The Life of Epicurus...........................................................................................................................................1

Diogenes..................................................................................................................................................1

I. EPICURUS was an Athenian, and the son of Neocles and Chľrestrate, of the burgh of Gargettus, and of

the family of the Philaidae, as Metrodorus tells us in his treatise on Nobility of Birth. Some writers, and

among them Heraclides, in his Abridgment of Sotion, say, that as the Athenians had Colonis and Samos, he

was brought up there, and came to Athens in his eighteenth year, while Xenocrates was president of the

Academy, and Aristotle at Chalcis. But after the death of Alexander, the Macedonian, when the Athenians

II. And when he had spent some time there, and collected some disciples, he again returned to Athens, in the

time of Anaxicrates, and for some time studied philosophy, mingling with the rest of the philosophers; but

subsequently, he somehow or other established the school which was called after his name; and he used to

say, that he began to study philosophy when he was fourteen years of age; but Apollodorus, the Epicurean, in

the first book of his account of the life of Epicurus, says, that he came to the study of philosophy, having

conceived a great contempt for the grammarians, because they could not explain to him the statements in

But Hermippus tells us, that he himself was a teacher of grammar, and that afterwards, having met with the

books of Democritus, he applied himself with zeal to philosophy, on which account Timon says of him:

And he had for his companions in his philosophical studies, his three brothers, Neocles, Chaeredemus, and

Aristobulus, who were excited by his exhortations, as Philodemus, the Epicurean, relates in the tenth book of

the Classification of Philosophers. He had also a slave, whose name was Inus, as Myronianus tells us in his

III. But Diotimus, the Stoic, was very hostile to him, and calumniated him in a most bitter manner, publishing

fifty obscene letters, and attributing them to Epicurus, and also giving him the credit of the letters, which

generally go under the name of Chrysippus. And Posidonius, the Stoic, and Nicolaus, and Sotion, in the

twelfth of these books, which are entitled the Refutations of Diocles, of which there are altogether

twentyfour volumes, and Dionysius, of Halicarnassus, have also attacked him with great severity; for they

say that he used to accompany his mother when she went about the small cottages, performing purification,

and that he used to read the formula, and that he used also to keep a school with his father at very low terms.

Also, that he, as well as one of his brothers, was a most profligate man in his morals, and that he used to live

with Leontium, the courtesan. Moreover, that he claimed the books of Democritus on Atoms, and that of

Aristippus on Pleasure, as his own; and that he was not a legitimate citizen; and this last fact is asserted also

They also say that he used to flatter Mithras, the steward of Lysimachus, in a disgraceful manner, calling him

in his letters Paean, and King; and also that he flattered Idomeneus, and Herodotus, and Timocrates who had

revealed all his secret practices, and that he flattered them on this very account. And in his letter to Leontium,

he says, "O king Apollo, my dear Leontium, what transports of joy did I feel when I read your charming

letter." And to Themista, the wife of Leontius, he writes, "I am ready and prepared, if you do not come to me,

to roll myself to wherever you and Themista invite me." And he addresses Pythocles, a beautiful youth, thus,

"I will sit quiet," says he, "awaiting your longedfor and godlike approach." And at another time, writing to

Themista, he says, "That he had determined to make his way with her," as Theodorus tells us in the fourth

He also wrote to many other courtesans, and especially to Leontium, with whom Metrodorus also was in

love. And in his treatise on the Chief Good, he writes thus, "For I do not know what I can consider good, if I

put out of sight the pleasures which arise from flavors, and those which are derived from amatory pleasures,

and from music and from the contemplation of beauty." And in his letter to Pythocles, he writes, "And, my

Epictetus also attacks him as a most debauched man, and reproaches him most vehemently, and so does

Timocrates, the brother of Metrodorus, in his treatise entitled the Merry Guests, and this Timocrates had been

a disciple in his school, though he afterwards abandoned it; and he says that he used to vomit twice a day, in

consequence of his intemperance; and that he himself had great difficulty in escaping from this nocturnal

philosophy, and that mystic kind of reunion. He also accuses Epicurus of shameful ignorance in his

reasoning, and still more especially in all matters relating to the conduct of life. And says that he was in a

pitiable state of health, so that he could not for many years rise up from his sofa; and that he used to spend a

minae a day on his eating, as he himself states in his letter to Leontium, and in that to the philosophers at

Mitylene. He also says that many courtesans used to live with him and Metrodorus; and among them

IV. And in the thirtyseven books which he wrote about natural philosophy, they say that he says a great

many things of the same kind over and over again, and that in them he writes in contradiction of other

philosophers, and especially of Nausiphanes, and speaks as follows, word for word: "But if this man had a

continual labor, striving to bring forth the sophistical boastfulness of his mouth, like many other slaves." And

Epicurus also speaks of Nausiphanes in his letters, in the following terms: "These things led him on to such

arrogance of mind, that he abused me and called me a schoolmaster." He used also to call him Lungs, and

Blockhead, and Humbug, and Fornicator. And he used to call Platos followers Flatterers of Dionysius, but

Plato himself he called Golden. Aristotle he called a debauchee and a glutton, saying that he joined the army

after he had squandered his patrimony, and sold drugs. He used to call Protagoras a porter, and the secretary

of Democritus, and to say that he taught boys their letters in the streets. Heraclitus, he called a disturber;

Democritus, he nicknamed Lerocrates; [1a] and Antidorus, Saenidorus; [1b] The Cynics he called the

enemies of Greece; and the Dialecticians he charged with being eaten up with envy. Pyrrho, he said, was

V. But these men who say this are all wrong, for there are plenty of witnesses of the unsurpassable kindness

of the man to everybody; both his own country which honored him with brazen statues, and his friends who

are so numerous that they could not be counted in whole cities; and all his acquaintances who were bound to

him by nothing but the charms of his doctrine, none of whom ever deserted him, except Metrodorus, the son

of Stratoniceus, who went over to Carneades, probably because he was not able to bear with equanimity the

unapproachable excellence of Epicurus. Also, the perpetual succession of his school, which, when every

other school decayed, continued without any falling off, and produced a countless number of philosophers,

succeeding one another without any interruption. We may also speak here of his gratitude towards his

parents, and his beneficence to his brothers, and his gentleness to his servants (as is plain from his will, and

from the fact too, that they united with him in his philosophical studies, and the most eminent of them was

the one whom I have mentioned already, named Inus); and his universal philanthropy towards all men.

His piety towards the gods, and his affection for his country was quite unspeakable; though, from an excess

of modesty, he avoided affairs of the state. And though he lived when very difficult times oppressed Greece,

he still remained in his own country, only going two or three times across to Ionia to see his friends, who

used to throng to him from all quarters, and to live with him in his garden, as we are told by Apollodorus

VI. And Diocles, in the third book of his Excursion, says that they all lived in the most simple and

economical manner; "They were content," says he, "with a small cup of light wine, and all the rest of their

drink was water." He also tells us that Epicurus would not allow his followers to throw their property into a

common stock, as Pythagoras did, who said that the possessions of friends were held in common. For he said

that such a doctrine as that was suited rather for those who distrusted one another; and that those who

distrusted one another were not friends. But he himself in his letters, says that he is content with water and

plain bread, and adds, "Send me some Cytherean cheese, so that if I wish to have a feast, I may have the

means." This was the real character of the man who laid down the doctrine that pleasure was the chief good;

And as we advance further, we shall learn this fact from his dogmas, and his maxims.

VII. Of all the ancient philosophers he was, as we are told by Diocles, most attached to Anaxagoras (although

on some points he argued against him); and to Archelaus, the master of Socrates. And, Diocles adds, he used

to accustom his pupils to preserve his writings in their memory. Apollodorus, in his Chronicles, asserts that

he was a pupil of Nausiphanes, and Praxiphanes; but he himself does not mention this; but says in his letter to

Euridicus, that he had been his own instructor. He also agreed with Hermarchus in not admitting that

Leucippus deserved to be called a philosopher; though some authors, among whom is Apollodorus, speak of

him as the master of Democritus. Demetrius, the Magnesian, says that he was a pupil of Xenocrates also.

VIII. He uses plain language in his works with respect to anything he is speaking of, for which Aristophanes,

the grammarian, blames him, on the ground of that style being vulgar. But he was such an admirer of

perspicuity, that even in his treatise on Rhetoric, he aims at and recommends nothing but clearness of

expression. And in his letters, instead of the usual civil expressions, "Greeting," "Farewell," and so on, he

substitutes, "May you act well," "May you live virtuously," and expressions of that sort. Some of his

biographers assert that it was he who composed the treatise entitled the Canon, in imitation of the Tripod of

Nausiphanes, whose pupil they say that he was, and add that he was also a pupil of Pamphilus, the Platonist

IX. They further tell us that he began to study philosophy at twelve years of age, and that he presided over his

school thirtytwo years. And he was born as we are told by Apollodorus, in his Chronicles, in the third year

of the hundred and ninth Olympiad, in the archonship of Sosigenes, on the seventh day of the month

Gamelion, seven years after the death of Plato. And when he was thirtytwo years of age, he first set up his

school at Mitylene, and after that at Lampsacus; and when he had spent five years in these two cities, he came

to Athens; and he died there in the second year of the hundred and twentyseventh Olympiad, in the

archonship of Pytharatus, when he had lived seventytwo years. And Hermarchus, the son of Agemarchus,

He died of the stone, as Hermarchus mentions in his letters, after having been ill a fortnight; and at the end of

the fortnight, Hermippus says that he went into a brazen bath, properly tempered with warm water, and asked

for a cup of pure wine and drank it; and having recommended his friends to remember his doctrines, he

expired. And there is an epigram of ours on him, couched in the following language:

"According to this, my will, I give all my possessions to Amynomachus, of Bate, the son of Philocrates, and

to Timocrates, of Potamos, the son of Demetrius; according to the deed of gift to each, which is deposited in

the temple of Cybele; on condition that they make over my garden and all that is attached to it to Hermarchus,

of Mitylene, the son of Agemarchus; and to those who study philosophy with him, and to whomsoever

Hermarchus leaves as his successors in his school, that they may abide and dwell in it, in the study and

practice of philosophy; and I give it also to all those who philosophize according to my doctrines, that they

may, to the best of their ability, maintain my school which exists in my garden, in concert with

Amynomachus and Timocrates; and I enjoin their heirs to do the same in the most perfect and secure manner

that they can; so that they also may maintain my garden, as those also shall to whom my immediate

successors hand it down. As for the house in Melita, that Amynomachus and Timocrates shall allow

Hermarchus that he may live in it during his life, together with all his companions in philosophy.

"Out of the income which is derived from that property, which is here bequeathed by me to Amynomachus

and Timocrates, I will that they, consulting with Hermarchus, shall arrange in the best manner possible the

offerings to the names in honor of the memory of my father, and mother, and brothers, and myself, and that

my birthday may be kept as it has been in the habit of being kept, on the tenth day of the month Gamelion;

and that the reunion of all the philosophers of our school, established in honor of Metrodorus and myself,

may take place on the twentieth day of every month. They shall also celebrate, as I have been in the habit of

doing myself, the day consecrated to my brothers, in the month Poseideon; and the day consecrated to

"Amynomachus and Timocrates, shall be the guardians of Epicurus, the son of Metrodorus, and of the son of

Polyaenus, as long as they study philosophy under, and live with Hermarchus. In the same way also, they

shall be the guardians of the daughter of Metrodorus, and when she is of marriageable age, they shall give her

to whomsoever Hermarchus shall select of his companions in philosophy, provided she is well behaved and

obedient to Hermarchus. And Amynomachus and Timocrates shall, out of my income, give them such a sum

for their support as shall appear sufficient year by year, after due consultation with Hermarchus. And

Amynomachus and Timocrates shall, out of my income, give them such a sum for their support as shall

appear sufficient year by year, after due consultation with Hermarchus. And they shall associate Hermarchus

with themselves in the management of my revenues, in order that everything may be done with the approval

of that man who has grown old with me in the study of philosophy, and who is now left as the president of all

those who have studied philosophy with us. And as for the dowry for the girl when she is come to

marriageable age, let Amynomachus and Timocrates arrange that, taking for the purpose such a sum from my

property as shall seem to them, in conjunction with Hermarchus, to be reasonable. And let them also take care

of Nicanor, as we ourselves have done; in order that all those who have studied philosophy with us, and who

have assisted us with their means, and who have shown great friendship for us, and who have chosen to grow

old with us in the study of philosophy, may never be in want of anything as far as our power to prevent it may

"I further enjoin them to give all my books to Hermarchus; and, if anything should happen to Hermarchus

before the children of Metrodorus are grown up, then I desire that Amynomachus and Timocrates, shall take

care that, provided they are well behaved, they shall have everything that is necessary for them, as far as the

estate which I leave behind me shall allow such things to be furnished to them. And the same men shall also

take care of everything else that I have enjoined; so that it may all be fulfilled, as far as the case may permit.

"Of my slaves, I hereby emancipate Inus, and Nicias, and Lycon: I also give Phaedrium her freedom."

And when he was at the point of death, he wrote the following letter to Idomeneus:

"We have written this letter to you on a happy day to us, which is also the last day of our life. For strangury

has attacked me, and also a dysentery, so violent that nothing can be added to the violence of my sufferings.

But the cheerfulness of my mind, which arises from there collection of all my philosophical contemplation,

counterbalances all these afflictions. And I beg you to take care of the children of Metrodorus, in a manner

XI. He had a great number of pupils, of whom the most eminent were Metrodorus, the Athenian, and

Timocrates, and Sandes, of Lampsacus; who, from the time that he first became acquainted with him, never

left him, except one when he went home for six months, after which he returned to him. And he was a

virtuous man in every respect, as Epicurus tells us in his Fundamental Principles. And he also bears witness

to his virtue in the third book of his Timocrates. And being a man of this character, he gave his sister Bates in

marriage to Idomeneus; and he himself had Leontium, the Attic courtesan, for his concubine. He was very

unmoved at all disturbances, and even at death; as Epicurus tells us, in the first book of his Metrodorus. He is

said to have died seven years before Epicurus himself, in the fiftythird year of his age. And Epicurus

himself, in the will which I have given above, gives many charges about the guardianship of his children,

showing by this that he had been dead some time. He also had a brother whom I have mentioned before, of

The writings of Metrodorus are these. Three books addressed to Physicians; one essay on the Sensations; one

addressed to Timocrates; one on Magnanimity; one on the Illness of Epicurus; one addressed to the

Dialecticians; one against the Nine Sophists; one on the Road to Wisdom; one on Change; one on Riches; one

XII. Likewise Polyaenus, of Lampsacus, the son of Athenodorus, was a man of mild and friendly manners, as

XIII. And his successor was Hermarchus, of Mitylene, the son of Agemarchus, a poor man; and his favorite

pursuit was rhetoric. And the following excellent works of his are extant. Twentytwo books of letters about

Empedocles; an essay on Mathematics; A treatise against Plato; another against Aristotle. And he died of

XIV. There was also Leontius, of Lampsacus, and his wife Themista, to whom Epicurus wrote.

XV. There were also Colotes and Idomeneus; and these also were natives of Lampsacus. And among the

most eminent philosophers of the school of Epicurus, were Polystratus, who succeeded Hermarchus, and

Dionysius who succeeded him, and Basilides who succeed him. Likewise Apollodorus, who was nicknamed

the tyrant of the gardens, was a very eminent man, and wrote more than four hundred books. And there were

XVI. There were also three other persons of the name of Epicurus; first, the son of Leonteus and Themista;

XVII. And Epicurus was a most voluminous author, exceeding all men in the number of his books; for there

are more than three hundred volumes of them; and in the whole of them there is not one citation from other

sources, but they are filled wholly with the sentiments of Epicurus himself. In the quantity of his writings he

was rivaled Chrysippus, as Carneades asserts, who calls him a parasite of the books of Epicurus; for if ever

this latter wrote anything, Chrysippus immediately set his heart on writing a book of equal size; and in this

way he often wrote the same thing over again; putting down whatever came into his head; and he published it

all without any corrections, by reason of his haste. And he quotes such numbers of testimonies from other

authors, that his books are entirely filled with them alone; as one may find also in the works of Aristotle and

Such then, so numerous are the works of Epicurus; the chief of which are the following: Thirtyseven

treatises on Natural Philosophy; one on Atoms and the Void; one on Love; an abridgment of the Arguments

employed against the Natural Philosophers; Doubts in Contradiction of the Doctrines of the Megarians;

Fundamental Propositions; a treatise on Choice and Avoidance; another on the Chief Good; another on the

Criterion, called also the Canon; the Chaeridemus, a treatise on the Gods; one on Piety; the Hegesiana; four

essays on Lives; one on Just Dealing; the Neocles; one essay addressed to Themista; the Banquet; the

Eurylochus; one essay addressed to Metrodorus; one on Seeing; one on the Angle in an Atom; one on Touch;

one on Fate; Opinions on the Passions; one treatise addressed to Timocrates; Prognostics; Exhortations; a

treatise on Specters; one on Perceptions; the Aristobulus; an essay on Music; one on Justice and the other

Virtues; one on Gifts and Gratitude; the Polymedes; the Timocrates, a treatise in three books; the Metrodorus,

in five books; the Antidorus, in two books; Opinions about the South Winds; a treatise addressed to Mithras;

XVIII. And I will endeavor to give an abridgment of the doctrines contained in these works, as it may be

agreeable, quoting three letters of his, in which is the epitome of all his philosophy. I will also give his

fundamental and peculiar opinions, and any adages which he uttered which appear worthy of being selected.

So that you may be thoroughly acquainted with the man, and may also judge that I understand him.

Now the first letter is one that he wrote to Herodotus, on the subject of Natural Philosophy; the second is one

that he wrote to Pythocles, which is about the Heavenly Bodies; the third is addressed to Menaeceus, and in

We must now begin with the first, after having said a little by way of preface concerning the divisions of

XIX. Now he divides philosophy into three parts. The canonical, the physical, and the ethical. The canonical,

which serves as an introduction to knowledge, is contained in the single treatise which is called the Canon.

The physical embraces the whole range of speculation on subjects of natural philosophy, and is contained in

the thirtyseven books on nature, and in the letters again it is discussed in an elementary manner. The ethical

contains the discussions of Choice and Avoidance; and is comprised in the books about lives, and in some of

the Letters, and in the treatise of the Chief Good. Accordingly, most people are in the habit of combining the

canonical divisions with the physical; and then they designate the whole under the names of the criterion of

the truth, and a discussion of principles, and elements. And they say that the physical division is conversant

about production, and destruction, and nature; and that the ethical division has reference to the objects of

XX. Dialectics they wholly reject as superfluous. For they say that the correspondence of words with things is

sufficient for the natural philosopher, so as to enable him to advance with certainty in the study of nature.

Now, in the Canon, Epicurus says that the criteria of truth are the senses, and their preconceptions, and the

passions. But the Epicureans, in general, add also the perceptive impressions of the intellect. And he says the

same thing in his Abridgment, which he addresses to Herodotus, and also in his Fundamental Principles. For,

says he, the senses are devoid of reason, nor are they capable of receiving any impressions of memory. For

they are not by themselves the cause of any motion, and when they have received any impression from any

external cause, then they can add nothing to it, nor can they subtract anything from it. Moreover, they are out

of the reach of any control; for one sensation cannot judge of another which resembles itself; for they have all

an equal value. Nor can one judge of another which is different from itself; since their objects are not

identical. In other words, one sensation cannot control another, since the effects of all of them influence us

equally. Again, Reason cannot pronounce on the senses; for we have already said that all reasoning has the

senses for its foundation. Reality and the evidence of sensation establish the certainty of the senses; for the

It follows from these considerations that we ought to judge of things which are obscure by their analogy to

those which we perceive directly. In fact, every notion proceeds from the senses, either directly, or in

consequence of some analogy, or proportion, or combination. Reasoning having always a share in these last

operations. The visions of insanity and of sleep have a real object for they act upon us; and that which has no

XXI. By preconception, the Epicureans meant a sort of comprehension as it were, or right opinion, or notion,

or general idea which exists in us; or, in other words, the recollection of an external object often perceived

anteriorly. Such for instance, is the idea: "Man is being of such and such nature." At the same moment that

we utter the word man, we conceive the figure of a man, in virtue of a preconception which we owe to the

preceding operations of the senses. Therefore, the first notion which each word awakens in us is a correct

one; in fact, we could not seek for anything if we had not previously some notion of it. To enable us to affirm

that what we see at a distance is a horse or an ox, we must have some preconception in our minds which

makes us acquainted with the form of a horse and an ox. We could not give names to things, if we had not

XXII. These preconceptions then furnish us with certainty. And with respect to judgments, their certainty

depends on our referring them to some previous notion, of itself certain, in virtue of which we affirm such

and such a judgment; for instance, "How do we know whether this thing is a man?"

The Epicureans also refer to Ôopinion as supposition. And say that it is at times true, and at times false; for

that, if it is supported by testimony, and not contradicted by testimony, then it is true; but if it is not supported

by testimony, and is contradicted by testimony, then it is false. On which account they have introduced the

expression of "waiting," as if, before pronouncing that a thing seen is a tower, we must wait till we come

XXIII. They say that there are two passions, pleasure and pain, which affect everything alive. And that the

one is natural, and the other foreign to our nature; with reference to which all objects of choice and avoidance

are judged of. They say also, that there are two kinds of investigation; the one about facts, the other about

mere words. And this is as far as an elementary sketch can goŃtheir doctrine about division, and about the

"For those, oh Herodotus, who are not able accurately to comprehend all the things which I have written

about nature, nor able to investigate those larger books which I have composed on the subject, I have made an

abridgment of the whole discussion on this question as far as I thought sufficient to enable them to recollect

accurately the most fundamental points; that so, on all grave occasions, they might be able to assist

themselves on the most important and undeniable principles; in proportion as they devoted themselves to

speculations on natural philosophy. And here it is necessary for those who have made sufficient progress in

their view of the general question, to recollect the principles laid down as elements of the whole discussion;

for we have still greater need of a correct notion of the whole, than we have even of an accurate

understanding of the details. We must therefore, give preference to former knowledge, and lay up in our

memory those principles on which we may rest, in order to arrive at an exact perception of things, and at a

"Now one has arrived at that point when one has thoroughly embraced the conceptions, and, if I may so

express myself, the most essential forms, and when one has impressed them adequately on ones senses. For

this clear and precise knowledge of the whole, taken together, necessarily facilitates ones particular

perceptions, when one has brought ones ideas back to the elements and simple terms. In short, a veritable

synthesis, comprising the entire circle of the phaenomena of the universe, ought to be able to resume in itself,

and in a few words, all the particular facts which have been previously studied. This method being useful

even to those who are already familiarized with the laws of the universe, I recommend them, while still

pursuing without intermission the study of nature, which contributes more than anything else to the

tranquillity and happiness of life, to make a concise statement, or summary of their opinions.

"First of all then Herodotus, one must determine with exactness the notion comprehended under each separate

word, in order to be able to refer to it, as to a certain criterion, the conceptions which emanate from ourselves,

the ulterior researches and the difficulties; otherwise the judgment has no foundation. One goes on from

demonstration to demonstration ad infinitum; or else one gains nothing beyond mere words. In fact, it is

absolutely necessary that in should perceive directly, and without the assistance of any demonstration, the

fundamental notion which every word expresses, if we wish to have any foundation to which we may refer

our researches, our difficulties, and our personal judgments, whatever in other respects may be the criterion

which we adopt, whether we take as our standard the impressions produced on our senses, or the actual

impression in general; or whether we cling to the idea by itself, or to any other criterion.

"We must also note carefully the impressions which we receive in the presence of objects, in order to bring

ourselves back to that point in the circumstances in which it is necessary to suspend the judgment, or even

when the question is about things, the evidence of which is not immediately perceived.

"When these foundations are once laid we may pass to the study of those things, about which the evidence is

not immediate. And, first of all, we must admit that nothing can come of that which does not exist; for, were

the fact otherwise, then everything would be produced from everything, and there would be no need of any

seed. And if that which disappeared were so absolutely destroyed as to become nonexistent, then every

thing would soon perish, as the things with which they would be dissolved would have no existence. But, in

truth, the universal whole always was such as it now is, and always will be such. For there is nothing into

which it can change; for there is nothing beyond this universal whole which can penetrate into it, and produce

(And Epicurus establishes the same principles at the beginning of the great Abridgment; and in the first book

"Now the universal whole is a body; for our senses bear us witness in every case that bodies have a real

existence; and the evidence of the senses, as I have said before, ought to be the rule of our reasoning about

everything which is not directly perceived. Otherwise, if that which we call the void, or space, or intangible

nature, had not a real existence, there would be nothing on which the bodies could be contained, or across

which they could move, as we see that they really do move. Let us add to the reflection that one cannot

conceive, either in virtue of perception, or of any analogy founded on perception, any general quality peculiar

to all beings which is not either an attribute, or an accident of the body, or of the void."

(The same principles are laid down in the first, and fourteenth, and fifteenth book of the treatise on Nature;

"Now, of bodies, some are combinations, and some are the elements out of which these combinations are

formed. These last are indivisible, and protected from every kind of transformation; otherwise everything

would be resolved into nonexistence. They exist by their own force, in the midst of the dissolution of the

combined bodies, being absolutely full, and as such offering no handle for destruction to take hold of. It

follows, therefore, as a matter of absolute necessity, that the principles of things must be corporeal,

"The universe is infinite. For that which is finite has an extreme, and that which has an extreme is looked at

in relationship to something else. Consequently, that which has not an extreme, has no boundary; and if it has

no boundary, it must be infinite, and not terminated by any limit. The universe then is infinite, both with

reference to the quantity of bodies of which it is made up, and to the magnitude of the void; for if the void

were infinite, the bodies being finite, then, the bodies would not be able to rest in any place; they would be

transported about, scattered across the infinite void for want of any power to steady themselves, or to keep

one another in their places by mutual repulsion. If, on the other hand, the void were finite, the bodies being

"Again: the atoms form the bodies, these full elements from which the combined bodies come, and into

which they resolve themselves, assume an incalculable variety of forms, for the numerous differences which

the bodies present cannot possibly result from an aggregate of the same forms. Each variety of forms contains

an innumerable amount of atoms, but there is not for that reason an infinity of atoms; it is only the number of

(Epicurus adds, a little lower down, that divisibility, ad infinitum, is impossible; for says he, the only things

which change are the qualities; unless, indeed one wishes to proceed from division to division, till one arrives

(He says, farther on, that they move with an equal rapidity from all eternity, since the void offers no more

"Among the atoms, some are separated by great distances others come very near to one another in the

formations of combined bodies, or at times are enveloped by others which are combining; but in this latter

case they, nevertheless, preserve their own peculiar motion, thanks to the nature of the void, which separates

the one from the other, and yet offers them no resistance. The solidity which they possess causes them, while

knocking against one another, to react the one upon the other; till at last the repeated shocks bring on the

dissolution of the combined body; and for all this there is no external cause, the atoms and the void being the

(He says, further on, that the atoms have no peculiar quality of their own, except from magnitude and weight.

As to color, he says in the twelfth book of his Principia, that it varies according to the position of the atoms.

Moreover, he does not attribute to the atoms any kind of dimensions; and accordingly, no atom has ever been

perceived by the senses; but this expression, if people only recollect what is here said, will by itself offer to

"But, again, the worlds also are infinite, whether they resemble this one of ours or whether they are different

from it. For, as the atoms are, as to their number, infinite, as I have proved above, they necessarily move

about at immense distances; for besides the infinite multitude of atoms, of which the world is formed, or by

which it is produced, could not be entirely absorbed by one single world, nor even by any worlds, the number

of which was limited, whether we suppose them like this word of ours, or different form it. There is therefore,

"Moreover, there are images resembling, as far as their form goes, the solid bodies which we see, but which

differ materially from them in the thinness of their substance. In fact it is not impossible but that there may be

in space some secretions of this kind and an aptitude to form surfaces without depth, and of an extreme

thinness; or else that from the solids there may emanate some particles which preserve the connection, the

disposition, and the motion which they had in the body. I give the name of images to these representations;

and indeed, their movement through the void taking place, without meeting any obstacle or hindrance,

perfects all imaginable extent in an inconceivable moment of time; for it is the meeting of obstacles, or the

absence of obstacles, which produces the rapidity or the slowness of their motion. At all events, a body in

motion does not find itself, at any momentum imaginable, in two places at the same time; that is quite

inconceivable. From what ever point of infinity it arrives at some appreciable moment, and whatever may be

the spot it its course in which we perceive its motion, it has evidently quitted that spot at the moment of our

thought; for this motion which, as we have admitted up to this point, encounters no obstacle to its rapidity, is

wholly in the same condition as that the rapidity of which is diminished by the shock of some resistance. "It

is useful, also, to retain this principle, and to know that the images have an incomparable thinness; which fact

indeed is in no respect contradicted by sensible appearances. From which it follows that their rapidity also is

incomparable; for they find everywhere an easy passage, and besides, their minuteness causes them to

experience no shock, or at all events to experience but a very slight one, while a multitude of elements very

"One must not forget that the production of images is simultaneous with the thought; for from the surface of

the bodies images of this kind are continually flowing off in an insensible manner indeed, because they are

immediately replaced. They preserve for a long time the same disposition and the same arrangement that the

atoms do in the solid body, although, notwithstanding, their form may be sometimes altered. The direct

production of images in space is equally instantaneous, because these images are only light substances

"But there are other manners in which phaenomena of this kind are produced; for there is nothing in all this

which at all contradicts the senses, if one only considers in what way the senses are exercised, and if one is

inclined to explain the relation which is established between external objects and ourselves. Also, one must

admit that something passes from external objects into us in order to produce in us sight and the knowledge

of forms; for it is difficult to conceive that external objects can affect us through the medium of the air which

is between us and them, or by means of rays, whatever emissions proceed from us to them, so as to give us an

impression of their form and color. This phenomenon, on the contrary, is perfectly explained, if we admit that

certain images of the same color, of the same shape, and of a proportionate magnitude pass from these objects

to us, and so arrive at being seen and comprehended. These images are animated by an exceeding rapidity,

and as on the other side, the solid object forming a compact mass, and comprising a vast quantity of atoms,

emits always the same quantity of particles, the vision is continued, and only produces in us one single

perception which preserves always the same relation to the object. Every conception, every sensible

perception which bears upon the form or the other attributes of these images, is only the same form of the

solid perceived directly, either in virtue of a sort of actual and continued condensation of the image, or in

"Error and false judgments always depend upon the supposition that a preconceived idea will be confirmed,

or at all events will not be overturned, by evidence. Then, when it is not confirmed, we form our judgments in

virtue of a sort of initiation of the thoughts connected, it is true with the perception, and with a direct

representation; but still connected also with a conception peculiar to ourselves, which is the parent of error. In

fact the representations which intelligence reflects like a mirror, whether one perceives them in a dream or by

any other conceptions of the intellect, or of any other of the criteria, can never resemble the objects that one

calls real and true, unless there were objects of this kind perceived directly. And, on the other side, error

could not be possible, if we did not receive some other motion also, a sort of initiative of intelligence

connected; it is true with direct representation, but going beyond that representative. These conceptions being

connected with direct perception which produces the representation, but going beyond it, in consequence of a

motion peculiar to the individual though, produces error when it is not confirmed by evidence, or when it is

contradicted by evidence; but when it is confirmed, or when it is not contradicted by evidence, then it

"We must carefully preserve these principles in order not to reject the authority of the faculties which

perceive truth directly; and not, on the other hand, to allow what is false to be established with equal

"Moreover, hearing is produced by some sort of current proceeding from something that speaks, or sounds, or

roars, or in any manner causes any sort of audible circumstances. And this current is diffused into small

bodies resembling one another in their parts; which, preserving not only some kind of relation between one

another, but even a sort of particular identity with the object from which they emanate, puts us, very

frequently, into a communication of sentiments with this object, or at least causes us to become aware of the

existence of some external circumstance. If these currents did not carry with them some sort of sympathy,

then there would be no such perception. We must not therefore think that it is the air which receives a certain

form, under the action of the voice or some other sound. For it is utterly impossible that the voice should act

in this manner on the air. But the percussion produced in us when we, by the utterance of a voice, cause a

disengagement of certain particles, constitutes a current resembling a light whisper, and prepares an acoustic

"We must admit that the case of smelling is the same as that of hearing. There would be no sense of smell if

there did not emanate from most objects certain particles capable of producing an impression on the sense of

smell. One class being illsuited to the organ, and consequently producing a disordered state of it, the other

"One must also allow, that the atoms possess not one of the qualities of sensible objects, except form, weight,

magnitude and anything else is unavoidably inherent in form; in fact, every quality is changeable, but the

atoms are necessarily unchangeable; for it is impossible but that in the dissolution of combined bodies, there

must be something which continues solid and indestructible, of such a kind, that it will not change either into

what does not exist, or out of what does not exist; but that it results either from a simple displacement of

parts, which is not the most usual case, or from the addition or subtraction of certain particles. It follows from

that, that that which does not admit of any change in itself, is imperishable, participates in no respect in the

nature of changeable things, and in a word, has its dimensions and forms immutable determined. And this is

proved plainly enough, because even in the transformations which take place under our eyes, in consequence

of the retrenchment of certain parts, we can still recognize the form of these constituent parts; while those

qualities, which are not constituent parts, do not remain like the form, but perish in the dissolution of the

combination. The attributes which we have indicated, suffice to explain all the differences of combined

bodies; for we must inevitably leave something indestructible, lest everything should resolve itself into

"However, one must not believe that every kind of magnitude exists in atoms, lest we find ourselves

contradicted by phaenomena. But we must admit that there are atoms of different magnitude, because, as that

is the case, it is then more easy to explain the impressions and sensations; at all events, I repeat, it is not

necessary for the purpose of explaining the differences of the qualities, to attribute to atoms every kind of

"We must not suppose either, that an atom can become visible to us; for, first of all, one does not see that that

is the case, and besides, one cannot even conceive, how an atom is to become visible; besides, we must not

believe, that in a finite body there are particles of every sort, infinite in number; consequently, on must not

only reject the doctrine of infinite divisibility in parcels smaller and smaller, lest we should be reducing

everything to nothing, and find ourselves forced to admit, that in a mass composed of a crowd of elements,

existence can reduce itself to nonexistence. But one cannot even suppose that a finite can be susceptible of

transformation ad infinitum, or even of transformation into smaller objects that itself; for when once one has

said that there are in an object particles of every kind, infinite in number, there is absolutely no means

whatever of imagining that this object can have only a finite magnitude; in fact, it is evident that these

particles, infinite in number, have some kind of dimension or other, and whatever this dimension may be in

other respects, the objects which are composed of it will have an infinite magnitude; in presenting forms

which are determined, and limits which are perceived by the senses, one conceives, easily, without it being

necessary to study this last question directly, that this would be the consequence of the contrary supposition,

"One must also admit that the most minute particle perceptible to the sense, is neither absolutely like the

objects which are susceptible of transformation, nor absolutely different from them. It has some characteristic

in common with he object which admit of transformation, but it also differs from them, inasmuch as it does

not allow any distinct parts to be discerned in it. When then, in virtue of these common characteristic, and of

this resemblance, we wish to form an idea of the smallest particle perceptible by the senses, in taking the

objects which change, for our terms of comparison, it is necessary that we should seize on some characteristic

common to these different objects. In this way, we examine them successively, form the first to the last, not

by themselves, more as composed of parts in juxtaposition, but only in their extent; in other words, we

consider, the magnitudes by themselves, and in an abstract manner, inasmuch as they measure, the greater a

greater extent, and the smaller a smaller extent. This analogy applies to the atom, as far as we consider it as

having the smallest dimensions possible. Evidently by its minuteness, it differs from all sensible objects, still

this analogy is applicable to it; in a word, we establish by this comparison, that the atom really has some

extent, but we exclude all considerable dimensions, for the sake of only investing it with the smallest

"We must also admit, in taking for our guide the reasoning which discourses to us things which are invisible

to the senses, that the most minute magnitudes, those which are not compound magnitudes, and which from

the limit of sensible extent, are the first measure of the other magnitudes which are only called greater or less

in their relation to the others. For these relations which they maintain with these particles, which are not

subject to transformation, suffice to give them this characteristic of first measure. But they cannot, like atoms,

combine themselves, and form compound bodies in virtue of any motion belonging to themselves.

"Moreover, we must not say (while speaking of the infinite), that such or such a point is the highest point of

it, or the lowest. For height and lowness must not be predicated of the infinite. We know, that in reality, that

if, wishing to determine the infinite, we conceive a point above our head, this point, whatever it may be, will

never appear to us to have the character in question: otherwise, that which would be situated above the point

so conceived as the limit of the infinite, would be at the same moment, and by virtue of its relation to the

"It follows that thought can only conceive that one single movement of transference, from low to high, ad

infinitum; and one single movement from high to low. From low to high, when even the object in motion,

going from us to the places situated above our heads, meets ten thousand times with the feet of those who are

above us; and from high to low, when in the same way it advances towards the heads of those who are below

us. For these two movements, looked at by themselves and in their whole, are conceived as really opposed the

"Moreover, all the atoms are necessarily animated by the same rapidity, when they move across the void, or

when no obstacle thwarts them. For why should heavy atoms have a more rapid movement than those which

are small and light, since in no quarter do they encounter any obstacle? Why, on the other hand, should the

small atoms have a rapidity superior to that of the large ones, since both the one and the other find

everywhere an easy passage, from the very moment that no obstacle intervenes to thwart their movements?

Movement from low to high, horizontal movement to and fro, in virtue of the reciprocal percussion of the

atoms, movement downwards, in virtue of their weight, will be all equal, for in whatever sense the atom

moves, it must have a movement as rapid as the thought, till the moment when it is repelled, in virtue of some

external cause, or of its own proper weight, by the shock of some object which resists it.

"Again, even in the compound bodies, one atom does not move more rapidly than another. In fact, if one only

looks at the continued movement of an atom which takes place in an indivisible moment of time, the briefest

possible, they all have a movement equally rapid. At the same time, an atom has not, in any moment

perceptible to the intelligence, a continued movement in the same direction; but rather a series of oscillating

movements from which there results, in the last analysis, a continued movement perceptible to the senses. If

then, one were to suppose, in virtue of a reasoning on things invisible, that, in the intervals of time accessible

to thought, the atoms have a continued movement one would deceive ones self, for that which is conceived

"Let us now return to the study of the affections, and of the sensations; for this will be the best method of

proving that the soul is a bodily substance composed of light particles, diffused over all the members of the

body, and presenting a great analogy to sort of spirit, having an admixture of heat, resembling at one time

one, and at another time the other of those two principles. There exists in it a special part, endowed with an

extreme mobility, in consequence of the exceeding slightness of the elements which compose it, and also in

reference to its more immediate sympathy with the rest of the body. That it is which the faculties of the soul

sufficiently prove, and the passions, and the mobility of its nature, and the thoughts, and, in a word,

everything, the privation of which is death. We must admit that it is in the soul most especially that the

principle of sensation resides. At the same time, it would not possess this power if it were not enveloped by

the rest of the body which communicates it to it, and in its turn receives it from it; but only in certain

measure; for there are certain affections of the soul of which it is not capable.

"It is on that account that, when the soul departs, the body is no longer possessed of sensation; for it has not

this power, (namely that of sensation) in itself; but on the other hand, this power can only manifest itself in

the soul through the medium of the body. The soul, reflecting the manifestations which are accomplished in

the substance which environs it, realizes in itself, in a virtue or power which belongs to it, the sensible

affections, and immediately communicates them to the body in virtue of the reciprocal bonds of sympathy

which unite it to the body; that is the reason why the destruction of a part of the body does not few after it a

cessation of all feeling in the soul while it resides in the body, provided that the senses still preserve some

energy; although, nevertheless, the dissolution of the corporeal covering, or even of any one of it portions,

"The rest of the body, on the other hand, even when it remains, either as a whole, or in any part, loses all

feeling by the dispersion of that aggregate of atoms, whatever it may be, that forms the soul. When the entire

combination of the body is dissolved, then the soul too is dissolved, and ceases to retain those faculties which

were previously inherent in it, and especially the power of motion; so that sensation perishes equally as far as

the soul is concerned; for it is impossible to imagine that it still feels, from the moment when it is no longer

in the same conditions of existence, and no longer possesses the same movements of existence in reference to

the same organic system; form the moment, in short, when the things which cover and surround it are no

(Epicurus expresses the same ideas in other works, and adds that the soul is composed of atoms of the most

perfect roundness and lightness; atoms wholly different from those of fire. He distinguishes in it the irrational

part which is diffused over the whole body, from the rational part which has its seat in the chest, as is proved

by the emotions of fear and joy. He adds that sleep is produced either when the parts of the soul diffused over

the whole of the body concentrate themselves, or when they disperse and escape by the pores of the body; for

"It must also be observed, that I use the word incorporeal in the usual acceptation of the word, to express that

which is in itself conceived as such. Now, nothing can be conceived in itself as incorporeal except the void;

but the void cannot be either passive or active; it is only the condition and the place of movement.

Accordingly, they who pretended that the soul is incorporeal, utter words destitute of sense; for if it had this

character, it would not be able either to do or to suffer anything; but, as it is, we see plainly enough that it is

"Let us then apply all these reasoning to the affections and sensations, recollecting the ideas which we laid

down at the beginning, and then we shall see clearly that these general principles contain an exact solution of

"As to forms, and hues, and magnitudes, and weight, and the other qualities which one looks upon as

attributes, whether it be of every body, or of those bodies only which are visible and perceived by the senses,

this is the point of view under which they ought to be considered: they are not particular substances, having a

peculiar existence of their own, for that cannot be conceived; nor can one say any more that they have no

reality at all. They are not incorporeal substances inherent in the body, nor are they parts of the body. But

they constitute by their union, I repeat, the eternal substance of the body. Each of these attributes has ideas

and particular perceptions which correspond to it; but they cannot be perceived independently of the whole

subject taken entirely. The union of all these perceptions forms the idea of the body. Bodies often possess

other attributes which are not eternally inherent in them, but which nevertheless, cannot be ranged among the

incorporeal and invisible things. Accordingly, it is sufficient to express the general idea of the movement of

transference to enable us to conceive in a moment certain distinct qualities, and those combined beings,

which, being taken in their totality, receive the name of bodies; and the necessary and eternal attributes

"There are certain conceptions corresponding to these attributes; but nevertheless, they cannot be known

abstractedly, and independently of some subjects; and further, inasmuch as they are not attributes necessarily

inherent in the idea of a body, one can only conceive them in the moment in which they are visible; they are

realities nevertheless; and one must not refuse them being an existence merely because they have neither the

characteristic of the compound beings to which we give the name of bodies, nor that of the eternal attributes.

We should be equally deceived if we were to suppose that they have a separate and independent existence;

for that is true neither of them nor of the eternal attributes. They are, as one sees plainly, accidents of the

body; accidents which do not of necessity make any part of its nature; which cannot be considered as

independent substances, but still to each of which sensation gives the peculiar character under which it

"Another important question is that of time. Here we cannot apply any more the method of examination to

which we submit other objects, where we study with reference to a give subject; and which we refer to the

preconceptions which exist in ourselves. We must seize, by analogy, and going round the whole circle of

things comprised under this general denomination for timeŃwe must seize, I sayŃthat essential character

which causes us to say that time is long or short. It is not necessary for that purpose to seek for any new

forms of expression as preferable to those which are in common use; we may content ourselves with those by

which time is usually indicated. Nor need we, as certain philosophers do, affirm any particular attribute of

time, for that would be to suppose that its essence is the same as that of this attribute. It is sufficient to seek

for the ingredients of which this particular nature which we call time is composed, and for the means by

which it is measured. For this we have no need of demonstration; a simple exposition is sufficient. It is, in

fact, evident, that we speak of time as composed of days and nights, and parts of days and nights; passiveness

and impassability, movement and repose, are equally comprised in time. In short it is evident that in

connection with these different states, we can conceive a particular property to which we give the name of

(Epicurus lays down the same principles in the second book of his treatise on Nature, and in his great

"It is from the infinite that the worlds are derived, and all the finite aggregates which present numerous

analogies with the things which we observe under our own eyes. Each of these objects, great and small, has

been separated from the infinite by a movement peculiar to itself. On the other hand, all these bodies will be

successively destroyed, some more, and others less rapidly; some under the influence of one cause, and others

(It is evident, after this, that Epicurus regards the worlds as perishable, since he admits that their parts are

capable of transformation. He also says in other places, that the earth rests suspended in the air.)

(He says, in fact, in the twelfth book of his treatise on the World, that the worlds differ from one another;

"Let us also beware of thinking that animals are derived from the infinite; for there is no one who can prove

that the germs from which animals are born, and plants, and all the other objects which we contemplate, have

been brought from the exterior in such a world, and that this same world would not have been able to produce

"Again, we must admit that in many and various respects, nature is both instructed and constrained by

circumstances themselves; and that Reason subsequently makes perfect and enriches with additional

discoveries the things which it has borrowed from nature; in some cases rapidly, and in others more slowly.

And in some cases according to periods and times greater than those which proceed from the infinite; in other

cases according to those which are smaller. So, originally it was only in virtue of express agreements that one

gave names to things. But men whose ideas and passion varied according to their respective nations, formed

these names of their own accord, uttering diverse sounds produced by each passion, or by each idea,

following the differences of the situations and of the peoples. At a later period one established in each nation,

in a uniform manner, particular terms intended to render the relations more easy, and language more concise.

Educated men introduced the notion of things not discoverable by the senses, and appropriated words to them

when they found themselves under the necessity of uttering their thoughts; after this, other men, guided in

"As to the heavenly phaenomena, such as the motion and course of the stars, the eclipses, their rising and

setting, and all other appearances of the same kind, we must beware of thinking that they are produced by any

particular being which has regulated, or whose business it is to regulate, for the future, the order of the world,

a being immortal and perfectly happy; for the cares and anxieties, the benevolence and the anger, far from

being compatible with felicity, are, on the contrary, the consequence of weakness, of fear, and of the want

which a thing has of something else. We must not fancy either that these globes of fire, which roll on is

space, enjoy a perfect happiness, and give themselves, with reflection and wisdom, the motions which they

possess. But we must respect the established notions on this subject, provided, nevertheless, that they do not

all contradict the respect due to truth; for nothing is more calculated to trouble the soul than this strife of

contradictory notions and principles. We must therefore admit that from the first movement impressed on the

heavenly bodies since the organization of the world there is derived a sort of necessity which regulates their

"Let us be well assured that it is to physiology that it belongs to determine the causes of the most elevated

phaenomena, and that happiness consists, above all things, in the science of the heavenly things and their

nature, and in the knowledge of analogous phaenomena which may aid us in the comprehension of the ethics.

These heavenly phenomena admit of several explanations; they have no reason of a necessary character, and

one may explain them in different manners. In a word, they have no relationŃa moments consideration will

prove this by itselfŃwith those imperishable and happy natures which admit of no division and of no

confusion. As for the theoretical knowledge of the rising and setting of the stars, of the movement of the sun

between the tropics, of the eclipses, and all other similar phaenomena, that is utterly useless, as far as any

influence upon happiness that it can have. Moreover, those who, though possessed of this knowledge, are

ignorant of nature, and of the most probable causes of the phaenomena, are no more protected from fear than

if they were in the most complete ignorance; they even experience the most lively fears, for the trouble, with

which the knowledge of which they are possessed inspires them, can find no issue, and is not dissipated by a

"As to us, we find many explanations of the motions of the sun, of the rising and setting of the stars, of the

eclipse and similar phaenomena, just as well as of the more particular phaenomena. And one must not think

that this method of explanation is not sufficient to procure happiness and tranquillity. Let us content

ourselves with examining how it is that similar phaenomena are bought about under our own eyes, and let us

apply these observations to the heavenly objects and to everything which is not known but indirectly. Let us

despise those people who are unable to distinguish facts susceptible of different explanations from others

which can only exist and be explained in one single way. Let us disdain those men who do not know, by

means of the different images which result form distance, how to give an account of the different appearances

of things; who, in a word, are ignorant about what are the objects which can excite any trouble in us. If, then,

we know that such a phaenomenon can be brought about in the same manner as another give phaenomenon of

the same character which does not inspire us with any apprehension; and if, on the other hand, we know that

it can take place in many different manners, we shall not be more troubled at sight of it than if we know the

"We must also recollect that which principally contributes to trouble the spirit of men is the persuasion which

they cherish that the stars are beings imperishable and perfectly happy, and that then ones thoughts and

actions are in contradiction to the will of these superior beings; they also being deluded by these fables,

apprehend an eternity of evils, they fear the insensibility of death, as that could affect them. What do I say? It

is not even belief, but inconsiderateness and blindness which govern them in every thing, to such a degree

that, not calculating these fears, they are just as much troubled as if they really had faith in these vain

phantoms. And the real freedom from this kind of trouble consists in being emancipated from all these things,

and in preserving the recollection of all the principles which we have established, especially of the most

essential of them. Accordingly, it is well to pay a scrupulous attention to existing phaenomena and to the

sensations, to the general sensations for general things, and to the particular sensations for particular things.

In a word, we must take note of this, the immediate evidence with which each of these judicial faculties

furnishes us; for, if we attend to these points, namely, whence confusion and fear arise, we shall divine the

causes correctly, and we shall deliver ourselves from those feelings, tracing back the heavenly phaenomena to

their causes, and also all the other which present themselves at every step, and inspire the common people

"This, Herodotus, is a kind of summary and abridgment of the whole question of natural philosophy. So that,

if this reasoning be allowed to be valid, and be preserved carefully in the memory, the man who allows

himself to be influenced by it, even though he may not descend to a profound study of its details, will have a

great superiority of character over other men. He will personally discover a great number of truths which I

have myself set forth in my entire work; and these truths being stored in his memory, will be a constant

assistance to him. By means of these principles, those who have descended into the details, and have studied

the question sufficiently, will be able, in bring in all their particular knowledge to bear on the general subject,

to run over without difficulty almost the entire circle of the natural philosophy; those, on the other hand, who

are not yet arrived at perfection, and who have not been able to hear me lecture on these subjects, will be able

in their minds to run over the main of the essential notions, and to derive assistance from them for the

"Cleon has brought me your letter, in which you continue to evince towards me an affection worthy of the

friendship which I have for you. You devote all your care, you tell me, to engraving in your memory those

ideas which contribute to the happiness of life; and you entreat me at the same time to send you a simple

abridgment and abstract of my ideas on the heavenly phaenomena, in order that you may without difficulty

preserve the recollection of them. For, say you, what I have written on this subject in my other works is

"I willingly yield to your desire, and I have good hope, that in fulfilling what you ask, I shall be useful too to

many others, especially to those who are as yet novices in the real knowledge of nature, and to those to whom

the perplexities and the ordinary affairs of life leave but little leisure. Be careful then to seize on those

precepts thoroughly, engrave them deeply in your memory, and meditate on them with the abridgment

"Know then, that it is with the knowledge of the heavenly phaenomena, both with those which are spoken of

in contact with one another, and of those which have a spontaneous existence, as with every other science; it

has no other aim but that freedom from anxiety, and that calmness which is derived from a firm belief.

"It is not good to desire what is impossible, and to endeavor to enunciate a uniform theory about everything;

accordingly, we ought not here to adopt the method, which we have followed in our researches into ethics, or

in the solution of problems of natural philosophy. We there said, for instance, that there are other things,

except bodies and the void, and that the atoms are the principles of things, and so the rest. In a word, we gave

"We cannot act in the same way with respect to the heavenly phaenomena; these productions may depend

upon several different causes, and we may give many different explanations on this subject, equally agreeing

with the impression of the senses. Besides, it is not here a question about reasoning on new principles, and of

laying down, priori, rules for the interpretation of nature; the only guides for us to follow are the

appearances themselves; for that which we have in view is not a set of systems and vain opinions, but much

"The heavenly phaenomena do not inspire those who give different explanations of them, conformable with

appearances, instead of explaining them by hypothesis, with any alarm. But if, abandoning hypothesis, one at

the same time renounces the attempt to explain them by means of analogies founded on appearances, then

one is placing ones self altogether at a distance from the science of nature, in order to fall into fables.

"It is possible that the heavenly phaenomena may present some apparent characteristics which appear to

assimilate them to those phaenomena which we see taking place around ourselves, without there being any

real analogy at the bottom. For the heavenly phaenomena may depend for their production on many different

causes; nevertheless, we must observe the appearances presented by each, and we must distinguish the

different circumstances which attach to them, and which can be explained in different manners by means of

"The world is a collection of things embraced by the heaven, containing the stars, the earth, and all visible

objects. This collection, separated from the infinite is terminated by an extremity, which is either rare, or

dense, or revolving, or in a state of repose, or of a round, or triangular, or some shape or other in fact, for it

may be any shape the dissolution of which must bring the destruction of everything which they embrace. In

fact, it can take place in every sort of way, since there is not one of those things which are seen which

testifies against this world in which we cannot detect any extremity; and that such worlds are infinite in

number is easily seen, and in the [muepsilontaualphaxi?omicronsigmamuiotaomicroneta:

metacosmos?], as we call the space between the worlds, being a huge space made up of plenum and void, but

not, as some philosophers pretend, an immensity of space absolutely empty. This production of a world may

be explained thus: seeds suitably appropriated to such an end may emanate either from one or from several

worlds, or from the space that separates them; they flow towards a particular point where they become

collected together and organized; after that, other germs come to unite them together is such a way as to form

a durable whole, a basis, a nucleus to which all successive additions unite themselves.

"One must not content ones self in this question with saying, as one of the natural philosophers has done, that

there is a reunion of the elements, or a violent motion in the void under the influence of necessity, and that

the body which is thus produced increases until it come to crash against some other; for this doctrine is

"The sun, the moon, and the other stars, were originally formed separately, and were afterwards

comprehended in the entire total of the world. All the other objects which our world comprises, for instance,

the earth and the sea, were also formed spontaneously, and subsequently gained size, by the addition and

violent movement of light substances, composed of elements of fire and air, or even of these two principles at

once. This explanation, moreover, is in accordance with the impressions of the senses.

"As to the magnitude of the sun and of the other stars, it is, as far as we are concerned, such as it appears to us

(This same doctrine is reproduced, and occurs again in the eleventh book of his treatise on Nature; where he

says, "if the distance has made it lose is size, ‡ fortiori, it would take away its brilliancy; for color has not,

"But considered by itself, the sun may be a little greater or a little smaller than it appears; or it may be just

such as it looks; for that is exactly the case with the fires of common occurrence among men, which are

perceived by the senses at distance. Besides, all the difficulties on this subject will be easily explained if one

attends to the clear evidence of the perceptions, as I have shown in my books about Nature.

"The rising and setting of the sun, of the moon, and of the stars, may depend on the fact of their becoming

lighted up, and extinguished alternately, and in order which we behold. One may also give other reasons for

the phaenomenon, which are not contradicted by any sensible appearances; accordingly, one might explain

them by the passage of the stars above and below the earth, for the impressions of the senses agree also with

"As to their motion, one may make that depend on the circular movement of the entire heaven. One may also

suppose that the stars move, while the heaven itself is immovable; for there is nothing to prevent the idea that

originally, before the formation of the world, they may have received, by the appointment of fate, an impulse

from east to west, and that now their movement continues in consequence of their heat, as the fire naturally

"The intertropical movements of the sun and moon may depend, either on the obliquity impressed by fate on

the heaven at certain determined epochs, or on the resistance of the air, or on the fact that these ignited bodies

stand in need of being nourished by a matter suitable to their nature, and that this matter fails them; or finally,

they may depend on the fact their having originally received an impulse which compels them to move as they

do describing a sort of spiral figure. The sensible evidence does not in the least contradict these different

suppositions, and all those of the same kind which one can form, having always a due regard to what is

possible, and bring back each phaenomenon to its analogous appearances in sensible facts, without

"The evacuations and subsequent replenishing of the moon may depend either on a conversion of this body,

or on the different forms which the air when in a fiery state can adopt, or perhaps to the interposition of

another body, or lastly, to some one of the causes by which one gives account of the analogous phaenomena

which pass under our eyes. Provided, however, that one does not obstinately adopt an exclusive mode of

explanation; and that, for want of knowing what is possible for a man to explain, and what is inaccessible to

It may also be possibly the case that the moon has a light of her own, or that she reflects that of the sun. For

we see around us many objects which are luminous of themselves, and many other which have only a

borrowed light. In a word, one will not be arrested by any of the celestial phaenomena, provided that one

always recollects that there are many explanations possible; that one examines the principles and reasons

which agree with this mode of explanation, and that one does not proceed in accounting for the facts which

do not agree with this method, to suffer ones self to be foolishly carried away, and to propose a separate

explanation for each phaenomenon, sometimes in one way, and sometimes in another.

"The appearance of a face in the orb of the moon, may depend either on a displacement of its parts, or on the

interposition of some obstacle, or on any other cause capable of accounting for such an appearance. For one

must not neglect to apply this same method to all the heavenly phaenomena; for, from the moment when one

comes to any point of contradiction to the evidence of the senses, it will be impossible to posses perfect

"The eclipses of the sun and moon may depend either on the fact that these celstial bodies extinguish

themselves, a phaenomenon which we often see produced under our eyes, or on the fact of other bodies, the

earth, the heaven, or something else of the same kind interposing, between them and us. Besides, we must

compare the different modes of explanation appropriate to phaenomena, and recollect that it is not impossible

(He says the same thing in the twelfth book of his treatise on Nature; and adds that the eclipses of the sun

arise from the fact that it penetrates into the shade of the moon, to quit it again presently; and the eclipse of

the moon from the fact of its entering into the shade of the earth. We also find the same doctrine asserted by

"The regular and periodical march of these phaenomena has nothing in it that ought to surprise us, if we only

attend to the analogous facts which take place under our eyes. Above all things let us beware of making the

Deity interpose here, for that being we ought to suppose exempt from all occupation and perfectly happy;

otherwise we shall be only giving vain explanations of the heavenly phaenomena, as has happened already to

a crowd of authors. Not being able to recognize what is really possible, they have fallen into vain theories, in

supposing that for all phaenomena there was but one single mode of production, and in rejecting all other

explanations which are founded on probability; they have adopted the most unreasonable opinions, for want

of placing in the front the study of heavenly phaenomena, and of sensible facts, which ought to serve to

"The differences in the length of nights and days may arise from the fact that the passage of the sun above the

earth is more or less rapid; and more or less slow, according to the length of the regions which it as to pass

through. Or, again, to the fact certain regions are passed through more rapidly than others, as is seen to be the

case by our own eyes, in those things to which we can compare the heavenly phaenomena. As to those who

on this point admit only one explanation as possible, they put themselves in opposition to facts, and lose sight

"The prognostics which are derived from the stars may, like those which we borrow from animals, arise from

a simple coincidence. They may also have other causes, for example, some change in the air; for these two

suppositions both harmonize equally with facts; but it is impossible to distinguish in what case one is to

"The clouds may be formed either by the air condensed under the pressure of the winds, or by the agency of

atoms set apart for the end, or by emanations from the earth and waters, or by other causes. For there are a

great number which are all equally able to produce this effect. When the clouds clash with one another, or

undergo any transformation, they produce showers; and the long rains are caused by the motion of the clouds

when moved from places suitable to them through the air, when a more violent inundation than usual takes

"Thunder possibly arises from the movement of the winds revolving in the cavities of the clouds; of which we

may see an image in vessels in our own daily use. It may also arise from the noise of fire acted upon by the

wind in them, and from the tearings and ruptures of the clouds when they have received a sort of crystaline

consistency. In a word, experience drawn from our sense, teaches us that all these phaenomena, and that one

"One may also assign different causes to lightning; either the shock and collision of the clouds produce a

fiery appearance, which is followed by lightning; or the lighting up of the clouds by the winds, produces this

luminous appearance; or the mutual pressure of the clouds, or that of the wind against them, disengages the

lightning. Or, one might say, that the interception of the light diffused from the stars, arrested for a time in the

bosom of the clouds, is driven from them subsequently by their own movements, and by those of the winds,

and so escapes from their sides; that the lightning is an extremely subtle light that evaporates from the clouds;

that the clouds which carry the thunder are collected masses of fire; that the lighting arises form the motion of

the fire, or from the conflagration of the wind, in consequence of the rapidity and continuousness of its

motion. One may also attribute the luminous appearance of lightning to the rupture of the clouds under the

action of the winds, or to the fall of inflammable atoms. Lastly, one may easily find a number of other

explanations, if one applies to sensible facts, in order to search out the analogies which they present to the

"Lightning precedes thunder, either because it is produced at the same moment that the wind falls on the

cloud, while the noise is only heard at the instant when the wind has penetrated into the bosom of the cloud;

or, perhaps, the two phaenomena being simultaneous, the lightning arrives among us more rapidly than the

noise of the thunderbolt, as is in fact remarked in other cases when we see at a instance the clash of two

"The thunderbolt may be produced either by a violent condensation of the winds, or by their rapid motion and

conflagrations. It may arise from the fact of the winds meeting in places which are too dense, in consequence

of the accumulation of clouds, and then a portion of the current detaches itself and proceeds towards the

lower situations; or else it may be caused by the fire which is contained in the bosom of the clouds

precipitating itself downwards. As one may suppose that an immense quantity of fire being accumulated in

the clouds dilates, violent bursting the substance which envelops it, because the resistance of the center

hinders it from proceeding further. This effect is especially produced in the neighborhood of high mountains;

and, accordingly, they are very frequently struck with the thunderbolts. In short, one may give a number of

explanations of the thunderbolt; but we ought, above all things, to be on our guard against fables, and this one

will easily be, if one follows faithfully the sensible phaenomena in the explanation of these things, which are

"Hurricanes may be caused either by the presence of a cloud, which a violent wind sets in motion and

precipitates with a spiral movement towards the lower regions, or by a violent gust which bears a cloud into

the neighborhood of some other current, or else by the mere agitation of the wind by itself, when air is

brought together from the higher regions and compressed without being able to escape on either side, in

consequence of the resistance of the air which surrounds it; when the hurricane descends towards the earth,

then there result whirlwinds in proportion to the rapidity of the wind that has produced them; and this

"Earthquakes may arise from the wind penetrating into the interior of the earth, or from the earth itself

receiving incessantly the addition of exterior particles, and being in incessant motion as to its constituent

atoms, being in consequence disposed to a general vibration. That which permits the wind to penetrate is the

fact that falls take place in the interior, or that the air being impressed by the winds insinuates itself into the

subterranean caverns. The movement which numberless falls and the reaction of the earth communicates to

the ground, when this motion meets bodies of greater resistance and solidity, is sufficient to explain the

"Winds are caused, either by the successive and regular addition of some foreign matter, or else by the

reunion of a great quantity of water; and the differences of the winds may arise form the fact that some

portions of this same matter fall into the numerous cavities of the earth, and are divided there.

"Hail is produced by an energetic condensation acting on the ethereal particles which the cold embraces in

every direction; or, in consequence of less violent condensation acting however on aqueous particles, and

accompanied by division, in such a manner as to produce, at the same time, the reunion of certain elements

and of the collective masses; or by the rupture of some dense and compact mass which would explain at the

same time, the numerousness of the particles and their individual hardness. As to the spherical form of the

hail, one may easily account for that by admitting that the shocks which it receives in every direction make

all the angles disappear, or else that at the moment when the different fragments are formed, each of them is

"Snow may be produced by a light vapor full of moisture which the clouds allow to escape by passage

intended for that end, when they are pressed, in a corresponding manner, by other clouds, and set in motion

by the wind. Subsequently, these vapors become condensed in their progress under the action of the cold

which surrounds the clouds in the lower regions. It may also be the case that this phaenomena is produced by

clouds of slight density as they become condensed. In this case the snow which escapes from the clouds

would be the result of the contact, or approximation of the aqueous particles, which in a still more condensed

state produce hail. This effect is most especially produced in the air. Snow again, may result from the

collection of clouds previously condensed and solidified; or from a whole army of other causes.

"Dew proceeds from a reunion of particles contained in the air calculated to produce this moist substance.

These particles may be also brought from places which are moist or covered with water (for in those places,

above all others, it is that dew is abundant). These then reunite, again resume their aqueous form, and fall

down. The same phaenomena takes place in other cases before our own eyes under many analogies.

"Ice is formed either by the detrition of round atoms contained in the water, and the reunion at scalene and

acute angles of the atoms which exist in the water, or by an addition from without of these latter particles,

which penetrating into the water, solidify it by driving away an equal amount of round atoms.

"The rainbow may be produced by the reflection of the solar rays on the moist air; or it may arise from a

particular property of light and air, in virtue of which these particular appearances of color are formed, either

because the shade which we perceive result directly from this property, or because, on the contrary, it only

produces a single shade, which, reflecting itself on the nearest portion of the air, communicates to them the

tints which we observe. As to the circular form of the rainbow, that depends either on the fact of the sight

perceiving an equal distance in every direction, or the fact of the atoms taking this form when reuniting in the

air; or it may be caused by its detaching from the air which moves towards the moon, certain atoms which,

"The lunar halo arises from the fact of the air, which moves towards the moon from all quarters, uniformly

intercepting the rays emitted by this heavenly object, in such a way as to form around it a sort of circular

cloud which partially veils it. It may also arise from the fact of the moon uniformly rejecting from all

quarters, the air which surrounds it, in such a manner as to produce this circular and opaque covering. And

perhaps this opaqueness may be caused by some particle which some current brings form without; perhaps

also, the heat of communicates to the moon the property of emitting by the pores in tits surface, the particles

"Comets arise either from the fact, that in the circumstances already stated, there are partial conflagrations in

certain points of the heaven; or, that at certain periods, the heaven has above our heads a particular movement

which causes them to appear. It may also be the case, that being themselves endowed with a peculiar

movement, they advance at the end of certain periods of time, and in consequence of particular

circumstances, towards the places which we inhabit. The opposite reasons explain their disappearance.

"Certain stars return to the same point in accomplishing their revolutions; and this arises, not only as has been

sometimes believed, from the fact of the pole of the world, around which they move, being immovable, but

also from the fact that the gyrations of the air which surrounds them, hinder them from deviations like the

wandering stars. Perhaps also, this may be caused by the fact, that except in the route in which they move,

and in which we perceive them, they do not find any material suitable to their nature. One may also explain

this phaenomenon in many other manners, reasoning according to sensible facts; thus, it is possible that

certain stars may be wandering because that is the nature of their movements, and, for the same reason, others

may be immovable. It is also possible, that the same necessity which has originally given them their circular

movement, may have compelled some to follow their orbit regularly, and have subjected others to an

irregular process; we may also suppose that the uniform character of the center which certain stars traverse

favor their regular march, and their return to a certain point; and that in the case of other, on the contrary, the

differences of the center produce the changes which we observe. Besides, to assign one single cause to all

these phaenomena, when the experience of our senses suggests us several, is folly. It is the conduct of

ignorant astrologers covetous of a vain knowledge, who assigning imaginary causes to facts, wish to leave

"Some stars [the planets] appear to be left behind by others in their progress; this arises either from the fact of

their having a slower motion, though traversing the same circle; or, because, that they are drawn on by the

same propelling power, they have, nevertheless, a movement proper to themselves in a contrary direction; or

it may be caused by the fact that, though all are placed in the same sphere of movement, still some have more

space to traverse, and others less. To give one uniform and positive explanation of all these facts, is not

consistent with the conduct of any people but those who love to flash prodigies in the eyes of the multitude.

"Falling stars may be particles detached from the stars, or fragments resulting from their collision; they may

also be produced by the fall of substances which are set on fire by the action of the wind; by the reunion of

inflammable atoms which are made to come together so as to produce this effect by a sort of reciprocal

attraction; or else by the movement which is produced in consequence of the reunion of atoms in the very

place where they meet. It may also happen that the light vapors reunite and become condensed under the form

of clouds, that they then take fire in consequence of their rotary motion, and that, bursting the obstacles which

surround them, they proceed towards the places whither the force by which they are animated drags them. In

"The forecasts which are drawn from certain animals arise from a fortuitous concourse of circumstances; for

there is no necessary connection between certain animals and winter. They do not produce it; nor is there any

divine nature sitting aloft watching the exits of these animals, and then fulfilling signs of this kind. Nor can

such folly as this occur to any being who is even moderately comfortable, much less to one which is

"Imprint all these precepts in your memory, O Pythocles, and so you will easily escape fables, and it will be

easy for you to discover other truths analogous to these. Above all, apply yourself to the study of general

principles, of the infinite, and of questions of this kind, and to the investigation of the different criteria and of

the passions, and to the study of the chief good, with a view to which we prosecute all our researches. When

these questions are once resolved, all particular difficulties will be made plain to you. As to those who will

not apply themselves to these principles, they will neither be able to give a good explanation of these same

XXVI. Such are his sentiments on the heavenly phaenomena, But concerning the rules of life, and how we

ought to choose some things, and avoid others, he writes thus. But first of all, let us go through the opinions

He said that injuries existed among men, either in consequence of hatred, or of envy, or of contempt, all

which the wise man overcomes by Reason. Also, that a man who has once been wise can never receive the

contrary dispositions, nor can he of his own accord invent such a state of things as that he should be subjected

to the dominion of the passions; nor can he hinder himself in his progress towards wisdom. That the wise

man, however, cannot exist in every state of body, nor in every nation. That even if the wise man were to be

put to the torture, he would still be happy. That the wise man will only feel gratitude to his friends, but to

them equally whether they are present or absent. Nor will he groan and howl when he is put to the torture.

Nor will he marry a wife whom the laws forbid, as Diogenes says, in his epitome of the Ethical Maxims of

Epicurus. He will punish his servants, but also pity them, and show indulgence to any that are virtuous. They

do not think that the wise man will ever be in love, nor that he will be anxious about his burial, nor that love

is a passion inspired by the gods, as Diogenes says in his twelfth book. They also assert that he will be

indifferent to the study of oratory. Intercourse, say they, is never any good to a man, and we must be quite

content if it does no harm; and the wise man will never marry or beget children, as Epicurus himself lays it

down, in his Doubts and in his treaties on Nature. Still, under certain circumstances of life, he will forsake

these rules and marry. Nor will he ever indulge in drunkenness, says Epicurus, in his Banquet, nor will he

entangle himself in affairs of state (as he says in his first book on Lives). Nor will he become a tyrant. Nor

will he become a Cynic (as he says in his second book about Lives). Nor a beggar. And even, though he

should lose his eyes, he will still partake of life (as he says in the same book).

The wise man will not be subject to grief, as Diogenes says, in the fifth book of his Select Opinions; he will

also not object to go to law. He will leave books and memorials of himself behind him, but he will not be

fond of frequenting assemblies. He will take care of his property, and provide for the future. He will like

being in the country, he will resists fortune, and will grieve none of his friends. He will show a regard for a

fair reputation to such an extent as to avoid being despised; and he will find more pleasure than other men in

All faults are not equal. Health is good for some people, but a matter of indifference to others. Courage is a

quality which does not exist by nature, but which is engendered by a consideration of what is suitable.

Friendship is caused by ones wants; but it must be begun on our side. For we sow the earth; and friendship

arises from a community of, and participation in, pleasures. Happiness must be understood in two senses; the

highest happiness, such as is that of a god, which admits of no increase; and another kind, which admits of

the addition or abstraction of pleasures. The wise man may raise statues if it suits his inclination, if it does not

then it does not signify. The wise man is the only person who can converse correctly about music and poetry;

It is possible for one wise man to be wiser than another. The wise man will also, if he is in need, earn money,

but only by his wisdom; he will appease an absolute ruler when occasion requires, and will humor him for the

sake of correcting his habits; he will have a school, but not on such a system as to draw a crowd about him;

he will also recite in a multitude, but that will be against his inclination; he will pronounce dogmas, and will

express no doubts; he will be the same man asleep and awake; and he will be willing even to die for a friend.

"Let no one delay to study philosophy while he is young, and when he is old let him not become weary of the

study; for no man can ever find the time unsuitable or too late to study the health of his soul. And he who

asserts either that it is not yet time to philosophize, or that the hour is passed, is like a man who should say

that the time is not yet come to be happy, or that it is too late. So that both young and old should study

philosophy, the one in order that, when he is old, he many be young in good things through the pleasing

recollection of the past, and the other in order that he may be at the same time both young and old, in

"It is right then for a man to consider the things which produce happiness, since, if happiness is present, we

have everything, and when it is absent, we do everything with a view to possess it. Now, what I have

constantly recommended to you, these things I would have you do and practice, considering them to be the

"First of all, believe that a god is an incorruptible and happy being, as the common opinion of the world

dictates; and attach to your theology nothing which is inconsistent with incorruptibility or with happiness;

and think that a diety is invested with everything which is able to preserve this happiness, in conjunction with

incorruptibility. For there are gods; for our knowledge of them is distinct. But they are not of the character

which people in general attribute to them; for they do not pay a respect to them which accords with the ideas

that they entertain of them. And that man is not impious who discards the gods believed in by the many, but

he who applies to the gods the opinions entertained of them by the many. For the assertions of the many

about the gods are not anticipations, but false opinions. And in consequence of these, the greatest evils which

befall wicked men, and the benefits which are conferred on the good, are all attributed to the gods; for they

connect all their ideas of them with a comparison of human virtues, and everything which is different from

"Accustom yourself also to think death a matter with which we are not at all concerned, since all good and all

evil is in sensation, and since death is only the privation of sensation. On which account, the correct

knowledge of the fact that death is no concern of ours, makes the mortality of life pleasant to us, inasmuch as

it sets forth no illimitable time, but relieves us for the longing for immortality. For there is nothing terrible in

living to a man who rightly comprehends that there is nothing terrible in ceasing to live; so that he was a silly

man who said that he feared death, not because it would grieve him when it was present, but because it did

grieve him while it was future. For it is very absurd that that which does not distress a man when it is present,

should afflict him only when expected. Therefore, the most formidable of evils, death, is nothing to us, since,

when we exist, death is not present to us; and when death is present, then we have no existence. It is no

concern then either of the living or of the dead; since to the one it has no existence, and the other class has no

existence itself. But people in general, at times flee from death as the greatest of evils, and at times wish for it

as a rest from the evils in life. Nor is the notliving a thing feared, since living is not connected with it: nor

does the wise man think notliving an evil; but, just as he chooses food, not preferring that which is most

abundant, but that which is nicest; so too, he enjoys time, not measuring it as to whether it is of the greatest

length, but as to whether it is most agreeable. And, they say, he who enjoins a young man to live well, and an

old man to die well, is a simpleton, not only because of the constantly delightful nature of life, but also

because the care to live well is identical with the care to die well. And he was still more wrong who said:

"For if this really was his opinion, why did he not quit life? For it was easily in his power to do so, if it really

was his belief. But if he was joking, then he was talking foolishly in a case where it ought not to be allowed;

and, we must recollect, that the future is not our own, nor, on the other hand, is it wholly no our own, I mean

so that we can never altogether await it with a feeling of certainty that it will be, nor altogether despair of it as

"And we must consider that some of the passions are natural, and some empty; and of the natural ones some

are necessary, and some merely natural. And of the necessary ones, some are necessary to happiness, and

others, with regard to the exemption of the body from trouble; and others with respect to living itself; for a

correct theory, with regard to these things, can refer all choice and avoidance to the health of the body and the

freedom from disquietude of the soul. Since this is the end of living happily; for it is for the sake of this that

we do everything, wishing to avoid grief and fear; and when once this is the case, with respect to us, then the

storm of the soul is, as I may say, put an end to; since the animal is unable to go as if to something deficient,

and to seek something different from that by which the good of the soul and body will be perfected.

"For then we have need of pleasure when we grieve, because pleasure is not present; but when we do not

grieve, then we have no need of pleasure; and on this account, we affirm, that pleasure is the beginning and

end of living happily; for we have recognized this as the first good, being connate with us; and with reference

to it, it is that we begin every choice and avoidance; and to this we come as if we judged of all good by

passion as the standard; and, since this is the first good and connate with us, on this account we do not choose

every pleasure, but at times we pass over many pleasures when any difficulty is likely to ensue from them;

and we think many pains better than pleasures, when a greater pleasure follows them, if we endure the pain

"Every pleasure is therefore a good on account of its own nature, but it does not follow that every pleasure is

worthy of being chosen; just as every pain is an evil, and yet every pain must not be avoided. But it is right to

estimate all these things by the measurement and view of what is suitable and unsuitable; for at times we may

feel the good as an evil, and at times, on the contrary, we may feel the evil as good. And, we think,

contentment a great good, not in order that we may never have but a little, but in order that, if we have not

much, we may make use of a little, being genuinely persuaded that those men enjoy luxury most completely

who are the best able to do without it; and that everything which is natural is easily provided, and what is

useless is not easily procured. And simple flavors give as much pleasure as costly fare, when everything that

can give pain, and every feeling of want, is removed; and bread and water give the most extreme pleasure

when any one in need eats them. To accustom ones self, therefore, to simple and inexpensive habits is a great

ingredient in the perfecting of health, and makes a man free from hesitation with respect to the necessary uses

of life. And when we, on certain occasions, fall in with more sumptuous fare, it makes us in a better

disposition towards it, and renders us fearless with respect to fortune. When, therefore, we say that pleasure is

a chief good, we are not speaking of the pleasures of the debauched man, or those which lie in sensual

enjoyment, as some think who are ignorant, and who do not entertain our opinions, or else interpret them

perversely; but we mean the freedom of the body from pain, and the soul from confusion. For it is not

continued drinkings and revels, or the enjoyment of female society, or feasts of fish and other such things, as

a costly table supplies, that make life pleasant, but sober contemplation, which examines into the reasons for

all choice and avoidance, and which puts to flight the vain opinions from which the greater part of the

"Now, the beginning and the greatest good of all these things is Prudence, on which account Prudence is

something more valuable than even philosophy, inasmuch as all the other virtues spring from it, teaching us

that it is not possible to live pleasantly unless one also lives prudently, and honorably, and justly; and that one

cannot live prudently, and honestly, and justly, without living pleasantly; for the virtues are connate with

living agreeably, and living agreeably is inseparable from the virtues. Since, who can you think better than

that man who has holy opinions respecting the gods, and who is utterly fearless with respect to death, and

who has properly contemplated the end of nature, and who comprehends that the chief good is easily

perfected and easily provided; and the greatest evil lasts but a short period, and causes but brief pain. And

who has no belief in necessity, which is set up by some as the mistress of all things, but he refers some things

to fortune, some to ourselves, because necessity is an irresponsible power, and because he sees that fortune is

unstable, while our own will is free; and this freedom constitutes, in our case, a responsibility which makes

us encounter blame and praise. Since it would be better to follow the fables about the gods than to be a slave

to the fate of the natural philosopher; for the fables which are told give us a sketch, as if we could avert the

wrath of god by paying him honor; but the other presents us with necessity who is inexorable.

"And he, not thinking fortune a goddess, as the generality esteem her (for nothing is done at random by a

god), nor a cause which no man can rely on, for he things that good or evil is not given by her to men so as to

make them live happily, but that the principles of great goods, or great evils are supplied by her; thinking it

better to be unfortunate in accordance with reason, than to be fortunate irrationally; for that those actions

"Do you then study these precepts, and those which are akin to them, by all means day and night, pondering

on them by yourself, and discussing them with any one like yourself, and then you will never be disturbed by

either sleeping or waking fancies, but you will live like a god among men; for a man living amid immortal

In other works, he discards divination; and also in his Little Epitome. And he says divination has no

existence; but, if it has any, still we should think that what happens according to it is nothing to us.

These are his sentiments about the things which concern the life of man, and he has discussed them at greater

XXVIII. Now, he differs with the Cyrenaics about pleasure. For they do not admit that to pleasure can exist

as a state, but place it wholly in motion. He, however, admits both kinds to be pleasure, namely, that of the

soul, and that of the body, as he says in his treatise on Choice and Avoidance; and also in his work on the

Chief Good; and in the first book of his treatise on Lives, and in his Letter against the Mitylenian

Philosophers. And in the same spirit, Diogenes, in the seventeenth book of his Select Discourses, and

Metrodorus, in his Timocrates, speak thus. "But when pleasure is understood, I mean both that which exists

in motion, and that which is a state . . . ." And Epicurus, in his treatise on Choice, speaks thus: "Now,

freedom from disquietude, and freedom from pain, are states of pleasure; but joy and cheerfulness are beheld

XXIX. For they make out the pains of the body to be worse than those of the mind; accordingly, those who

do wrong, are punished in the body. But he considers the pains of the soul the worst; for that the flesh is only

sensible to present affliction, but the soul feels the past, the present, and the future. Therefore, in the same

manner, he contends that the pleasure of the soul are greater than those of the body; and he uses as proof that

pleasure is the chief good, the fact that all animals from the moment of their birth are delighted with pleasure,

and are offended with pain by their natural instinct, and without the employment of Reason. Therefore, too

we, of our own inclinations, flee from pain; so that Hercules, when devoured by his poisoned tunic cries out:

XXX. And we choose the virtues for the sake of pleasure, and not on their own account; just as we seek the

skill of the physician for the sake of health, as Diogenes says, in the twentieth book of his Select Discourses,

where he also calls virtue alone is inseparable from pleasure, but that every thing else may be separated from

XXXI. Let us, however, now add the finishing stroke, as one may say, to this whole treatise, and to the life of

the philosopher; giving some of his fundamental maxims, and closing the whole work with them, taking that

[Important Note: Yonge translates these into 43 distinct maxims, but they are more commonly treated as 40.

1."That which is happy and imperishable, neither has trouble itself, nor does it cause it to anything; so that it is not

subject to feelings of either anger or gratitude; for these feelings only exist in what is weak." (In other passages he

says that the gods are speculated on by reason, some existing according to number, and others according to some

similarity of form, arising from the continual flowing on of similar images, perfected for this very purpose in human

2."Death is nothing to us; for that which is dissolved is devoid of sensation, and that which is devoid of sensation is

3."The limit of the greatness of the pleasures is the removal of everything which can give pain. And where pleasure is,

as long as it lasts, that which gives pain, or that which feels pain, or both of them, are absent.

4."Pain does not abide continuously in the flesh, but in its extremity it is present only a very short time. That pain which

only just exceeds the pleasure in the flesh, does not last many days. But long diseases have in them more that is

5."It is not possible to live pleasantly without living prudently, and honorably, and justly; nor to live prudently, and

honorably, and justly, without living pleasantly. But to whom it does not happen to live prudently, honorably, and

6.[6 7] "For the sake of feeling confidence and security with regard to men, and not with reference to the nature of

government and kingly power being a good, some men have wished to be eminent and powerful, in order that others

might attain this feeling by their means; thinking that so they would secure safety as far as men are concerned. So that

if the life of such men are is safe, they have attained to the nature of good; but if it is not safe, then they have failed in

obtaining that for the sake of which they originally desired power according to the sake for which they originally

7.[8] "No pleasure is intrinsically bad: but the effective causes of some pleasures bring with them a great many

8.[9] If every pleasure were condensed, if one may so say, and if each lasted long, and affected the whole body, or the

essential parts of it, then there would be no difference between one pleasure and another.

9.[10] "If those things which make the pleasures of debauched men, put an end to the fears of the mind, and to those

which arise about the heavenly bodies, and death, and pain; and if they taught us what ought to be the limit of our

desires, we should have no pretense for blaming those who wholly devote themselves to pleasure, and who never feel

10.[11] "If apprehensions relating to the heavenly bodies did not disturb us, and if the terrors of death have no concern

with us, and if we had the courage to contemplate the boundaries of pain and of the desires, we should have no need

11.[12] "It would not be possible for a person to banish all fear about those things which are called most essential, unless

he knew what is the nature of the universe, or if he had any idea that the fables told about it could be true; and

therefore it is, that a person cannot enjoy unmixed pleasure without physiological knowledge.

12.[13] "It would be no good for a man to secure himself safety as far as men are concerned, while in a state of

apprehension as to all the heavenly bodies, and those under the earth, and in short, all those in the infinite.

13.[14] "Irresistible power and great wealth may, up to a certain point, give us security as far as men are concerned; both

the security of men in general depends upon the tranquillity of their souls, and their freedom from ambition.

14.[15] "The riches of nature are defined and easily procurable; but vain desires are insatiable.

15.[16] "The wise man is but little favored by fortune; but his reason procures him the greatest and most valuable goods,

16.[17] "The just man is the freest of all men from disquietude; but the unjust man is a perpetual prey to it.

17.[18] "Pleasure in the flesh is not increased, when once the pain arising from want is removed; it is only diversified.

18.[...18...] "The most perfect happiness of the soul depends on these reflections, and on opinions of a similar character

19."Infinite and finite time both have equal pleasure, if any one measures it limits by reason.

20."If the flesh could experience boundless pleasure, it would want to dispose of eternity.*

21.[...20...] "But reason, enabling us to conceive the end and dissolution of the body, and liberating us from the fears

relative to eternity, procures for us all the happiness of which life is capable, so completely that we have no further

occasion to include eternity in our desires. In this disposition of mind, man is happy even when his troubles engage

him to quit life; and to die thus, is for him only to interrupt a life of happiness.

22.[21] "He who is acquainted with the limits of life knows that that which removes the pain which arises from want and

which makes the whole of life perfect, is easily procurable; so that he has no need of those things which can only be

23.[22] "But as to the subsisting end, we ought to consider it with all the clearness and evidence which we refer to

whatever we think and believe; otherwise, all things will be full of confusion and uncertainty of judgment.

24.[23] "If you resist all the senses, you will not even have anything left who which you can refer, or by which you may

25.[24] "If you simply discard on sense, and do not distinguish between the different elements of the judgment, so as to

know on the one hand, the induction which goes beyond the actual sensation, or, on the other, the actual and

immediate notion; the affections, and all the conceptions of the mind which lean directly on the sensible

representation, you will be imputing trouble into the other sense, and destroying in that quarter every species of

26.[...24...] "If you allow equal authority to the ideas, which being only inductive, require to be verified, and to those

which bear about them an immediate certainty, you will not escape error; for you will be confounding doubtful

opinions with those which are not doubtful, and true judgments with those of a different character.

27.[25] "If, on every occasion, we do not refer every one of our actions to the chief end of nature, if we turn aside from

that to seek or avoid some other object, there will be a want of agreement between our words and our actions. [26] All

such desires as lead to no pain when they remain ungratified are unnecessary, and the longing is easily got rid of,

when the thing desired is difficult to procure or when the desires seem likely to produce harm.

28.[27] "Of all the things which wisdom provides for the happiness of the whole life, by far the most important is the

29.[28] "The same opinion encourages man to trust that no evil will be everlasting, or even of long duration; as it sees

that, in the space of life allotted to us, the protection of friendship is most sure and trustworthy.

30.[29] "Of the desires, some are natural and necessary, some natural, but not necessary, and some are neither natural nor

necessary, but owe their existence to vain opinions. (Epicurus thinks that those are natural and necessary which put an

end to pains as drink when one is thirsty; and that those are natural but not necessary which only diversify pleasure,

but do not remove pain, such as expensive food; and that these are neither natural nor necessary, which are such as

31.[30] "Those desires which do not lead to pain, if they are not satisfied, are not necessary. It is easy to impose silence

32.[...30...] "When the natural desires, the failing to satisfy which is nevertheless, not painful, are violent and obstinate, it

is a proof that there is an admixture of vain opinion in them; for then energy does not arise from their own nature, but

33.[31] "Natural justice is a covenant of what is suitable for leading men to avoid injuring on another, and being injured.

34.[32] "Those animals which are unable to enter into an argument of this nature, or the guard against doing or sustaining

mutual injury, have no such thing as justice or injustice. And the case is the same with those nations, the members of

which are either unwilling or unable to enter into a covenant to respect their mutual interests.

35.[33] "Justice has no independent existence; it results from mutual contracts, and establishes itself wherever there is a

36.[34] "Injustice is not intrinsically bad; it has this character only because there is joined with it a fear of not escaping

37.[35] "It is not possible for a man who secretly does anything in contravention of the agreement which men have made

with one another, to guard against doing, or sustaining mutual injury, to believe that he shall always escape notice,

even if he has escaped notices already then thousand times; for till, his death, it is uncertain whether he will not be

38.[36] "In a general point of view, justice is the same thing to every one; for there is something advantageous in mutual

society. Nevertheless, the difference of place, and diverse other circumstances, make justice vary.

39.[37] "From the moment that a thing declared just by the law is generally recognized as useful for the mutual relations

of men, it becomes really just, whether it is universally regarded as such or not.

40.[...37...] "But if, on the contrary, a thing established by law is not really useful for the social relations, then it is not

just; and if that which was just, inasmuch as it was useful, loses this character, after having been for some time

considered so, it is not less true that during that time, it was really just, at least for those who do not perplex

themselves about vain words, but who prefer in every case, examining and judging for themselves.

41.[38] "When, without any fresh circumstances arising a thing which has been declared just in practice does not agree

with the impressions of reason, that is a proof that the thing was not really just. In the same way, when in consequence

of new circumstances, a thing which has been pronounced just does not any longer appear to agree with utility, the

thing which was just, inasmuch as it was useful to the social relations and intercourse of mankind, ceases to be just the

42.[39] "He who desires to live tranquilly without having anything to fear from other men, ought to make himself

friends; those whom he cannot make friends of, he should, at least avoid rendering enemies; and if that is not in his

power, he should, as far as possible, avoid all intercourse with them, and keep them aloof, as far as it is for his interest

43.[40] "The happiest men are they who have arrived at the point of having nothing to fear from those who surround

them. Such men live with one another most agreeably, having the firmest grounds of confidence in one another,

enjoying the advantages of friendship in all their fullness, and not lamenting as a pitiable circumstance, the premature

[2] This sentence is a remark of Diogenes himself. There are several more of his observations in parentheses

[3] This is the argument in its completed form: "We can only form an idea of an atom by analogy, and

analogy demonstrates to us that it is not of infinite smallness. In fact, let us compare it to the smallest

particles recognizable by sense, and the let us endeavor to form an idea of these last. To do this we must take

a term of comparison in complex objects, which are composed of various parts. Abstracting from these all

other characteristic but that of extent, we see that these objects have dimensions, some greater and some less,

measuring an extent which is greater or less as the case may be. The smallest sensible particle will then have

its dimensions; it will measure the smallest possible sensible extent, that is to say, it will not be infinitely

small. Applying this analogy to an atom, one comes to conceive it as measuring the smallest extent possible,