to do in camp, he put his men through frequent war maneuvers

to accustom the recruits, most of whom were volunteer slaves, to follow the standards and know their places

in the ranks when in action. In carrying out these exercises, the general's main objectand he had given

similar instructions to the officerswas that there should be no classfeeling in the ranks, through the slaves

being twitted with their former condition; the old soldiers were to regard themselves as on a perfect equality

with the recruits, the free men with the slaves; all to whom Rome had entrusted her standards and her arms

were to be regarded as equally honourable, equally wellborn; Fortune had compelled them to adopt this

state of things, and now that it was adopted she compelled them to acquiesce to it. The soldiers were quite as

anxious to obey these instructions as the officers were to enforce them, and in a short time the men had

become so fused together that it was almost forgotten what condition of life each man had been in before he

became a soldier.

While Gracchus was thus occupied messengers from Cumae informed him of the proposals made by the

Campanians a few days previously and of their reply, and that the festival was to be held in three days' time,

when not only the whole senate would be there but also the Campanian army in camp. Gracchus gave the

Cumans orders to remove everything from their fields into the city and to remain within their walls, whilst he

himself moved his camp to Cumae the day before the Campanians were to perform their sacrifice. Hamae

was about three miles distant. The Campanians had already, as arranged, assembled there in large numbers

and not far away Marius Alfius, the "Medixtuticus" (the chief magistrate of the Campanians), was secretly

encamped with 14,000 troops, but he was more intent on making preparations for the sacrifice and the

stratagem he was to execute during its performance than on fortifying his camp or any other military duty.

The ceremonial took place at night and was over by midnight. Gracchus thought this the best time for his

purpose, and after stationing guards at the camp gate to prevent any one from conveying information of his

design, he ordered his men to refresh themselves and get what sleep they could at four o'clock in the

afternoon so that they might be ready to assemble round the standards as soon as it was dark. About the first

watch he ordered the advance to be made and the army marched in silence to Hamae, which they reached at

midnight. The Campanian camp, as might be expected during a nocturnal festival, was negligently guarded,


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and he made a simultaneous attack on all sides of it. Some were slain whilst stretched in slumber, others

whilst returning unarmed after the ceremony. In the confusion and terror of the night more than 2000 men

were killed, including their general, Marius Alfius, and 34 standards seized.

After getting possession of the enemies' camp with a loss of less than 100 men, Gracchus speedily retired,

fearing an attack from Hannibal, who had his camp at Tifata, overlooking Capua. Nor were his anticipations

groundless. No sooner had the news of the disaster reached Capua than Hannibal, expecting to find at Hamae

an army, composed mostly of raw recruits and slaves, wildly delighted at their victory, despoiling their

vanquished foes and carrying off the plunder, hurried on with all speed past Capua, and ordered all the

Campanian fugitives he met to be escorted to Capua and the wounded to be carried there in wagons. But

when he got to Hamae he found the camp abandoned, nothing was to be seen but the traces of the recent

slaughter and the bodies of his allies lying about everywhere. Some advised him to march straight to Cumae

and attack the place. Nothing would have suited his wishes better for, after his failure to secure Neapolis, he

was very anxious to get possession of Cumae that he might have one maritime city at all events. As, however,

his soldiers in their hurried march had brought nothing with them beyond their arms he returned to his camp

on Tifata. The next day, yielding to the importunities of the Campanians, he marched back to Cumae with all

the necessary appliances for attacking the city, and after effectually devastating the neighbourhood, fixed his

camp at the distance of one mile from the place. Gracchus still remained in occupation of Cumae, more

because he was ashamed to desert the allies who were imploring his protection and that of the Roman people

than because he felt sufficiently assured as to his army. The other consul, Fabius, who was encamped at

Cales, did not venture to cross the Vulturnus; his attention was occupied first with taking fresh auspices and

then with the portents which were being announced one after another, and which the soothsayers assured him

would be very difficult to avert.

Whilst these causes kept Fabius from moving, Sempronius was invested, and the siege works were now

actually in operation. A huge wooden tower on wheels had been brought up against the walls and the Roman

consul constructed another still higher upon the wall itself, which was fairly high and which served as a

platform, after he had placed stout beams across. The besieged garrison protected the walls of the city by

hurling stones and sharpened stakes and other missiles from their tower; at last when they saw the other tower

brought up to the walls they flung blazing brands over it and caused a large fire. Terrified by the

conflagration the crowd of soldiers in it flung themselves down and at the same moment a sortie was made

from two of the gates, the outposts of the enemy were overpowered and driven in flight to their camp, so that

for that day the Carthaginians were more like a besieged than a besieging force. As many as 1300

Carthaginians were killed and 59 taken prisoners who had been surprised while standing careless and

unconcerned round the walls or at the outposts, and least of all fearing a sortie. Before the enemy had time to

recover from their panic Gracchus gave the signal to retire and withdrew with his men inside the walls. The

following day, Hannibal, expecting that the consul, elated with his success, would be prepared to fight a

regular battle, formed his line on the ground between his camp and the city; when, however, he saw that not a

single man moved from his usual post of defence and that no risks were being taken through rash confidence,

he returned to Tifata without accomplishing anything. Just at the time when the siege of Cumae was raised

Ti. Sempronius, surnamed "Longus," fought a successful action with the Carthaginian Hanno at Grumentum

in Lucania. Over 2000 were killed, 280 men and 41 military standards were captured. Driven out of Lucania,

Hanno retreated to Bruttium. Amongst the Hirpini, also, three towns which had revolted from Rome,

Vercellium, Vescellium, and Sicilinum, were retaken by the praetor M. Valerius, and the authors of the revolt

beheaded. Over 5000 prisoners were sold, the rest of the booty was presented to the soldiers, and the army

marched back to Luceria.

During these incidents amongst the Lucanians and Hirpini, the five ships which were carrying the

Macedonian and Carthaginian agents to Rome, after sailing almost round the whole of Italy in their passage

from the upper to the lower sea were off Cumae, when Gracchus, uncertain whether they belonged to friends

or foes, sent vessels from his own fleet to intercept them. After mutual questionings those on board learnt that


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the consul was at Cumae. The vessels accordingly were brought into the harbour and the prisoners were

brought before the consul and the letters placed in his hands. He read the letters of Philip and Hannibal

through and sent everything under seal by land to the senate, the agents he ordered to be taken by sea. The

letters and the agents both reached Rome the same day, and when it was ascertained that what the agents said

in their examination agreed with the letters, the senate were filled with very gloomy apprehensions. They

recognised what a heavy burden a war with Macedon would impose upon them at a time when it was all they

could do to bear the weight of the Punic war. They did not, however, so far give way to despondency as not

to enter at once upon a discussion as to how they could divert the enemy from Italy by themselves

commencing hostilities against him. Orders were given for the agents to be kept in chains and their

companions to be sold as slaves; they also decided to equip twenty vessels in addition to the twentyfive

which P. Valerius Flaccus already had under his command. After these had been fitted out and launched, the

five ships which had carried the agents were added and thirty vessels left Ostia for Tarentum. Publius

Valerius was instructed to place on board the soldiers which had belonged to Varro's army and which were

now at Tarentum under the command of L. Apustius, and with his combined fleet of fiftyfive vessels he was

not only to protect the coast of Italy but try to obtain information about the hostile attitude of Macedon. If

Philip's designs should prove to correspond to the captured despatches and the statements of the agents, he

was to write to Marcus Valerius, the praetor, to that effect and then, after placing his army under the

command of L. Apustius, go to the fleet at Tarentum and sail across to Macedonia at the first opportunity and

do his utmost to confine Philip within his own dominions. A decree was made that the money which had been

sent to Appius Claudius in Sicily to be returned to King Hiero should now be devoted to the maintenance of

the fleet and the expenses of the Macedonian war, and it was conveyed to Tarentum through L. Antistius.

Two hundred thousand modii of wheat and barley were sent at the same time by King Hiero.

While these various steps were being taken, one of the captured ships which were on their way to Rome

escaped during the voyage to Philip, and he then learnt that his agents had been captured together with his

despatches. As he did not know what understanding they had come to with Hannibal, or what proposals

Hannibal's agents were bringing to him, he despatched a second embassy with the same instructions. Their

names were Heraclitus, surnamed Scotinus, Crito of Boeotia, and Sositheus the Magnesian. They

accomplished their mission successfully, but the summer passed away before the king could attempt any

active measures. So important was the seizure of that one ship with the king's agents on board in delaying the

outbreak of the war which now threatened Rome! Fabius at last succeeded in expiating the portents and

crossed the Vulturnus; both consuls now resumed the campaign round Capua. Combulteria, Trebula, and

Austicula, all of which had revolted to Hannibal, were successfully attacked by Fabius, and the garrisons

which Hannibal had placed in them as well as a large number of Campanians were made prisoners. At Nola,

the senate were on the side of the Romans, as they had been the year before, and the populace, who were on

the side of Hannibal, were hatching secret plots for the murder of the aristocrats and the betrayal of the city.

To prevent them from carrying out their intentions Fabius marched between Capua and Hannibal's camp on

Tifata and established himself in Claudius' camp overlooking Suessula. From there he sent M. Marcellus,

who was propraetor, with the force under his command to occupy Nola.

The active operations in Sardinia which had been dropped owing to the serious illness of Q. Mucius were

resumed under the direction of T. Manlius. He hauled ashore his warships and furnished the seamen and

rowers with arms, so that they might be available for service on land; with these and the army he had taken

over from the praetor he made up a force of 22,000 infantry and 1200 cavalry. With this combined force he

invaded the hostile territory and fixed his camp at no great distance from Hampsicora's lines. Hampsicora

himself happened to be absent; he had paid a visit to the PellitiSardinians in order to arm the younger men

amongst them so as to increase his own strength. His son Hostus was in command and in the impetuosity of

youth he rashly offered battle, with the result that he was defeated and put to flight. 3000 Sardinians were

killed in that battle and 800 taken alive; the rest of the army after wandering in their flight through fields and

woods heard that their general had fled to a place called Cornus, the chief town of the district, and thither

they directed their flight. That battle would have finished the war had not the Carthaginian fleet under


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Hasdrubal, which had been driven by a storm down to the Balearic Isles, arrived in time to revive their hopes

of renewing the war. When Manlius heard of its arrival he retired upon Carales, and this gave Hampsicora an

opportunity of forming a junction with the Carthaginian. Hasdrubal disembarked his force and sent the ships

back to Carthage, and then, under Hampsicora's guidance, proceeded to harry and waste the land belonging to

the allies of Rome. He would have gone as far as Carales if Manlius had not met him with his army and

checked his widespread ravages. At first the two camps faced each other, with only a small space between;

then small sorties and skirmishes took place with varying results; at last it came to a battle, a regular action,

which lasted for four hours. For a long time the Carthaginians made the issue doubtful, the Sardinians, who

were accustomed to defeat, being easily beaten, but at last when they saw the whole field covered with dead

and flying Sardinians they too gave way, but when they turned to flee the Roman wing which had routed the

Sardinians wheeled round and hemmed them in. Then it was more of a massacre than a battle. 12,000 of the

enemy, Sardinians and Carthaginians, were slain, about 3700 were made prisoners, and 27 military standards

were captured.

What more than anything else made the battle glorious and memorable was the capture of the

commanderinchief, Hasdrubal, and also of Hanno and Mago, two Carthaginian nobles. Mago was a

member of the house of Barca, a near relative of Hannibal; Hanno had taken the lead in the Sardinian revolt

and was unquestionably the chief instigator of the war. The battle was no less famous for the fate which

overtook the Sardinian generals; Hampsicora's son, Hostus, fell on the field, and when Hampsicora, who was

fleeing from the carnage with a few horsemen, heard of his son's death, he was so crushed by the tidings,

coming as it did on the top of all the other disasters, that in the dead of night, when none could hinder his

purpose, he slew himself with his own hand. The rest of the fugitives found shelter as they had done before in

Cornus, but Manlius leading his victorious troops against it effected its capture in a few days. On this the

other cities which had espoused the cause of Hampsicora and the Carthaginians gave hostages and

surrendered to him. He imposed upon each of them a tribute of money and corn; the amount was

proportioned to their resources and also to the share they had taken in the revolt. After this he returned to

Carales. There the ships which had been hauled ashore were launched, the troops he had brought with him

were reembarked, and he sailed for Rome. On his arrival he reported to the senate the complete subjugation

of Sardinia, and made over the money to the quaestors, the corn to the aediles, and the prisoners to Q.

Fulvius, the praetor.

During this time T. Otacilius had crossed with his fleet from Lilybaeum to the coast of Africa and was

ravaging the territory of Carthage, when rumours came to him that Hasdrubal had recently sailed from the

Balearic Isles to Sardinia. He set sail for that island and fell in with the Carthaginian fleet returning to Africa.

A brief action followed on the high seas in which Otacilius took seven ships with their crews. The rest

dispersed in a panic far and wide, as though they had been scattered by a storm. It so happened at this time

that Bomilcar arrived at Locri with reinforcements of men and elephants and also with supplies. Appius

Claudius intended to surprise him, and with this view he led his army hurriedly to Messana as though he were

going to make a circuit of the province, and finding the wind and tide favourable, crossed over to Locri.

Bomilcar had already left to join Hanno in Bruttium and the Locrians shut their gates against the Romans;

Appius after all his efforts achieved no results and returned to Messana. This same summer Marcellus made

frequent excursions from Nola, which he was holding with a garrison, into the territory of the Hirpini and in

the neighbourhood of Samnite Caudium. Such utter devastation did he spread everywhere with fire and sword

that he revived throughout Samnium the memory of her ancient disasters.

Both nations sent envoys simultaneously to Hannibal, who addressed him thus: "We have been the enemies

of Rome, Hannibal, from very early times. At first we fought her in our own might as long as our arms, our

strength, sufficed to protect us. When we could trust them no more we took our place by the side of King

Pyrrhus; when we were abandoned by him we were compelled to accept terms of peace and by those terms

we stood for almost fifty years, down to the time of your arrival in Italy. It was your conspicuous courtesy

and kindness towards our fellowcountrymen who were your prisoners and whom you sent back to us, quite


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as much as your courage and success, which have so won our hearts that as long as you, our friend, are safe

and prosperous we should not fearI do not say the Romans, buteven the wrath of heaven, if I may say so

without irreverence. But, good heavens! while you are not only safe and victorious but actually here amongst

us, when you could almost hear the shrieks of our wives and children and see our blazing houses, we have

suffered such repeated devastations this summer that it would seem as if M. Marcellus and not Hannibal had

been the victor at Cannae, and as if the Romans had good cause to boast that you have only strength enough

for one blow, and that like a bee that has left its sting you are now inert and powerless. For a hundred years

we have been at war with Rome and no general, no army from without, has come to our aid save for the two

years when Pyrrhus used our soldiers to increase his strength rather than use his strength to defend us. I will

not boast of our successesthe two consuls with their armies whom we sent under the yoke, and all the other

fortunate or glorious events which we can recall. The trials and sufferings we then went through can be

recounted with less bitter feelings than those which are happening today. Then great Dictators with their

Masters of the Horse would invade our borders, two consuls and two consular armies found it necessary to

act together against us, and they took every precaution, careful scouting, reserves duly posted, their army in

order of battle, when they ravaged our country; now we are the prey of a solitary propraetor and a small

garrison at Nola! They do not even march in military detachments, but they scour the whole of our country

like brigands and more carelessly than if they were roaming about on Roman ground. The reason is simply

this: you do not defend us, and our soldiery who could protect us if they were at home are all serving under

your standards. I should be utterly ignorant of you and your army if I did not think it an easy task for the man,

by whom to my knowledge so many Roman armies have been routed and laid low, to crush these plunderers

of our country while they are roving about in disorder and wandering wherever any one is led by hopes of

plunder, however futile such hopes may be. They will be the prey of a few Numidians, and you will relieve

both us and Nola of its garrison if only you count the men whom you thought worthy of your alliance still

worthy of your protection."

To all this Hannibal replied: "You Samnites and Hirpini are doing everything at once; you point out your

sufferings and ask for protection and complain of being unprotected and neglected. But you ought to have

first made your representations, then asked for protection, and if you did not obtain it then only should you

have complained that you had sought help in vain. I shall not lead my army into the country of the Hirpini

and Samnites because I do not want to be a burden to you, but I shall march into those districts belonging to

the allies of Rome which are nearest to me. By plundering these I shall satisfy and enrich my soldiers and

shall frighten the enemy sufficiently to make him leave you alone. As to the war with Rome, if Trasumennus

was a more famous battle than the Trebia, if Cannae was more famous than Trasumennus, I shall make even

the memory of Cannae fade in the light of a greater and more brilliant victory." With this reply and with

munificent presents he dismissed the envoys, and then leaving a somewhat small detachment on Tifata

marched with the rest of his army to Nola, whither Hanno also came with the reinforcements he had brought

from Carthage and the elephants. Encamping at no great distance, he found out, on inquiry, that everything

was very different from the impression he had received from the envoys. No one who watched Marcellus'

proceedings could ever say that he trusted to Fortune or gave the enemy a chance through his rashness.

Hitherto his plundering expeditions had been made after careful reconnoitring, with strong supports for the

marauding parties and a secure retreat. Now when he became aware of the enemy's approach, he kept his

force within the fortifications and ordered the senators of Nola to patrol the ramparts and keep a sharp

lookout all round and find out what the enemy were doing.

Hanno had come close up to the walls, and, seeing amongst the senators Herennius Bassus and Herius

Pettius, asked for an interview with them. Having obtained permission from Marcellus they went out to him.

He addressed them through an interpreter. After magnifying the merits and good fortune of Hannibal and

dwelling upon the decaying strength and greatness of Rome, he went on to urge that even if Rome were what

she once had been, still men who knew by experience how burdensome the Roman government was to their

allies and with what indulgence Hannibal had treated all those of his prisoners who belonged to any Italian

nation must surely prefer the alliance and friendship of Carthage to those of Rome. If both the consuls and


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their two armies had been at Nola, they would still be no more a match for Hannibal than they were at

Cannae, how then could one praetor with a few raw soldiers defend the place? It was of more importance to

them whether the town were taken or surrendered than it was to Hannibal; he would get possession of it in

any case as he had got possession of Capua and Nuceria. But what a difference there was between the fate of

Capua and that of Nola, they knew best, situated as they were midway between the two places. He did not

want to prophesy what would happen to the city if it were captured; he preferred to pledge his word that if

they would give up Marcellus and his garrison and the city of Nola no one but themselves should dictate the

terms on which they would become allies and friends of Hannibal.

Herennius Bassus briefly replied that the friendship between Rome and Nola had now lasted many years, and

up to that day neither party had had any reason to regret it. If they had wished to change their allegiance when

the change came in their fortunes, it was too late to do so now. If they had thought of surrendering to

Hannibal would they have asked for a Roman garrison? They were in perfect accord with those who had

come to protect them, and they would continue to be so to the last. This interview destroyed any expectations

Hannibal might have formed of securing Nola by treachery. He therefore drew his lines completely round the

town so that a simultaneous attack might be made on all sides. When Marcellus saw that he was close up to

the ramparts, he drew up his men inside one of the gates and then burst out in a fierce tumultuous charge. A

few were overthrown and killed in the first shock, but as men ran up into the fighting line and the two sides

became more equalised, the contest was beginning to be a severe one, and few battles would have been more

memorable had not a very heavy storm of rain and wind separated the combatants. They retired for that day

after only a brief encounter but in a state of great exasperation, the Romans to the city, the Carthaginians to

their camp. Of the latter not more than thirty fell in the first attack; the Romans lost fifty. The rain fell

without any intermission all through the night and continued till the third hour of the following day, so,

though both sides were eager for battle, they remained that day within their lines. The following day Hannibal

sent part of his force on a plundering expedition in the Nolan territory. No sooner was Marcellus aware of it

than he formed his line of battle, nor did Hannibal decline the challenge. There was about a mile between his

camp and the city, and within that spaceit is all level ground round Nolathe armies met. The battle shout

raised on both sides brought back the nearest amongst the cohorts who had been sent off to plunder; the

Nolans, too, on the other side, took their place in the Roman line. Marcellus addressed a few words of

encouragement and thanks to them, and told them to take their station amongst the reserve and help to carry

the wounded from the field, they were to keep out of the fighting unless they received the signal from him.

The battle was obstinately contested; the generals encouraged the men, and the men fought to the utmost of

their strength. Marcellus urged his men to press vigorously on those whom they had vanquished only three

days ago, who had been driven in flight from Cumae, and whom he had himself, with another army, defeated

the year before. "All his forces," he said, "are not in the field, some are roving through the land bent on

plunder, whilst those who are fighting are enervated by the luxury of Capua and have worn themselves out

through a whole winter's indulgence in wine and women and every kind of debauchery. They have lost their

force and vigour, they have dissipated that strength of mind and body in which they surmounted the Alpine

peaks. The men who did that are mere wrecks now; they can hardly bear the weight of their armour on their

limbs while they fight. Capua has proved to be Hannibal's Cannae. All soldierly courage; all military

discipline, all glory won in the past, all hopes for the future have been extinguished there." By showing his

contempt for the enemy, Marcellus raised the spirits of his men. Hannibal, on the other hand, reproached his

own men in much more severe terms. "I recognise," he said, "the same arms and standards here which I saw

and used at the Trebia, at Trasumennus, and finally at Cannae, but not the same soldiers. It is quite certain

that I led one army into winter quarters at Capua and marched out with quite a different one. Are you, whom

two consular armies never withstood, hardly able now to hold your own against a subordinate officer, with

his one legion and its contingent of allies? Is Marcellus to challenge us with impunity a second time with his

raw recruits and Nolan supports? Where is that soldier of mine who dragged the consul, C. Flaminius, from

his horse and struck off his head? Where is the one who slew L. Paulus at Cannae? Has the sword lost its

edge; have your right hands lost their power? Or has any other miracle happened? Though but few


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yourselves, you have been wont to vanquish an enemy that far outnumbered you; now you can hardly stand

up against a force far smaller than your own. You used to boast, tonguevaliant as you are, that you would

take Rome by storm if any one would lead you. Well, I want you to try your courage and your strength in a

smaller task. Carry Nola; it is a city in a plain, with no protection from river or from sea. When ye have

loaded yourselves with the plunder of such a wealthy city as this, I will lead you or follow you wherever you

wish."

Neither his censures nor his promises had any effect in strengthening the morale of his men. When they

began to fall back in all directions the spirits of the Romans rose, not only because of their general's cheering

words, but also because the Nolans raised encouraging shouts and fired them with the glow of battle, until the

Carthaginians fairly turned to flee and were driven to their camp. The Romans were anxious to storm the

camp, but Marcellus marched them back to Nola amid the joyous congratulations even of the populace who

had before been more inclined to the Carthaginians. More than 5000 of the enemy were killed that day and

600 made prisoners, 18 military standards were taken and two elephants; four had been killed in the battle.

The Romans had less than a thousand killed. The next day was spent by both sides in burying those killed in

battle, under an informal truce. Marcellus burnt the spoils taken from the enemy in fulfilment of a vow to

Vulcan. Three days later, owing, I fancy, to some disagreement or in hope of more liberal pay, 272 troopers,

Numidians and Spaniards, deserted to Marcellus. The Romans often availed themselves of their brave and

loyal help in the war. At its close a gift of land was made in Spain to the Spaniards and in Africa to the

Numidians as a reward for their valour.

Hanno was sent back into Bruttium with the force he had brought, and Hannibal went into winter quarters in

Apulia and encamped in the neighbourhood of Arpi. As soon as Q. Fabius heard that Hannibal had left for

Apulia, he had a quantity of corn from Nola and Neapolis conveyed into the camp above Suessula, and after

strengthening its defences and leaving a force sufficient to hold the position through the winter months, he

moved his own camp nearer to Capua and laid waste its territory with fire and sword. The Campanians had

no confidence whatever in their strength, but they were at last compelled to come out of their gates into the

open and form an entrenched camp in front of the city. They had 6000 men under arms, the infantry were

absolutely useless, but the mounted men were more efficient, so they kept harassing the enemy by cavalry

skirmishes. There were several Campanian nobles serving as troopers, amongst them Cerrinus Vibellius,

surnamed Taurea. He was a citizen of Capua and by far the finest soldier in the Campanian horse, so much so

indeed that when he was serving with the Romans there was only one Roman horseman that enjoyed an equal

reputation, and that was Claudius Asellus. Taurea had for a long time been riding up to the enemy's

squadrons to see if he could find this man, and at last when there was a moment's silence he asked where

Claudius Asellus was. "He has often," he said, "argued with me about our respective merits, let him settle the

matter with the sword, and if he is vanquished yield me the spolia opima, or if he is the victor take them from

me."

When this was reported to Asellus in the camp, he only waited till he could ask the consul whether he would

be allowed, against the regulations, to fight his challenger. Permission being granted he at once armed

himself and, riding in front of the outposts, called Taurea by name and told him to meet him wherever he

pleased. The Romans had already gone out in crowds to watch the duel, and the Campanians had not only

lined the rampart of their camp, but had gathered in large numbers on the fortifications of the city. After a

great flourish of words and expressions of mutual defiance they levelled their spears and spurred their horses.

As there was plenty of space they kept evading each other's thrusts and the fight went on without either being

wounded. Then the Campanian said to the Roman: "This will be a trial of skill between the horses and not

their riders unless we leave the open and go down into this hollow lane. There will be no room for swerving

aside there, we shall fight at close quarters." Almost before the words were out of his mouth, Claudius leaped

his horse into the lane, and Taurea, bolder in words than deeds, shouted, "Never be an ass in a ditch," and this

expression became a rustic proverb. After riding some distance along the lane and finding no opponent,

Claudius got into the open and returned to camp, saying strong things about the cowardice of his adversary.


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He was welcomed as victor with cheers and congratulations by his comrades. In the accounts of this duel on

horseback some annalists record an additional circumstancehow far there is any truth in it each must judge

for himself, but it is at least remarkable. They say that Claudius went in pursuit of Taurea who fled to the

city, and galloped in through one open gate and out through another unhurt, the enemy standing

dumbfounded at the extraordinary sight.

After this incident the Roman camp was undisturbed; the consul even shifted his camp further away that the

Campanians might complete their sowing, and he did not inflict any injury on their land until the corn was

high enough in the blade to yield fodder. Then he carried it off to Claudius' camp above Suessula and built

huts for his men to winter in there. M. Claudius, the proconsul, received orders to keep a force at Nola

sufficient to protect the place and send the rest of his troops to Rome to prevent their being a burden to the

allies and an expense to the republic. And Ti. Gracchus, having marched his legions from Cumae to Luceria

in Apulia, sent the praetor, M. Valerius, to Brundisium with the army he had had at Luceria, and gave him

orders to protect the coast of the Sallentine territory and to make such provision as might be necessary with

regard to Philip and the Macedonian war. Towards the end of the summer in which the events we have been

describing occurred, despatches from P. and Cn. Scipio arrived, giving an account of the great successes they

had achieved, but also stating that money to pay the troops was needed, as also clothing and corn for the

army, whilst the seamen were destitute of everything. As regarded the pay, if the treasury were low they (the

Scipios) would devise some means by which they could obtain it from the Spaniards, but all the other things

must in any case be sent from Rome, otherwise they could neither keep their army nor the province. When

the despatches had been read there was no one present who did not admit that the statements were true and

the demands fair and just. But other considerations were present to their mindsthe enormous land and sea

forces they had to keep up; the large fleet that would have to be fitted out if the war with Macedon went

forward; the condition of Sicily and Sardinia, which before the war had helped to fill the treasury and were

now hardly able to support the armies which were protecting those islands; and, above all, the shrinkage in

the revenue. For the wartax from which the national expenditure was met had diminished with the number

of those who paid it after the destruction of the armies at Trasumennus and at Cannae, and if the few

survivors had to pay at a very much higher rate, they too, would perish, though not in battle. If, therefore, the

State could not be upheld by credit it could not stand by its own resources. After thus reviewing the position

of affairs the senate decided that Fulvius, one of the praetors, should appear before the Assembly and point

out to the people the pressing needs of the State and ask those who had augmented their patrimonies by

making contracts with the government to extend the date of payment for the State, out of which they had

made their money, and contract to supply what was needed for the army in Spain on condition that as soon as

there was money in the treasury they should be the first to be paid. After making this proposal, the praetor

fixed a date for making the contracts for the supply of clothing and corn to the army in Spain, and for

furnishing all that was required for the seamen.

On the appointed day three syndicates appeared, consisting each of nineteen members, prepared to tender for

the contracts. They insisted on two conditionsone was that they should be exempt from military service

whilst they were employed on this public business, and the other that the cargoes they shipped should be

insured by the government against storm or capture. Both demands were conceded, and the administration of

the State was carried on with private money. Such were the moral tone and lofty patriotism which pervaded

all ranks of society! As the contracts had been entered into from a generous and noble spirit, so they were

executed with the utmost conscientiousness; the soldiers received as ample supplies as though they had been

furnished, as they once were, from a rich treasury. When these supplies reached Spain, the town of Iliturgi,

which had gone over to the Romans, was being attacked by three Carthaginian armies under Hasdrubal,

Mago, and Hannibal, the son of Bomilcar. Between these three camps the Scipios forced their way into the

town after hard fighting and heavy losses. They brought with them a quantity of corn, of which there was a

great scarcity, and encouraged the townsfolk to defend their walls with the same courage that they saw the

Roman army display when fighting on their behalf. Then they advanced to attack the largest of the three

camps, of which Hasdrubal was in command. The other two commanders and their armies saw that the


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decisive struggle would be fought there and they hastened to its support. As soon as they had emerged from

their camps the fighting began. There were 60,000 of the enemy engaged that day and about 16,000 Romans.

And yet the victory was such a crushing one that the Romans slew more than their own number of the enemy,

made prisoners of more than 3000, captured somewhat less than 1000 horses, 59 military standards, 7

elephants, 5 having been killed in the battle, and got possession of the three campsall in that one day. After

the siege of Iliturgi was thus raised, the Carthaginian armies marched to attack Intibili. They had repaired

their losses out of that province which, above all others, was eager for fighting, if only plunder and money

were to be got out of it, and which, too, abounded in young men. A pitched battle was again fought with the

same result for both sides. Over 13,000 of the enemy were killed, more than 2000 made prisoners, 42

standards and 9 elephants were also taken. And now nearly all the tribes of Spain went over to Rome, and the

successes gained in Spain that summer were far greater than those in Italy.

Book 24. The Revolution in Syracuse

After his return to Bruttium, Hanno, with the assistance and guidance of the Bruttians, made an attempt on

the Greek cities. They were steadfast in their adherence to Rome, and all the more so because they saw that

the Bruttians, whom they feared and hated, were taking sides with the Carthaginians. Rhegium was the first

place he attempted, and several days were spent there without any result. Meanwhile the Locrians were

hastily carrying their corn and wood and everything else they might want out of the fields into the city, not

only for safety, but also that no plunder whatever might be left for the enemy. Every day larger numbers of

people poured out of all the gates, till at last only those remained in the city whose duty it was to repair the

walls and gates and provide a store of weapons on the ramparts. Against this miscellaneous crowd of all ranks

and ages wandering through the fields mostly unarmed, Hamilcar sent his cavalry with orders not to injure

any one but simply to scatter them in flight and then cut them off from returning to the city. He had taken up

his position upon some high ground where he had a view of the country and the city, and he sent orders to

one of the Bruttian cohorts to go up to the walls and invite the principal men of the place to a conference, and

if they consented they were to endeavour to persuade them to betray the city, promising them, if they did so,

Hannibal's friendship. The conference took place, but no credence was placed in what the Bruttians said, until

the Carthaginians showed themselves on the hills and a few who escaped to the city brought the news that the

whole population was in the hands of the enemy. Unnerved by terror they replied that they would consult the

people, and a meeting was at once convened. All who were restless and discontented preferred a fresh policy

and a fresh alliance, whilst those whose kinsfolk had been shut out of the city by the enemy felt as much

pledged as though they had given hostages. A few were in favour of maintaining their loyalty to Rome, but

they kept silence rather than venture to defend their opinion. A resolution was passed with apparent

unanimity in favour of surrendering to the Carthaginians. L. Atilius, the commandant of the garrison, and his

men were conducted down to the harbour and placed on board ship for conveyance to Regium; Hamilcar and

his Carthaginians were received into the city on the understanding that a treaty with equal rights should be at

once concluded. This condition was within a very little of being broken, for the Carthaginians charged the

Locrians with treachery in sending away the Romans, whilst the Locrians pleaded that they had escaped.

Some cavalry went in pursuit in case the tide in the straits should either delay the departure of the ships or

drift them ashore. They did not overtake those whom they were in pursuit of, but they saw some other ships

crossing the straits from Messana to Regium. These were Roman soldiers who had been sent by Claudius to

hold the city. So the Carthaginians at once retired from Regium. By Hannibal's orders peace was granted to

the Locrians; they were to be independent and live under their own laws; the city was to be open to the

Carthaginians, the Locrians were to have sole control of the harbour, and the alliance was to be based on the

principle of mutual support: the Carthaginians were to help the Locrians and the Locrians the Carthaginians

in peace and in war.

Thus the Carthaginians marched back from the straits amidst the protests of the Bruttians, who complained

that the cities which they had marked for themselves for plunder had been left unmolested. They determined

to act on their own account, and after enrolling and arming 15,000 of their own fighting men they proceeded


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to attack Croto, a Greek city situated on the coast. They imagined that they would gain an immense accession

of strength if they possessed a seaport with a strongly fortified harbour. What troubled them was that they

could not quite venture to summon the Carthaginians to their aid lest they should be thought not to have acted

as allies ought to act, and again, if the Carthaginian should for the second time be the advocate of peace

rather than of war, they were afraid that they would fight in vain against the freedom of Croto as they had

against that of Locri. It seemed the best course to send to Hannibal and obtain from him an assurance that on

its capture Croto should pass to the Bruttians. Hannibal told them that it was a matter for those on the spot to

arrange and referred them to Hanno, for neither he nor Hanno wanted that famous and wealthy city to be

plundered, and they hoped that when the Bruttians attacked it and it was seen that the Carthaginians neither

assisted nor approved of the attack, the defenders would come over to Hannibal all the sooner.

In Croto there was neither unity of purpose nor of feeling; it seemed as though a disease had attacked all the

cities of Italy alike, everywhere the populace were hostile to the aristocracy. The senate of Croto were in

favour of the Romans, the populace wanted to place their state in the hands of the Carthaginians. This

division of opinion in the city was reported by a deserter to the Bruttians. According to his statements,

Aristomachus was the leader of the populace and was urging the surrender of the city, which was extensive

and thickly populated, with fortifications covering a large area. The positions where the senators kept watch

and ward were few and scattered, wherever the populace kept guard the way lay open into the city. At the

suggestion of the deserter and under his guidance the Bruttians completely invested the town, and at the very

first assault were admitted by the populace and took possession of the whole place with the exception of the

citadel. This was held by the aristocrats, who had prepared it beforehand as a place of refuge in case anything

of this sort should happen. Aristomachus, too, fled there, and gave out that he had advised the surrender of

the city to the Carthaginians, not to the Bruttians.

Before Pyrrhus' arrival in Italy, the city of Croto had walls which formed a circuit of twelve miles. After the

devastation caused by that war hardly half the place was inhabited; the river which used to flow through the

middle of the city now ran outside the part where the houses were, and the citadel was at a considerable

distance from them. Sixteen miles from this famous city there was a still more famous temple to Juno

Lacinia, an object of veneration to all the surrounding communities. There was a grove here enclosed by a

dense wood and lofty firtrees, in the middle of which there was a glade affording delightful pasture. In this

glade cattle of every kind, sacred to the goddess, used to feed without any one to look after them, and at

nightfall the different herds separated each to their own stalls without any beasts of prey lying in wait for

them or any human hands to steal them. These cattle were a source of great profit, and a column of solid gold

was made from the money thus gained and dedicated to the goddess. Thus the temple became celebrated for

its wealth as well as for its sanctity, and as generally happens in these famous spots, some miracles also were

attributed to it. It was commonly reported that an altar stood in the porch of the temple, the ashes on which

were never stirred by any wind.

The citadel of Croto, which overhung the sea on one side and on the other faced the land, was formerly

protected by its natural position; afterwards it was further protected by a wall, on the side where Dionysius,

the Sicilian tyrant, had captured it by stratagem, scaling it on the side away from the sea. It was this citadel

that the aristocrats of Croto now occupied, regarding it as a fairly safe stronghold, while the populace in

conjunction with the Bruttians besieged them. At last the Bruttians saw that they could never take the place in

their own strength, and found themselves compelled to appeal to Hanno for help. He tried to bring the

Crotonians to a surrender on condition that they would admit a Bruttian colony and allow their city, wasted

and desolate as it was by war, to recover its ancient populousness. Not a single man amongst them, except

Aristomachus, would listen to him. They said that they would sooner die than be mingled with Bruttians and

change to alien ceremonies, customs, and laws, and soon even to a foreign speech. Aristomachus, finding

himself powerless to persuade them to surrender and not getting any opportunity of betraying the citadel as he

had betrayed the city, went off by himself to Hanno. Shortly after some envoys from Locri, who had, with

Hanno's permission, obtained access to the citadel, persuaded them to suffer themselves to be transferred to


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Locri instead of facing the last extremity. They had already sent to Hannibal and obtained his consent to this

course. So they left Croto and were conducted to the sea and put on board ship and sailed in a body for Locri.

In Apulia even the winter did not pass quietly so far as the Romans and Hannibal were concerned.

Sempronius was wintering at Luceria and Hannibal not far from Arpi; skirmishes took place between them as

occasion offered or either side saw its opportunity, and these brushes with the enemy made the Romans more

efficient every day and more familiar with the cunning methods of their opponents.

In Sicily the position of the Romans was totally altered by the death of Hiero and the demise of the crown to

his grandson, Hieronymus, who was but a boy and hardly likely to use his own liberty much less his

sovereign power with moderation. At such an age and with such a temperament guardians and friends alike

sought to plunge him into every kind of excess. Hiero, it is said, seeing what was going to happen, was

anxious at the close of his long life to leave Syracuse as a free State, lest the kingdom which had been

acquired and built up by wise and honourable statesmanship should go to ruin by being made the sport of a

boy tyrant. His project met with the most determined opposition from his daughters. They imagined that

whilst the boy retained the name of king, the supreme power would really rest with them and their husbands,

Andranodorus and Zoippus, whom the king purposed to leave as the boy's principal guardians. It was no easy

matter for a man in his ninetieth year, subject night and day to the coaxing and blandishments of two women,

to keep an open mind and make public interests predominant over private ones in his thoughts. So all he

could do was to leave fifteen guardians for his son, and he implored them on his deathbed to maintain

unimpaired the loyal relations with Rome which he had cultivated for fifty years, and to see to it that the

young man, above all things, followed in his footsteps and adhered to the principles in which he had been

brought up. Such were his instructions. When the king had breathed his last the guardians produced the will

and brought the boy, who was then about fifteen, before the assembled people. Some who had taken their

places in different parts to raise acclamations shouted their approval of the will, the majority, feeling that they

had lost a father, feared the worst now that the State was orphaned. Then followed the king's funeral, which

was honoured more by the love and affection of his subjects than by any grief amongst his own kindred.

Shortly afterwards Andranodorus got rid of the other guardians by giving out that Hieronymus was now a

young man and capable of assuming the government; by himself resigning the guardianship which he shared

with several others, he concentrated all their powers in his own person.

Even a good and sensible prince would have found it difficult to win popularity with the Syracusans as

successor to their beloved Hiero. But Hieronymus, as though he were anxious by his own vices to make the

loss of his grandfather more keenly felt, showed on his very first appearance in public how everything was

changed. Those who had for so many years seen Hiero and his son, Gelo, going about with nothing in their

dress or other marks of royalty to distinguish them from the rest of their countrymen, now saw Hieronymus

clad in purple, wearing a diadem, surrounded by an armed escort, and sometimes even proceeding from his

palace in a chariot drawn by four white horses, after the style of Dionysius the tyrant. Quite in harmony with

this extravagant assumption of state and pomp was the contempt he showed for everybody; the insolent tone

in which he addressed those who sought audiences of him; the way he made himself difficult of access not

only to strangers but even to his guardians; his monstrous lusts; his inhuman cruelty. Such terror seized

everybody that some of his guardians anticipated a death of torture by suicide or flight. Three of them, the

only ones who had familiar access to the palace, Andranodorus and Zoippus, Hiero's sonsinlaw, and a

certain Thraso, did not rouse much interest in him when talking of other matters, but as two of them took the

side of the Carthaginians and Thraso that of the Romans, their heated arguments and quarrels attracted the

young king's attention. A conspiracy formed against the despot's life was disclosed by a certain Callo, a lad of

about the same age as Hieronymus and accustomed from his boyhood to associate with him on terms of

perfect familiarity. The informer was able to give the name of one of the conspirators, Theodotus, by whom

he had himself been invited to join in the plot. This man was at once arrested and handed over to

Andranodorus for torture. He confessed his own complicity without any hesitation, but was silent about the

others. At last, when he was racked with tortures too terrible for human endurance, he pretended to be

overcome by his sufferings, and instead of disclosing the names of the guilty informed against an innocent


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man, and falsely accused Thraso of being the ringleader of the plot. Unless, he said, they had had such an

influential man to lead them they would never have ventured upon so serious an undertaking. He went on

inventing his story amidst groans of anguish and mentioning names just as they occurred to him, taking care

to select the most worthless amongst the king's courtiers. It was the mention of Thraso that weighed most in

persuading the king of the truth of the story; he accordingly was at once given up for punishment, and the

others, as innocent as he was, shared his fate. Though their accomplice was under torture for a long time, not

one of the actual conspirators either concealed himself or sought safety in flight, so great was their

confidence in the courage and honour of Theodotus, and so great the firmness with which he kept their secret.

The one link with Rome had now gone with Thraso, and there was no doubt about the movement towards

revolt. Envoys were sent to Hannibal, and he sent back, together with a young noble, also named Hannibal,

two other agents, Hippocrates and Epicydes, natives of Carthage and Carthaginians on the mother's side, but

their grandfather was a refugee from Syracuse. Through their agency an alliance was formed between

Hannibal and the Syracusan tyrant, and with Hannibal's consent they stayed on with Hieronymus. As soon as

Appius Claudius, who was commanding in Sicily heard of this, he sent envoys to the king. When they

announced that they had come to renew the alliance which had existed with his grandfather, they were

laughed at, and as they were leaving the king asked them in jest what fortune they had met with in the battle

of Cannae, for he could hardly believe what Hannibal's envoys told him; he wanted to know the truth so that

he might make up his mind which course to follow as offering the best prospects. The Romans said that they

would come back to him when he had learnt to receive embassies seriously, and, after warning him, rather

than asking him, not to abandon their alliance lightly, they departed. Hieronymus sent envoys to Carthage to

conclude a treaty in the terms of their alliance with Hannibal. It was agreed in this compact that after they had

expelled the Romans from Sicilyand that would soon be done if they sent a fleet and an armythe river

Himera, which almost equally divides the island, was to be the boundary between the dominions of Syracuse

and that of Carthage. Puffed up by the flattery of people who told him to remember not only Hiero but his

maternal grandfather, King Pyrrhus, Hieronymus sent a second legation to Hannibal to tell him that he

thought it only fair that the whole of Sicily should be ceded to him and that Carthage should claim the empire

of Italy as their own. They expressed neither surprise nor displeasure at this fickleness and levity in the

hotheaded youth provided only they could keep him from declaring for Rome.

But everything was hurrying him headlong into ruin. He had sent Hippocrates and Epicydes in advance, each

with 2000 troops, to attempt some cities which were held by Roman garrisons, whilst he himself advanced to

Leontini with 15,000 foot and horse, which comprised the rest of his army. The conspirators, all of whom

happened to be in the army, took an empty house overlooking the narrow road by which the king usually

went down to the forum. Whilst they were all standing in front of the house, fully armed, waiting for the king

to pass, one of them, Dinomenes by name, in the royal bodyguard, had the task assigned to him of keeping

back the crowd in the rear, by some means or other, when the king approached the gate of the house. All was

done as had been arranged. Pretending to loosen a knot which was too tight on his foot, Dinomenes stopped

the crowd and made so wide a gap in it that when the king was attacked in the absence of his guards he was

stabbed in several places before help could reach him. As soon as the shouting and tumult were heard the

guard hurled their missiles on Dinomenes who was now unmistakably stopping the way, but he escaped with

only two wounds. When they saw the king lying on the ground the attendants fled. Some of the assassins

went to the people who had assembled in the forum, rejoicing in their recovered liberty, others hastened to

Syracuse to forestall the designs of Andranodorus and the rest of the king's men. In this critical state of affairs

Appius Claudius saw that a war was beginning close at hand, and he sent a despatch to the senate informing

them that Sicily was being won over to Carthage and Hannibal. To frustrate the plans being formed at

Syracuse, he moved all the garrisons to the frontier between the Roman province and the late king's

dominion. At the close of the year Q. Fabius was authorised by the senate to fortify Puteoli, where there had

grown up a considerable trade during the war, and also to place a garrison in it. On his way to Rome, where

he was to conduct the elections, he gave notice that they would be held on the first election day that he could

fix, and then to save time he marched past the City straight to the Campus Martius. That day the first voting


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fell by lot to the junior century of the tribe of the Anio, and they were giving their vote for T. Otacilius and

M. Aemilius Regillus, when Q. Fabius, having obtained silence, made the following address:

"If Italy were at peace, or if we had on our hands such a war and such an enemy as to allow room for less care

on our part, I should consider any one who sought to check the eagerness with which you have come here to

confer honour on the men of your choice as very forgetful of your liberties. But in this war, in dealing with

this enemy, none of our generals has ever made a single mistake which has not involved us in the gravest

disasters, and therefore it is only right that you should exercise your franchise in the election of consuls with

as much circumspection as you show when going armed into battle. Every man must say to himself, 'I am

nominating a consul who is to be a match for Hannibal.' It was during this year that Vibellius Taurea, the

foremost of the Campanian knights challenged and was met by Asellus Claudius, the finest Roman horseman,

at Capua. Against a Gaul, who once offered his defiance on the bridge over the Anio, our ancestors sent T

Manlius, a man of undaunted courage and prowess. Not many years later it was in the same spirit of fearless

confidence, I will make bold to say, that M. Valerius armed himself against the Gaul who challenged him in

the same way to single combat. Just as we desire to have our infantry and cavalry stronger, or if that is

impossible at least equal to the enemy, so we should look for a commander equal to his. Even if we choose as

our commander the finest general in the republic, still he is only chosen for a year, and immediately after his

election he will be pitted against a veteran and permanent strategist who is not shackled by any limitations of

time or authority, or prevented from forming and executing any plans which the necessities of war may

require. In our case, on the other hand, the year is gone simply in making preparations and commencing a

campaign. I have said enough as to the sort of men you ought to elect as your consuls; let me say a word

about the men in whose favour the first vote has already been given. M. Aemilius Regillus is a Flamen or

Quirinus; we cannot discharge him from his sacred duties without neglecting our duty to the gods nor can we

keep him at home without neglecting proper attention to the war. Otacilius married my sister's daughter and

has children by her, but the obligations you have conferred on me and my ancestors are not such that I can

place private relationship before the welfare of the State. In a calm sea any sailor, any passenger, can steer the

ship, but when a violent storm arises and the vessel is driven by the wind over the raging waters then you

want a man who is really a pilot. We are not sailing now in smooth water, already we have almost foundered

in the many storms that have overtaken us, and therefore you must use the utmost foresight and caution in

choosing the man who is to take the helm.

"As for you, T. Otacilius, we have had some experience of your conduct of comparatively unimportant

operations, and you have certainly not shown any grounds for our entrusting you with more important ones.

There were three objects for which we equipped the fleet this year which you commanded: it was to ravage

the African coast, to render the coast of Italy safe for us, and, what was most important of all, to prevent any

reinforcements, money, or supplies from being sent from Carthage to Hannibal. If T. Otacilius has carried

outI will not say all, butany one of these objects for the State, then by all means elect him consul. But if,

whilst you were in command of the fleet, everything required reached Hannibal safe and sound from home, if

the coast of Italy has this year been in greater danger than the coast of Africa, what possible reason can you

give why they should put you up, most of all, to oppose Hannibal? If you were consul we should have to

follow the example of our forefathers and nominate a Dictator, and you could not take it as an insult that

somebody amongst all the citizens of Rome was looked upon as a better strategist than yourself. It is of more

importance to you, T. Otacilius, than it can be to any one else that you should not have a burden placed upon

your shoulders whose weight would crush you. And to you, my fellowcitizens, I appeal most solemnly to

remember what you are about to do. Imagine yourselves standing in your armed ranks on the field of battle;

suddenly you are called upon to choose two commanders under whose auspicious generalship you are to

fight. In the same spirit choose the consuls today to whom your children must take the oath, at whose edict

they must assemble, under whose tutelage and protection they must serve. Trasumennus and Cannae are

melancholy precedents to recall, but they are solemn warnings to guard against similar disasters. Usher! call

back the century of juniors in the tribe of the Anio to give their votes again."


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T. Otacilius was in a state of great excitement, loudly exclaiming that Fabius wanted to have his consulship

prolonged, and as he persisted in creating a disturbance the consul ordered the lictors to approach him and

warned him that as he had marched straight to the Campus without entering the City, the axes were still

bound up in the fasces. The voting had in the meantime recommenced, and the first was given in favour of Q.

Fabius Maximus as consul for the fourth time and M. Marcellus for the third. All the other centuries voted

without exception for the same men. One praetor was reelected, Q Fulvius Flaccus, the others were fresh

appointments; T. Otacilius Crassus, now praetor for the second time; Q. Fabius, a son of the consul and

curule aedile at the time of his election; and P. Cornelius Lentulus. When the election of the praetors was

finished the senate passed a resolution that Quintus Fulvius should have the City as his special province, and

when the consuls had gone to the war he should command at home. There were two great floods this year; the

Tiber inundated the fields, causing widespread destruction of farmbuildings and stock and much loss of life.

It was in the fifth year of the second Punic war that Q. Fabius Maximus assumed the consulship for the fourth

time and M. Claudius Marcellus for the third time. Their election excited an unusual amount of interest

amongst the citizens, for it was many years since there had been such a pair of consuls. Old men remembered

that Maximus Rullus had been similarly elected with P. Decius in view of the Gaulish war, and in the same

way afterwards Papirius and Carvilius had been chosen consuls to act against the Samnites and Bruttians and

also against the Lucanians and Tarentines. Marcellus was elected in his absence whilst he was with the army.

Fabius was reelected when he was on the spot and actually conducting the election. Irregular as this was, the

circumstances at the time, the exigencies of the war, the critical position of the State prevented any one from

inquiring into precedents or suspecting the consul of love of power. On the contrary, they praised his

greatness of soul, because when he knew that the republic needed its greatest general, and that he was

unquestionably himself the one, he thought less of any personal odium which he might incur than of the

interest of the republic.

On the day when the consuls entered upon office, a meeting of the senate was held in the Capitol. The very

first decree passed was that the consuls should either draw lots or arrange between themselves which of them

should conduct the election of censors before he left for the army. A second decree extended the command of

the former consuls who were with their armies, and they were ordered to remain in their respective provinces;

Ti. Gracchus at Luceria, where he was stationed with his army of volunteer slaves; C. Terentius Varro in the

district of Picenum; Manius Pomponius in the land of the Gauls. The praetors of the former year were to act

as propraetors; Q. Mucius was to hold Sardinia, and M. Valerius was to continue in command of the coast

with his headquarters at Brundisium, where he was to be on the watch against any movement on the part of

Philip of Macedon. The province of Sicily was assigned to P. Cornelius Lentulus, one of the praetors, and T.

Otacilius was to command the same fleet which he had had the previous year, to act against the

Carthaginians. Many portents were announced that year, and the more readily men of simple and pious minds

believed in them the more numerously were they reported. Right in the inside of the temple of Juno Sospita at

Lanuvium some crows had built a nest; in Apulia a green palmtree had caught fire; at Mantua a pool formed

by the overflow of the Mincius presented the appearance of blood; at Cales there was a rain of chalk stones,

and at Rome, in the Forum Boarium, one of blood; in the Insteian quarter a subterranean spring flowed with

such violence that it carried off some casks and jars in the cellars there as though they had been swept away

by a torrent; various objects were struck by lightning, a public hall in the Capitol, the temple of Vulcan in the

Campus Martius, some farm buildings in the Sabine territory; and the public road, the walls, and one of the

gates of Gabii. Then other marvels were reported; the spear of Mars at Praeneste had moved of its own

accord; in Sicily an ox had spoken; amongst the Marrucini an infant had cried "Io triumphe" in its mother's

womb; at Spoletum a woman had been turned into a man; at Hadria an altar had been seen in the sky with

men clothed in white standing round it; and lastly at Rome, in the very City itself, a swarm of bees was seen

in the Forum and immediately afterwards some people raised the cry "To arms!" declaring that they saw

armed legions on the Janiculum, though the people who were on the hill at the time said that they saw no one

except those who were usually at work in the gardens there. These portents were expiated by victims of the

larger kind in accordance with the directions of the diviners, and solemn intercessions were ordered to be

made to all the deities who possessed shrines in Rome.


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When all had been done to secure "the peace of the gods," the consuls brought before the senate the questions

relating to the policy of the State, the conduct of the war, and the amount and disposition of the military and

naval forces of the republic. It was decided to place eighteen legions in the field. Each of the consuls was to

have two, Gaul, Sicily, and Sardinia were each to be held by two, Q. Fabius, the praetor, was to take

command of two in Apulia, and Ti. Gracchus was to keep his two legions of volunteer slaves at Luceria. One

legion was left with C. Terentius at Picenum, and one also with M. Valerius at Brundisium for the fleet, and

two were to defend the City. To make up this number of legions six new ones had to be raised. The consuls

were directed to raise these as quickly as possible, and to fit out a fleet so that with the vessels stationed off

the Calabrian coast the navy might that year be increased to 150 vessels of war. After the troops were levied

and 100 new vessels launched, Q. Fabius held the election for the appointment of censors; those elected were

M. Atilius Regulus and P. Furius Philus. As the rumours of war in Sicily became more frequent, T. Otacilius

was directed to sail thither with his fleet. As there was a deficiency of sailors, the consuls, acting upon the

instructions of the senate, published an order to meet the case. Every one who had been assessed or whose

father had been assessed in the censorship of L. Aemilius and C. Flaminius at from 50,000 to 100,000 ases or

whose property had since reached that amount, was to furnish one sailor with six months' pay; those whose

assessment was from 100,000 to 300,000 were to supply three sailors with twelve months' pay; from 300,000

to 1,000,000 the contribution was to be five sailors, and above that amount seven. The senators were to

furnish eight sailors and a year's pay. The sailors forthcoming under this order, after being armed and

equipped by their masters, went on board with thirty days' rations. This was the first occasion on which a

Roman fleet was manned by seamen provided at private cost.

The extraordinary scale on which these preparations were made threw the Campanians into a state of

consternation; they were in dread lest the Romans should begin their campaigns for the year by besieging

Capua. So they sent to Hannibal imploring him to move his army to Capua; fresh armies, they informed him,

had been raised in Rome with a view to attacking them, and there was no city whose defection the Romans

more bitterly resented than theirs. Owing to the urgency of the message, Hannibal felt he ought to lose no

time in case the Romans anticipated him, and leaving Arpi he took up his position in his old camp at Tifata,

overlooking Capua. Leaving his Numidians and Spaniards to protect the camp and Capua at the same time, he

descended with the rest of his army to Lake Avernus, ostensibly for the purpose of offering sacrifice, but

really to make an attempt on Puteoli and the garrison there. As soon as the news of Hannibal's departure from

Arpi and his return to Campania reached Maximus, he returned to his army, travelling night and day, and sent

orders to Ti. Gracchus to move his forces from Luceria to Beneventum, whilst Q. Fabius, the praetor, the

consul's son, was instructed to take Gracchus' place at Luceria. Two praetors started at the same time for

Sicily, P. Cornelius to the army and T. Otacilius to take charge of the coast and direct the naval affairs. The

others all left for their respective provinces, and those whose command had been extended kept the districts

they had held the year before.

While Hannibal was at Lake Avernus he was visited by five young nobles from Tarentum who had been

made prisoners, some at Trasumennus and the others at Cannae, and afterwards sent to their homes with the

same courteous treatment that the Carthaginian had shown to all the allies of Rome. They told him that they

had not forgotten his kindness, and out of gratitude had persuaded most of the younger men in Tarentum to

choose the friendship and alliance of Hannibal in preference to that of the Romans; they had been sent by

their compatriots to ask him to march his army nearer to Tarentum. "If only," they declared, "your standards

and camp are visible at Tarentum, there will be no hesitation in making the city over to you. The populace is

in the hands of the younger men, and the government of Tarentum is in the hands of the populace." Hannibal

expressed his warm approval of their sentiments, loaded them with splendid promises, and bade them return

home to mature their plans. He would himself be with them at the right time. With this hope the Tarentines

were dismissed. Hannibal himself was extremely anxious to gain possession of Tarentum; he saw that it was

a wealthy and famous city, and, what was more, it was a maritime city on the coast opposite Macedonia, and

as the Romans were holding Brundisium, this would be the port that King Philip would make for if he sailed

to Italy. After performing the sacred rites which were the object of his coming, and having during his stay


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laid waste the territory of Cumae as far as the promontory of Misenum, he suddenly marched to Puteoli,

hoping to surprise the Roman garrison. There were 6000 troops there, and the place was not only one of great

strength, but had also been strongly fortified. The Carthaginian spent three days there in attempting the

fortress on every side, and as he met with no success he proceeded to ravage the district round Naples, more

out of disappointed rage than in hopes of gaining possession of the city. The populace of Nola, who had long

been disaffected towards Rome and at variance with their own senate, were greatly excited by his presence in

a territory so close to their own. Their envoys accordingly came to invite Hannibal and brought him a positive

assurance that the city would be delivered up to him. Their design was forestalled by the consul Marcellus,

who had been summoned by the leading citizens. In one day he marched from Cales to Suessula in spite of

the delay involved in crossing the Vulturnus, and the following night he threw into Nola 6000 infantry and

500 cavalry as a protection to the senate. While the consul was acting with the utmost energy in making Nola

safe against attack, Hannibal was losing time, and after two unsuccessful attempts was less inclined to put

faith in the populace of Nola.

During this time the consul, Q. Fabius, made an attempt on Casilinum, which was held by a Carthaginian

garrison, while, as though they were acting in concert, Hanno, marching from Bruttium with a strong body of

horse and foot, reached Beneventum on the one side and Ti. Gracchus, from Luceria, approached it in the

opposite direction. He got into the town first, and hearing that Hanno had encamped by the river Caloris

about three miles from the city and was ravaging the country, he moved out of the place and fixed his camp

about a mile from the enemy. Here he harangued his troops. His legions were composed mostly of volunteer

slaves who had made up their minds to earn their liberty, without murmuring, by another year's service rather

than demand it openly. He had, however, on leaving his winter quarters noticed that there were discontented

"rumblings going on in the army, men were asking whether they would ever serve as free men. In

consequence of this he had sent a despatch to the senate in which he stated that the question was not so much

what they wanted as what they deserved; they had rendered him good and gallant service up to that day, and

they only fell short of the standard of regular soldiers in the matter of personal freedom. On that point

permission had been granted to him to do what he thought best in the interests of the State. So before closing

with the enemy he announced that the hour which they had so long hoped for, when they would gain their

freedom, had now come. The next day he was going to fight a pitched battle in a free and open plain where

there would be full scope for true courage without any fear of ambuscade. Whoever brought back the head of

an enemy would be at once by his orders declared to be a free man; whoever quitted his place in the ranks he

would punish with a slave's death. Every man's fortune was in his own hands. It was not he alone that

guaranteed their liberty, but the consul Marcellus also and the whole of the senate whom he had consulted

and who had left the question of their liberty to him. He then read the despatch from Marcellus and the

resolution passed in the senate. These were greeted with a loud and ringing cheer. They demanded to be led at

once to battle and pressed him forthwith to give the signal. Gracchus announced that the battle would take

place the next day and then dismissed the men to quarters. The soldiers were in high spirits, those especially

who had the prospect of earning their freedom by one day's strenuous work, and they spent the rest of the day

in getting their arms and armour ready.

When the bugles began to sound the next morning the volunteer slaves were the first to muster in front of the

headquarters' tent, armed and ready. As soon as the sun was risen Gracchus led his forces into the field, and

the enemy showed no slackness in meeting him. He had 17,000 infantry, mostly Bruttians and Lucanians, and

1200 cavalry, amongst whom were very few Italians, the rest were almost all Numidians and Moors. The

battle was a severe and protracted one; for four hours neither side gained any advantage. Nothing hampered

the Romans more than the setting a price upon the heads of their foes, the price of liberty, for no sooner had

any one made a furious attack upon an enemy and killed him than he lost time in cutting off his heada

difficult matter in the tumult and turmoil of the battleand then, as their right hands were occupied in holding

the heads all the best soldiers were no longer able to fight, and the battle was left to the slow and the timid.

The military tribunes reported to their general that not a man of the enemy was being wounded as he stood,

whilst those who had fallen were being butchered and the soldiers were carrying human heads in their right


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hands instead of swords. Gracchus made them at once give the order to throw down the heads and attack the

enemy, and to tell them that their courage was sufficiently clear and conspicuous, and that there would be no

question about liberty for brave men. On this the fighting was renewed and even the cavalry were sent against

the enemy. The Numidians made a countercharge with great impetuosity, and the fighting became as fierce

between the cavalry as it was amongst the infantry, making the issue of the contest again uncertain. The

generals on both sides now appealed to their men; the Roman pointed to the Bruttians and Lucanians who had

been so often defeated and crushed by their ancestors; the Carthaginian showered contempt upon Roman

slaves and soldiers taken out of the workshops. At last Gracchus gave out that there would be no hope

whatever of liberty if the enemy were not routed and put to flight that day.

These words so kindled their courage that they seemed like different men; they raised the battle shout again

and flung themselves on the enemy with such force that their attack could no longer be withstood. The

Carthaginian ranks in front of the standards were broken, then the soldiers round the standards were thrown

into disorder, and at last their entire army became a scene of confusion. Soon they were unmistakably routed,

and they rushed to their camp in such haste and panic that not even in the gates or on the rampart was there

any attempt at resistance. The Romans followed almost on their heels and commenced a fresh battle inside

the enemies' rampart. Here the combatants had less space to move and the battle was all the more bloody. The

prisoners in the camp also helped the Romans, for they snatched up swords amid the confusion and, forming

a solid phalanx, they fell upon the Carthaginians in the rear and stopped their flight. Out of that large army

not 2000 men escaped, and amongst these were the greater part of the cavalry who got clear away with their

general, all the rest were either killed or made prisoners, and thirtyeight standards were captured. Of the

victors hardly 2000 fell. The whole of the plunder, with the exception of the prisoners, was given to the

soldiers; whatever cattle the owners claimed within thirty days were also excepted.

On their return to camp, laden with booty, some 4000 of the volunteer slaves who had shown remissness in

the fighting and had not joined in the rush into the camp took possession of a hill not far from their own camp

as they were afraid of punishment. The next day Gracchus ordered a parade of his army, and these men were

brought down by their officers and entered the camp after the rest of the army was mustered. The proconsul

first bestowed military rewards on the veterans, according to the courage and activity they had shown in the

battle. Then turning to the volunteer slaves he said that he would much rather have praised all alike, whether

deserving or undeserving, than that any man should be punished that day. "And," he continued, "I pray that

what I am now doing may prove to be for the benefit, happiness, and felicity of yourselves and of the

commonwealthI bid you all be free." At these words they broke out into a storm of cheering; at one moment

they embraced and congratulated each other, at another they lifted up their hands to heaven and prayed that

every blessing might descend upon the people of Rome and upon Gracchus himself. Gracchus continued:

"Before making you all equal as free men I did not want to affix any mark by which the brave soldier could

be distinguished from the coward, but now that the State has fulfilled its promise to you I shall not let all

distinction between courage and cowardice be lost. I shall require the names to be brought to me of those

who, conscious of their skulking in battle, lately seceded from us, and when they have been summoned

before me I shall make each of them take an oath that he will never as long as he is with the colours, unless

prevented by illness, take his meals other than standing. You will be quite reconciled to this small penalty

when you reflect that it would have been impossible to mark you with any lighter stigma for your cowardice."

He then gave orders for the tents and other things to be packed up, and the soldiers carrying their plunder or

driving it in front of them with mirth and jest returned to Beneventum in such happy laughing spirits that they

seemed to be coming back after a day of revelry rather than after a day of battle. The whole population of

Beneventum poured out in crowds to meet them at the gates; they embraced and congratulated the soldiers

and invited them to partake of their hospitality. Tables had been spread for them all in the forecourts of the

houses; the citizens invited the men and begged Gracchus to allow his troops to enjoy a feast. Gracchus

consented on condition that they all banqueted in public view, and each citizen brought out his provision and

placed his tables in front of his door. The volunteers, now no longer slaves, wore white caps or fillets of white


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wool round their heads at the feast; some were reclining, others remained standing, waiting on the others and

taking their food at the same time. Gracchus thought the scene worth commemorating, and on his return to

Rome he ordered a representation of that celebrated day to be painted in the temple of Liberty; the temple

which his father had built and dedicated on the Aventine out of the proceeds of the fines.

During these proceedings at Beneventum, Hannibal, after ravaging the Neapolitan territory, shifted his camp

to Nola. As soon as the consul became aware of his approach he sent for Pomponius, the propraetor, to join

him with the army which was in camp above Suessula, and prepared to meet the enemy without delay. He

sent C. Claudius Nero with the best of the cavalry out through the camp gate which was furthest from the

enemy, in the dead of night, with instructions to ride round to the rear of the enemy without being observed

and follow him slowly, and when he saw the battle begin, throw himself across his rear. Nero was unable to

follow out his instructions, whether because he lost his way or because he had not sufficient time is uncertain.

The battle commenced in his absence and the Romans undoubtedly had the advantage, but owing to the

cavalry not making their appearance in time the general's plans were all upset. Marcellus did not venture to

pursue the retreating Carthaginians, and gave the signal for retreat though his soldiers were actually

conquering. It is asserted that more than 2000 of the enemy were killed that day, whilst the Romans lost less

than 400. About sunset Nero returned with his horses and men tired out to no purpose and without having

even seen the enemy. He was severely censured by the consul who even went so far as to say that it was

entirely his fault that they had not inflicted on the enemy in his turn a defeat as crushing as the one at Cannae.

The next day the Romans marched into the field, but the Carthaginian remained in camp, thereby tacitly

admitting that he was vanquished. The following day he gave up all hope of gaining possession of Nola, his

attempts having been always foiled, and proceeded to Tarentum, where he had better hopes of securing the

place through treachery.

The government showed quite as much energy at home as in the field. Owing to the emptiness of the treasury

the censors were released from the task of letting out public works to contract, and they devoted their

attention to the regulation of public morals and the castigation of the vices which sprang up during the war,

just as constitutions enfeebled by long illness naturally develop other evils. They began by summoning before

them those who were reported to have formed plans for abandoning Italy after the defeat of Cannae; the

principal person concerned, M. Caecilius Metellus, happened to be praetor at the time. He and the rest who

were involved in the charge were put upon their trial, and as they were unable to clear themselves the censors

pronounced them guilty of having uttered treasonable language both privately and publicly in order that a

conspiracy might be formed for abandoning Italy. Next to these were summoned those who had been too

clever in explaining how they were absolved from their oath, the prisoners who imagined that when they had

furtively gone back, after once starting, to Hannibal's camp they were released from the oath which they had

taken to return. In their case and in that of those above mentioned, all who possessed horses at the cost of the

State were deprived of them, and they were all removed from their tribes and disfranchised. Nor were the

attentions of the censors confined to the senate or the equestrian order, they took out from the registers of the

junior centuries the names of all those who had not served for four years, unless formally exempted or

incapacitated by sickness, and the names of above 2000 men were removed from the tribes and the men

disfranchised. This drastic procedure of the censors was followed by severe action on the part of the senate.

They passed a resolution that all those whom the censors had degraded were to serve as foot soldiers and be

sent to the remains of the army of Cannae in Sicily. This class of soldiers was only to terminate its service

when the enemy had been driven out of Italy.

As the censors were now abstaining, owing to the emptiness of the treasury, from making any contracts for

repairs to the sacred edifices or for supplying chariot horses or similar objects, they were frequently

approached by those who had been in the habit of tendering for these contracts, and urged to conduct all their

business and let out the contracts just as if there was money in the treasury. No one, they said, would ask for

money from the exchequer till the war was over. Then came the owners of the slaves whom Tiberius

Sempronius had manumitted at Beneventum. They stated that they had had notice from the financial


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commissioners that they were to receive the value of their slaves, but they would not accept it till the war was

at an end. While the plebeians were thus showing their readiness to meet the difficulties of an empty

exchequer, the moneys of minors and wards and then of widows began to be deposited, those who brought

the money believing that their deposits would not be safer or more scrupulously protected anywhere than

when they were under the guarantee of the State. Whatever was bought or provided for the minors and

widows was paid for by a bill of exchange on the quaestor. This generous spirit on the part of individual

citizens spread from the City to the camp, so that not a single horse soldier, not a single centurion would

accept pay; whoever did accept it received the opprobrious epithet of "mercenary."

It has been stated above that the consul, Q. Fabius, was encamped near Casilinum, which was held by a

garrison of 2000 Campanians and 700 of Hannibal's troops. Statius Metius had been sent by Gnaevius

Magius of Atella, who was the "medixtuticus" for that year, to take command, and he had armed the populace

and the slaves indiscriminately in order to attack the Roman camp while the consul was engaged in the

assault on the town. Fabius was perfectly aware of all that was going on, and he sent word to his colleague at

Nola that a second army would be needed to hold the Campanians while he was delivering the assault, and

either he should come himself and leave a sufficient force at Nola, or, if there was still danger to be

apprehended from Hannibal and Nola required his presence, he should recall Tiberius Gracchus from

Beneventum. On receipt of this message Marcellus left 2000 men to protect Nola and came with the rest of

his army to Casilinum. His arrival put an end to any movement on the part of the Campanians, and Casilinum

was now besieged by both consuls. Many of the Roman soldiers were wounded by rashly venturing too near

the walls, and the operations were by no means successful. Fabius thought that the enterprise, which was of

small importance though quite as difficult as more important ones, ought to be abandoned, and that they

ought to go where more serious business awaited them. Marcellus urged that while there were many things

which a great general ought not to undertake, still, when he had undertaken them, he ought not to let them

drop, as in either case it had great influence on public opinion. He succeeded in preventing the siege from

being abandoned. Now the assault commenced in earnest, and when the vineae and siege works and artillery

of every kind were brought against the walls, the Campanians begged Fabius to be allowed to depart under

safe conduct to Capua. After a few had got outside the town Marcellus occupied the gate through which they

were leaving, and an indiscriminate slaughter began, first amongst those near the gate and then, after the

troops burst in, in the city itself. About fifty of the Campanians had already passed out and they fled to

Fabius, under whose protection they reached Capua. During these parleys, and the delay occasioned by those

who appealed for protection, the besiegers found their opportunity and Casilinum was taken. The

Campanians and those of Hannibal's troops who were made prisoners were sent to Rome and shut up in

prison; the mass of the townsfolk were distributed amongst the neighbouring communities to be kept in

custody.

Just at the time when the consuls were withdrawing from Casilinum after their success, Gracchus sent some

cohorts, which he had raised in Lucania under an officer of the allies, on a plundering expedition in the

enemy's territory. Whilst they were scattered in all directions Hanno attacked them and inflicted on them as

great a loss as he had suffered at Beneventum, after which he hurriedly retreated into Bruttium lest Gracchus

should be on his track. Marcellus went back to Nola, Fabius marched into Samnium to lay waste the country

and to recover by force of arms the cities which had revolted. His hand fell most heavily on Caudium; the

crops were burnt far and wide, cattle and men were driven away as plunder, their towns were taken by

assault; Compulteria, Telesia, Compsa, and after these Fugifulae and Orbitanium, amongst the Lucanians

Blandae and the Apulian town of Aecae, were all captured. In these places 25,000 of the enemy were either

killed or made prisoners and 370 deserters were taken, whom the consul sent on to Rome; they were all

scourged in the Comitium and then flung from the rock. All these successes were gained by Q. Fabius within

a few days. Marcellus was compelled to remain quiet at Nola owing to illness. The praetor, Q. Fabius, was

also meeting with success; he was operating in the country round Luceria and captured the town of Acuca,

after which he established a standing camp at Ardaneae.


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While the Roman generals were thus engaged elsewhere Hannibal had reached Tarentum, utterly ruining and

destroying everything as he advanced. It was not till he was in the territory of Tarentum that his army began

to advance peaceably; no injury was inflicted, no foragers or plunderers left the line of march, and it was

quite apparent that this selfrestraint on the part of the general and his men was solely with a view to winning

the sympathies of the Tarentines. When, however, he went up to the walls and there was no such movement

as he expected at the sight of his army, he went into camp about a mile from the city. Three days before his

arrival M. Valerius, the propraetor, who was in command of the fleet at Brundisium, had sent M. Livius to

Tarentum. He speedily embodied a force out of the young nobility, and posted detachments at the gates and

on the walls wherever it seemed necessary, and by being ever on the alert day and night gave no chance to

either the enemy or the untrustworthy allies of making any attempt themselves or hoping for anything from

Hannibal. After spending some days there fruitlessly and finding that none of those who had paid him a visit

at Lake Avernus either came in person or sent any messenger or letter, he recognised that he had been misled

by empty promises and withdrew his army. He still abstained from doing any injury to the Tarentine territory,

although this affectation of mildness had done him no good so far. He still clung to the hope of undermining

their loyalty to Rome. When he came to Salapia the summer was now over, and as the place seemed suitable

for winter quarters he provisioned it with corn collected from the country round Metapontum and Heraclea.

From this centre the Numidians and Moors were sent on marauding expeditions through the Sallentine

district and the pasture lands bordering on Apulia; they brought away mostly quantities of horses, not much

plunder of other kinds, and as many as 4000 of these were distributed amongst the troopers to be trained.

A war was threatening in Sicily which could by no means be treated lightly, for the death of the tyrant had

rather furnished the Syracusans with able and energetic leaders than produced any change in their political

sentiments. The senate accordingly placed the other consul, M. Marcellus, in charge of that province.

Immediately after the death of Hieronymus a disturbance broke out among the soldiery at Leontini; they

loudly demanded that the murder of the king should be atoned for by the blood of the conspirators. When,

however, the words, so delightful to hear, "the restoration of liberty," were constantly uttered, and they were

led to hope that they would receive a largesse out of the royal treasure and would henceforth serve under

more able generals, when, too, the foul crimes and still fouler lusts of the late tyrant were recounted to them,

their feelings were so completely changed that they allowed the body of the king, whose loss they had

regretted, to lie unburied. The rest of the conspirators remained behind to secure the army, whilst Theodotus

and Sosis, mounting the king's horses, rode at full speed to Syracuse to crush the royalists while still ignorant

of all that had happened. Rumour, however, which on such occasions travels more quickly than anything else,

reached the city before them, and also one of the royal servants had brought the news. Thus forewarned,

Andranodorus had occupied with strong garrisons the Island, the citadel, and all the other suitable positions.

Theodotus and Sosis rode in through the Hexapylon after sunset when it was growing dark and displayed the

bloodstained robe of the king and the diadem that had adorned his head. Then they rode on through the

Tycha, and summoning the people to liberty and to arms bade them assemble in the Achradina. Some of the

population ran out into the streets, others stood in the doorways, others looked out from the windows and the

roofs inquiring what was the matter. Lights were visible everywhere and the whole city was in an uproar.

Those who had arms mustered in the open spaces of the city; those who had none tore down the spoils of the

Gauls and Illyrians which the Roman people had given to Hiero and which he had hung up in the temple of

Olympian Jupiter, and as they did so prayed to the deity that he would of his grace and mercy lend them those

consecrated arms to use in defence of the shrines of the gods and in defence of their liberty. The citizens were

joined by the troops who had been posted in the different parts of the city. Amongst the other places in the

Island Andranodorus had strongly occupied the public granary. This place, enclosed by a wall of large stone

blocks and fortified like a citadel, was held by a body of young men told off for its defence, and they sent

messengers to the Achradina to say that the granaries and the corn stored there were in the possession of the

senate.

As soon as it was light the whole population, armed and unarmed, assembled at the Senatehouse in the

Achradina. There, in front of the temple of Concord, which was situated there, Polyaenus, one of the


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prominent citizens, made a speech which breathed of freedom but at the same time counselled moderation.

"Men," he said, "who have experienced the fear and the humiliation of slavery are stung to rage against an

evil which they know well. What disasters civil discord brings in its train, you, Syracusans, have heard from

your fathers rather than witnessed yourselves. I praise your action in so promptly taking up arms, I shall

praise you more if you do not use them unless compelled to do so as a last resort. I should advise you to send

envoys at once to Andranodorus and warn him to submit to the authority of the senate and people, to open the

gates of the Island, and surrender the fort. If he chooses to usurp the sovereignty of which he has been

appointed guardian, then I tell you you must show much more determination in recovering your liberties from

him than you did from Hieronymus."

Envoys were accordingly sent. A meeting of the senate was then held. During the reign of Hiero this body

had continued to act as the great council of the nation, but after his death it had never up to that day been

summoned or consulted about any matter whatever. Andranodorus, on the arrival of the envoys, was much

impressed by the unanimity of the people and also by the seizure of various points in the city, especially in

the Island, the most strongly fortified position in which had been betrayed to his opponents. But his wife,

Demarata, a daughter of Hiero, with all the spirit of a princess and the ambition of a woman, called him aside

from the envoys and reminded him of an oftquoted saying of Dionysius the tyrant that one ought to

relinquish sovereign power when dragged by the heels not when mounted on a horse. It was easy for any one

who wished to resign in a moment a great position, but to create and secure it was a difficult and arduous

task. She advised him to ask the envoys for time for consultation, and to employ that time in summoning the

troops from Leontini; if he promised to give them the royal treasure, he would have everything in his own

power. These feminine suggestions Andranodorus did not wholly reject, nor did he at once adopt them. He

thought the safest way of gaining power was to yield for the time being, so he told the envoys to take back

word that he should submit to the authority of the senate and people. The next day as soon as it was light he

opened the gates of the Island and entered the forum in the Achradina. He went up to the altar of Concord,

from which the day before Polyaenus had addressed the people; and began his speech by apologising for his

delay. "I have," he went on, "it is true, closed the gates, but not because I regard my interests as separate from

those of the State, but because I felt misgivings, when once the sword was drawn, as to how far the thirst for

blood might carry you, whether you would be content with the death of the tyrant, which amply secures your

liberty, or whether every one who had been connected with the palace by relationship or by official position

was to be put to death as being involved in another's guilt. As soon as I saw that those who freed their country

meant to keep it free and that all were consulting the public good, I had no hesitation in giving back to my

country my person and all that had been entrusted to my protection now that he who committed them to me

has perished through his own madness." Then turning to the king's assassins and addressing Theodotus and

Sosis by name, he said, "You have wrought a deed that will be remembered but, believe me, your reputation

has yet to be made, and unless you strive for peace and concord there is a most serious danger ahead; the

State will perish in its freedom."

With these words he laid the keys of the gates and of the royal treasury at their feet. The assembly was then

dismissed for the day and the joyful citizens accompanied by their wives and children offered thanksgivings

at all the temples. The next day the election was held for the appointment of praetors. Amongst the first to be

elected was Andranodorus, the rest were mostly men who had taken part in the tyrant's death; two were

elected in their absence, Sopater and Dinomenes. These two, on hearing what had happened at Syracuse,

brought that part of the royal treasure which was at Leontini and delivered it into the charge of specially

appointed quaestors, that portion which was in the Island was also handed over to them in Achradina. That

part of the wall which shut off the Island from the city by a needlessly strong barrier was with the unanimous

approval of the citizens thrown down, and all the other measures taken were in harmony with the general

desire for liberty. As soon as Hippocrates and Epicydes heard of the tyrant's death, which Hippocrates had

tried to conceal by putting the messenger to death, finding themselves deserted by their soldiers they returned

to Syracuse, as this seemed the safest course under the circumstances. To avoid attracting observation or

being suspected of plotting a counterrevolution, they approached the praetors, and through them were


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admitted to an audience of the senate. They declared publicly that they had been sent by Hannibal to

Hieronymus as to a friend and ally; they had obeyed the commands of the men whom their general Hannibal

had wished them to obey, and now they were anxious to return to Hannibal. The journey, however, was not a

safe one, for the Romans were to be found in every part of Sicily; they requested therefore that they might

have an escort to conduct them to Socri in Italy, in this way the Syracusans would confer a great obligation

on Hannibal with very little trouble to themselves. The request was very readily granted, for they were

anxious to see the last of the king's generals who were not only able commanders but also needy and daring

adventurers. But Hippocrates and Epicydes did not execute their purpose with the promptness which seemed

necessary. These young men, thorough soldiers themselves and living in familiar intercourse with soldiers,

went about amongst the troops, amongst the deserters, consisting to a large extent of Roman seamen, and

even amongst the dregs of the populace, spreading libellous charges against the senate and the aristocracy,

whom they accused of secretly plotting and contriving to bring Syracuse under the suzerainty of Rome under

the presence of renewing the alliance. Then, they hinted, the small faction which had been the prime agents in

renewing the treaty would be the masters of the city.

These slanders were listened to and believed in by the crowds which flocked to Syracuse in greater numbers

every day, and not only Epicydes but even Andranodorus began to entertain hopes of a successful revolution.

The latter was constantly being warned by his wife that now was the time to seize the reins of power whilst a

new and unorganised liberty had thrown everything into confusion, while a soldiery, battening on the royal

donative, was ready to his hand, and while Hannibal's emissaries, generals who could handle troops, were

able to aid his enterprise. Wearied out at last by her importunity he communicated his design to Themistus,

the husband of Gelo's daughter, and a few days later he incautiously disclosed it to a certain Aristo, a tragic

actor to whom he had been in the habit of confiding other secrets. Aristo was a man of respectable family and

position, nor did his profession in any way disgrace him, for among the Greeks nothing of that kind is a thing

to be ashamed of. This being his character, he thought that his country had the first and strongest claim on his

loyalty, and he laid an information before the praetors. As soon as they ascertained by decisive evidence that

it was no merely trumped up affair they consulted the elder senators and on their authority placed a guard at

the door and slew Themistus and Andranodorus as they entered the Senatehouse. A disturbance was raised

at what appeared an atrocious crime by those who were ignorant of the reason, and the praetors, having at last

obtained silence, introduced the informer into the senate. The man gave all the details of the story in regular

order. The conspiracy was first started at the time of the marriage of Gelo's daughter Harmonia to Themistus;

some of the African and Spanish auxiliary troops had been told off to murder the praetor and the rest of the

principal citizens and had been promised their property by way of reward; further, a band of mercenaries, in

the pay of Andranodorus, were in readiness to seize the Island a second time. Then he put before their eyes

the several parts which each were to play and the whole organisation of the conspiracy with the men and the

arms that were to be employed. The senate were quite convinced that the death of these men was as justly

deserved as that of Hieronymus, but clamours arose from the crowd in front of the Senatehouse, who were

divided in their sympathies and doubtful as to what was going on. As they pressed forward with threatening

shouts into the vestibule, the sight of the conspirators' bodies so appalled them that they became silent and

followed the rest of the population who were proceeding calmly to hold an assembly. Sopater was

commissioned by the senate and by his colleagues to explain the position of affairs.

He began by reviewing the past life of the dead conspirators, as though he were putting them on their trial,

and showed how all the scandalous and impious crimes that had been committed since Hiero's death were the

work of Andranodorus and Themistus. "For what," he asked, "could a boy like Hieronymus, who was hardly

in his teens, have done on his own initiative? His guardians and masters reigned unmolested because the

odium fell on another; they ought to have perished before Hieronymus or at all events when he did. Yet these,

men, deservedly marked out for death, committed fresh crimes after the tyrant's decease; at first openly, when

Andranodorus closed the gates of the Island and, by declaring himself heir to the crown, seized, as though he

were the rightful owner, what he had held simply as trustee. Then, when he was abandoned by all in the

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attain the sovereignty which he had failed to secure by open violence. He could not be turned from his

purpose even by the favour shown him and the honour conferred, when he who was plotting against liberty

was elected praetor with those who had won their country's freedom. But it was really the wives who were

responsible and who, being of royal blood, had filled their husbands with a passion for royalty, for one of the

men had married Hiero's daughter, the other a daughter of Gelo." At these words shouts rose from the whole

assembly declaring that neither of these women ought to live, and that no single member of the royal family

ought to survive. Such is the character of the mob; either they are cringing slaves or ruthless tyrants. As for

the liberty which lies between these extremes, they are incapable of losing it without losing their selfrespect,

or possessing it without falling into licentious excesses. Nor are there, as a rule, wanting men, willing tools,

to pander to their passions and excite their bitter and vindictive feelings to bloodshed and murder. It was just

in this spirit that the praetors at once brought forward a motion which was adopted almost before it was

proposed, that all the blood royal should be exterminated. Emissaries from the praetors put to death Demarata

and Harmonia, the daughters of Hiero and Gelo and the wives of Andranodorus and Themistus.

There was another daughter of Hiero's, Heraclia, the wife of Zoippus, a man whom Hieronymus had sent on

an embassy to Ptolemy, and who had chosen to remain in voluntary exile. As soon as she learned that the

executioners were coming to her she fled for sanctuary into the private chapel where the household gods

were, accompanied by her unmarried daughters with their hair dishevelled and everything in their appearance

which could appeal to pity. This silent appeal she strengthened by remonstrances and prayers. She implored

the executioners by the memory of her father Hiero and her brother Gelo not to allow an innocent woman like

her to fall a victim to the hatred felt for Hieronymus. "All that I have gained by his reign is my husband's

exile; in his lifetime my sisters' fortunes were very different from mine and now that he has been killed our

interests are not the same. Why! had Andranodorus' designs succeeded, her sister would have shared her

husband's throne and the rest would have been her slaves. Is there one of you who doubts that if any one were

to announce to Zoippus the assassination of Hieronymus and the recovery of liberty for Syracuse, he would

not at once take ship and return to his native land? How are all human hopes falsified! Now his country is

free and his wife and children are battling for their lives, and in what are they opposing freedom and law?

What danger is there for any man in a lonely, all but widowed woman and daughters who are living in

orphanhood? Ah, but even if there is no danger to be feared from us, we are of the hated royal birth. Then

banish us far from Syracuse and Sicily, order us to be transported to Alexandria, send the wife to her

husband, the daughters to their father."

She saw that ears and hearts were deaf to her appeals and that some were getting their swords ready without

further loss of time. Then, no longer praying for herself, she implored them, to spare her daughters; their

tender age even an exasperated enemy would respect. "Do not," she cried, "in wreaking vengeance on tyrants,

imitate the crimes which have made them so hated." In the midst of her cries they dragged her out of the

chapel and killed her. Then they attacked the daughters who were bespattered with their mother's blood.

Distracted by grief and terror they dashed like mad things out of the chapel, and, could they have escaped into

the street, they would have created a tumult all through the city. Even as it was, in the confined space of the

house they for some time eluded all those armed men without being hurt, and freed themselves from those

who got hold of them, though they had to struggle out of so many strong hands. At last, exhausted by

wounds, while the whole place was covered by their blood, they fell lifeless to the ground. Their fate, pitiable

in any case, was made still more so by an evil chance, for very soon after all was over a messenger came to

forbid their being killed. The popular sentiment had changed to the side of mercy, and mercy soon passed

into selfaccusing anger for they had been so hasty to punish that they had left no time for repentance or for

their passions to cool down. Angry remonstrances were heard everywhere against the praetors, and the people

insisted upon an election to fill the places of Andranodorus and Themistus, a proceeding by no means to the

liking of the other praetors.

When the day fixed for the election arrived, to the surprise of all, a man from the back of the crowd proposed

Epicydes, then another nominated Hippocrates. The voices of their supporters become more and more


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numerous and evidently carried with them the assent of the people. As a matter of fact the gathering was a

very mixed one; there were not only citizens, but a crowd of soldiers present, and a large proportion of

deserters, ripe for a complete revolution, were mingled with them. The praetors pretended at first not to hear

and tried hard to delay the proceedings; at last, powerless before a unanimous assembly, and dreading a

seditious outbreak, they declared them to be duly elected praetors. They did not reveal their designs

immediately they were appointed, though they were extremely annoyed at envoys having gone to Appius

Claudius to arrange a ten days' truce, and at others having been sent, after it was arranged, to discuss the

renewal of the ancient treaty. The Romans had at the time a fleet of a hundred vessels at Murgantia awaiting

the issue of the disturbances which the massacre of the royal family had created in Syracuse and the effect

upon the people of their new and untried freedom. During that time the Syracusan envoys had been sent by

Appius to Marcellus on his arrival in Sicily, and Marcellus, after hearing the proposed terms of peace,

thought that the matter could be arranged and accordingly sent envoys to Syracuse to discuss publicly with

the praetors the question of renewing the treaty. But now there was nothing like the same state of quiet and

tranquillity in the city. As soon as news came that a Carthaginian fleet was off Pachynum, Hippocrates and

Epicydes, throwing off all fear, went about amongst the mercenaries and then amongst the deserters declaring

that Syracuse was being betrayed to the Romans. When Appius brought his ships to anchor at the mouth of

the harbour in the hope of increasing the confidence of those who belonged to the other party, these

groundless insinuations received to all appearance strong confirmation, and at the first sight of the fleet the

people ran down to the harbour in a state of great excitement to prevent them from making any attempt to

land.

As affairs were in such a disturbed condition it was decided to hold an assembly. Here the most divergent

views were expressed and things seemed to be approaching an outbreak of civil war when one of their

foremost citizens, Apollonides, rose and made what was under the circumstances a wise and patriotic speech.

"No city," he said, "has ever had a brighter prospect of permanent security or a stronger chance of being

utterly ruined than we have at the present moment. If we are all agreed in our policy, whether it take the side

of Rome or the side of Carthage, no state will be in a more prosperous and happy condition; if we all pull

different ways, the war between the Carthaginians and the Romans will not be a more bitter one than between

the Syracusans themselves, shut up as they are within the same walls, each side with its own army, its own

munitions of war, its own general. We must then do our very utmost to secure unanimity. Which alliance will

be the more advantageous to us is a much less important question, and much less depends upon it, but still I

think that we ought to be guided by the authority of Hiero in choosing our allies rather than by that of

Hieronymus; in any case we ought to prefer a tried friendship of fifty years' standing to one of which we now

know nothing and once found untrustworthy. There is also another serious considerationwe can decline to

come to terms with the Carthaginians without having to fear immediate hostilities with them, but with the

Romans it is a question of either peace or an immediate declaration of war." The absence of personal

ambition and party spirit from this speech gave it all the greater weight, and a council of war was at once

summoned, in which the praetors and a select number of senators were joined by the officers and

commanders of the auxiliaries. There were frequent heated discussions, but finally, as there appeared to be no

possible means of carrying on a war with Rome, it was decided to conclude a peace and to send an embassy

along with the envoys who had come from Marcellus to obtain its ratification.

Not many days elapsed before a deputation came from Leontini begging for a force to protect their territory.

This request seemed to afford a most favourable opportunity for relieving the city of a number of

insubordinate and disorderly characters and getting rid of their leaders. Hippocrates received orders to march

the deserters to Leontini, with these and a large body of mercenaries he made up a force of 4000 men. The

expedition was welcomed both by those who were despatched and those who were despatching them: the

former saw the opportunity, long hoped for, of effecting a revolution; the latter were thankful that the dregs

of the city were being cleared out. It was, however, only a temporary alleviation of the disease, which

afterwards became all the more aggravated. For Hippocrates began to devastate the country adjacent to the

Roman province; at first making stealthy raids, then, when Appius had sent a detachment to protect the fields


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of the allies of Rome, he made an attack with his entire force upon one of the outposts and inflicted heavy

loss. When Marcellus was informed of this he promptly sent envoys to Syracuse to say that the peace they

had guaranteed was broken, and that an occasion of war would never be wanting until Hippocrates and

Epicydes had been banished far away, not only from Syracuse, but from Sicily. Epicydes feared that if he

remained he should be held responsible for the misdeeds of his absent brother, and also should be unable to

do his share in stirring up war, so he left for Leontini, and finding the people there sufficiently exasperated

against Rome, he tried to detach them from Syracuse as well. "The Syracusans," he said, "have concluded a

peace with Rome on condition that all the communities which were under their kings should remain under

their rule; they are no longer content to be free themselves unless they can rule and tyrannise over others.

You must make them understand that the Leontines also think it right that they should be free, and that for

two reasons; it was on Leontine soil that the tyrant fell, and it was at Leontini that the cry of liberty was first

raised, and from Leontini the people flocked to Syracuse, after deserting the royal leaders. Either that

provision of the treaty must be struck out, or if it is insisted upon, the treaty must not be accepted." They had

no difficulty in persuading the people, and when the Syracusan envoys made their protest against the

massacre of the Roman outpost and demanded that Hippocrates and Epicydes should go to Locri or any other

place which they preferred so long as they left Sicily, they received the defiant reply that the Leontines had

given no mandate to the Syracusans to conclude a treaty with Rome, nor were they bound by any compacts

which other people made. The Syracusans reported this to the Romans, and said that the Leontines were not

under their control, "in which case," they added, "the Romans may carry on war with them without any

infringement of their treaty with us, nor shall we stand aloof in such a war, if it is clearly understood that

when they have been subjugated they will again form part of our dominions in accordance with the terms of

the treaty."

Marcellus advanced with his whole force against Leontini and summoned Appius to attack it on the opposite

side. The men were so furious at the butchery of the outpost while negotiations were actually going on that

they carried the place at the first assault. When Hippocrates and Epicydes saw that the enemy were getting

possession of the walls and bursting in the gates, they retreated with a small following to the citadel, and

during the night made their escape secretly to Herbesus. The Syracusans had already started with an army of

8000 men, and were met at the river Myla with the news that the city was captured. The rest of the message

was mostly false: their informant told them that there had been an indiscriminate massacre of soldiers and

civilians, and he thought that not a single adult was left alive; the city had been looted and the property of the

wealthy citizens given to the troops. On receiving this shocking intelligence the army halted; there was great

excitement in all ranks, and the generals, Sosis and Dinomenes, consulted as to what was to be done. What

lent a certain plausibility to the story and afforded apparent grounds for alarm was the scourging and

beheading of as many as two thousand deserters, but otherwise not one of the Leontines or the regular troops

had been injured after the city was taken and every man's property was restored to him beyond what had been

destroyed in the first confusion of the assault. The men could not be induced to continue their march to

Leontini, though they loudly protested that their comrades had been given up to massacre, nor would they

consent to remain where they were and wait for more definite intelligence. The praetors saw that they were

inclined to mutiny, but they did not believe that the excitement would last long if those who were leading

them in their folly were put out of the way. They conducted the army to Megara and rode on with a small

body of cavalry to Herbesus, hoping in the general panic to secure the betrayal of the place. As this attempt

failed, they resolved to resort to force, and the following day marched from Megara with the intention of

attacking Herbesus with their full strength. Now that all hope was cut off, Hippocrates and Epicydes thought

that their only course, and that not at first sight a very safe one, was to give themselves up to the soldiers,

who knew them well, and were highly incensed at the story of the massacre. So they went to meet the army.

It so happened that the front ranks consisted of a body of 600 Cretans who had served under these very men

in Hieronymus's army and had had experience of Hannibal's kindness, having been taken prisoners with other

auxiliary troops at Trasumennus and afterwards released. When Hippocrates and Epicydes recognised them

by their standards and the fashion of their arms they held out olive branches and other suppliant emblems and

begged them to receive and protect them and not give them up to the Syracusans, who would surrender them


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to the Romans to be butchered.

"Be of good heart," came back the answering shout, "we will share all your fortunes." During this colloquy

the standards had halted and the whole army was stopped, but the generals had not yet learnt the cause of the

delay. As soon as the rumour spread that Hippocrates and Epicydes were there, and cries of joy from the

whole army showed unmistakably how glad they were that they had come, the praetors rode up to the front

and sternly demanded: "What is the meaning of this conduct? What audacity is this on the part of the Cretans,

that they should dare to hold interviews with an enemy and admit him against orders into their ranks? "They

ordered Hippocrates to be arrested and thrown into chains. At this order such angry protests were made by the

Cretans, and then by others, that the praetors saw that if they went any further their lives would be in danger.

Perplexed and anxious they issued orders to return to Megara, and sent messengers to Syracuse to report as to

the situation they were in. Upon men who were ready to suspect everybody Hippocrates practiced a fresh

deceit. He sent some of the Cretans to lurk near the roads, and read a despatch which he had put together

himself, giving out that it had been intercepted. It bore the address, "The praetors of Syracuse to the consul

Marcellus," and after the usual salutation went on to say, "You have acted rightly and properly in not sparing

a single Leontine, but all the mercenaries are making common cause and Syracuse will never be at peace as

long as there are any foreign auxiliaries either in the city or in our army. Do your best, therefore, to get into

your power those who are with our praetors in camp at Megara and by their punishment secure liberty at last

for Syracuse." After the reading of this letter there was a general rush to arms and such angry shouts were

raised that the praetors, appalled by the tumult, rode off to Syracuse. Not even their flight quieted the

disturbance, and the Syracusan soldiers were being attacked by the mercenaries, nor would a single man have

escaped their violence had not Epicydes and Hippocrates withstood their rage, not from any feeling of pity or

humanity, but the fear of cutting off all hopes of their return. Besides, by thus protecting the soldiers they

would have them as faithful adherents as well as hostages, and they would at the same time win over their

friends and relations in the first place by doing so great a service and afterwards by keeping them as

guarantees of loyalty. Having learnt by experience how easy it is to excite the senseless mob, they got hold of

one of the men who had been in Leontini when it was captured, and bribed him to carry intelligence to

Syracuse similar to what they had been told at Myla, and to rouse the passions of the populace by personally

vouching for the truth of his story and silencing all doubts by declaring that he had been an eyewitness of

what he narrated.

This man not only obtained credence with the mob, but after being introduced into the senate actually

produced an impression on that body. Some of those present who were by no means lacking in sense openly

averred that it was a very good thing that the Romans had displayed their rapacity and cruelty at Leontini for,

had they entered Syracuse, they would have behaved in the same way or even worse, since there was more to

feed their rapacity. It was the unanimous opinion that the gates should be shut and the city put in a state of

defence, but they were not unanimous in their fears and hates. To the whole of the soldiery and to a large

proportion of the population the Romans were the objects of detestation; the praetor and a few of the

aristocracy were anxious to guard against a nearer and more pressing danger, though they too were excited by

the false intelligence. For as a matter of fact, Hippocrates and Epicydes were already at the Hexapylon, and

conversations were going on amongst the relations of the Syracusan soldiers about opening the gates and

letting their common country be defended from any attack by the Romans. One of the gates of the Hexapylon

had already been thrown open and the troops were beginning to be admitted when the praetors appeared on

the scene. At first they used commands and threats, then they brought their personal authority to bear, and at

last, finding all their efforts useless, they resorted to entreaties, regardless of their dignity, and implored the

citizens not to betray their country to men who had once danced attendance on a tyrant and were now

corrupting the army. But the ears of the maddened people were deaf to their appeals and the gates were

battered as much from within as from without. After they had all been burst open the army was admitted

through the whole length of the Hexapylon. The praetors and the younger citizens took refuge in the

Achradina. The enemies' numbers were swelled by the mercenaries, the deserters, and all the late king's

guards who had been left in Syracuse, with the result that the Achradina was captured at the first attempt, and


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all the praetors who had failed to make their escape in the confusion were put to death. Night put an end to

the massacre. The following day the slaves were called up to receive the cap of freedom and all who were in

gaol were released. This motley crowd elected Hippocrates and Epicydes praetors, and Syracuse, after its

shortlived gleam of liberty, fell back into its old bondage.

When the Romans received information of what was going on they at once broke their camp at Leontini and

marched to Syracuse. Some envoys had been sent by Appius to pass through the harbour on board a

quinquereme, and a quadrireme which had sailed in advance of them was captured, the envoys themselves

making their escape with great difficulty. It soon became apparent that not only the laws of peace but even

the laws of war were no longer respected. The Roman army had encamped at the Olympiuma temple of

Jupiterabout a mile and a half from the city. It was decided to send envoys again from there; and

Hippocrates and Epicydes met them with their attendants outside the gate, to prevent them from entering the

city. The spokesman of the Romans said they were not bringing war to the Syracusans but help and succour,

both for those who had been cowed by terror and for those who were enduring a servitude worse than exile,

worse even than death itself. "The Romans," he said, "will not allow the infamous massacre of their allies to

go unavenged. If, therefore, those who have taken refuge with us are at liberty to return home unmolested, if

the ringleaders of the massacre are given up and if Syracuse is allowed once more to enjoy her liberty and her

laws, there is no need of arms; but if these things are not done we shall visit with all the horrors of war those,

whoever they are, who stand in the way of our demands being fulfilled." To this Epicydes replied: "If we had

been the persons to whom your demands are addressed we should have replied to them; when the government

of Syracuse is in the hands of those to whom you were sent, then you can return again. If you provoke us to

war you will learn by experience that to attack Syracuse is not quite the same thing as attacking Leontini."

With these words he left the envoys and closed the gates. Then a simultaneous attack by sea and land was

commenced on Syracuse. The land attack was directed against the Hexapylon; that by sea against Achradina,

the walls of which are washed by the waves. As they had carried Leontini at the first assault owing to the

panic they created, so the Romans felt confident that they would find some point where they could penetrate

into the wide and scattered city, and they brought up the whole of their siege artillery against the walls.

An assault begun so vigorously would have undoubtedly succeeded had it not been for one man living at the

time in Syracuse. That man was Archimedes. Unrivalled as he was as an observer of the heavens and the

stars, he was still more wonderful as the inventor and creator of military works and engines by which with

very little trouble he was able to baffle the most laborious efforts of the enemy. The city wall ran over hills of

varying altitude, for the most part lofty and difficult of access, but in some places low and admitting of

approach from the level of the valleys. This wall he furnished with artillery of every kind, according to the

requirements of the different positions. Marcellus with sixty quinqueremes attacked the wall of Achradina,

which as above stated is washed by the sea. In the other ships were archers, slingers, and even light infantry,

whose missile is an awkward one to return for those who are not expert at it, so they hardly allowed any one

to remain on the walls without being wounded. As they needed space to hurl their missiles, they kept their

ships some distance from the walls. The other quinqueremes were fastened together in pairs, the oars on the

inside being shipped so as to allow of the sides being brought together; they were propelled like one ship by

the outside set of oars, and when thus fastened together they carried towers built up in stories and other

machinery for battering the wall.

To meet this naval attack Archimedes placed on the ramparts engines of various sizes. The ships at a distance

he bombarded with immense stones, the nearer ones he raked with lighter and therefore more numerous

missiles; lastly he pierced the entire height of the walls with loopholes about eighteen inches wide so that his

men might discharge their missiles without exposing themselves. Through these openings they aimed arrows

and small socalled "scorpions" at the enemy. Some of the ships which came in still more closely in order to

be beneath the range of the artillery were attacked in the following way. A huge beam swinging on a pivot

projected from the wall and a strong chain hanging from the end had an iron grappling hook fastened to it.

This was lowered on to the prow of a ship and a heavy lead weight brought the other end of the beam to the


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ground, raising the prow into the air and making the vessel rest on its stern. Then the weight being removed,

the prow was suddenly dashed on to the water as though it had fallen from the wall, to the great consternation

of the sailors; the shock was so great that if it fell straight it shipped a considerable amount of water. In this

way the naval assault was foiled, and all the hopes of the besiegers now rested upon an attack from the side of

the land, delivered with their entire strength. But here too Hiero had for many years devoted money and pains

to fitting up military engines of every kind, guided and directed by the unapproachable skill of Archimedes.

The nature of the ground also helped the defence. The rock on which the foundations of the wall mostly

rested was for the greater part of its length so steep that not only when stones were hurled from the engines

but even when rolled down with their own weight they fell with terrible effect on the enemy. The same cause

made any approach to the foot of the walls difficult and the foothold precarious. A council of war was

accordingly held and it was decided, since all their attempts were frustrated, to desist from active operations

and confine themselves simply to a blockade, and cut off all supplies from the enemy both by land and sea.

Marcellus in the meanwhile proceeded with about onethird of his army to recover the cities which in the

general disturbance had seceded to the Carthaginans. Helorum and Herbesus at once made their submission,

Megara was taken by assault and sacked and then completely destroyed in order to strike terror into the rest,

especially Syracuse. Himilco, who had been for a considerable time cruising with his fleet off the promontory

of Pachynus, returned to Carthage as soon as he heard that Syracuse had been seized by Hippocrates.

Supported by the envoys from Hippocrates and by a despatch from Hannibal in which he said that the time

had arrived for winning back Sicily in the most glorious way, and by the weight of his own personal

presence, he had no difficulty in persuading the government to send to Sicily as large a force as they could of

both infantry and cavalry. Sailing back to the island he landed at Heraclea an army of 20,000 infantry, 3000

cavalry, and twelve elephants, a very much stronger force than he had with him at Pachynus. Immediately on

his arrival he took Heraclea and a few days later Agrigentum. Other cities which had taken the side of

Carthage were now so hopeful of expelling the Romans from Sicily that even the spirits of the blockaded

Syracusans began to rise. Their generals considered that a portion of their army would be adequate for the

defence of the city, and accordingly divided their force; Epicydes was to superintend the defence of the city,

whilst Hippocrates was to conduct the campaign against the Roman consul in conjunction with Himilco.

Hippocrates marched out of the city in the night through an unguarded part of the Roman lines and selected a

site for his camp near the city of Acrillae. Marcellus came upon them while they were entrenching

themselves. He had marched hastily to Agrigentum in the hope of reaching it before the enemy, but, finding it

already occupied, was returning to his position before Syracuse and expected least of all to find a Syracusan

force at that time and in that place. Knowing that he was no match with the troops he had for Himilco and his

Carthaginians, he had advanced with the utmost caution, keeping a sharp lookout and guarding against any

possible surprise.

Whilst thus on the alert he fell in with Hippocrates, and the preparations he had made to meet the

Carthaginians served him in good stead against the Syracusans. He caught them whilst forming their camp,

dispersed and in disorder, and for the most part unarmed. The whole of their infantry were cut off, the cavalry

offered but slight resistance and escaped with Hippocrates to Acrae. That battle checked the Sicilians in their

revolt from Rome and Marcellus returned to Syracuse. A few days later Himilco, who had been joined by

Hippocrates, fixed his camp by the river Anapus, about eight miles from Syracuse. A Carthaginian fleet of

fiftyfive vessels of war sailed about the same time into the great harbour of Syracuse from the high seas;

and a Roman fleet, also, of thirty quinqueremes, landed the first legion at Panormus. It looked as if the war

had been wholly diverted from Italy, so completely were both peoples devoting their attention to Sicily.

Himilco fully expected that the legion which had been landed at Panormus would fall into his hands on its

march to Syracuse, but he was disappointed as it did not take the route he expected. Whilst he marched

inland, the legion proceeded along the coast, accompanied by the fleet, and joined Appius Claudius who had

come to meet it with a portion of his force. Now the Carthaginians despaired of relieving Syracuse and left it

to its fate. Bomilcar did not feel sufficient confidence in his fleet as the Romans had one of double the

number, and he saw that by remaining there inactive he was only aggravating the scarcity which prevailed


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amongst his allies, so he put out to sea and sailed across to Africa. Himilco had followed upon Marcellus'

track to Syracuse, hoping for a chance of fighting before he was joined by superior forces; and as no

opportunity of doing so occurred and he saw that the enemy were in great strength and safe within their lines

round Syracuse he marched away, not caring to waste time by looking on in idleness at the investment of his

allies. He also wished to be free to march wherever any hope of defection from Rome summoned him that he

might by his presence encourage those whose sympathies were with Carthage. He began with the capture of

Murgantia, where the populace betrayed the Roman garrison, and where a large quantity of corn and

provisions of all kinds had been stored for the use of the Romans.

Other cities took courage from this example of defection, and the Roman garrisons were either expelled from

their strongholds or treacherously overpowered. Henna, situated on a lofty position precipitous on all sides

was naturally impregnable, and it had also a strong Roman garrison and a commandant who was not at all a

suitable man for traitors to approach. L. Pinarius was a keen soldier and trusted more to his own vigilance and

alertness than to the fidelity of the Sicilians. The numerous betrayals and defections which reached his ears

and the massacre of Roman garrisons made him more than ever careful to take every possible precaution. So

by day and night alike, everything was in readiness, every position occupied by guards and sentinels, and the

soldiers never laid aside their arms or left their posts. The chief citizens of Henna had already come to an

understanding: with Himilco about betraying the garrison, and when they observed all this vigilance and

recognised that the Romans were not open to any treacherous surprise, they saw that they would have to use

forcible measures. "The city and its stronghold," they said, "are under our authority; if as free men we

accepted the Roman alliance we did not hand ourselves over to be kept in custody as slaves. We think it right,

therefore, that the keys of the gates should be given up to us; the strongest bond between good allies is to

trust one another's loyalty; it is only if we remain friends with Rome voluntarily and not by constraint that

your people can feel grateful to us." To this the Roman commandant replied: "I have been placed in charge

here by my commanding officer, it is from him that I have received the keys of the gates and the custody of

the citadel; I do not hold these things at my own disposal or at the disposal of the citizens of Henna, but at the

disposal of the man who committed them to my charge. To quit one's post is with the Romans a capital

offence, and fathers have even punished it as such in the case of their own children. The consul Marcellus is

not far away, send to him, he has the right and authority to act in the matter." They said that they should not

send, and if argument failed they would seek some other method of vindicating their liberty. To this Pinarius

answered: "Well if you think it too much trouble to send to the consul, you can, at all events, give me an

opportunity of consulting the people, that it may be made clear whether this demand proceeds from a few or

from the whole body of the citizens." They agreed to convene a meeting of the assembly the following day.

After he had returned from the interview to the citadel, he called his men together and addressed them as

follows: "I think, soldiers, you have heard what has happened lately and how the Roman garrisons have been

surprised and overwhelmed by the Sicilians. That treachery you have escaped, in the first place by the good

providence of the gods and next by your own steady courage and by your persistent watchfulness and

remaining under arms night and day. I only hope the rest of our time may be spent without suffering or

inflicting things too horrible to speak about. The precautions we have so far taken have been against secret

treachery; as that has proved unsuccessful they are now openly demanding the keys of the gates; and no

sooner will they be delivered than Henna will be in the power of the Carthaginians, and we here shall be

butchered with greater cruelty than the garrison of Murgantia. I have succeeded with difficulty in getting one

night allowed for deliberation so that I could inform you of the impending peril. At daybreak they are going

to hold an assembly of the people at which they will fling charges against me and stir up the populace against

you. So tomorrow Henna will run with blood, either yours or that of its own citizens. If you are not

beforehand with them, there is no hope for you; if you are, there is no danger. Victory will fall to him who

first draws the sword. So all be on the alert and wait attentively for the signal. I shall be in the assembly and

will spin out the time by speaking and arguing till everything is perfectly ready, and when I give the signal

with my toga, raise a loud shout and make an attack on the crowd from all sides and cut everything down

with the sword, and take care that nothing survives from which either open violence or treachery is to be


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feared." Then he continued, "You, Mother Ceres and Proserpina, and all ye deities, celestial and infernal, who

have your dwelling in this city and these sacred lakes and grovesI pray and beseech you to be gracious and

merciful to us if we are indeed purposing to do this deed not that we may inflict but that we may escape

treachery and murder. I should say more to you, soldiers, if you were going to fight with an armed foe; it is

those who are unarmed and unsuspecting whom you will slay till you are weary of slaughter. The consul's

camp, too, is in the neighbourhood, so nothing need be feared from Himilco and the Carthaginians."

After this speech he dismissed them to seek refreshment and rest. The next morning some of them were

posted in various places to block the streets and close the exits from the theatre, the majority took their stand

round the theatre and on the ground above it; they had frequently watched the proceedings of the assembly

from there, and so their appearance aroused no suspicion. The Roman commandant was introduced to the

assembly by the magistrates. He said that it was the consul and not he who had the right and the power to

decide the matter, and went pretty much over the same ground as on the day before. At first one or two voices

were heard and then several, demanding the surrender of the keys, till the whole assembly broke out into loud

and threatening shouts, and seemed on the point of making a murderous attack upon him as he still hesitated

and delayed. Then, at last, he gave the agreed signal with his toga, and the soldiers, who had long been ready

and waiting, raised a shout and rushed down upon the crowd, while others blocked the exits from the densely

packed theatre. Hemmed in and caged, the men of Henna were ruthlessly cut down and lay about in heaps;

not only where the dead were piled up, but where in trying to escape they scrambled over each other's heads

and fell one upon another, the wounded stumbling over the unwounded, the living over the dead. Then the

soldiers dispersed in all directions and the city was filled with dead bodies and people fleeing for their lives,

for the soldiers slew the defenceless crowd with as much fury as though they were fighting against an equal

foe, and glowing with all the ardour of battle.

So Henna was saved for Rome by a deed which was criminal if it was not unavoidable. Marcellus not only

passed no censure on the transaction, but even bestowed the plundered property of the citizens upon his

troops, thinking that by the terror thus inspired the Sicilians would be deferred from any longer betraying

their garrisons. The news of this occurrence spread through Sicily almost in a day, for the city, lying in the

middle of the island, was no less famous for the natural strength of its position than it was for the sacred

associations which connected every part of it with the old story of the Rape of Proserpine. It was universally

felt that a foul and murderous outrage had been offered to the abode of gods as well as to the dwellings of

men, and many who had before been wavering now went over to the Carthaginians. Hippocrates and Himilco,

who had brought up their forces to Henna on the invitation of the wouldbe betrayers, finding themselves

unable to effect anything retired, the former to Murgantia, the latter to Agrigentum. Marcellus marched back

to Leontini, and after collecting supplies of corn and other provisions for the camp he left a small detachment

to hold the city and returned to the blockade of Syracuse. He gave Appius Claudius leave to go to Rome to

carry on his candidature for the consulship, and placed T. Quinctius Crispinus in his stead in command of the

fleet and the old camp, whilst he himself constructed and fortified winter quarters in a place called Leon

about five miles from Hexapylon. These were the main incidents in the Sicilian campaign up to the beginning

of the winter.

The war with Philip which had been for some time apprehended actually broke out this summer. The praetor,

M. Valerius, who had his base at Brundisium and was cruising off the Calabrian coast, received information

from Oricum that Philip had made an attempt on Apollonia by sending a fleet of 120 light vessels up the river

Aous, and then finding that matters were moving too slowly, he had brought up his army by night to Oricum,

and as the place lay in a plain and was not strong enough to defend itself either by its fortifications or its

garrison, it was taken at the first assault. His informants begged him to send help and to keep off one who

was unmistakably an enemy to Rome from injuring the cities on the coast which were in danger solely

because they lay opposite to Italy. M. Valerius complied with their request, and leaving a small garrison of

2000 men under P. Valerius, set sail with his fleet ready for action, and such soldiers as the warships had not

room for he placed on the cargo boats. On the second day he reached Oricum, and as the king on his


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departure had only left a weak force to hold it, it was taken with very little fighting. Whilst he was there

envoys came to him from Apollonia with the announcement that they were undergoing a siege because they

refused to break with Rome, and unless the Romans protected them, they should be unable to withstand the

Macedonian any longer. Valerius promised to do what they wanted and he sent a picked force of 2000 men

on warships to the mouth of the river under the command of Q. Naevius Crista, an active and experienced

soldier. He disembarked his men and sent the ships back to rejoin the fleet at Oricum, whilst he marched a

some distance from the river, where he would be least likely to meet any of the king's troops, and entered the

city by night, without being observed by any of the enemy. The following day they rested to give him an

opportunity of making a thorough inspection of the armed force of Apollonia and the strength of the city. He

was much encouraged by the result of his inspection and also by the account which his scouts gave of the

indolence and negligence which prevailed amongst the enemy. Marching out of the city in the dead of the

night, without the slightest noise or confusion, he got within the enemy's camp, which was so unguarded and

open that it is credibly stated that more than a thousand men were inside the lines before they were detected,

and if they had only refrained from using their swords they could actually have reached the king's tent. The

slaughter of those nearest the camp gates aroused the enemy, and such universal panic and terror ensued that

no one seized his weapons or made any attempt to drive out the invaders. Even the king himself, suddenly

wakened from sleep, fled halfdressed, in a state not decent for a common soldier, to say nothing of a king,

and escaped to his ships in the river. The rest fled wildly in the same direction. The losses in killed and

prisoners were under three thousand, the prisoners being much the most numerous. After the camp had been

plundered the Apollonians removed the catapults, the ballistae, and the other siege artillery, which had been

put in readiness for the assault, into the city for the defence of their own walls if such an emergency should

ever occur again; all the other booty was given to the Romans. As soon as the news of this action reached

Oricum, Valerius sent the fleet to the mouth of the river to prevent any attempt on the part of Philip to escape

by sea. The king did not feel sufficient confidence in risking a contest either by sea or land, and hauled his

ships ashore or burnt them and made his way to Macedonia by land, the greater part of his army having lost

their arms and all their belongings. M. Valerius wintered with his fleet at Oricum.

The fighting went on in Spain this year with varying success. Before the Romans crossed the Ebro Mago and

Hasdrubal defeated enormous forces of Spaniards. All Spain west of the Ebro would have abandoned the side

of Rome had not P. Cornelius Scipio hurriedly crossed the Ebro and by his timely appearance confirmed the

wavering allies. The Romans first fixed their camp at Castrum Album, a place made famous by the death of

the great Hamilcar, and had accumulated supplies of corn there. The country round, however, was infested by

the enemy, and his cavalry had attacked the Romans while on the march with impunity; they lost as many as

2000 men who had fallen behind or were straying from the line of march. They decided to withdraw to a less

hostile part and entrenched themselves at the Mount of Victory. Cn. Scipio joined them here with his entire

force, and Hasdrubal, the son of Gisgo, came up also with a complete army. There were now three

Carthaginian generals and they all encamped on the other side of the river opposite the Roman camp. Publius

Scipio went out with some light cavalry to reconnoitre, but in spite of all his precautions he did not remain

unobserved, and would have been overpowered in the open plain had he not seized some rising ground that

was near. Here he was surrounded and it was only his brother's timely arrival that rescued him. Castulo, a

powerful and famous city of Spain, and in such close alliance with Carthage that Hannibal took a wife from

there, seceded to Rome. The Carthaginians commenced an attack upon Illiturgis, owing to the presence of a

Roman garrison there, and it looked as if they would certainly reduce it by famine. Cn. Scipio went to the

assistance of the besieged with a legion in light marching order, and fighting his way between the two

Carthaginian camps, entered the town after inflicting heavy losses upon the besiegers. The following day he

made a sortie and was equally successful. Above 12,000 men were killed in the two battles and more than a

thousand were made prisoners; thirtysix standards were also captured. In this way the siege of Illiturgis was

raised. Their next move was to Bigerraalso in alliance with Romewhich they proceeded to attack, but on

Cn. Scipio's appearance they retired without striking a blow.


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The Carthaginian camp was next shifted to Munda, and the Romans instantly followed them. Here a pitched

battle was fought for four hours and the Romans were winning a splendid victory when the signal was given

to retire. Cn. Scipio was wounded in the thigh with a javelin and the soldiers round him were in great fear lest

the wound should prove fatal. There was not the smallest doubt that if that delay had not occurred the

Carthaginian camp could have been captured that same day, for the men and the elephants, too, had been

driven back to their lines, and thirtynine of the latter had been transfixed by the heavy Roman javelins. It is

stated that 12,000 men were killed in this battle and about 3000 made prisoners, whilst fiftyseven standards

were taken. From there the Carthaginians retreated to Auringis, the Romans following them up slowly and

allowing them no time to recover from their defeats. There another battle was fought, and Scipio was carried

into the field on a litter. The victory was decisive, though not half as many of the enemy were killed as on the

previous occasion, for there were fewer left to fight. But the Spaniards have a natural instinct for repairing the

losses in war, and when Mago was sent by his brother to raise troops, they very soon filled up the gaps in the

army and encouraged their generals to try another battle. Though they were mostly fresh soldiers, yet as they

had to defend a cause which had been repeatedly worsted in so short a time, they fought with the same spirit

and the same result as those before them had done. More than 8000 men were killed, not less than 1000 made

prisoners, and fiftyeight standards were captured. Most of the spoil had belonged to Gauls, there were a

large number of golden armlets and chains, and two distinguished Gaulish chieftains, Moeniacoepto and

Vismaro, fell in the battle. Eight elephants were captured and three killed. As things were going so

prosperously in Spain, the Romans at last began to feel ashamed of having left Saguntum, the primary cause

of the war, in the possession of the enemy for almost eight years. So after expelling the Carthaginian garrison

they recovered the town and restored it to all the former inhabitants whom the ravages of war had spared. The

Turdetani, who had brought about the war between Saguntum and Carthage, were reduced to subjection and

sold as slaves; their city was utterly destroyed.

Such was the course of events in Spain in the year when Q. Fabius and M. Claudius were consuls.

Immediately the new tribunes of the plebs entered office, M. Metellus, one of their number, indicted the

censors, P. Furius and M. Atilius, and demanded that they should be put on their trial before the people. His

reason for taking this course was that the year before they had deprived him of his horse, degraded him from

his tribe, and disfranchised him on the ground that he was involved in the plot which had been formed after

the battle of Cannae for abandoning Italy. The other nine tribunes, however, interposed their veto against

their being tried whilst holding office, and the matter fell through. The death of P. Furius prevented them

from completing the lustrum and M. Atilius resigned office. The consular elections were held under the

presidency of Q. Fabius Maximus, the consul. Both consuls were elected in their absenceQ. Fabius

Maximus, the son of the consul, and Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, for the second time. The praetors elected

were M. Atilius and three who were at the time curule aediles, namely, P. Sempronius Tuditanus, Cnaeus

Fulvius Centimalus, and M. Aemilius Lepidus. It is recorded that the scenic games were celebrated for the

first time this year by the curule aediles and that the celebration lasted four days. The aedile Tuditanus was

the officer who led his men through the midst of the enemy after the defeat at Cannae when all the others

were paralysed with terror. As soon as the elections were over, the consuls elect were, on the advice of Q.

Fabius, recalled to Rome to enter upon their duties. After they had returned they consulted the senate on the

conduct of the war, the allocation of provinces to themselves and the praetors, the armies to be raised, and the

men who were to command them.

The following was the distribution of the provinces and the armies. The operations against Hannibal were

entrusted to the two consuls, and Sempronius was to retain the army he had been commanding. Fabius was to

take over his father's army. Each consisted of two legions. M. Aemilius, the praetor, who had the jurisdiction

over aliens, was to have Luceria for his province and the two legions which Q. Fabius, the newly elected

consul, had been commanding as praetor; P. Sempronius Tuditanus received Ariminum as his province and

Cn. Fulvius, Suessula, each likewise with two legions, Fulvius being in command of the City legions and

Tuditanus taking over those from Manius Pomponius. The commands were extended in the following cases:

M. Claudius was to retain that part of Sicily which had constituted Hiero's kingdom, Lentulus as propraetor


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was to administer the old province; Titus Otacilius was to continue in command of the fleet, no fresh troops

being supplied him, and M. Valerius was to operate in Greece and Macedonia with the legion and ships

which he had; Q. Mucius was to continue in command of his old army of two legions in Sardinia, and C.

Terentius was to keep his one legion at Picenum. Orders were given for two legions to be raised in the City

and 20,000 men to be furnished by the allies.

These were the generals and the troops that were to be the bulwark of Rome against the many wars, some

actually going on, some anticipated, that were threatening the existence of her dominion. After raising the

City contingent, and recruiting fresh drafts for other legions, the two consuls before they left the City set

about the expiation of certain portents which had been announced. Part of the City wall and some of the gates

had been struck by lightning, as had also the temple of Jupiter at Aricia. Other things which people imagined

they had seen or heard were believed to be true; warships were supposed to have been seen in the river at

Tarracina, whilst there were none there; a clashing of arms was heard in the temple of Jupiter Vicilinus in the

neighbourhood of Compsa, and the river at Amiternum was said to have run with blood. When these portents

had been expiated in accordance with the directions of the pontiffs, the consuls left for the front; Sempronius

for Lucania, Fabius for Apulia. Old Fabius came into his son's camp at Suessula as his lieutenant. The son

went out to meet him with the twelve lictors preceding him in single file. The old man rode past eleven of

them, all of whom out of respect for him remained silent, whereupon the consul ordered the remaining lictor

who was immediately in front of him to do his duty. The man thereupon called to Fabius to dismount, and he

springing from his horse said to his son, "I wanted to find out, my son, whether you sufficiently realised that

you are consul."

One night, Dasius Altinius of Arpi paid a stealthy visit to this camp, accompanied by three slaves, and offered

for a fitting reward to betray Arpi. Fabius referred the matter to the council of war, and some thought he

ought to be treated as a deserter, scourged and beheaded. They said he was a trimmer, an enemy to both sides,

for, after the defeat of Cannae, as though loyalty depended on success, he had gone over to Hannibal and had

drawn Arpi over with him, and now that the cause of Rome was, in the teeth of all his hopes and wishes,

springing up, as it were, again from its roots, he was promising a fresh treason by way of indemnifying those

whom he betrayed before. He openly espoused one side while all his sympathies were with the other, faithless

as an ally, contemptible as an enemy; like the man who would have betrayed Falerii, or the man who offered

to poison Pyrrhus, let him be made a third warning to all renegades. The consul's father took a different view.

"Some men," he said, "oblivious of times and seasons, pass judgment upon everything as calmly and

impartially in the excitement of war as though they were at peace. The more important matter for us to

discuss and decide is how we can possibly prevent our allies from deserting us, but this is the last thing we

are thinking about; we are talking about the duty of making an example of any one who sees his error and

looks back with regret to the old alliance. But if a man is at liberty to forsake Rome, but not at liberty to

return to her, who can fail to see that in a short time the Roman empire, bereft of its allies, will find every part

of Italy bound by treaty to Carthage? Still I am not going to advise that any confidence be placed in Altinius;

I shall suggest a middle course in dealing with him. I should recommend that he be treated neither as an

enemy nor as a friend, but be interned in some city we can trust not far from our camp and kept there during

the war. When that is over, then we should discuss whether he deserves punishment for his former disloyalty

more than he merits pardon for his coming back to us now. Fabius' suggestions met with general approval,

and Altinius was handed over to some officials from Cales together with those who accompanied him. He

had brought with him a considerable amount of gold, and this was ordered to be taken care of for him. At

Cales he was free to move about in the daytime, but was always followed by a guard, who kept him in

confinement at night. At Arpi he was missed from home and a search was commenced, rumours soon ran

through the city and naturally caused intense excitement, seeing they had lost their leader. Fears were

entertained of a revolution, and messengers were at once despatched to Hannibal. The Carthaginian was not

at all concerned at what had happened; he had long suspected the man and doubted his loyalty, and he had

now a plausible reason for seizing and selling the property of a very rich man. But, in order to create a belief

that he was swayed more by anger than by avarice, he aggravated his rapacity by an act of atrocious cruelty.


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He sent for the wife and children, and after questioning them first about the circumstances under which

Altinius had disappeared, and then about the amount of gold and silver which he had left at home, and so

finding out all he wanted to know, he had them burnt alive.

Fabius broke up his camp at Suessula and decided to begin by an attack on Arpi. He encamped about half a

mile from it, and on examining from a near position the situation of the city and its fortifications, he saw one

part where it was most strongly fortified and, therefore, less carefully guarded, and at this point he

determined to deliver his assault. After seeing that everything required for the storm was in readiness, he

selected out of the whole army the pick of the centurions and placed them under the command of tribunes

who were distinguished for courage. He then furnished them with six hundred of the rank and file, a number

which he deemed quite sufficient for his purpose, and gave them orders to carry scaling ladders to that point

when they heard the bugles sound the fourth watch. There was a low narrow gate which led into an

unfrequented street running through a lonely part of the city. His orders were that they were first to scale the

wall with their ladders, and then open the gate or break the bolts and bars from the inside and when they were

in possession of that quarter of the city they were to give a signal on the bugle, so that the rest of the troops

might be brought up, and he would have everything in order and ready. His instructions were carried out to

the letter, and what seemed likely to prove a hindrance turned out to be of the greatest help in concealing their

movements. A rain storm which began at midnight drove all the sentries and outposts to seek shelter in the

houses, and the roar of the rain which at first came down like a deluge prevented the noise of those who were

at work on the gate from being heard. Then when the sound of the rain fell upon the ear more gently and

regularly, it soothed most of the defenders to sleep. As soon. as they were in possession of the gate, they

placed the buglers at equal distances along the street and ordered them to sound the signal to give notice to

the consul. This having been done as previously arranged, the consul ordered a general advance, and shortly

before daylight he entered the city through the broken down gate.

Now at last the enemy was roused; there was a lull in the storm and daylight was approaching. Hannibal's

garrison in the city amounted to about 5000 men, and the citizens themselves had raised a force of 3000.

These the Carthaginians put in front to meet the enemy, that there might be no attempt at treachery in their

rear. The fighting began in the dark in the narrow streets, the Romans having occupied not only the streets

near the gate but the houses also, that they might not be assailed from the roofs. Gradually as it grew light

some of the citizen troops and some of the Romans recognised one another, and entered into conversation.

The Roman soldiers asked what it was that the Arpinians wanted, what wrong had Rome done them, what

good service had Carthage rendered them that they, Italiansbred and born, should fight against their old

friends the Romans on behalf of foreigners and barbarians, and wish to make Italy a tributary province of

Africa. The people of Arpi urged in their excuse that they knew nothing of what was going on, they had in

fact been sold by their leaders to the Carthaginians, they had been victimised and enslaved by a small

oligarchy. When a beginning had been once made the conversations became more and more general; at last

the praetor of Arpi was conducted by his friends to the consul, and after they had given each other mutual

assurances, surrounded by the troops under their standards, the citizens suddenly turned against the

Carthaginians and fought for the Romans. A body of Spaniards also, numbering something less than a

thousand, transferred their services to the consul upon the sole condition that the Carthaginian garrison

should be allowed to depart uninjured. The gates were opened for them and they were dismissed, according to

the stipulation, in perfect safety, and went to Hannibal at Salapia. Thus Arpi was restored to the Romans

without the loss of a single life, except in the case of one man who had long ago been a traitor and had

recently deserted. The Spaniards were ordered to receive double rations, and the republic availed itself on

very many occasions of their courage and fidelity.

While one of the consuls was in Apulia and the other in Lucania some hundred and twelve Campanian nobles

left Capua by permission of the magistrates for the purpose, as they alleged, of carrying away plunder from

the enemy's territory. They really, however, rode off to the Roman camp above Suessula, and when they

came up to the outposts they told them that they wished for an interview with the commander, Cn. Fulvius.


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On being informed of their request he gave orders for ten of their number to be conducted to him, after they

had laid aside their arms. When he heard what they wanted, which was simply that, after the recapture of

Capua, their property might be restored to them, he received them all under his protection. The other praetor

took the town of Atrinum by storm. More than 7000 were taken prisoners and a considerable quantity of

bronze and silver coinage seized. At Rome there was a dreadful fire which lasted for two nights and a day.

All the buildings between the Salinae and the Porta Carmentalis, including the Aequimaelium, the Vicus

Jugarius, and the temples of Fortune and Mater Matuta were burnt to the ground. The fire travelled for a

considerable distance outside the gate and destroyed much property and many sacred objects.

The two Scipios, Publius and Cnaeus, after their successful operations in Spain, in the course of which they

won back many old allies and gained new ones, during the year began to hope for similar results in Africa.

Syphax, king of the Numidians, had suddenly taken up a hostile attitude towards Carthage. The Scipios sent

three centurions on a mission to him, with instructions to conclude a friendly alliance with him and to assure

him that if he would go on persistently harassing the Carthaginians he would confer an obligation on the

senate and people of Rome, and it would be their endeavour to repay the debt of gratitude at a fitting time end

with large interest. The barbarian was delighted at the mission and held frequent conversations with the

centurions upon the methods of warfare. As he listened to the seasoned soldiers he found out how many

things he was ignorant of, and how great the contrast was between his own practice and their discipline and

organisation. He asked that whilst two of them carried back the report of their mission to their commanders,

the third might remain with him as a military instructor. He explained that the Numidians made very poor

infantry soldiers, they were only useful as mounted troops; he explained that this was the style of warfare

which his ancestors had adopted from the very earliest times, it was the style to which he had been trained

from his boyhood. They had an enemy who depended mainly upon his infantry, and if he wished to meet him

with equal strength he must provide himself also with infantry. His kingdom contained an abundant

population fit for the purpose, but he did not know the proper method of arming and equipping and drilling

them. All was disorderly and haphazard, just like a crowd collected together by chance.

The envoys replied that for the time being they would do what he wished, on the distinct understanding that if

their commanders did not approve of the arrangement he would at once send back the one who remained.

This man's name was Statorius. The king sent some Numidians to accompany the two Romans to Spain and

obtain sanction for the arrangement from the commanders. He also charged them to take immediate steps to

persuade the Numidians who were acting as auxiliaries with the Carthaginian troops to come over to the

Romans. Out of the large number of young men which the country contained Statorius enrolled a force of

infantry for the king. These he formed into companies pretty much on the Roman model, and by drilling and

exercising them he taught them to follow their standards and keep their ranks. He also made them so familiar

with the work of entrenchment and other regular military tasks that the king placed quite as much confidence

in his infantry as in his cavalry, and in a pitched battle fought on a level plain he proved superior to the

Carthaginians. The presence of the king's envoys in Spain proved very serviceable to the Romans, for on the

news of their arrival numerous desertions took place amongst the Numidians. So between Syphax and the

Romans friendly relations were established. As soon as the Carthaginians heard what was going on, they sent

envoys to Gala, who reigned in the other part of Numidia over a tribe called Maesuli.

Gala had a son called Masinissa, seventeen years old, but a youth of such a strong character that even then it

was evident that he would make the kingdom greater and wealthier than he received it. The envoys pointed

out to Gala that since Syphax had joined the Romans in order to strengthen his hands, by their alliance,

against the kings and peoples of Africa, the best thing for him to do would be to unite with the Carthaginians

as soon as possible, before Syphax crossed into Spain or the Romans into Africa. Syphax, they said, could

easily be crushed, for he had got nothing out of the Roman alliance except the name. Gala's son asked to be

entrusted with the management of the war and easily persuaded his father to send an army, which in

conjunction with the Carthaginians conquered Syphax in a great battle, in which it is stated that 30,000 men

were killed. Syphax with a few of his horse fled from the field to the Maurusii, a tribe of Numidians who


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dwell at almost the furthest point of Africa near the ocean, opposite Gades. At the news of his arrival the

barbarians flocked to him from all sides and in a short time he armed an immense force. Whilst he was

preparing to cross over with them into Spain, which was only separated by a narrow strait, Masinissa arrived

with his victorious army, and won a great reputation by the way in which he concluded the war against

Syphax without any help from the Carthaginians. In Spain nothing of any importance took place except that

the Romans secured for themselves the services of the Celtiberians by offering them the same pay which the

Carthaginians had agreed to pay. They also sent to Italy three hundred of the leading Spanish nobility to win

over their countrymen who were serving with Hannibal. That is the solitary incident in Spain worth recording

for the year, and its interest lies in the fact that the Romans had never had a mercenary soldier in their camp

until they employed the Celtiberians.

Book 25. The Fall of Syracuse

While these operations in Spain and Africa were going on, Hannibal spent the whole summer in the

Sallentine territory in the hope of securing the city of Tarentum by treachery, and whilst he was there some

unimportant towns seceded to him. Out of the twelve communities in Bruttium who had gone over to the

Carthaginians the year before, two, namely Consentia and Thurii, returned to their old allegiance to Rome,

and more would have done so had it not been for T. Pomponius Veientanus, an officer of allies. He had made

several successful raids in Bruttium and had in consequence began to be regarded as a regularly

commissioned general. With the raw and undisciplined army which he had got together he engaged Hanno. In

that battle a great number of men, who were simply a confused crowd of peasants and slaves, were killed or

made prisoners; the least important loss was that of the officer himself, who was made prisoner. For not only

was he responsible for such a reckless and illadvised battle, but in his capacity as a public contractor he had

previously been guilty of all sorts of dishonest practices and robbed both the State and the City guilds. The

consul Sempronius fought several trifling actions in Lucania, none of which are worth recording, and took

some unimportant towns belonging to the Lucanians.

The longer the war continued, and the more men's minds as well as their fortunes were affected by the

alternations of success and failure, so much the more did the citizens become the victims of superstitions, and

those for the most part foreign ones. It seemed as though either the characters of men or the nature of the

gods had undergone a sudden change. The Roman ritual was growing into disuse not only in secret and in

private houses; even in public places, in the Forum and the Capitol, crowds of women were to be seen who

were offering neither sacrifices nor prayers in accordance with ancient usage. Unauthorised sacrificers and

diviners had got possession of men's minds and the numbers of their dupes were swelled by the crowds of

country people whom poverty or fear had driven into the City, and whose fields had lain untilled owing to the

length of the war or had been desolated by the enemy. These impostors found their profit in trading upon the

ignorance of others, and they practiced their calling with as much effrontery as if they had been duly

authorised by the State. Respectable citizens protested in private against the state of things, and ultimately the

matter became a public scandal and formal complaint was made to the senate. The aediles and commissioners

of police were severely reprimanded by the senate for not preventing these abuses, but when they attempted

to remove the crowds from the Forum and destroy the altars and other preparations for their rites they

narrowly escaped being roughly handled. As the mischief appeared to be too much for the inferior

magistrates to deal with, M. Aemilius, the City praetor, was entrusted with the task of delivering the people

from these superstitions. He read the resolution of the senate before the Assembly and gave notice that all

those who had in their possession any manuals of divination or forms of prayers or sacrificial ritual in writing

were to bring all their books and writings to him before the first of April, and no one was to use any strange

or foreign form of sacrifice in any public or consecrated place.

Several officials connected with the State religion died this year: L. Cornelius Lentulus the chief pontiff, C.

Papirius, son of C. Masso, one of the pontiffs, P. Furius Philus the augur, and C. Papirius, son of L. Maso,

one of the Keepers of the Sacred Books. M. Cornelius Cethegus was appointed chief pontiff in place of


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Lentulus, and Cn. Servilius Caepio in place of Papirius. L. Quintius Flamininus was appointed augur and L.

Cornelius Lentulus Keeper of the Sacred Books. The time for the consular elections was now drawing near,

and as it was decided not to recall the consuls who were engaged in the war, Tiberius Sempronius nominated

C. Claudius Cento Dictator for the purpose of conducting the elections. He appointed Q. Fulvius Flaccus as

his Master of the Horse. The elections were completed on the first day; the Dictator returned as duly elected

consuls Q. Fulvius Flaccus, Master of the Horse, and Appius Claudius Pulcher, who was at the time praetor

in Sicily. Then the praetors were elected; Cn. Fulvius Flaccus, C. Claudius Nero, M. Junius Silanus, and P.

Cornelius Sulla. When the elections were over the Dictator resigned. The curule aediles for the year were M.

Cornelius Cethegus and P. Cornelius Scipio, who was subsequently known as Africanus. When the latter

offered himself as a candidate, the tribunes of the plebs objected to him, and said that he could not be allowed

to stand because he had not yet reached the legal age. His reply was: "If the Quirites are unanimous in their

desire to appoint me aedile, I am quite old enough." On this the people hurried to give their tribal votes for

him with such eagerness that the tribunes abandoned their opposition. The new aediles discharged their

functions with great munificence; the Roman Games were celebrated on a grand scale considering their

resources at the time; they were repeated a second day and a congius of oil was distributed in each street. L.

Villius Tappulus and M. Fundanius Fundulus, the plebeian aediles, summoned several matrons before the

people on a charge of misconduct; some of them were convicted and sent into exile. The celebration of the

Plebeian Games lasted two days and there was a solemn banquet in the Capitol on the occasion of the Games.

Q. Fulvius Flaccus and Appius Claudius entered on their consulship, the former for the third time. The

praetors drew lots for their provinces; P. Cornelius Sulla had assigned to him both the home and foreign

jurisdiction, which had previously been held separately; Apulia fell to Cn. Fulvius Flaccus; Suessula to C.

Claudius Nero; Etruria to M. Junius Silanus. Two legions were decreed for each of the consuls in the

operations against Hannibal; one consul took over the army from Q. Fabius, the consul of the previous year,

the other that of Fulvius Centumalus. With regard to the praetors, Fulvius Flaccus was to have the legions

which were at Luceria under Aemilius, Claudius Nero those which were serving in Picenum under C.

Terentius, and they were each to raise their force to its full complement. The City legions raised the previous

year were assigned to M. Junius to meet any movement from Etruria. Ti. Sempronius Gracchus and P.

Sempronius Tuditanus had their commands extended in their respective provinces of Lucania and CisAlpine

Gaul, as also had P. Lentulus in the Roman province of Sicily and M. Marcellus in Syracuse and that part of

the island over which Hiero had reigned. The command of the fleet was left in the hands of T. Otacilius, the

operations in Greece in those of M. Valerius, the campaign in Sardinia was still to be under the conduct of Q.

Mucius Scaevola, whilst the two Scipios were to continue their work in Spain. In addition to the existing

armies two fresh legions were raised in the City by the consuls, thus bringing up the total number to

twentythree legions for the year.

The enrolment was interrupted by the conduct of M. Postumius Pyrgensis which might have endangered the

stability of the republic. This man was a public contractor and for many years had had only one man to match

him in dishonesty and greed, and that was T. Pomponius Veientanus, whom the Carthaginians under Hanno

got hold of while he was recklessly raiding Lucania. The State had made itself responsible where supplies

intended for the armies were lost through storms at sea, and these men invented stories of shipwrecks, and

when they did not invent, the shipwrecks which they reported were due to their dishonesty, not to accident.

They placed small and worthless cargoes on old shattered ships, which they sank when out at sea, the sailors

being taken into boats which were kept in readiness, and then they made a false declaration as to the cargo,

putting it at many times its real value. This fraud had been disclosed to M. Aemilius, the praetor, and he laid

the matter before the senate, but they had taken no action because they were anxious not to offend the body of

public contractors at such a time as that. The people, however, took a much severer view of the case, and at

length two tribunes of the plebs, Spurius Carvilius and L. Carvilius, seeing the public indignation and disgust

aroused, demanded that a fine of 200,000 ases should be imposed on them. When the day came for the

question to be decided, the plebs were present in such great numbers that the space on the Capitol hardly held

them, and after the case had been gone through, the only hope left to the defence was the chance of C.


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Servilius Casca, a tribune of the plebs and a near relative of Postumius, interposing his veto before the tribes

proceeded to vote. When the evidence had been given, the tribunes ordered the people to withdraw and the

voting urn was brought in, in order that it might be determined in what tribe the Latins were to vote. While

this was being done the contractors urged Casca to stop the proceedings for the day, and the people loudly

opposed that step. Casca happened to be sitting in front at the end of the tribunal seats, and he was labouring

under the conflicting emotions of fear and shame. Seeing that no dependence was to be placed upon him, the

contractors determined to create a disturbance and rushed in a compact body into the space left vacant by the

withdrawal of the Assembly, loudly abusing both the people and the tribunes. As there was every prospect of

a handtohand fight the consul Fulvius said to the tribunes: "Do you not see that your authority has gone,

and that there will certainly be a riot if you do not dismiss the meeting?"

After the Assembly of the plebs was dismissed a meeting of the senate was called, and the consuls brought

forward the question of "the disturbance of a meeting of the plebs through the violence and audacity of the

public contractors." "M. Furius Camillus," they said, "whose exile was followed by the downfall of Rome,

submitted to condemnation at the hands of the irate citizens; before his time the decemvirswhose laws are in

force todayand after him many of our foremost citizens have bowed to the sentence of the people. Whereas

Postumius Pyrgensis has deprived the people of their right to vote, broken up a meeting of the plebs,

destroyed the authority of the tribunes, levied war upon the people of Rome, made forcible seizure of a

position in the City to cut off the plebs from its tribunes, and prevented the tribes from being called to vote.

There was nothing to restrain men from fighting and bloodshed except the forbearance of the magistrates,

who for the time being yielded to the furious audacity of a few men and allowed themselves and the Roman

people to be successfully defied, and, rather than give any occasion for a conflict to those who were seeking

one, they voluntarily closed the elections which the accused was going to stop by armed force." This

indictment was listened to by all good citizens with feelings of indignation proportioned to the atrocity of the

outrage, and the senate passed a decree affirming that "that violent conduct was an offence against the

republic and set a most vicious precedent." Immediately on this the two Carvilii dropped the proposal for a

fine and indicted Postumius for high treason, and ordered him to find sureties for his appearance on the day

of trial, or failing that to be at once arrested and taken to prison. He found sureties, but did not appear. The

resolution proposed by the tribunes and adopted by the plebs was in the following terms: "If M. Postumius

does not enter an appearance before the first day of May and when cited into court does not answer his name

on that day, and has not been lawfully excused from so appearing, he shall be deemed to be an exile, his

goods shall be sold, and he himself placed under outlawry." Then all those who had taken the lead in the

riotous disturbance were one by one indicted on the same charge and ordered to find sureties. Those who did

not find them and afterwards even those who could find them were alike cast into prison. Most of them, to

escape the danger, went into exile.

Such was the issue of the dishonesty of the State contractors, and their daring attempt to screen themselves.

The next thing was the election of the chief pontiff. The new pontiff, M. Cornelius Cethegus, conducted the

election, which was very keenly contested. There were three candidates: Q. Fulvius Flaccus, the consul, who

had previously been twice consul as well as censor; T. Manlius Torquatus, who could also point to two

consulships and the censorship; and P. Licinius Crassus, who was about to stand for the curale aedileship.

This young man defeated his old and distinguished competitors; before him there had been no one for a

hundred and twenty years, with the sole exception of P. Cornelius Calussa, who had been elected chief

pontiff without having first sat in a curule chair. The consuls found the levying of troops a difficult task, for

there were not sufficient men of the required age to answer both purposes, that of raising the new City legions

and also bringing the existing armies up to their full strength. The senate, however, would not allow them to

give up the attempt, and ordered two commissions, each consisting of three members, to be appointed, one to

work within a radius of fifty miles from the City, the other outside that radius. They were to inspect all the

villages, market towns, and boroughs, and ascertain the total number of freeborn men in each, and were to

make soldiers of all who appeared strong enough to bear arms, even though they were below the military age.

The tribunes of the plebs might, if they thought good, make a proposal to the people that those who had taken


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the military oath when under seventeen years of age should have their pay reckoned to them on the same

scale as if they had been enlisted at seventeen, or older. The commissions so appointed recruited all the

freeborn men in the country districts. About this time a despatch was read in the senate from M. Marcellus

in Sicily, in which he put forward the request made to him by the soldiers who were serving with P. Lentulus.

These were the remains of the army of Cannae, they had been sent away to Sicily, as has been stated above,

and were not to be brought back to Italy before the Punic war had come to an end.

The principal officers of the cavalry, with the centurions of highest rank and the pick of the legionaries, had

been allowed by Lentulus to send a deputation to M. Marcellus in Italy. One was allowed to speak on behalf

of the rest, and this is what he said: "We should have approached you, Marcellus, when you were consul, in

Italy, as soon as that severe if not unjust resolution of the senate was passed concerning us, had we not hoped

that after being sent into a province thrown into confusion by the death of its kings, to take part in a serious

war against Sicilians and Carthaginians combined, we should have made reparation to the senate by our blood

and our wounds in the same way that those who were taken by Pyrrhus at Heraclea, within the memory of our

fathers, made reparation by fighting against Pyrrhus afterwards. And yet, what have we done, senators, that

you should be wrath with us then or that we should deserve your anger now? I seem to myself to be gazing on

the faces of both the consuls and of the whole senate when I look at you, Marcellus; if we had had you as our

consul at Cannae, both we and the republic would have met with better fortune.

"Allow me, I pray you, before I complain of our treatment, to clear ourselves of the guilt which is laid to our

charge. If it was not through the anger of the gods or through the ordering of that destiny by whose laws the

chain of human affairs is immutably linked together, but by the fault of man that we perished at Cannae,

whose fault, pray, was it? The fault of the soldiers or of their commanders? As a soldier I will never say a

word about my commander, though I know that he was specially thanked by the senate because he did not

despair of the republic, and has had his command extended every year since his flight from Cannae. Those of

the survivors from that disaster, who were our military tribunes at the time, solicited and obtained office, as

we have heard, and are in command of provinces. Do you lightly forgive yourselves and your children,

senators, whilst you reserve your anger for poor wretches like us? While it was no disgrace for the consul and

the foremost men in the State to flee when all hope was lost, did you send us, the common soldiers, to meet

certain death in the battle field? At the Alia almost the entire army fled, at the Caudine Forks they delivered

up their arms to the enemy without even attempting to fight, not to mention other shameful defeats that our

armies have suffered. But so far were those armies from having any humiliation inflicted upon them, that the

City of Rome was recovered by the very army which had fled from the Alia to Veii, and the Caudine legions

who had returned to Rome without their arms were sent back armed to Samniun, and made that same enemy

pass under the yoke who had enjoyed seeing them undergo that humiliation. Can any man charge the army at

Cannae with flight or cowardice when more than 50,000 men fell there, when the consul fled with only

seventy horsemen, when not one survives who fought there except those whom the enemy, wearied with

slaughter, left alone. When the ransom of the prisoners was vetoed we were universally praised because we

had saved ourselves for our country, because we returned to the consul at Venusia and presented the

appearance of a regular army. But as it is, we are in a worse case than those prisoners in our fathers' days; for

all that they had to endure was a change in their arms, in their military status, in their quarters in camp, and

these they recovered by the one service they rendered to the State in fighting a successful battle. Not one of

them was sent into exile, not one was deprived of the prospect of obtaining his discharge, and above all they

had the chance of putting an end either to their life or their disgrace by fighting the enemy. But we, against

whom no charge can be brought except that it is through our fault that a single Roman soldier is left alive

after the battle of Cannaewe, I say, have not only been sent far away from our native soil and from Italy, but

we have been placed out of reach of the enemy, we are to grow old in exile, with no hope, no chance, of

wiping out our shame, or of appeasing our fellowcitizens, or even of dying an honourable death. We are not

asking for an end to our ignominy or for the rewards of valour, we only ask to be allowed to prove our mettle

and to show our courage. We ask for labours and dangers, for a chance of doing our duty as men and as

soldiers. This is the second year of the war in Sicily with all its hardfought battles. The Carthaginians are


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capturing some cities, the Romans are taking others, infantry and cavalry meet in the shock of battle, at

Syracuse a great struggle is going on by land and sea, we hear the shouts of the combatants and the clash of

their arms, and we are sitting idly by, as though we had neither weapons nor hands to use them. The legions

of slaves have fought many pitched battles under Tiberius Sempronius; they have as their reward freedom

and citizenship, we implore you to treat us at least as slaves who have been purchased for this war, and to

allow us to meet and fight the enemy and so win our freedom. Are you willing to make proof of our courage

by sea or by land, in the open field or against city walls? We ask for whatever brings the hardest toil and the

greatest danger, if only what ought to have been done at Cannae may be done as soon as we can do it, now.

For all our life since has been but one long agony of shame."

When he had finished speaking they prostrated themselves at the knees of Marcellus. He told them that he

had not the authority or the power to grant their request, but said that he would write to the senate and would

be guided entirely by their decision. The despatch was delivered into the hands of the new consuls and read

by them to the senate. After discussing its contents, the senate decided that they saw no reason why the safety

of the republic should be entrusted to soldiers who had deserted their comrades at Cannae. If M. Claudius, the

propraetor, thought otherwise, he was to act as he thought best in the interests of the State, but only on this

condition, that none of them should get their discharge or receive any reward for valour or be conveyed back

to Italy as long as the enemy remained on Italian soil. After this an election was held by the City praetor, in

accordance with a decision of the senate and a resolution of the plebs, for the appointment of special

commissioners of works. Five commissioners were chosen to undertake the repair of the walls and towers of

the City, and two boards, each consisting of three members, were selected; one to inspect the contents of the

temples and to make an inventory of the offerings; the other to rebuild the temples of Fortune and Mater

Matuta inside the Porta Carmentalis and the temple of Spes outside, all of which had been destroyed by fire

the previous year. Frightful storms occurred: on the Alban Mount it rained stones incessantly for two days.

Many places were struck by lightning, two buildings in the Capitol, the rampart of the camp above Suessula

in many places, two sentinels being killed. The wall and some of the towers at Cumae were not only struck,

but even thrown down by the lightning. At Reate a huge rock was seen to fly about, and the sun was

unusually red, in fact the colour of blood. By reason of these portents a day was set apart for special

intercessions, and for several days the consuls devoted their attention to religious matters, and special

services were held for nine days. The betrayal of Tarentum had long been an object of hope with Hannibal

and of suspicion with the Romans, and now an incident which occurred outside its walls hastened its capture.

Phileas had been a long time in Rome, ostensibly as the Tarentine envoy. He was a restless character and

chafed under the inaction in which he seemed likely to spend the greater part of his life. The hostages from

Tarentum and Thurii were kept in the Hall of Liberty, but not under strict surveillance, because it was neither

for their own interest nor for that of their city to play the Romans false. Phileas found means of access to

them and had frequent interviews, in which he won them over to his design, and by bribing two of the

watchmen he brought them out of confinement as soon as it was dark, and they made their secret escape from

Rome. As soon as it was light their flight became known throughout the City, and a party was sent in pursuit.

They were caught at Tarracina and brought back; then they were marched into the Comitium and, with the

approval of the people, scourged with rods and thrown from the Rock.

The cruelty of this punishment produced a feeling of bitter resentment in the two most important Greek cities

in Italy, not only amongst the population at large, but especially amongst those who were connected by ties of

relationship or friendship with the men who had met with such a horrible fate. Amongst these there were

thirteen young nobles of Tarentum who entered into a conspiracy; the ringleaders were Nico and Philemenus.

Before taking any action they thought that they ought to have an interview with Hannibal. They left the city

by night on the presence that they were going on a hunting expedition and took the direction of his camp.

When they were not far from it, the others concealed themselves in a wood near the road while Nico and

Philemenus went on to the outposts. They were seized, as they intended to be, and were conducted to

Hannibal. After explaining to him the motives which had prompted them and the nature of the step they were

contemplating they were warmly thanked and loaded with promises, and Hannibal advised them to drive to


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the city some cattle belonging to the Carthaginians which had been turned out to pasture, so that they might

make their fellowtownsmen believe that they had really gone out, as they said, to get plunder. He promised

that they should be safe and unmolested while so engaged. Every one saw the plunder which the young men

had brought, and as they did the same thing over and over again people wondered less at their daring. At their

next interview with Hannibal they obtained from him a solemn promise that the Tarentines should preserve

their freedom and retain their own laws and all that belonged to them, they were to pay no taxes or tribute to

Carthage, nor be required to admit a Carthaginian garrison against their will. The Roman garrison was to be

at the mercy of the Carthaginians. When this understanding had been arrived at, Philemenus made a regular

habit of leaving the city and returning to it by night. He was noted for his passion for hunting and he had his

dogs and other requisites for the sport with him. Generally he brought back something which had purposely

been placed in his way and gave it either to the commanders or the men on guard. They imagined that he

chose night time for his expeditions through fear of the enemy. When they had become so accustomed to his

movements that the gate was opened at whatever hour of the night he gave the signal by whistling, Hannibal

thought the time had come for action. He was three days' march distant, and in order to lessen any surprise

that might be felt at his remaining encamped on one and the same spot so long he feigned illness. The

Romans who were garrisoning Tarentum had ceased to view his remaining there with suspicion.

When he had made up his mind to march to Tarentum, he picked out a force of 10,000 infantry and cavalry,

who, from their agility and the lightness of their armour, would be most suitable for a dash upon the city. At

the fourth watch of the night he made his advance and sent forward about eighty Numidian troopers with

orders to patrol the roads in the neighbourhood and keep a sharp look out so that none of the rustics might

espy his movements from a distance. Those in front of them they were to bring back, any whom they met

they were to kill in order that the inhabitants of the district might take them for a marauding force rather than

an army. Marching his men rapidly forward he encamped about fifteen miles from Tarentum, and without

saving a word as to where they were going he called his men together and warned them all to keep in the line

of march and not to allow any one to fall out or leave the ranks. They were above all things to listen to orders

with attention and not to do anything that they were not told to do. He would tell them, when the time came,

what he wanted them to do. Almost at the same hour a rumour reached Tarentum that a small body of

Numidian horse were ravaging their fields and creating a panic far and wide amongst the peasantry. This

news did not disturb the Roman commandant farther than that he ordered a portion of his cavalry to ride out

the next morning early to drive off the enemy. As to guarding against any other contingency, so little care

was shown that this movement on the part of the Numidians was actually taken as a proof that Hannibal and

his army had not stirred from their camp.

Hannibal resumed his advance soon after dark; Philemenus leading the way with the usual load of game on

his shoulders, the rest of the conspirators waiting inside the town to carry out their part in the plot. The

arrangement was that Philemenus should carry his prey through the wicket gate which he always used and at

the same time admit some armed men; Hannibal was to approach the Temenide gate from another direction.

This gate was on the landward part of the city and looked eastwards near the public cemetery inside the walls.

As he approached the gate Hannibal gave the signal by showing a light, the signal was answered in the same

way by Nico; then both lights were extinguished. Hannibal marched up to the gate in silence; Nico made a

sudden attack upon the sentinels who were sleeping soundly in their beds and killed them, then he opened the

gate. Hannibal entered with his infantry, but the cavalry were ordered to remain outside, ready to meet any

attack in the open plain. In the other direction Philemenus also reached the wicket gate which he had been in

the habit of using, and whilst he was calling out that they could hardly stand the weight of the huge beast they

were carrying, his voice and wellknown signal roused the sentry and the gate was opened. Two young men

carrying a wild boar entered, Philemenus and a lightly equipped huntsman followed close after, and whilst

the sentinel, astonished at its size, turned unsuspectingly towards those who were carrying it, Philemenus ran

him through with a hunting spear. Then about thirty armed men ran in and massacred the rest of the sentinels

and broke open the large gate adjoining and the army at once entered in fighting order and marched in perfect

silence to the forum where they joined Hannibal. The Carthaginian general formed 2000 of his Gauls into


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three divisions, furnishing each with Tarentines to guide them, and sent them into different parts of the city

with orders to occupy the main streets, and if a tumult arose they were to cut down the Romans and spare the

townsfolk. To secure this latter object he gave instructions to the conspirators to tell any of their people

whom they saw at a distance to keep quiet and silent and fear nothing.

By this time there was as much shouting and uproar as usually happens when a city is taken, but nobody

knew for certain what had happened. The Tarentines thought that the Roman garrison had started to pillage

the town; the Romans were under the impression that the townsfolk had got up a disturbance with some

treacherous design. The commandant, awakened by the tumult, hurried away to the harbour, and getting into

a boat was rowed round to the citadel. To add to the confusion the sound of a trumpet was heard from the

theatre. It was a Roman trumpet which the conspirators had procured for the purpose, and being blown by a

Greek who did not know how to use it, no one could make out who gave the signal or for whom it was

intended. When it began to grow light, the Romans recognised the arms of the Carthaginians and Gauls, and

all doubt was removed; the Greeks, too, seeing the bodies of the Romans lying about everywhere, became

aware that the city had been taken by Hannibal. When the light grew clearer and the Romans who survived

the massacre had taken refuge in the citadel, the tumult having somewhat subsided, Hannibal ordered the

Tarentines to assemble without their arms. After they had all assembled, with the exception of those who had

accompanied the Romans into the citadel to share their fate whatever it might be, Hannibal addressed some

kind words to them, and reminded them of the way he had treated their compatriots whom he had taken in the

battle of Cannae. He went on to inveigh bitterly against the tyranny of Roman domination, and ended by

ordering them each to return to their homes and write their names over their doors; if any houses were not so

inscribed he should at once give the signal for them to be plundered, and if any one placed an inscription on a

house occupied by a Romanthey were in a separate quarterhe should treat him as an enemy. The people

were dismissed, and after the inscriptions had been placed on the doors, so that the houses could be

distinguished from those of the enemy, the signal was given and the troops dispersed in all directions to

plunder the Roman houses. There was a considerable amount of plunder seized.

The next day he advanced to attack the citadel. It was protected by lofty cliffs on the side of the sea which

surrounded the greater part of it like a peninsula, and on the side of the city it was enclosed by a wall and a

very deep moat; Hannibal saw at once that it could successfully defy any attack either by storm or by siege

works. As he did not wish to be delayed from undertaking more important operations by having to protect the

Tarentines nor to leave them without adequate defence against any attacks which the Romans might make at

their pleasure from the citadel, he decided to cut off communication between the city and the citadel by

earthworks. He rather hoped, too, that the Romans might attempt to interfere whilst these were being

constructed and give him a chance of fighting, and in case they made a sortie in force he might inflict such

heavy loss upon them and so weaken them that the Tarentines could easily hold their own against them

unaided. No sooner was the work commenced than the Romans suddenly flung open the citadel gates and

attacked the working party. The detachment who were on guard along the front allowed themselves to be

driven in, and the Romans, emboldened by success, followed them up in greater numbers and to a greater

distance. Then a signal was given and the Carthaginians whom Hannibal had drawn up in readiness rushed

upon them from all sides. The Romans could not withstand their attack, but their flight was checked by the

narrow space and the obstructions caused by the work which had been begun and the preparations made for

continuing it. A great many flung themselves headlong into the fosse, and more were killed in the flight than

in the fighting. After this the work proceeded without molestation. An enormous fosse was dug and on its

inner side a breastwork and parapet thrown up, and a little further off in the same direction he made

preparations for adding a wall, so that the town could protect itself against the Romans without his aid. He

left, however, a small detachment to garrison the place and also help to complete the wall, while he himself

with the rest of his force fixed his camp by the river Galaesus about five miles from Tarentum. Returning

from this position to inspect the work, and finding it much more advanced than he expected, he became

hopeful of successfully attacking the citadel. It was not, like other similar places, protected by its lofty

position, as it stood on level ground and was separated from the city by a moat and a wall. While the attack


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was being pressed with siege works, machines, and artillery of every kind, reinforcements arrived from

Metapontum, and thus strengthened, the Romans were encouraged to make a night attack upon the enemies'

works. Some they broke up, others they burnt, and that was the end of Hannibal's attempts to storm the walls.

His only hope now was to invest the citadel, but that seemed useless, for standing as it did on a promontory

and overlooking the mouth of the harbour, those who held it could make free use of the sea. The city, on the

other hand, was cut off from all seaborne supplies, and the besiegers were more likely to starve than the

besieged.

Hannibal called the principal men of the place together and explained all the difficulties of the situation. He

told them that he saw no way of carrying a citadel so strongly fortified by storm, and there was nothing to

hope for from a blockade as long as the enemy were masters of the sea. If he had ships, so that all supplies

could be stopped from reaching them, they would then have to evacuate the citadel or surrender. The

Tarentines quite agreed with him, but they thought that the man who gave the advice ought to help in

carrying it out. If he sent for Carthaginian vessels from Sicily the thing could be done, but their own ships

were locked up in a narrow bay; so how could they escape into the open sea as long as the enemy held the

mouth of the harbour? "They shall escape," Hannibal replied. "Many things which nature makes difficult

become easy to the man who uses his brains. You have a city situated in a flat country; broad and level roads

lead in all directions. I will transport your ships without much trouble on wagons and along the road which

leads from the harbour through the heart of the city to the sea. Then the sea which the enemy are now masters

of will be ours, we shall invest the citadel by sea on the one side, by land on the other, or rather I would say

we shall very soon capture it, either after the enemy have evacuated it or with the enemy inside as well."

These words excited not only hopes of success but also an intense feeling of admiration for the general.

Wagons were speedily collected from all sides and fastened together; machines were employed for hauling

the ships ashore, and the surface of the road was made good so that the wagons could be drawn more easily

and the transport effected with less difficulty. Then draught animals and men were got together, and the work

promptly began. After a few days a completely equipped fleet sailed round the citadel and cast anchor off the

very mouth of the harbour. Such was the condition of affairs which Hannibal left behind him at Tarentum

when he returned to his winter quarters. Authorities, however, are divided on the question whether the

defection of Tarentum occurred this year or last, but the majority, including those who lived nearest to the

time of the events, assert that it happened this year.

The consuls and praetors were detained in Rome by the Latin Festival until the 27th of April. That day the

sacred rites were completed on the Alban Mount, and they all set out for their various provinces.

Subsequently the need of fresh religious observances was brought to their notice in consequence of the

prophetic utterances of Marcius. This Marcius was a famous seer and his prophecies had come to light the

previous year when by order of the senate an inspection was made of all books of a similar character. They

first came into the hands of M. Aemilius who, as City praetor, was in charge of the business, and he at once

handed them to the new praetor, Sulla. One of the two referred to events which had already happened before

it saw the light, and the authority thus acquired by its fulfilment gained more credence for the other, which

had yet to be fulfilled. In the first the disaster of Cannae was foretold in words to this effect:

"Thou who art sprung from Trojan blood, beware 

The stream by Canna. Let not aliens born

Force thee to battle on the fatal plain

Of Diomed. But thou wilt give no heed

To this my rede until that all the plain

Be watered by thy blood, and mighty hosts

The stream shall bear into the boundless deep

From off the fruitful earth, and they who till

Its soil shall be for food to birds and beasts

And fishes. Such is Great Jove's word to me." 


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Those who had fought there recognised the truth of the descriptionthe plains of Argive Diomed and the river

Canna and the very picture of the disaster. Then the second prophecy was read. It was not only more obscure

than the first because the future is more uncertain than the past, but it was also more unintelligible owing to

its phraseology. It ran as follows:

"If, Romans, ye would drive the foemen forth

Who come from far to mar your land, then see

That Games be held as each fourth year comes round

In honour of Apollo and your State

Shall bear its part and all your folk shall share

The holy work, each for himself and his.

Your praetor, who shall justice do for each

And all, shall have the charge. Then let there be

Ten chosen who shall offer sacrifice

In Grecian fashion. This if ye will do

Then shall ye evermore rejoice and all

Your State shall prosper; yea, the god shall bring

Your foes to nought, who now eat up your land." 

They spent one day interpreting this prophecy. The day following, the senate passed a resolution that the Ten

should inspect the sacred books with reference to the institution of Games to Apollo and the proper form of

sacrifice. After they had made their investigations and reported to the senate, a resolution was passed "that

Games be vowed and celebrated in honour of Apollo, and that when they were finished, 12,000 ases were to

be given to the praetor for the expenses of the sacrifice and two victims of large size." A second resolution

was passed that "the Ten should sacrifice according to Greek ritual the following victims: to Apollo, an ox

with gilded horns and two white shegoats with gilded horns, and to Latona a heifer with gilded horns."

When the praetor was about to celebrate the Games in the Circus Maximus he gave notice that during the

Games the people should contribute a gift to Apollo, according to each man's convenience. Such is the origin

of the Apollinarian Games, which were instituted for the cause of victory and not, as is generally thought, in

the interests of the public health. The people wore garlands whilst witnessing them, the matrons offered up

intercessions; feasting went on in the forecourts of the houses with open doors, and the day was observed

with every kind of ceremonious rite.

Hannibal was still in the neighbourhood of Tarentum and both the consuls were in Samnium apparently

making preparations for besieging Capua. Famine, generally the result of a long siege, was already beginning

to press upon the Campanians, as they had been prevented by the Roman armies from sowing their crops.

They sent a message to Hannibal asking him to give orders for corn to be conveyed to Capua from places in

the neighbourhood before the consuls sent their legions into their fields and all the roads were rendered

impassable by the enemy. Hannibal ordered Hanno who was in Bruttium to march his army into Campania

and see to it that the people of Capua were plentifully supplied with corn. Hanno accordingly marched into

Campania and, carefully avoiding the consuls who were both encamped in Samnium, he selected a position

for his camp on some rising ground about three miles from Beneventum. He then issued orders for the corn

which had been stored in the friendly cities round to be carried to his camp, and assigned detachments to

guard the convoys. A message was despatched to Capua stating the day on which they were to appear in the

camp to receive the corn, bringing with them all the vehicles and beasts they could collect. The Campanians

carried out his instructions with the same slackness and carelessness that they showed in everything else.

Hardly more than four hundred country carts were sent and a few draught cattle. Hanno scolded them

severely, telling them that even the hunger which rouses the energies of dumb animals failed to stimulate

them to exertion. He then fixed another day for them to come for corn provided with much more efficient

means of transport.

Everything was reported to the people of Beneventum exactly as it happened. They at once sent a deputation

of ten of their principal citizens to the consuls, both of whom were near Bovianum. On hearing what was


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going on at Capua they arranged that one of them should march into Campania. Fulvius, to whom that

province had been assigned, made a night march and entered Beneventum. He was now in Hanno's

immediate neighbourhood and was informed that he had left with a portion of his army on a foraging

expedition, that corn was supplied to Capua under the superintendence of the head of his commissariat, that

two thousand wagons with a disorderly and unarmed crowd had arrived at his camp, that haste and confusion

prevailed everywhere, and that the rustics had invaded the camp from all the country round and destroyed all

semblance of military order and all chance of military discipline. When he had satisfied himself that this

information was correct, he issued an order for his men to get ready their standards and arms against

nightfalland nothing elseas they would have to attack the Carthaginian camp. Leaving their kits and all

their baggage in Beneventum, they started at the fourth watch and reached the camp just before dawn. Their

appearance created such alarm that, had the camp been on level ground, it could undoubtedly have been

carried at the first assault. Its elevated position and its entrenchments saved it; in no direction could it be

approached except by steep and difficult climbing. When day broke a hot fight commenced; the

Carthaginians did not confine themselves to defending their lines; but being on more even ground themselves

they threw down the enemy who were struggling up the heights.

Courage and resolution, however, overcame all difficulties, and in some places the Romans had forced their

way to the breastwork and fosse, but with heavy loss in killed and wounded, when the consul, calling round

him the superior officers, told them that they must desist from the hazardous attempt. He thought it would be

wiser to march back to Beneventum for that day, and on the next day to bring their camp close up to the

enemy's camp, so that the Campanians could not quit it and Hanno would be unable to return to it. To make

more certain of this, he prepared to send for his colleague and his army and direct their joint operations

against Hanno and the Campanians. The "retire" was already being sounded when the general's plans were

shattered by the angry shouts of the soldiers who spurned such feeble tactics. The Paelignian cohort happened

to be in closest touch with the enemy, and their commanding officer, Vibius Accaus, snatched up a standard

and flung it across the enemies' rampart, at the same time invoking a curse on himself and his cohort if the

enemy got possession of the standard. He was the first to dash over fosse and rampart into the camp. Now the

Paelignians were fighting inside the lines, and Valerius Flaccus, the commanding officer of the third legion,

was rating the Romans for their cowardice in letting the allies have the glory of capturing the camp, when T.

Pedanius, a centurion in command of the leading maniples' took a standard out of the bearer's hands and

shouted, "This standard and this centurion will be inside the rampart in a moment, let those follow who will

prevent its capture by the enemy." His own maniples followed him as he sprang across the fosse, then the

whole of the legion pressed hard after. By this time even the consul, when he saw them climbing over the

rampart, changed his mind, and instead of recalling the troops began to urge them on by pointing to the

dangerous position of their gallant allies and their own fellow citizens. Every man did his best to push on;

over smooth and rough ground alike, amidst missiles showered upon them from all directions, against the

desperate resistance of the enemy who thrust their persons and their weapons in the way, they advanced step

by step and broke into the camp. Many who were wounded, even those who were faint from loss of blood,

struggled on that they might fall within the enemies' camp. In this way the camp was taken, and taken too as

quickly as though it lay on level ground, entirely unfortified. It was no longer a fight but a massacre, for they

were all crowded together inside the lines. Over l0,000 of the enemy were killed and over 7000 made

prisoners, including the Campanians who had come for corn, and all the wagons and draught animals were

captured. There was also an immense quantity of plunder which Hanno, who had been raiding everywhere,

had carried off from the fields of the allies of Rome. After totally destroying the enemies' camp they returned

to Beneventum. There the two consulsAppius Claudius had arrived a few days beforesold and distributed

the spoil. Those to whose exertions the capture of the camp was due were rewarded, especially Accaus the

Paelignian and T. Pedanius the centurion who headed the first legion. Hanno was at CominiumOcritum with

a small foraging party when he heard of the disaster to his camp, and he retreated to Bruttium in a way which

suggested flight rather than an orderly march.


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When the Campanians, in their turn, heard of the disaster which had overtaken them and their allies, they sent

to Hannibal to inform him that the two consuls were at Beneventum, a day's march from Capua, and that the

war had all but reached their walls and gates. If he did not come with all speed to their help Capua would fall

into the hands of the enemy more rapidly than Arpi had done. Not even Tarentum, much less its citadel,

ought to be of so much importance in his eyes as to make him give up to Rome, abandoned and defenceless,

the Capua which he always used to say was as great as Carthage. Hannibal promised that he would take care

of Capua, and sent a force of 2000 cavalry by whose aid they would be able to keep their fields from being

devastated. The Romans, meanwhile, amongst their other cares, had not lost sight of the citadel of Tarentum

and its beleaguered garrison. P. Cornelius, one of the praetors, had, acting on the instructions of the senate,

sent his lieutenant, C. Servilius, to purchase corn in Etruria, and after loading some ships sailed to Tarentum

and made his way through the enemies' guard ships into the harbour. His arrival produced such a change that

the very men who, having lost almost all hope, had been frequently invited by the enemy in their colloquies

with them to go over to them, now actually invited and tried to persuade the enemy to come over to them.

Soldiers, too, had been sent from Metapontum, so the garrison was now strong enough for the defence of the

citadel. The Metapontines, on the other hand, relieved from their fears by the departure of the Romans,

promptly went over to Hannibal. The people of Thurii, on the same part of the coast, took the same step.

Their action was due in some measure to the defection of Tarentum and Metapontum, but it was due quite as

much to their feeling of exasperation against the Romans at the recent massacre of their hostages. It was the

relations and friends of these who sent messengers with despatches to Hannibal and Mago, who were in the

neighbourhood, promising to put the city in their power if they would march up to the walls. M. Atinius was

in command at Thurii with a small garrison, and they thought that he would easily be drawn into a precipitate

engagement, not because he trusted to his own small garrison, but because he relied upon the soldiery of

Thurii, whom he had carefully drilled and armed against such an emergency.

After the Carthaginian generals had entered the country of Thurii they divided their forces: Hanno proceeded

with the infantry in battle order up to the city; Mago and his cavalry halted and took up a position behind

some hills admirably adapted for concealing his movements. Atinius understood from his scouts that the

hostile force consisted entirely of infantry, accordingly he went into battle quite unaware of the treachery of

the citizens or the maneuver of the enemy. The contest was a very spiritless one, only a few Romans were in

the fighting line, and the Thurians were awaiting the issue rather than helping to decide it. The Carthaginian

line purposely fell back in order to draw their unsuspecting enemy behind the hill where the cavalry were

waiting. No sooner had they reached the place than the cavalry dashed forward with their battle cry. The

Thurians, an illdisciplined crowd, disloyal to the side on which they fought, were at once put to flight; the

Romans kept up the fight for some time in spite of their being attacked on one side by the infantry and on the

other by the cavalry, but at last they, too, turned and fled to the city. There a body of the traitors admitted the

stream of their fellow townsmen through the open gate, but when they saw the Romans routed and running

towards the city they shouted that the Carthaginians were at their heels and the enemy would enter the city

pell mell with the Romans unless they instantly closed the gates. The Romans accordingly were shut out for

slaughter by the enemy, Atinius and a few others being alone allowed to enter. A heated discussion thereupon

arose amongst the townsmen; some were for maintaining their loyalty to Rome, others thought they ought to

yield to fate and surrender the city to the victors. As usual, evil counsels and the desire to be on the winning

side carried the day. Atinius and his men were conducted down to the sea and placed on board ship, not

because they were Romans, but because, after Atinius' mild and impartial administration, they wished to

provide for his safety. Then the Carthaginians were admitted into the city. The consuls left Beneventum and

marched their legions into the territory of Capua, partly to destroy the crops of corn which were now in the

blade, and partly with the view of making an attack upon the city. They thought that they would make their

consulship illustrious by the destruction of so wealthy and prosperous a city and at the same time they would

wipe out a great stain from the republic which had allowed the defection of so close a neighbour to go for

three years unpunished. They could not, however, leave Beneventum unguarded. If, as they felt certain would

be the case, Hannibal came to Capua to help his friends, it would be necessary, in view of the sudden

emergency, to provide against the attacks of his cavalry. They sent orders, therefore, to Tiberius Gracchus,


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who was in Lucania, to come to Beneventum with his cavalry and light infantry, and to leave some one in

command of the legions in the standing camp who were protecting Lucania.

Before he left Lucania a most illomened portent happened to Gracchus whilst he was offering sacrifice. The

sacrifice itself was just finished when two snakes glided unobserved up to the reserved parts of the victim and

devoured the liver; as soon as they were seen they suddenly disappeared. On the advice of the augurs a fresh

sacrifice was offered and the parts reserved with greater care, but according to the tradition the same thing

happened a second and even a third time; the snakes glided up and after tasting the liver slipped away

untouched. The augurs warned the commander that the portent concerned him and they bade him be on his

guard against secret foes and secret plots. But no foresight could avert the impending doom. There was a

Lucanian named Flavus, the head of that section of the Lucanians who stood by Romeone section had gone

over to Hannibaland they elected him praetor. He had already been a year in office when suddenly he

changed his mind and began to look out for an opportunity of ingratiating himself with the Carthaginians. He

did not think it enough to go over himself and draw the Lucanians with him into revolt, unless he could make

his league with the enemy sure by the lifeblood of the very man who was his guestfriend, and betray the

Roman commander. He had a secret interview with Mago, who was commanding in Bruttium, and obtained

his solemn pledge that if he would betray the Roman commander to the Carthaginians the Lucanians should

be taken into friendship and allowed to live as a free people under their own laws. He then took Mago to the

spot where he said he would bring Gracchus with a small escort. Mago was to bring foot and horse fully

armed to the place and place a large force in concealment. After the spot had been thoroughly examined and

an investigation made of every part, a day was fixed for carrying out the project. Flavus went to the Roman

commander and told him that he had an important enterprise on hand and required Gracchus' help for its

accomplishment. He had persuaded the chief magistrates of all the communities which in the general

disturbance of Italy had seceded to the Carthaginians to return to friendship with Rome, since the cause of

Rome which had been all but ruined at Cannae was every day becoming stronger and more popular, whilst

the strength of Hannibal was waning and had almost reached the vanishing point. The Romans, he knew,

would not be implacable to those who had formerly offended, there had never been a nation more ready to

listen to prayers and more quick to grant forgiveness. How often had they pardoned even their own ancestors

after their repeated renewal of hostilities! This was the language he had addressed to them. "But," he went on,

"they would rather hear all this from Gracchus himself in person, and touch his right hand, and carry away

with them that pledge of good faith." He explained that he had mentioned a place to those whom he had taken

into confidence not far from the Roman camp, and only a few words would be needed so to arrange matters

there that the entire Lucanian nation would become faithful allies of Rome.

Gracchus, impressed by the apparent sincerity of the man's language and the proposal he made, and carried

away by his smooth and plausible address, started from camp with his lictors and a troop of cavalry under the

guidance of his guestfriend. He rode straight into the snare; suddenly enemies showed themselves on all

sides, and to take away all doubt as to his being betrayed Flavus joined them. Missiles were hurled from

every quarter upon Gracchus and his cavalry. He sprung from his horse, and ordered the rest to do the same,

and called upon them to make the one thing which Fortune had left them glorious by their courage. "For what

is left," he cried, "to a little band surrounded by an enormous host in a valley shut in by forest and mountain,

except death? The one question is, are you going to offer yourselves like cattle to be butchered without

striking a blow, or are you going to turn all your thoughts from passively awaiting the end and make a fierce

and furious onslaught, doing and daring, until you fall, covered with your enemies blood, amidst the

heapedup bodies and arms of your dying foes? Make, every one of you, for the Lucanian traitor and

renegade! The man who sends him beforehand as a victim to the gods below will find in his own death a

glorious honour and unspeakable consolation." Whilst saying this he wound his paludamentum round his left

armfor they had not even brought their shields with themand charged the enemy. There was more fighting

than might have been expected from the number of the combatants. The Romans were most exposed to the

darts, and as they were hurled from the higher ground all round they were pierced by them. Gracchus was

now left without any defence and the Carthaginians tried to take him alive, but catching sight of his Lucanian


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guestfriend amongst the enemy, he made such a furious onslaught on their serried ranks that it became

impossible to save his life without incurring heavy loss. Mago sent his dead body to Hannibal and ordered it

and the captured fasces to be placed before the general's tribunal. If this is the true story, Gracchus perished

in Lucania at the place called the "Old Fields."

There are some who point to a place in the neighbourhood of Beneventum, near the river Calor, as the scene

of his death. He had left the camp with his lictors and three attendants to bathe in the river, whilst the enemy

were concealed in osier beds on the bank, and whilst naked and defenceless was killed, after vainly

endeavouring to drive off the enemy by stones from the bed of the river. Others say that, acting on the advice

of the augurs, he had gone about half a mile from the camp for the purpose of averting the abovementioned

portents in a place free from defilement, when he was surrounded by two squadrons of Numidians who

happened to have taken up their position there. So little agreement is there as to the place and circumstances

of the death of this brilliant and famous man. And there are different versions of the account of his funeral.

Some say that his men buried him in his own camp; others say that he was buried by Hannibal, and this is the

more generally accepted account. According to this version, a funeral pyre was erected on the open space in

front of the camp and the whole army fully accoutred went through various evolutions with Spanish dances

and the movements of limbs and weapons peculiar to each tribe, Hannibal doing honour to the dead in every

way by his acts and words. This is the account given by those who say that his death took place in Lucania. If

you choose to believe those who place it at the river Calor, it would appear that the enemy only got

possession of the head; this was sent to Hannibal, and he at once despatched Carthalo to carry it to Cn.

Cornelius, the quaestor, who carried out the obsequies in the Roman camp, the people of Beneventum taking

their part in the ceremony as well as the soldiers.

The consuls had invaded the territory of Capua and were devastating it far and wide when great alarm and

confusion were caused by a sudden sortie of the townsmen supported by Mago and his troopers. They

hurriedly recalled to the standards the men who were scattered in all directions, but they had hardly time to

form their line before they were routed and lost more than 1500 men. The selfconfidence and arrogance of

the people of Capua were immensely strengthened by this success and they were continually challenging the

Romans to fight. But that one engagement brought about by want of caution and foresight put the consuls

much more on their guard. An incident occurred, however, which put heart into the Romans and lessened the

confidence of the other side, an insignificant one it is true, but in war nothing is so insignificant as not

sometimes to involve serious consequences. T. Quinctius Crispinus had a friend in Capua called Badius, and

their friendship was a very close and intimate one. The intimacy had been formed before the defection of

Capua when Badius was lying ill in Rome at Crispinus' house and received the kindest and most careful

attention from his host. One day this Badius walked up to the sentinels on duty before the camp gate and

asked them to call Crispinus. Crispinus, on receiving the message, imagined that he had not forgotten the old

ties of friendship even though public treaties were torn up, and that he wanted a friendly and familiar talk,

and accordingly he went on a short distance from his comrades. As soon as they came in sight of one another

Badius called out: "I, Badius, challenge you, Crispinus, to battle. Let us mount our horses and, when the

others have withdrawn, decide who of us is the better fighter." Crispinus replied that neither he nor his

challenger lacked enemies upon whom they could display their courage, but as for himself, even if he met

Badius on the field of battle, he would avoid him sooner than pollute his right hand with a friend's blood.

Then he turned round and was in the act of departing when Badius became more insolent and began to taunt

him with effeminacy and cowardice and hurled at him abusive epithets which he himself more properly

deserved. He said that he was an enemy masquerading as a friend and pretending to spare a man for whom he

knew he was no match. If he were under the impression that when the bonds which held states together were

broken the bonds of private friendship were not broken at the same time, then he, Badius of Capua, openly

renounced in the hearing of both armies the friendship of T. Quinctius Crispinus the Roman. "There is," he

went on, "no fellowship, no bond of alliance between foe and foe, between me and the man who has come to

attack my home, my country, and my country's gods. If you are a man, meet me!" For a long time Crispinus

hesitated, but the men of his troop at last prevailed upon him not to let the Campanian insult him with


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impunity, and so, only waiting till he could ask his commanders if they would allow him, against regulations,

to fight an enemy who challenged him, he mounted his horse with their permission and called upon Badius

by name to come out and fight. The Campanian showed no hesitation; they spurred their horses against each

other and met. Crispinus with his lance wounded Badius in his left shoulder above his shield. He fell from his

horse and Crispinus leaped down from the saddle to despatch him as he lay. Badius, before he was

overpowered, escaped to his comrades, leaving shield and horse behind. Crispinus, proudly displaying his

spoils, the horse and shield which he had taken, was conducted amid the cheers and congratulations of the

soldiers to the consuls. Here he was addressed in terms of high praise and loaded with gifts.

Hannibal left the neighbourhood of Beneventum and encamped close to Capua. Three days afterwards he led

out his force to battle, feeling quite certain that as the Campanians had fought a successful action a short time

before in his absence, the Romans would be far less able to withstand him and the army which had been so

often victorious. As soon as the battle commenced the Roman line was in difficulties, chiefly owing to the

attack of cavalry, as they were almost overwhelmed by their darts. The signal was given for the Roman

cavalry to charge the enemy at full gallop, and now it had become simply a cavalry engagement when the

sight of Sempronius' army in the distance commanded by Cn. Cornelius created equal alarm on both sides, as

each feared that a fresh enemy was coming on. The signal to retire was given in both armies as if by mutual

consent, and the combatants separated on almost equal terms and returned to camp. The loss on the Roman

side was, however, somewhat the greater owing to the cavalry attack at the beginning. In order to draw

Hannibal away from Capua the consuls left in the night after the battle for different destinations; Fulvius went

into the neighbourhood of Cumae and Claudius into Lucania. On being informed the next day that the Roman

camp was evacuated, and that they had gone in two divisions by different routes, Hannibal was at first

undecided which he should follow; he decided to follow Appius. After leading his enemy about just as he

pleased, Appius returned by a circuitous route to Capua.

Another chance of achieving success in this country presented itself to Hannibal. There was a certain M.

Centenius, surnamed Paenula, who was conspicuous among the centurions of the first rank for his physical

stature and his courage. After completing his period of service he was introduced by P. Cornelius Sulla, the

praetor, to the senate. He requested the senators to allow him 5000 men; he was well acquainted with the

enemy and the country where he was operating and would very soon do something worth the doing; the

tactics by which our generals and their armies had been outwitted up to that time he would employ against the

man who invented them. Stupid as the promise was it was quite as stupidly given credence to, as though the

qualifications of a soldier were the same as those of a general. Instead of 5000 he was given 8000 men, half

of them Romans and half troops furnished by the allies. He himself, too, picked up a considerable number of

volunteers in the country through which he was marching, and he arrived in Lucania with double the army he

started with. Here Hannibal had come to a halt after his fruitless pursuit of Claudius. The result could not be

doubtful, seeing it was a contest between armies one of which consisted of veterans habituated to victory, the

other a hastily raised and halfarmed force. As soon as they caught sight of each other, neither side declined

battle and they at once got into fighting order. For more than two hours, however, in spite of the utterly

unequal conditions, the Roman army kept up the fighting as long as their leader stood his ground. At last, out

of regard for his former reputation and also fearing the disgrace he would incur if he survived a defeat

brought on by his own headlong folly, he rushed upon the weapons of the foe and fell, and the Roman army

was instantly routed. But even when they fled they found no way of escape, for all avenues were closed by

the cavalry, so that out of that multitude of men only a thousand escaped, all the rest perished in one way or

another.

The consuls now resumed the siege of Capua in earnest, and everything necessary for the task was brought

together and got into readiness. Corn was stored at Casilinum; at the mouth of the Vulturnus, where the town

of Vulturnum now stands, a fort was constructed and a garrison was placed in it and in Puteoli also, which

Fabius had previously fortified, so that they might command both the river and the adjacent sea. The corn

which had lately been sent from Sardinia as well as that which M. Junius had purchased in Etruria was


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conveyed from Ostia into these two maritime fortresses, that the army might have a supply throughout the

winter. Meantime the disaster which had overtaken Centenius in Lucania was aggravated by another which

resulted from the death of Gracchus. The volunteer slaves who had done excellent service when he was alive

to lead them, looked upon his death as discharging them from further military duties and accordingly

disbanded themselves. Hannibal was anxious not to neglect Capua or desert friends who were in such a

critical position, but after his easy victory through the foolhardiness of one Roman general he was watching

for an opportunity of crushing another. Envoys from Apulia had informed him that Cn. Fulvius, who was

attacking some of their cities which had seceded to him, had at first conducted his operations with care and

prudence, but afterwards, intoxicated with success and loaded with plunder, he and his men had given

themselves up to such idleness and selfindulgence that all military discipline had disappeared. Hannibal

knew by repeated experience, and especially within the last few days, what state an army gets into under an

incompetent commander and he at once moved into Apulia.

Fulvius and his legions were in the neighbourhood of Heraclea. When they heard that the enemy were

approaching they were almost on the point of dragging up the standards and going into battle without waiting

for orders. In fact the one thing that restrained them more than anything else was the confidence they felt of

being able to choose their own time for fighting. The following night, when Hannibal became aware that the

camp was in a state of tumult and that most of the men were defying their commander and insisting that he

should give the signal, and that there was a general cry, "To arms!" he was quite certain that the opportunity

was presented of a successful battle. He quietly disposed some three thousand of his light infantry in the

surrounding homesteads and in the woods and copses. They were all to spring from their concealment at the

same moment when the signal was given, and Mago had orders to place about two thousand cavalry along all

the roads which he thought the direction of the flight might take. After making these dispositions during the

night, he marched out to battle at dawn. Fulvius did not hesitate, though he was not drawn on so much by any

hopes of success on his own part as by the blind impetuosity of his men. The same recklessness which sent

them on to the field appeared in the formation of their line. They went forward in a haphazard way and took

their places in the ranks just where they chose, and left them again as their caprices or fears dictated. The first

legion and the left wing of the allies were drawn up in front and the line was extended far beyond its proper

length. The officers called out that it possessed neither strength nor depth and wherever the enemy made their

attack they would break through, but the men would not even listen to, much less attend to anything that was

for their good. And now Hannibal was upon them; a general so different from their own, with an army so

different and in such different order! As might be expected, the Romans were unable to withstand the very

first attack; their general, quite as foolish and reckless as Centenius, though not to be compared with him in

courage, no sooner saw the day going against him and his men in confusion than he seized a horse and made

his escape with about two hundred of his cavalry. The rest of the army, repulsed in front and then surrounded

in rear and flanks, was so completely cut up that out of 12,000 men not more than 2000 escaped. The camp

was taken.

The news of these disasters, one after another, created very great grief and alarm amongst the citizens in

Rome, still, as they knew that the consuls were so far successful where success was most important, they

were not so much disturbed by the tidings as they might have been. The senate despatched C. Laetorius and

M. Metilius with instructions to the consuls, telling them to carefully get together the remains of the two

armies and to see to it that the survivors were not driven by fear and despair to surrender to the enemy, as had

happened after the disaster at Cannae. They were also to find out who had deserted amongst the volunteer

slaves. Publius Cornelius also was charged with this latter task, as he was with the raising of fresh troops, and

he caused notices to be published through the markettowns and boroughs, ordering that search should be

made for the volunteer slaves, and that they should be brought back to their standards. These instructions

were all most carefully carried out. Appius Claudius placed D. Junius in command at the mouth of the

Vulturnus, and M. Aurelius Cotta at Puteoli; whenever the vessels arrived from Etruria and Sardinia they

were at once to have the corn sent on to the camp. Claudius then returned to Capua and found his colleague

Q. Fulvius bringing everything from Casilinum and making preparations to attack the city. Both of them now


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commenced the investment of the place, and they summoned the praetor, Claudius Nero, who was in

Claudius' old camp at Suessula. He, too, leaving a small force to hold the position, came down with the rest

of his army to Capua. So three commanders had their headquarters now established round Capua, and three

armies working on different sides were preparing to ring the city round with fosse and dyke. They erected

blockhouses at certain intervals, and battles took place in several places at once with the Campanians as they

tried to stop the work, the result being that at last the Campanians kept within their walls and gates.

Before, however, the circle of investment was completed, envoys were despatched to Hannibal to remonstrate

with him for having abandoned Capua which was now almost restored to the Romans, and to implore him to

bring them succour now, at all events, as they were no longer merely besieged but completely blockaded. A

despatch was sent to the consuls by P. Cornelius bidding them give an opportunity to the inhabitants, before

they completed the investment, of leaving the place and carrying away their property with them. Those who

left before the 15th of March would be free and remain in possession of all their property; after that date

those who left and those who remained would be alike treated as enemies. When this offer was announced to

the Campanians they treated it not only with scorn but with gratuitous insults and threats as well. Shortly

before this Hannibal had left Herdonea for Tarentum in the hope of acquiring the place either by treachery or

by force, and as he failed to do so he bent his course towards Brundisium, under the impression that the town

would surrender. It was whilst he was spending time here to no purpose that the envoys from Capua came to

him with their remonstrances and appeals. Hannibal answered them in highsounding words; "he had raised

the siege of Capua once already, and the consuls would not wait for his approach even now." Dismissed with

this hope the envoys had considerable difficulty in getting back to Capua, surrounded as it now was with a

double fosse and rampart.

Just when the circumvallation of Capua was being completed the siege of Syracuse came to an end. This

result was due in a large measure to the energy and courage of the general and his army, but it had been

helped on by domestic treachery. At the commencement of the spring Marcellus was undecided whether to

turn the stress of war to Agrigentum against Himilco and Hippocrates, or whether he should press the siege of

Syracuse. He saw that this place could not be carried by assault, as it was unassailable by sea or land owing to

its position, nor could it be reduced by famine, since it was nourished by a free supply of provisions from

Carthage. However, he determined to leave nothing untried. There were with the Romans some leading

members of the Syracusan nobility who had been expelled when the defection took place, and Marcellus told

these refugees to sound the feelings of the men of their own party, and give them an assurance that if

Syracuse were surrendered they should be free and live under their own laws. It was impossible to get any

chance of interviews, for the fact of many being suspected made all more careful and watchful, so that no

attempt of the kind should escape detection. A slave belonging to the exiles was admitted into the city as a

deserter, and after getting a few men together, broached the subject in conversation. Subsequently some were

hidden under the nets in a fishing boat and in that way taken round to the Roman camp where they had

conversations with the refugees. Different people, one after another, did the same thing, until at last there

were as many as eighty concerned in the matter. When all the arrangements for surrender had been made,

information was given to Epicydes by a certain Attalus who resented not having been intrusted with the

secret, and they were all tortured to death.

This hope, which had proved so illusory, was soon succeeded by another. A certain Damippus, a

Lacedaemonian, had been sent from Syracuse on a mission to King Philip and was captured by some Roman

ships. Epicydes was particularly anxious to ransom this man, and Marcellus raised no objection, as just at that

time the Romans were bidding for the friendship of the Aetolians with whom the Lacedaemonians were in

alliance. Those who were sent to discuss the terms of the ransom thought that the most central place for the

conference, and the one most convenient to both sides, was a spot near the tower called Galeagra, at the

Trogilian port. As they went to and fro there several times, one of the Romans took a near view of the wall,

counted the stones and formed an estimate in his mind of the thickness of each stone. Having thus calculated

the height of the wall as well as he could by conjecture, and finding it lower than he or any one else had


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supposed and capable of being scaled by a ladder of even moderate length, he made a report to the consul.

Marcellus attached considerable importance to his suggestion, but as that part of the wall, being lower, was

for that very reason more carefully guarded, it was impossible to approach it and they had to watch their

opportunity, which soon came. A deserter brought word that the townspeople were keeping the festival of

Diana which lasted three days, and that, through lack of other things, owing to the siege, they were

celebrating the feast mostly with wine, which Epicydes had distributed amongst the populace, and the leading

citizens amongst the tribes. On hearing this, Marcellus talked the matter over with a few of the military

tribunes, and through them selected the centurions and private soldiers who were fittest for such a daring

enterprise. Scaling ladders were quietly got ready, and then all the rest of the men were ordered to seek

refreshment and rest as soon as they could, as a nocturnal expedition was in front of them. As soon as he

thought the time had come when, after feasting all day, the men would have their fill of wine and be in their

first sleep, the consul ordered one maniple to carry scaling ladders, and about a thousand men were silently

marched in a narrow column up to the spot. They got up on to the wall without any confusion or noise and

others at once followed in order; even those who felt nervous were reassured by the daring of those in front.

By this time a thousand men had got possession of that section of the wall. They went on as far as the

Hexapylon without meeting a soul, as the majority of those on guard in the bastions were either stupid with

wine after their revels or were drinking themselves drunk. They killed a few, however, whom they surprised

in their beds. When they reached the Hexapylon they gave the signal, and the rest of the troops marched up to

the walls bringing more scaling ladders with them. The postern gate near the Hexapylon was giving way to

the violence of the blows, and the agreed signal was given from the wall. They no longer attempted to

conceal their movements, but commenced an open attack, as they had now reached Epipolae, where there was

a large force on guard, and their object was now to frighten rather than elude the enemy. They succeeded

perfectly. For no sooner were the notes of the trumpets heard and the shouts of those who held the wall and a

part of the city, than the men on guard thought that every part was taken, and some fled along the wall, others

leaped from it, and a crowd of panicstruck citizens took to headlong flight. A great many, however, were

ignorant of the great disaster that had befallen them, for everybody was heavy with, wine and sleep, and in a

city of such vast extent what was happening in one part was not known to the population generally.

At daybreak Marcellus forced the gates of the Hexapylon and entered the city with his entire force, rousing

the citizens who all betook themselves to arms, prepared to render what help they could to a city which was

all but captured. Epicydes made a hurried march from the Islandits local name is Nasosunder the

impression that a few men had succeeded in scaling the walls owing to the negligence of the guards and that

he would soon drive them out. He told the terrified fugitives whom he met that they were adding to the

confusion and making things out to be more serious and alarming than they really were. When, however, he

saw every place round Epipolae full of armed men, he simply discharged a few missiles at the enemy and

marched back to the Achradina, not so much through fear of the strength and numbers of the enemy as of

some opening for treason from within, which might close the gates of Achradina and the Island against him in

the confusion. When Marcellus mounted the fortifications and saw from his higher ground the city below

him, the fairest city of the time, he is said to have shed tears at the sight, partly through joy at his great

achievement, partly at the memory of its ancient glories. He thought of the Athenian fleets which had been

sunk in that harbour, of the two great armies with their famous generals which had been annihilated there, of

all of its many powerful kings and tyrants, above all, of Hiero, whose memory was so fresh, and who, in

addition to all his endowments of fortune and character, had distinguished himself by his services to Rome.

As all this passed through his mind and with it the thought that in one short hour all he saw round him would

be burnt and reduced to ashes, he decided, before advancing against Achradina, to send the Syracusans, who,

as already stated, were with the Roman troops, into the city to try if kind words could induce the enemy to

surrender the place.

The gates and walls of Achradina were mostly held by the deserters who were hopeless of obtaining mercy

on any terms, and they allowed no one to approach the walls or to speak to them. So Marcellus, finding that


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his project had failed, ordered the troops to return to Euryalus. This was a hill in the furthest part of the city,

away from the sea, and overlooking the road which leads into the country and the inland part of the island. It

was, therefore, admirably adapted for the reception of supplies from the interior. The command of the citadel

here had been entrusted by Epicydes to Philodemus an Argive. Sosis, one of the regicides, had been sent by

Marcellus to open up negotiations, but after a long conversation in which he found himself put off with

evasive replies he reported to Marcellus that Philodemus was taking time for consideration. He continued to

procrastinate from day to day, to allow time for Hippocrates and Himilco to bring up their legions, feeling

quite sure that if he had them in his stronghold the Romans would be shut up within the walls and

annihilated. As Marcellus saw that Euryalus could not be taken by either treachery or force, he established his

camp between Neapolis and Tychaparts of the city, and almost cities in themselvesas he was afraid if he

entered the more populous parts he would not be able to keep his soldiers from dispersing in their eagerness

for plunder. Envoys came to him from these two places with olive branches and woollen fillets, imploring

him that they might be spared from fire and sword. Marcellus held a council of war to consider this request,

or rather this entreaty, and in accordance with the wish of all present he gave notice to the soldiers that they

were not to lay hands on any free citizen; everything else they were at liberty to appropriate. Instead of fosse

and rampart the camp was protected by the private houses which served it for walls, and sentinels and pickets

were posted at the gates of the houses which stood open to the street to secure the camp against attack while

the soldiers were dispersed in the city. After this the signal was given and the soldiers ran in all directions,

breaking open the house doors and filling everything with uproar and panic, but they refrained from

bloodshed. There was no limit to the work of rapine until they had cleared the houses of all the goods and

possessions which had been accumulating during the long spell of prosperity. Whilst this was going on,

Philodemus saw that there was no hope of succour, and after getting the promise of a safe conduct for him to

return to Epicydes, he withdrew his garrison and handed the position over to the Romans. Whilst everybody

was preoccupied with the tumult in the captured part of the city, Bomilcar seized the opportunity to escape.

The night was a tempestuous one, and the Roman fleet were unable to keep their anchorage off the harbour,

so he slipped out with thirtyfive ships, and finding the sea clear set sail for Carthage, leaving fiftyfive ships

for Epicydes and the Syracusans. After making the Carthaginians realise the critical state of affairs at

Syracuse he returned with a hundred ships a few days later and was rewardedso they sayby Epicydes with

gifts from Hiero's treasury.

The capture of Euryalus and its occupation by a Roman garrison relieved Marcellus of one cause of anxiety;

he had no longer to dread an attack from the rear which might have created confusion amongst his men, shut

in and hampered as they were by walls. His next move was against Achradina. He established three separate

camps in suitable positions and sat down before the place, hoping to reduce it by famine. For some days the

outposts were undisturbed, when the sudden arrival of Hippocrates and Himilco led to a general attack upon

the Roman lines. Hippocrates had formed an entrenched camp at the Great Harbour, and after giving a signal

to the troops in Achradina he made an attack on the old camp of the Romans which Crispinus commanded.

Epicydes made a sortie against Marcellus and the Carthaginian fleet which lay between the city and the

Roman camp was brought ashore and so prevented Crispinus from sending any help to Marcellus. The

excitement which the enemy caused was, however, much more alarming than the fighting, for Crispinus not

only drove Hippocrates back from his entrenchments, but actually went in pursuit as he fled hurriedly away,

whilst Marcellus drove Epicydes back into the city. And now, apparently, ample provision was made against

danger arising from any sudden attacks in the future.

To add to their troubles both sides were visited by pestilence, a calamity almost heavy enough to turn them

from all thoughts of war. It was the time of autumn and the locality was naturally unhealthy, more so,

however, outside the city than within it, and the insupportable heat affected the constitutions of almost all

who were in the two camps. In the beginning people fell ill and died through the effects of the season and the

unhealthy locality; later, the nursing of the sick and contact with them spread the disease, so that either those

who had caught it died neglected and abandoned, or else they carried off with them those who were waiting

on them and nursing them, and who had thus become infected. Deaths and funerals were a daily spectacle; on


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all sides, day and night, were heard the wailings for the dead. At last familiarity with misery so brutalised

men that not only would they not follow the dead with tears and the lamentations which custom demanded,

but they actually refused to carry them out for burial, and the lifeless bodies were left lying about before the

eyes of those who were awaiting a similar death. So what with fear and the foul and deadly miasma arising

from the bodies, the dead proved fatal to the sick and the sick equally fatal to those in health. Men preferred

to die by the sword; some, singlehanded, attacked the enemies' outposts. The epidemic was much more

prevalent in the Carthaginian camp than in that of the Romans, for their long investment of Syracuse had

made them more accustomed to the climate and to the water. The Sicilians who were in the hostile ranks

deserted as soon as they saw that the disease was spreading through the unhealthiness of the place, and went

off to their own cities. The Carthaginians, who had nowhere to go to, perished to a man together with their

generals, Hippocrates and Himilco. When the disease assumed such serious proportions Marcellus transferred

his men to the city, and those who had been weakened by sickness were restored by shade and shelter. Still,

many of the Roman soldiers, too, were carried off by that pestilence.

When the land army of the Carthaginians had been thus wiped out, the Sicilians who had been with

Hippocrates took possession of two walled towns, not large ones certainly, but made safe by their situation

and strong fortifications. One was three miles from Syracuse, the other fifteen. They carried supplies to these

towns from their own states and asked for reinforcements. Bomilcar had in the meantime paid a second visit

to Carthage with his fleet and had drawn such a picture of the state of things in Syracuse as to lead the

government to hope that they might not only render effectual assistance to their friends, but even succeed in

capturing the Romans inside that city, which they had in some measure captured. He persuaded them to

despatch as many cargo ships as they could, laden with stores of all kinds, and also to augment his force of

fighting ships. The result was that he left Carthage with 130 ships of war and 700 transports. The winds were

favourable for him whilst sailing for Sicily, but they prevented him from rounding the promontory of

Pachinus. The news of Bomilcar's approach and then his unexpected delay excited first hope and then fear

amongst the Syracusans and just the reverse among the Romans. Epicydes was afraid that if the east wind

lasted much longer the Carthaginian fleet would return to Africa, and he handed Achradina over to the

commanders of the mercenaries and put off to meet Bomilcar. He found him at anchor with his ships headed

for the African coast and anxious to avoid a naval engagement, not because he was inferior in the strength or

number of his shipshe really had more than the Romansbut because the winds were more favourable to

them than to him; Epicydes, however, persuaded him to try his chance in a sea fight. When Marcellus became

aware that an army of Sicilians was being raised from the whole of the island, and that a Carthaginian fleet

was approaching with vast supplies, he determined, though inferior in the number of ships to prevent

Bomilcar from reaching Syracuse, lest he should be shut in by sea and land whilst he was confined and

hampered in a hostile city. The two fleets lay facing each other off the promontory of Pachinus, ready to

engage as soon as the sea was calm enough to allow them to sail into deep water. As soon as the east wind,

which had been blowing strongly for some days, dropped Bomilcar made the first move. It seemed as though

he was making for the open sea in order the better to round the promontory, but when he saw the Roman

ships sailing straight for him he crowded on all sail and skirting the coast of Sicily made for Tarentum,

having previously sent a message to Heraclea ordering the transports to return to Africa. Finding all his hopes

suddenly crushed, Epicydes did not care to go back to a city which was in a state of siege and a large part of

which was already taken. He sailed for Agrigentum, to watch events rather than to control them.

When the news of what had happened reached the camp of the Sicilians, viz. that Epicydes had left Syracuse

and that the island had been abandoned by the Carthaginians and almost surrendered a second time to the

Romans, they sent envoys to Marcellus to treat for the surrender of the city, having previously sounded in

frequent interviews the feelings of those who were undergoing the siege. They were practically united on

these two points, that all that had been included in the king's dominions should belong to Rome, and that all

else was to be retained by the Sicilians together with their liberty and their laws. They then invited those who

had been left in charge by Epicydes to a conference, the envoys telling them that the army of the Sicilians had

sent them to them as well as to Marcellus, so that those who were within and those who were outside of the


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beleaguered city might share the same fortune, and neither should make separate terms for themselves.

Admission was granted to them that they might converse with their friends and relatives. After explaining the

nature of their understanding with Marcellus and holding out a prospect of safety, they persuaded them to

join in an attack upon those to whom Epicydes had committed the governmentPolyclitus, Philistio, and

Epicydes, surnamed Sindon. They were put to death and the citizens were summoned to a public meeting.

Here the envoys complained bitterly of the straits they were in for food, and the other evils which they had

been in the habit of grumbling about in secret; they said that although they had so much to distress them, they

must not throw the blame on Fortune; it was in their own power to decide how long they would endure it. The

motives which led the Romans to attack Syracuse were those of affection, not animosity. When they heard

that the reins of government had been seized by Hippocrates and Epicydes, who had been first creatures of

Hannibal and then of Hieronymus, they set their armies in motion and began the siege, not for the purpose of

destroying the city but of crushing those who were tyrannising over it. But now that Hippocrates was

disposed of and Epicydes shut out from Syracuse and his officers put to death, what was there left to prevent

the Romans from wishing that Syracuse should be free from all harm, just as they would have wished it had

Hiero, that eminently loyal friend of Rome, been still alive? There was, then, no danger either to the city or

its people other than what would arise from their own action if they let slip that chance of reconciliation with

Rome. There would never be another so favourable as the one they had at that moment, just when it was plain

to all that Syracuse had been delivered from an impotent tyranny.

This address was received with universal approval. It was, however, decided to elect magistrates before

sending the envoys. From amongst the magistrates so elected they selected the envoys who were to be sent to

Marcellus. Their leader addressed him in the following terms: "It is not we, the people of Syracuse, who have

revolted from you, but Hieronymus, who acted much more wickedly towards us than towards you. And when

peace had been restored by the tyrant's death it was no Syracusan, but the king's creatures Hippocrates and

Epicydes, who disturbed it, by crushing us on the one hand by fear, on the other by treachery. No man can

say that there was ever a time during which we enjoyed liberty when we were not at peace with you. Now, at

all events, no sooner have we become our own masters through the death of the oppressors of Syracuse than

we come to you to give up our arms, to surrender ourselves, our city and its fortifications, to accept any

condition which you may lay upon us. To you, Marcellus, the gods have vouchsafed the glory of capturing

the noblest and fairest of Grecian cities. Whatever memorable achievement we have wrought by sea or land

enhances the splendour of your triumph. Would you wish that it should be only a glorious tradition how great

a city you have captured, rather than that it should be a spectacle for the eyes of posterity to rest upon? That it

should exhibit to all who visit it by land or sea the trophies we have won from Athenians and Carthaginians,

which are now the trophies you have won from us? That you should hand down to your house an unharmed

Syracuse to be kept under the patronage and protection of all who bear the name of Marcellus? Let not the

memory of Hieronymus weigh more with you than that of Hiero. He was your friend for a far longer time

than the other was your enemy. You found in him a real benefactor; this man's madness only availed to his

own destruction." As far as the Romans were concerned they could have gained all they wanted in perfect

security. It was amongst the besieged themselves that war existed with all its perils. The deserters, thinking

that they were being betrayed, communicated their fears to the mercenaries; they all flew to arms, and

beginning with the murder of the magistrates they commenced a general massacre of the citizens, killing in

their desperate madness everybody they met, and plundering all they could lay hands on. Then, that they

might not be without officers, they elected six, three to command in Achradina and three in Nasos. When the

tumult had somewhat subsided and the mercenaries found out on inquiry what agreement had been come to

with the Romans, the truth began to dawn upon them, and they realised that their case was quite distinct from

that of the deserters.

The envoys came back from their interview with Marcellus just at the right moment, and were able to assure

them that their suspicions were groundless and that the Romans saw no reason why they should visit them

with punishment. One of the three commanders in Achradina was a Spaniard named Moericus, and amongst

those who accompanied the envoys a soldier from the Spanish auxiliaries had designedly been introduced.


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When they had entered Achradina this man obtained a private interview with Moericus and described to him

the state of affairs in Spain, which he had quite recently left, and how everything there was under the power

of Rome. If Moericus chose to make himself of use to the Romans, he might be a leading man among his

countrymen, and either take service under the Roman standard or return to his own country, whichever he

chose. But if on the other hand he preferred to remain under siege, what hope had he of relief, shut in as he

was by sea and land? Moericus was impressed by the force of these arguments, and after it had been decided

to send envoys to Marcellus, he sent his brother as one of them. The same Spanish soldier conducted him by

himself to Marcellus. In this interview the details were settled and Marcellus pledged himself to observe the

conditions, after which the envoys returned to Achradina. In order to avoid the least chance of suspicion

Moericus made it known that he disapproved of envoys going to and fro, and gave orders that none were to

be admitted and none sent. Also, with a view to greater security, he thought that the conduct of the defence

ought to be properly distributed amongst the three commanders, so that each might be responsible for his own

section of the fortifications. They all agreed. In the division, his command extended from the fountain of

Arethusa to the mouth of the Great Harbour, and he managed to let the Romans know that. So Marcellus

ordered a cargo ship filled with troops to be towed by a quadrireme to the Island, and the men to land near the

gate adjoining the fountain. This order was carried out in the fourth watch, and Moericus, as previously

arranged, admitted the soldiers through the gate. At dawn Marcellus attacked Achradina with his full

strength, and not only those who were actually holding it, but the troops in Nasos also, left their posts and ran

to defend Achradina from the assault of the Romans. In the confusion of the attack some swift vessels, which

had previously been brought round to Nasos, landed troops. These making an unexpected attack upon the

halfmanned posts, and rushing through the gates, still open, out of which the garrison had just sallied to

defend Achradina, had little trouble in capturing a position which had been abandoned owing to the flight of

its defenders. There were none who did less to defend the place or to maintain their ground with any spirit

than the deserters; they did not even trust their own comrades, and fled in the middle of the fighting. When

Marcellus learnt that Nasos was captured and one district of Achradina occupied, and that Moericus with his

men had joined the Romans, he ordered the retreat to be sounded, for he was afraid that the royal treasure, the

fame of which exceeded the reality, might fall into the hands of plunderers.

The impetuosity of the soldiers being thus checked and time and opportunity given for the deserters in

Achradina to effect their escape, the Syracusans were at last relieved of their apprehensions and opened the

gates. They at once sent a deputation to Marcellus with the one request that they and their children might

remain unharmed. He called a council of war, to which he summoned the Syracusan refugees in the Roman

camp, and made the following reply to the deputation: "The crimes committed against the people of Rome

during these last few years by those who have held Syracuse quite outweigh all the good services which

Hiero rendered us during his fifty years' reign. Most of these, it is true, have recoiled on the heads of those

who were guilty of them, and they have punished themselves for their breach of treaties far more severely

than the Roman people could have wished. I have been for three years investing Syracuse, not that Rome may

make the city her slave, but that the leaders of deserters and renegades may not keep it in a state of

oppression and bondage. What the Syracusans could have done has been shown by those amongst them who

have been living within the Roman lines, by the Spaniard Moericus who brought over his men, and last of all

by the belated but courageous resolution which the Syracusans have now taken. After all the toils and dangers

which have endured for so long a time round the walls of Syracuse by sea and land, the fact that I have been

able to capture the city is nothing like such a reward as I should have received had I been able to save it."

After giving this reply he sent the quaestor with an escort to Nasos to receive the royal treasure into his

custody. Achradina was given up for plunder to the soldiers, after guards had been placed at the houses of the

refugees who were within the Roman lines.

Amongst many horrible instances of fury and rapacity the fate of Archimedes stands out. It is recorded that

amidst all the uproar and terror created by the soldiers who were rushing about the captured city in search of

plunder, he was quietly absorbed in some geometrical figures which he had drawn on the sand, and was killed

by a soldier who did not know who he was. Marcellus was much grieved and took care that his funeral was


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properly conducted; and after his relations had been discovered they were honoured and protected by the

name and memory of Archimedes. Such, in the main, were the circumstances under which Syracuse was

captured, and the amount of plunder was almost greater than if Carthage had been taken, the city which was

waging war on equal terms with Rome. A few days prior to the capture of Syracuse, T. Otacilius crossed over

from Lilybaeum to Utica with eighty quinqueremes. He entered the harbour before daylight and captured

some transports laden with corn, and then landing his men ravaged a considerable portion of the country

round Utica and carried back to his ships every description of plunder. He returned to Lilybaeum three days

after he had started with a hundred and thirty transports laden with corn and booty. The corn he at once sent

on to Syracuse; had it not been for that timely assistance, victors and vanquished alike would have been in

danger of a very serious famine.

For two years nothing very remarkable had happened in Spain; the contest was carried on by diplomacy more

than by arms. This summer the Roman commanders on leaving their winter quarters united their forces. A

council of war was called and they came to a unanimous decision that as up to that time all they had done was

to keep Hasdrubal from marching to Italy, it was now high time to make an effort to finish the war. During

the winter they had raised a force of 20,000 Celtiberians, and with this reinforcement they considered

themselves strong enough for the task. The enemies' force consisted of three armies. Hasdrubal, the son of

Gisgo, had united his army with Mago, and their joint camp was about a five days' march from the Romans.

Somewhat nearer to them was Hasdrubal, the son of Hamilcar, an old commander in Spain, who was in camp

at a city called Amtorgis. The Roman commanders wanted to dispose of him first, and they believed that they

had more than enough strength for the purpose; the only doubt in their minds was whether, after his defeat,

the other Hasdrubal and Mago would not retreat into the trackless forest and mountains and keep up a guerilla

warfare. The best plan, they thought, would be to form their force into two armies and finish the war in Spain

at one stroke. They arranged accordingly that P. Cornelius was to advance against Mago and Hasdrubal with

twothirds of the army of Romans and allied troops, and Cn. Cornelius with the remaining third of the old

army and the recently raised Celtiberians was to oppose the Barcine Hasdrubal. Both generals with their

armies advanced together as far as the town of Amtorgis where they encamped in full view of the enemy with

the river between them. Here Cn. Scipio took his stand with the force above mentioned, while Publius Scipio

went on to execute his share of the operations.

When Hasdrubal became aware that the Romans formed only a small portion of the army and that they were

depending entirely upon their Celtiberian auxiliaries, he determined to detach the latter from their Roman

service. He was quite at home with every form of treachery known to barbarians, and especially those

practised by the tribes amongst whom he had for so many years been campaigning. Both camps were full of

Spaniards, who had no difficulty in understanding each other's language, and secret interviews were held, in

the course of which he made an agreement with the Celtiberian chieftains, by the offer of a large bribe, that

they should withdraw their forces. They did not look upon this as very atrocious conduct, for it was not a

question of turning their arms against the Romans, and though the money was quite equal to the pay they

received in war, it was given them to abstain from war. Then, too, the mere rest from the toils of the

campaign, the thought of returning home, the delight of seeing their friends and their possessions were

universally welcomed. So the mass of the troops were quite as easily persuaded as their chiefs, and they had

nothing to fear from the Romans who were too few in number to keep them lack by force. This is a thing

against which Roman generals will always have to be on their guard, and instances such as these ought to

serve as warnings that they must not depend upon foreign auxiliaries to such an extent as not to have in their

camp a preponderance of that solidity and fighting power which native troops can alone supply. The

Celtiberians took up their standards and marched off. The Romans asked them why they were going, and

appealed to them to stay where they were, but the only answer they got was that they were called away by a

war at home. When Scipio saw that his allies could not be detained by either appeals or force and that without

them he was no match for the enemy, whilst a junction with his brother was out of the question, he

determined to retreat as far as he could; this seemed the only safe measure to adopt. His one object was to

avoid an encounter on open ground with the enemy who had crossed the river and were pressing closely at his


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heels.

P. Scipio was at the same time placed in a position quite as alarming but fraught with much greater danger by

the appearance of a new enemy. This was young Masinissa, at that time an ally of the Carthaginians, but

afterwards raised to fame and power by his friendship with Rome. He first sought to check Scipio's advance

with a body of Numidian horse, and he kept up incessant attacks upon him day and night. He not only cut off

all who had wandered too far from camp in search of wood and fodder, but he actually rode up to the camp

and charged into the middle of the outposts and pickets, creating alarm and confusion everywhere. In the

night he frequently upset the camp by making a sudden rush at the gates and the stockade; there was no place

and no time at which the Romans were free from anxiety and fear, and they were compelled to keep within

their lines, unable to obtain anything they wanted. It was fast becoming a regular siege and would evidently

become a still closer one if Indebilis, who was reported to be approaching with 7500 Suessetanians, should

join the Carthaginians. Cautious and prudent general though he was, Scipio was compelled by his position to

take the hazardous step of making a night march to oppose Indebilis' advance and to fight him wherever he

met him. Leaving a small force to guard the camp and placing Tiberius Fonteius in command, he started at

midnight and encountered the enemy. They fought in order of march rather than of battle; the Romans,

however, had the advantage, in spite of its being an irregular battle. But the Numidian horse, whom Scipio

thought he had eluded, swept round both flanks and created the greatest alarm. A fresh action had now begun

against the Numidians when a third enemy appeared; the Carthaginian generals had come up and were

attacking the rear. The Romans had to face a battle on both flanks and on their rear, and could not make up

their minds against what enemy to make their main attack or in what direction to close their line and charge.

Whilst their commander was fighting and encouraging his men and exposing himself in the hottest of the

turmoil he was run through by a lance in his left side. The massed body of the enemy who had charged the

closed ranks round their general, as soon as they saw Scipio falling lifeless from his horse were wild with joy

and ran in all directions shouting that the Roman commander had fallen. The news spread over the whole

field, and the enemy at once regarded themselves as unquestionably victorious, while the Romans equally felt

themselves vanquished. With the loss of the general there began at once a flight from the field. It was not

difficult to break through the Numidians and other lightarmed troops, but it was almost impossible to make

one's escape amidst such numbers of cavalry and of foot soldiers who rivalled horses in speed. Almost more

were killed in flight than in battle, and not a man would have survived had not the day been rapidly drawing

to a close so that night put an end to the carnage.

The Carthaginian generals were not slow to take advantage of their success. After allowing their men the

needful rest, they proceeded straight from the battlefield by forced marches to Hasdrubal, fully expecting

that when they had joined forces the war could be brought to a close. When they reached his camp, the

generals and the soldiers, in high spirits over their recent victory, exchanged hearty congratulations at the

destruction of so great a commander and his entire army, and looked forward with confidence to winning

another victory as complete. The report of the terrible disaster had not reached the Romans, but there was a

gloomy silence, a secret foreboding, such as usually happens when men feel a presentiment of coming

misfortune. The general, who saw himself deserted by his allies and knew that the forces of the enemy were

so largely augmented, was led still further by his own conjectures and inferences to suspect the occurrence of

some disaster much sooner than to entertain any hopes of success. "How," he asked himself, "could

Hasdrubal and Mago have brought up their army without opposition if they had not brought their own share

of the war to a successful close? How could his brother have failed to stop them or to follow them up so that

if he could not prevent their forming a junction he could at least have united his own forces with those of his

brother?" Filled with these anxieties he believed that the only safe course for him for the time being was to

retreat from his present position as far as he could. He accordingly accomplished a considerable march in a

single night, unobserved by the enemy and therefore unmolested. When it grew light the enemy became

aware of his departure, and sending on the Numidians in advance, commenced the pursuit with the utmost

speed of which they were capable. The Numidians came up with them before nightfall, and by making

repeated charges on flank and rear compelled them to come to a halt and defend themselves. Scipio, however,


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urged them to fight as well as they could and keep moving forward before they were overtaken by the

infantry.

As, however, what with fighting and halting, they had for some time been making very little progress and

night was close at hand, Scipio called his men off from battle, massed them in close order, and led them to

some rising ground, not, indeed, a very safe position, especially for unnerved troops, but still somewhat more

elevated than the ground round it. The baggage and the cavalry were placed in the centre and the infantry

drawn up round them, and at first they had no difficulty in repelling the attacks of the Numidians. But when

the three commanders appeared in full force with three regular armies it was obvious that they would be

unable to defend the position by arms alone in the absence of entrenchments. The general began to look

round him and consider whether it were in any way possible to surround himself with an earthwork. But the

hill was so bare and the ground so rocky that there was no brushwood to cut for a stockade nor earth for

constructing a rampart or carrying a fosse or for any other work. No part was naturally so steep or precipitous

as to render the approach or ascent difficult for the enemy; the whole surface of the hill rose in a gentle slope.

In order, however, to present to the enemy something which might look like a rampart they tied together their

saddles and the packs which the animals carried and piled them up all round them as if they were building up

a rampart to the usual height, and where there were not enough saddles they made it up by throwing all the

kits and packages of every kind into the gaps, as a barricade.

When the Carthaginian armies came up, their column had no difficulty in mounting the hill, but they stopped

short at the sight of the novel defence as though it were something uncanny. Their officers shouted out on all

sides: "Why are you stopping? Why do you not tear down and demolish that juggler's trick, which is hardly

strong enough to stop women and children? The enemy, hiding behind his baggage, is caught and held!" But

in spite of the taunts and sarcasms of the officers, it was anything but easy either to clamber over or to push

away the heavy obstacles in front of them, or to cut through the tightly packed saddles, buried as they were

beneath the baggage. After a considerable time they succeeded in forcing away the heavy obstacles and

opened a way for the troops, and when they had done this in several places the camp was rushed on all sides

and captured; the little band of defenders were slaughtered by the masses of the enemy, helpless in the hands

of their victors. Still a good many found refuge in the neighbouring woods and escaped to P. Scipio's camp

where Ti. Fonteius was in command. Some traditions assert that Cn. Scipio was killed in the first onset of the

enemy on the hill; according to others he escaped to a tower near the camp, and as they were unable to break

down the door with all their efforts, they lighted fires against it, and after it was burnt away they slew all

inside including the commander. Cn. Scipio was killed after he had been eight years in Spain, and

twentynine days after his brother's death. The grief felt at their death was as great throughout Spain as it was

in Rome. The City had to mourn not only for them, but for the loss of its armies, the defection of the

province, and the blow inflicted on the republic; in Spain it was the generals themselves whose loss was so

bitterly felt, more so in the case of Cnaeus, because he had held his command there for a longer time; he too

was the first to win popularity amongst the people, the first to show what Roman justice and Roman

selfcontrol and moderation really meant.

With the destruction of the armies it seemed as though Spain must be lost. But one man restored the fallen

fortunes of the State. There was in the army a Lucius Marcius, the son of Septimius, a Roman knight, an

active and energetic youth whose character and abilities were somewhat superior to the position in which he

had been born. His many natural gifts had been developed by Scipio's training, under whom he had learnt all

the arts of war. Out of the fugitive soldiers whom he had rallied, and some whom he had drawn from the

garrisons in Spain, he had formed quite a respectable army, and with it had joined Ti. Fonteius, Scipio's

lieutenant. After they had entrenched themselves in a camp on this side of the Ebrot his soldiers decided to

hold a regular election for the purpose of choosing a general to command the united armies, and they relieved

each other on sentinel and outpost duty so that every man might give his vote. So far did the Roman knight

surpass all others in the authority and respect which he possessed with the soldiers that the whole army

unanimously conferred the supreme command on L. Marcius. After this he spent the whole of the timeand


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short enough it wasin strengthening the defences of the camp and storing supplies in it, and the soldiers

carried out all his commands with alacrity and in anything but a despondent mood. But when the news

arrived that HasdrubalGisgo's sonhad crossed the Ebro and was coming to stamp out the remains of the

war and the soldiers saw the signal for battle put out by their new general they gave way completely. The

recollection of the men who had so lately commanded them, the proud confidence which they had always felt

in their generals and their armies when they went into battle quite unnerved them; they all burst into tears and

smote their heads; some raised their hands to heaven and reproached the gods; others lay on the ground and

invoked the names of their old commanders. Nothing could check these wild outbursts of grief, though the

centurions tried to rouse their men, and Marcius himself went about calming them and at the same time

reproaching them for their unmanly conduct. "Why," he asked them, "have you given way to womanish and

idle tears instead of bracing yourselves up to defend yourselves and the republic and not allowing your

commanders' death to go unavenged?"

Suddenly a shout was heard and the sound of trumpets, for the enemy was now close up to the rampart. In an

instant their grief changed to fury, they rushed to arms, and racing to the gates like madmen they dashed upon

the enemy who were coming on carelessly and in disorder. The sudden and unlooked for movement created a

panic among the Carthaginians. They wondered whence all these enemies had arisen, after their army had

been all but annihilated, what gave such daring and selfconfidence to men who had been vanquished and put

to flight, who had come forward as their commander now that the two Scipios were killed, who was over the

camp, who had given the signal for battle. Bewildered and astounded at all these utterly unlookedfor

surprises they at first slowly retired, then as the attack became heavier and more insistent they turned and

fled. There would have been either a frightful slaughter amongst the fugitives or a rash and dangerous attack

on the part of the pursuers if Marcius had not hurriedly given the signal to retire and kept back the excited

troops by throwing himself in front of the foremost and even holding some back with his hands. Then he

marched them back to camp still thirsting for blood. When the Carthaginians saw that none were pursuing

them after the first repulse from the rampart they imagined that they had been afraid to go any further, their

feelings of contempt returned, and they marched at a leisurely pace back to their camp. They showed as much

carelessness in guarding their own camp as they had shown in attacking the Roman, for although their enemy

was near them they regarded them as only the wreckage of two armies which had been destroyed a few days

before. Whilst they were, in consequence of this, neglectful of everything, Marcius, who had become

thoroughly aware of it, thought out a plan, at first glance hazardous rather than bold, which was to assume the

aggressive and attack the enemy's camp. He thought it would be easier to storm Hasdrubal's camp whilst he

was alone than to defend his own, in case the three commanders united their forces once more. Besides, if he

succeeded he would have gone far to retrieve their late disasters; if he failed the enemy could no longer

despise him, since he would have been the first to attack.

His plan seemed a desperate one, considering the position he was in, and might easily be upset by some

unforeseen incident creating a panic in the night. To guard against these dangers as far as possible, he thought

it well to address some words of encouragement to his men. He called them together and made the following

speech to them: "My loyalty and affection for my old commanders whether living or dead, as well as the

situation in which we now find ourselves, ought to convince every one of you, soldiers, that this command,

honourable as you rightly deem it to be, is, as a matter of fact, a position of very grave anxiety. For at a

moment when I was hardly sufficient master of myselfdid not fear dull the sense of painto find any

comfort in my distress, I saw myself compelled to take thought alone for you all, the hardest thing in the

world in a time of grief. Even when I have to consider how I can possibly preserve for my country you who

are all that remain out of two armies, it is still a grief to have to divert my thoughts from a sorrow that is ever

with me. Bitter memories vex me; the two Scipios haunt me in anxious thoughts by day and in dreams at

night; they rouse me from my slumbers and forbid me to suffer them or their soldiersyour own comrades

who never for eight years knew defeat in these landsor the republic, to remain unavenged. They call upon

me to follow their example and act on the principles they laid down; as no man obeyed them more faithfully

while they lived, so now that they are gone they would have me think that what they would have done on any


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occasion that arose is the best thing for me also to do. And I would have you, my soldiers, not follow them

with tears and laments as though they had ceased to be, for they live and are strong in the glory of all that

they have done, but go into battle thinking of them as if they were here to encourage you and give you the

signal. Surely it was nothing else than their image before your eyes which brought about that memorable

battle yesterday, in which you showed your enemy that the Roman name did not perish with the Scipios, and

that a people whose strength and courage even Cannae could not crush will rise superior to the hardest blows

of fortune.

"Well, as you showed such daring yesterday on your own account, I want now to see if you will show as

much daring at the bidding of your commander. When I gave the signal yesterday to recall you from your hot

pursuit of your disordered foe it was from no wish to damp your courage but to reserve it for a greater and

more glorious occasion, when you will shortly be able, prepared and armed, to fall upon the enemy when he

is off his guard, without his arms and even wrapped in slumbers. And in thus hoping, I am not trusting simply

to chance, but have good grounds for what I say. If any one were to ask you how, few as you are, you

managed to defend your camp against a mighty host, how after your defeat you were able to repel those who

had defeated you from your rampart, you would, I am sure, reply that this was the very danger you feared,

and therefore you strengthened your defences in every possible way and held yourselves at your posts in

readiness. And such is generally the case; men are least safe when their circumstances give them no cause for

fear; what you think of no importance you leave open and unguarded. There is nothing which the enemy are

less afraid of than that we who were lately surrounded and attacked should of our own motion attack their

camp. Let us venture where no one can believe we will venture. The fact that it is thought too difficult will

make it all the easier. I will lead you out in a silent march at the third watch of the night. I have ascertained

that they have no proper arrangement of sentinels and pickets. When once our shout is heard in their gates the

camp will be carried at the first rush. Then, whilst they are heavy with sleep, panicstruck at the

unlookedfor tumult, and surprised defenceless in their beds, that slaughter will take place amongst them

from which you were, to your intense disappointment, recalled yesterday.

"I know that the plan seems a daring one, but in difficult circumstances which leave little to hope for the

boldest measures are always the safest. If, when the critical moment comes, you hang back ever so little and

do not catch the opportunity as it flies past, you will look for it in vain when once you have let it go. There is

one army near us, two more are not very far away. If we attack them now, there is some hope for us; you

have already tried your strength against theirs. If we put off the day, and after yesterday's sortie are no longer

regarded with contempt, there is the danger of all the generals and their armies uniting. In that case, shall we

withstand the three generals, the three armies, which Cn. Scipio did not withstand when his army was in its

full strength? As our generals perished owing to their forces being divided, so the enemy can be crushed in

detail while they are divided. There is no other way of carrying on war; let us, then, wait for nothing beyond

the opportunity of the coming night. Now go, trusting to the help of the gods and get food and rest so that,

fresh and vigorous, you may break into the enemies' camp in the same courageous spirit in which you

defended your own." They were delighted to hear this new plan from their new general, and the more daring

it was the more it pleased them. The rest of the day was spent in getting their arms ready and in looking after

themselves. At the fourth watch they began to move.

The other Carthaginian forces were about six miles beyond the camp nearest to the Romans. Between them

lay a valley thickly wooded, and on some ground about halfway through the wood a Roman cohort,

adopting Punic tactics, concealed themselves with some cavalry. After the road was thus occupied midway,

the rest of the force marched in silence to the enemy nearest to them, and as there were no outposts in front of

the gates and no guard mounted they penetrated without any opposition into the camp just as if they were

entering their own. Then the signals were sounded and the battle shout raised. Some slew the enemy while

half asleep, others threw firebrands on to their huts, which were thatched with dry straw, others held the gates

to intercept the fugitives. The fire, the shouting, and the slaughter, all combined, bereft the enemy almost of

their senses and prevented them from either hearing one another on taking any measures for their safety.


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Without arms themselves they fell amongst troops of armed men; some rushed to the gates, others, finding

the ways blocked, sprang over the rampart, and all who escaped in this way fled at once to the other camp,

where they were met by the cohort and the cavalry running out from their concealment and all cut down to a

man. Even if any one had escaped from the carnage the Romans, after taking that camp, ran on so swiftly to

the other one that no one could get there before them to announce the disaster.

When they got to the second camp they found neglect and disorder everywhere, partly owing to its greater

distance from them and partly because some of the defenders had dispersed in quest of fodder and wood and

plunder. At the outposts the arms were actually piled, the soldiers, all unarmed, were sitting and lying about

on the ground or walking up and down in front of the gates and rampart. In this state of careless disorder they

were assailed by the Romans who were tired by their recent fighting and flushed with victory. It was

impossible to hold the gates against them, and once within the gates a desperate battle began. At the first

alarm there was a rush from all parts of the camp, and there would have been a long and obstinate struggle if

the Carthaginians had not seen in the bloodstained shields of the Romans plain traces of the former contest,

which filled them with dismay and terror. They all turned and fled wherever they could find the way open to

escape, and all but those who had been already killed were driven out of the camp. So in a night and a day

two of the enemies' camps had been carried under the leadership of L. Marcius. According to Claudius, who

translated the annals of Acilius from Greek into Latin, as many as 37,000 of the enemy were slain, 1830

being prisoners, besides an immense amount of plunder. The latter included a silver shield one hundred and

thirtyseven pounds in weight, together with a statuette of Hasdrubal. Valerius Antias relates that only

Mago's camp was taken, when the enemy lost 7000 killed; in the other battle when the Romans made the

sortie and fought with Hasdrubal 10,000 were killed and 4380 made prisoners. Piso says that 5000 men were

killed when Mago was ambushed while recklessly pursuing our men. All these authors dwell upon the

greatness of Marcius, and they exaggerate the glory he really won by describing a supernatural incident.

Whilst he was addressing his troops they say that a flame shot from his head, without his being aware of it, to

the great terror of the soldiers standing round. It is also stated that there was in the temple on the Capitol

before it was burnt a shield called "the Marcian" with a statuette of Hasdrubal, as memorials of his victory.

For some time after this, matters were quiet in Spain, neither side after the defeats they had suffered being

anxious to risk a decisive action.

While these events were occurring in Spain, Marcellus, after the capture of Syracuse, settled the affairs of

Sicily with so much justice and integrity as to enhance not merely his own reputation but the greatness and

dignity of Rome as well. He removed to Rome the ornaments of the city, the statues and pictures in which

Syracuse abounded; they were, it is true, spoils taken from the enemy and acquired by the laws of war, but

that was the beginning of our admiration for Greek works of art, which has led to the present reckless

spoliation of every kind of treasure, sacred and profane alike. This has at last recoiled upon the gods of

Rome, upon that temple especially which Marcellus so splendidly adorned. For the shrines near the Capena

Gate, which Marcellus dedicated, used to be visited by strangers on account of the very beautiful specimens

of that class of ornament; but very few are to be seen today. Whilst Marcellus was settling the affairs of

Sicily, deputations from nearly all the communities in the island visited him. The treatment they received

varied with their circumstances. Those who had not revolted or had returned to our friendship prior to the

capture of Syracuse were welcomed and honoured as loyal allies; those who after its capture had surrendered

through fear, had to accept the terms which the victor imposes on the vanquished. The Romans, however, had

considerable remnants of the war still on their hands round Agrigentum. There were still left in the field the

generals Epicydes and Hanno who had commanded in the late war, and a fresh general who had been sent in

place of Hippocrates by Hannibal, a man of Libyphoeniclan nationality, called Hippacritanushis

fellowcountrymen called him Muttinesa man of energy and enterprise, who had had a thorough military

training under that master of war, Hannibal. He was furnished by Epicydes and Hanno with a force of

Numidians, and with these troopers he committed such extensive depredations on the lands of those who

were hostile and was so active in keeping his friends loyal by always bringing them help at the right moment,

that in a short time all Sicily had heard of him and there was no one from whom the supporters of Carthage


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expected greater things.

Up to that time Epicydes and Hanno had been compelled to keep within the fortifications of Agrigentum;

now, however, in a spirit of selfconfidence quite as much as in compliance with the advice of Muttines, they

ventured outside and fixed their camp by the Himera. No sooner was this reported to Marcellus than he

promptly moved up and encamped about four miles from the enemy with the intention of waiting for any

action he might take. But no time was allowed him for either delay or deliberation; Muttines crossed the river

and charged his enemy's outposts, creating the greatest terror and confusion. The next day there was almost a

regular battle and he drove the Romans within their lines. Then he was recalled by tidings of a mutiny which

had broken out amongst the Numidians in Hanno's camp. Nearly three hundred of them had gone off to

Heraclea Minoa. When he left the camp to reason with them and recall them, he is said to have most earnestly

advised the generals not to engage the enemy in his absence. They both resented this; more especially Hanno

who had long been jealous of Muttines' reputation. "Is Muttines," he exclaimed, "to dictate to me; a lowborn

African to give orders to a Carthaginian general bearing the commission of the senate and people? "Epicydes

wished to wait, but he brought him over to his view, that they should cross the river and offer battle, for, he

argued, if they waited for Muttines, and then fought a successful action, he would undoubtedly get all the

credit for it.

Marcellus was of course intensely indignant at the idea of the man who had turned Hannibal, flushed with his

victory at Cannae, aside from Nola now giving way before enemies whom he had defeated by sea and land,

and he ordered his men to seize their arms at once and march out in order of battle. Whilst he was forming his

lines, ten Numidians from the opposing army galloped up to him at full speed with the announcement that

their countrymen would take no part in the fighting, first because they sympathised with the three hundred

mutineers who had gone to Heraclea, and secondly because they saw that their leader had been got rid of on

the very day of battle by generals who wanted to cast a cloud on his reputation. Deceitful as that nation

usually is, they kept their promise on that occasion. The news flew quickly through the ranks that the cavalry

of whom they stood in greatest fear had left the enemy in the lurch, and their courage rose accordingly. The

enemy, on the other hand, were in a great state of alarm because, not only were they losing the support of

their strongest arm, but there was a chance of their being attacked by their own cavalry. So there was not

much of a conflict, the action was decided by the first battle shout and charge. When the opposing lines met,

the Numidians were standing quietly on the wings; when they saw their own side turn tail they joined them in

their flight for a short distance, but when they saw them making in all haste for Agrigentum they dispersed to

all the neighbouring cities for fear of having to stand a siege. Several thousand men were killed and eight

elephants captured. This was the last battle Marcellus fought in Sicily. After his victory he returned to

Syracuse. As the year was now almost at an end, the senate decreed that the praetor P. Cornelius should send

instructions to the consuls at Capua for one of them, if they approved, to come to Rome to appoint new

magistrates while Hannibal was at a distance and no very critical operations were going on at Capua. After

receiving the despatch the consuls came to a mutual arrangement that Claudius should conduct the elections

and Fulvius remain at Capua. The new consuls were Cn. Fulvius Centimalus and P. Sulpicius Galba, the son

of Servius, a man who had never before filled a curule office. The election of praetors followed; those elected

were L. Cornelius Lentulus, M. Cornelius Cethegus, C. Sulpicius, and C. Calpurnius Piso. Piso took over the

urban jurisdiction, Sicily was allotted to Sulpicius, Apulia to Cethegus, Sardinia to Lentulus. The consuls had

their commands extended for another year.


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Bookmarks



1. Table of Contents, page = 3

2. The History of Rome, Vol. III, page = 4

   3. Livy, page = 4

   4. Book 21. From Saguntum to the Trebia, page = 4

   5. Book 22. The Disaster of Cannae, page = 34

   6. Book 23. Hannibal at Capua, page = 67

   7. Book 24. The Revolution in Syracuse, page = 95

   8. Book 25. The Fall of Syracuse, page = 122