The Federalist Papers.........................................................................................................................................1

FEDERALIST No. 3 Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence (con't) JAY

FEDERALIST No. 4 Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence (con't) JAY

FEDERALIST No. 5 Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence (con't) JAY

FEDERALIST No. 6 Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States HAMILTON

FEDERALIST No. 7 Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States (con't) HAMILTON

FEDERALIST No. 9 The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection HAMILTON

FEDERALIST No. 10 The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection (con't)

FEDERALIST No. 11 The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy HAMILTON

FEDERALIST No. 13 Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government HAMILTON

FEDERALIST No. 14 Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered

FEDERALIST No. 15 The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union HAMILTON

FEDERALIST No. 16 The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't)

FEDERALIST No. 17 The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't)

FEDERALIST No. 18 The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't)

FEDERALIST No. 19 The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't)

FEDERALIST No. 20 The Insufficiency fo the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't)

FEDERALIST No. 23 The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation

FEDERALIST No. 24 The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered HAMILTON

FEDERALIST No. 25 The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered (con't)

FEDERALIST No. 26 The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense

FEDERALIST No. 27 The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense

FEDERALIST No. 28 The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense

FEDERALIST No. 37 Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of

FEDERALIST No. 38 The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan

FEDERALIST No. 40 The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained

FEDERALIST No. 41 General View of the Powers Conferred by The Constitution MADISON

FEDERALIST No. 42 The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered MADISON

FEDERALIST No. 43 The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered (con't) MADISON

FEDERALIST No. 45 The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments

FEDERALIST No. 46 The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared MADISON

FEDERALIST No. 47 The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power

FEDERALIST No. 48 These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional

FEDERALIST No. 49 Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of

FEDERALIST No. 50 Periodical Appeals to the People Considered HAMILTON OR MADISON

FEDERALIST No. 51 The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances

FEDERALIST No. 54 The Apportionment of Members Among the States HAMILTON OR MADISON

FEDERALIST No. 55 The Total Number of the House of Representatives HAMILTON OR MADISON

FEDERALIST No. 56 The Total Number of the House of Representatives (con't) HAMILTON OR

FEDERALIST No. 57 The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the

FEDERALIST No. 58 Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of

FEDERALIST No. 59 Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members HAMILTON

FEDERALIST No. 60 Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members (con't)

FEDERALIST No. 61 Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members (con't)

FEDERALIST No. 66 Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further

FEDERALIST No. 72 The Same Subject Continued, and ReEligibility of the Executive Considered

FEDERALIST No. 73 The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power HAMILTON

FEDERALIST No. 74 The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the

FEDERALIST No. 77 The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered

FEDERALIST No. 81 The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority HAMILTON

FEDERALIST No. 84 Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and

AFTER an unequivocal experience of the inefficacy of the subsisting federal government, you are called

upon to deliberate on a new Constitution for the United States of America. The subject speaks its own

importance; comprehending in its consequences nothing less than the existence of the UNION, the safety and

welfare of the parts of which it is composed, the fate of an empire in many respects the most interesting in the

world. It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by

their conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or

not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to

depend for their political constitutions on accident and force. If there be any truth in the remark, the crisis at

which we are arrived may with propriety be regarded as the era in which that decision is to be made; and a

wrong election of the part we shall act may, in this view, deserve to be considered as the general misfortune

This idea will add the inducements of philanthropy to those of patriotism, to heighten the solicitude which all

considerate and good men must feel for the event. Happy will it be if our choice should be directed by a

judicious estimate of our true interests, unperplexed and unbiased by considerations not connected with the

public good. But this is a thing more ardently to be wished than seriously to be expected. The plan offered to

our deliberations affects too many particular interests, innovates upon too many local institutions, not to

involve in its discussion a variety of objects foreign to its merits, and of views, passions and prejudices little

Among the most formidable of the obstacles which the new Constitution will have to encounter may readily

be distinguished the obvious interest of a certain class of men in every State to resist all changes which may

hazard a diminution of the power, emolument, and consequence of the offices they hold under the State

establishments; and the perverted ambition of another class of men, who will either hope to aggrandize

themselves by the confusions of their country, or will flatter themselves with fairer prospects of elevation

from the subdivision of the empire into several partial confederacies than from its union under one

It is not, however, my design to dwell upon observations of this nature. I am well aware that it would be

disingenuous to resolve indiscriminately the opposition of any set of men (merely because their situations

might subject them to suspicion) into interested or ambitious views. Candor will oblige us to admit that even

such men may be actuated by upright intentions; and it cannot be doubted that much of the opposition which

has made its appearance, or may hereafter make its appearance, will spring from sources, blameless at least, if

not respectablethe honest errors of minds led astray by preconceived jealousies and fears. So numerous

indeed and so powerful are the causes which serve to give a false bias to the judgment, that we, upon many

occasions, see wise and good men on the wrong as well as on the right side of questions of the first

magnitude to society. This circumstance, if duly attended to, would furnish a lesson of moderation to those

who are ever so much persuaded of their being in the right in any controversy. And a further reason for

caution, in this respect, might be drawn from the reflection that we are not always sure that those who

Ambition, avarice, personal animosity, party opposition, and many other motives not more laudable than

these, are apt to operate as well upon those who support as those who oppose the right side of a question.

Were there not even these inducements to moderation, nothing could be more illjudged than that intolerant

spirit which has, at all times, characterized political parties. For in politics, as in religion, it is equally absurd

to aim at making proselytes by fire and sword. Heresies in either can rarely be cured by persecution.

And yet, however just these sentiments will be allowed to be, we have already sufficient indications that it

will happen in this as in all former cases of great national discussion. A torrent of angry and malignant

passions will be let loose. To judge from the conduct of the opposite parties, we shall be led to conclude that

they will mutually hope to evince the justness of their opinions, and to increase the number of their converts

by the loudness of their declamations and the bitterness of their invectives. An enlightened zeal for the energy

and efficiency of government will be stigmatized as the offspring of a temper fond of despotic power and

hostile to the principles of liberty. An overscrupulous jealousy of danger to the rights of the people, which is

more commonly the fault of the head than of the heart, will be represented as mere pretense and artifice, the

stale bait for popularity at the expense of the public good. It will be forgotten, on the one hand, that jealousy

is the usual concomitant of love, and that the noble enthusiasm of liberty is apt to be infected with a spirit of

narrow and illiberal distrust. On the other hand, it will be equally forgotten that the vigor of government is

essential to the security of liberty; that, in the contemplation of a sound and wellinformed judgment, their

interest can never be separated; and that a dangerous ambition more often lurks behind the specious mask of

zeal for the rights of the people than under the forbidden appearance of zeal for the firmness and efficiency of

government. History will teach us that the former has been found a much more certain road to the

introduction of despotism than the latter, and that of those men who have overturned the liberties of republics,

the greatest number have begun their career by paying an obsequious court to the people; commencing

In the course of the preceding observations, I have had an eye, my fellowcitizens, to putting you upon your

guard against all attempts, from whatever quarter, to influence your decision in a matter of the utmost

moment to your welfare, by any impressions other than those which may result from the evidence of truth.

You will, no doubt, at the same time, have collected from the general scope of them, that they proceed from a

source not unfriendly to the new Constitution. Yes, my countrymen, I own to you that, after having given it

an attentive consideration, I am clearly of opinion it is your interest to adopt it. I am convinced that this is the

safest course for your liberty, your dignity, and your happiness. I affect not reserves which I do not feel. I will

not amuse you with an appearance of deliberation when I have decided. I frankly acknowledge to you my

convictions, and I will freely lay before you the reasons on which they are founded. The consciousness of

good intentions disdains ambiguity. I shall not, however, multiply professions on this head. My motives must

remain in the depository of my own breast. My arguments will be open to all, and may be judged of by all.

They shall at least be offered in a spirit which will not disgrace the cause of truth.

In the progress of this discussion I shall endeavor to give a satisfactory answer to all the objections which

shall have made their appearance, that may seem to have any claim to your attention.

It may perhaps be thought superfluous to offer arguments to prove the utility of the UNION, a point, no

doubt, deeply engraved on the hearts of the great body of the people in every State, and one, which it may be

imagined, has no adversaries. But the fact is, that we already hear it whispered in the private circles of those

who oppose the new Constitution, that the thirteen States are of too great extent for any general system, and

that we must of necessity resort to separate confederacies of distinct portions of the whole.1 This doctrine

will, in all probability, be gradually propagated, till it has votaries enough to countenance an open avowal of

it. For nothing can be more evident, to those who are able to take an enlarged view of the subject, than the

alternative of an adoption of the new Constitution or a dismemberment of the Union. It will therefore be of

use to begin by examining the advantages of that Union, the certain evils, and the probable dangers, to which

1 The same idea, tracing the arguments to their consequences, is held out in several of the late publications

WHEN the people of America reflect that they are now called upon to decide a question, which, in its

consequences, must prove one of the most important that ever engaged their attention, the propriety of their

taking a very comprehensive, as well as a very serious, view of it, will be evident.

Nothing is more certain than the indispensable necessity of government, and it is equally undeniable, that

whenever and however it is instituted, the people must cede to it some of their natural rights in order to vest it

with requisite powers. It is well worthy of consideration therefore, whether it would conduce more to the

interest of the people of America that they should, to all general purposes, be one nation, under one federal

government, or that they should divide themselves into separate confederacies, and give to the head of each

the same kind of powers which they are advised to place in one national government.

It has until lately been a received and uncontradicted opinion that the prosperity of the people of America

depended on their continuing firmly united, and the wishes, prayers, and efforts of our best and wisest

citizens have been constantly directed to that object. But politicians now appear, who insist that this opinion

is erroneous, and that instead of looking for safety and happiness in union, we ought to seek it in a division of

the States into distinct confederacies or sovereignties. However extraordinary this new doctrine may appear,

it nevertheless has its advocates; and certain characters who were much opposed to it formerly, are at present

of the number. Whatever may be the arguments or inducements which have wrought this change in the

sentiments and declarations of these gentlemen, it certainly would not be wise in the people at large to adopt

these new political tenets without being fully convinced that they are founded in truth and sound policy.

It has often given me pleasure to observe that independent America was not composed of detached and

distant territories, but that one connected, fertile, widespreading country was the portion of our western sons

of liberty. Providence has in a particular manner blessed it with a variety of soils and productions, and

watered it with innumerable streams, for the delight and accommodation of its inhabitants. A succession of

navigable waters forms a kind of chain round its borders, as if to bind it together; while the most noble rivers

in the world, running at convenient distances, present them with highways for the easy communication of

friendly aids, and the mutual transportation and exchange of their various commodities.

With equal pleasure I have as often taken notice that Providence has been pleased to give this one connected

country to one united peoplea people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language,

professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their manners and

customs, and who, by their joint counsels, arms, and efforts, fighting side by side throughout a long and

This country and this people seem to have been made for each other, and it appears as if it was the design of

Providence, that an inheritance so proper and convenient for a band of brethren, united to each other by the

strongest ties, should never be split into a number of unsocial, jealous, and alien sovereignties.

Similar sentiments have hitherto prevailed among all orders and denominations of men among us. To all

general purposes we have uniformly been one people each individual citizen everywhere enjoying the same

national rights, privileges, and protection. As a nation we have made peace and war; as a nation we have

vanquished our common enemies; as a nation we have formed alliances, and made treaties, and entered into

A strong sense of the value and blessings of union induced the people, at a very early period, to institute a

federal government to preserve and perpetuate it. They formed it almost as soon as they had a political

existence; nay, at a time when their habitations were in flames, when many of their citizens were bleeding,

and when the progress of hostility and desolation left little room for those calm and mature inquiries and

reflections which must ever precede the formation of a wise and wellbalanced government for a free people.

It is not to be wondered at, that a government instituted in times so inauspicious, should on experiment be

found greatly deficient and inadequate to the purpose it was intended to answer.

Still continuing no less attached to union than enamored of liberty, they observed the danger which

immediately threatened the former and more remotely the latter; and being pursuaded that ample security for

both could only be found in a national government more wisely framed, they as with one voice, convened the

late convention at Philadelphia, to take that important subject under consideration.

This convention composed of men who possessed the confidence of the people, and many of whom had

become highly distinguished by their patriotism, virtue and wisdom, in times which tried the minds and

hearts of men, undertook the arduous task. In the mild season of peace, with minds unoccupied by other

subjects, they passed many months in cool, uninterrupted, and daily consultation; and finally, without having

been awed by power, or influenced by any passions except love for their country, they presented and

recommended to the people the plan produced by their joint and very unanimous councils.

Admit, for so is the fact, that this plan is only RECOMMENDED, not imposed, yet let it be remembered that

it is neither recommended to BLIND approbation, nor to BLIND reprobation; but to that sedate and candid

consideration which the magnitude and importance of the subject demand, and which it certainly ought to

receive. But this (as was remarked in the foregoing number of this paper) is more to be wished than expected,

Experience on a former occasion teaches us not to be too sanguine in such hopes. It is not yet forgotten that

wellgrounded apprehensions of imminent danger induced the people of America to form the memorable

Congress of 1774. That body recommended certain measures to their constituents, and the event proved their

wisdom; yet it is fresh in our memories how soon the press began to teem with pamphlets and weekly papers

against those very measures. Not only many of the officers of government, who obeyed the dictates of

personal interest, but others, from a mistaken estimate of consequences, or the undue influence of former

attachments, or whose ambition aimed at objects which did not correspond with the public good, were

indefatigable in their efforts to pursuade the people to reject the advice of that patriotic Congress. Many,

indeed, were deceived and deluded, but the great majority of the people reasoned and decided judiciously;

They considered that the Congress was composed of many wise and experienced men. That, being convened

from different parts of the country, they brought with them and communicated to each other a variety of

useful information. That, in the course of the time they passed together in inquiring into and discussing the

true interests of their country, they must have acquired very accurate knowledge on that head. That they were

individually interested in the public liberty and prosperity, and therefore that it was not less their inclination

than their duty to recommend only such measures as, after the most mature deliberation, they really thought

These and similar considerations then induced the people to rely greatly on the judgment and integrity of the

Congress; and they took their advice, notwithstanding the various arts and endeavors used to deter them from

it. But if the people at large had reason to confide in the men of that Congress, few of whom had been fully

tried or generally known, still greater reason have they now to respect the judgment and advice of the

convention, for it is well known that some of the most distinguished members of that Congress, who have

been since tried and justly approved for patriotism and abilities, and who have grown old in acquiring

political information, were also members of this convention, and carried into it their accumulated knowledge

It is worthy of remark that not only the first, but every succeeding Congress, as well as the late convention,

have invariably joined with the people in thinking that the prosperity of America depended on its Union. To

preserve and perpetuate it was the great object of the people in forming that convention, and it is also the

great object of the plan which the convention has advised them to adopt. With what propriety, therefore, or

for what good purposes, are attempts at this particular period made by some men to depreciate the importance

of the Union? Or why is it suggested that three or four confederacies would be better than one? I am

persuaded in my own mind that the people have always thought right on this subject, and that their universal

and uniform attachment to the cause of the Union rests on great and weighty reasons, which I shall endeavor

to develop and explain in some ensuing papers. They who promote the idea of substituting a number of

distinct confederacies in the room of the plan of the convention, seem clearly to foresee that the rejection of it

would put the continuance of the Union in the utmost jeopardy. That certainly would be the case, and I

sincerely wish that it may be as clearly foreseen by every good citizen, that whenever the dissolution of the

Union arrives, America will have reason to exclaim, in the words of the poet: ``FAREWELL! A LONG

IT IS not a new observation that the people of any country (if, like the Americans, intelligent and

wellinformed) seldom adopt and steadily persevere for many years in an erroneous opinion respecting their

interests. That consideration naturally tends to create great respect for the high opinion which the people of

America have so long and uniformly entertained of the importance of their continuing firmly united under

one federal government, vested with sufficient powers for all general and national purposes.

The more attentively I consider and investigate the reasons which appear to have given birth to this opinion,

Among the many objects to which a wise and free people find it necessary to direct their attention, that of

providing for their SAFETY seems to be the first. The SAFETY of the people doubtless has relation to a

great variety of circumstances and considerations, and consequently affords great latitude to those who wish

At present I mean only to consider it as it respects security for the preservation of peace and tranquillity, as

well as against dangers from FOREIGN ARMS AND INFLUENCE, as from dangers of the LIKE KIND

arising from domestic causes. As the former of these comes first in order, it is proper it should be the first

discussed. Let us therefore proceed to examine whether the people are not right in their opinion that a cordial

Union, under an efficient national government, affords them the best security that can be devised against

The number of wars which have happened or will happen in the world will always be found to be in

proportion to the number and weight of the causes, whether REAL or PRETENDED, which PROVOKE or

INVITE them. If this remark be just, it becomes useful to inquire whether so many JUST causes of war are

likely to be given by UNITED AMERICA as by DISUNITED America; for if it should turn out that United

America will probably give the fewest, then it will follow that in this respect the Union tends most to

The JUST causes of war, for the most part, arise either from violation of treaties or from direct violence.

America has already formed treaties with no less than six foreign nations, and all of them, except Prussia, are

maritime, and therefore able to annoy and injure us. She has also extensive commerce with Portugal, Spain,

and Britain, and, with respect to the two latter, has, in addition, the circumstance of neighborhood to attend

It is of high importance to the peace of America that she observe the laws of nations towards all these powers,

and to me it appears evident that this will be more perfectly and punctually done by one national government

than it could be either by thirteen separate States or by three or four distinct confederacies.

Because when once an efficient national government is established, the best men in the country will not only

consent to serve, but also will generally be appointed to manage it; for, although town or country, or other

contracted influence, may place men in State assemblies, or senates, or courts of justice, or executive

departments, yet more general and extensive reputation for talents and other qualifications will be necessary

to recommend men to offices under the national government,especially as it will have the widest field for

choice, and never experience that want of proper persons which is not uncommon in some of the States.

Hence, it will result that the administration, the political counsels, and the judicial decisions of the national

government will be more wise, systematical, and judicious than those of individual States, and consequently

more satisfactory with respect to other nations, as well as more SAFE with respect to us.

Because, under the national government, treaties and articles of treaties, as well as the laws of nations, will

always be expounded in one sense and executed in the same manner,whereas, adjudications on the same

points and questions, in thirteen States, or in three or four confederacies, will not always accord or be

consistent; and that, as well from the variety of independent courts and judges appointed by different and

independent governments, as from the different local laws and interests which may affect and influence them.

The wisdom of the convention, in committing such questions to the jurisdiction and judgment of courts

appointed by and responsible only to one national government, cannot be too much commended.

Because the prospect of present loss or advantage may often tempt the governing party in one or two States to

swerve from good faith and justice; but those temptations, not reaching the other States, and consequently

having little or no influence on the national government, the temptation will be fruitless, and good faith and

justice be preserved. The case of the treaty of peace with Britain adds great weight to this reasoning.

Because, even if the governing party in a State should be disposed to resist such temptations, yet as such

temptations may, and commonly do, result from circumstances peculiar to the State, and may affect a great

number of the inhabitants, the governing party may not always be able, if willing, to prevent the injustice

meditated, or to punish the aggressors. But the national government, not being affected by those local

circumstances, will neither be induced to commit the wrong themselves, nor want power or inclination to

So far, therefore, as either designed or accidental violations of treaties and the laws of nations afford JUST

causes of war, they are less to be apprehended under one general government than under several lesser ones,

As to those just causes of war which proceed from direct and unlawful violence, it appears equally clear to

me that one good national government affords vastly more security against dangers of that sort than can be

Because such violences are more frequently caused by the passions and interests of a part than of the whole;

of one or two States than of the Union. Not a single Indian war has yet been occasioned by aggressions of the

present federal government, feeble as it is; but there are several instances of Indian hostilities having been

provoked by the improper conduct of individual States, who, either unable or unwilling to restrain or punish

The neighborhood of Spanish and British territories, bordering on some States and not on others, naturally

confines the causes of quarrel more immediately to the borderers. The bordering States, if any, will be those

who, under the impulse of sudden irritation, and a quick sense of apparent interest or injury, will be most

likely, by direct violence, to excite war with these nations; and nothing can so effectually obviate that danger

as a national government, whose wisdom and prudence will not be diminished by the passions which actuate

But not only fewer just causes of war will be given by the national government, but it will also be more in

their power to accommodate and settle them amicably. They will be more temperate and cool, and in that

respect, as well as in others, will be more in capacity to act advisedly than the offending State. The pride of

states, as well as of men, naturally disposes them to justify all their actions, and opposes their acknowledging,

correcting, or repairing their errors and offenses. The national government, in such cases, will not be affected

by this pride, but will proceed with moderation and candor to consider and decide on the means most proper

Besides, it is well known that acknowledgments, explanations, and compensations are often accepted as

satisfactory from a strong united nation, which would be rejected as unsatisfactory if offered by a State or

In the year 1685, the state of Genoa having offended Louis XIV., endeavored to appease him. He demanded

that they should send their Doge, or chief magistrate, accompanied by four of their senators, to FRANCE, to

ask his pardon and receive his terms. They were obliged to submit to it for the sake of peace. Would he on

any occasion either have demanded or have received the like humiliation from Spain, or Britain, or any other

MY LAST paper assigned several reasons why the safety of the people would be best secured by union

against the danger it may be exposed to by JUST causes of war given to other nations; and those reasons

show that such causes would not only be more rarely given, but would also be more easily accommodated, by

a national government than either by the State governments or the proposed little confederacies.

But the safety of the people of America against dangers from FOREIGN force depends not only on their

forbearing to give JUST causes of war to other nations, but also on their placing and continuing themselves in

such a situation as not to INVITE hostility or insult; for it need not be observed that there are PRETENDED

It is too true, however disgraceful it may be to human nature, that nations in general will make war whenever

they have a prospect of getting anything by it; nay, absolute monarchs will often make war when their nations

are to get nothing by it, but for the purposes and objects merely personal, such as thirst for military glory,

revenge for personal affronts, ambition, or private compacts to aggrandize or support their particular families

These and a variety of other motives, which affect only the mind of the sovereign, often lead him to engage in

wars not sanctified by justice or the voice and interests of his people. But, independent of these inducements

to war, which are more prevalent in absolute monarchies, but which well deserve our attention, there are

others which affect nations as often as kings; and some of them will on examination be found to grow out of

With France and with Britain we are rivals in the fisheries, and can supply their markets cheaper than they

can themselves, notwithstanding any efforts to prevent it by bounties on their own or duties on foreign fish.

With them and with most other European nations we are rivals in navigation and the carrying trade; and we

shall deceive ourselves if we suppose that any of them will rejoice to see it flourish; for, as our carrying trade

cannot increase without in some degree diminishing theirs, it is more their interest, and will be more their

In the trade to China and India, we interfere with more than one nation, inasmuch as it enables us to partake

in advantages which they had in a manner monopolized, and as we thereby supply ourselves with

The extension of our own commerce in our own vessels cannot give pleasure to any nations who possess

territories on or near this continent, because the cheapness and excellence of our productions, added to the

circumstance of vicinity, and the enterprise and address of our merchants and navigators, will give us a

greater share in the advantages which those territories afford, than consists with the wishes or policy of their

Spain thinks it convenient to shut the Mississippi against us on the one side, and Britain excludes us from the

Saint Lawrence on the other; nor will either of them permit the other waters which are between them and us

From these and such like considerations, which might, if consistent with prudence, be more amplified and

detailed, it is easy to see that jealousies and uneasinesses may gradually slide into the minds and cabinets of

other nations, and that we are not to expect that they should regard our advancement in union, in power and

The people of America are aware that inducements to war may arise out of these circumstances, as well as

from others not so obvious at present, and that whenever such inducements may find fit time and opportunity

for operation, pretenses to color and justify them will not be wanting. Wisely, therefore, do they consider

union and a good national government as necessary to put and keep them in SUCH A SITUATION as,

instead of INVITING war, will tend to repress and discourage it. That situation consists in the best possible

state of defense, and necessarily depends on the government, the arms, and the resources of the country.

As the safety of the whole is the interest of the whole, and cannot be provided for without government, either

one or more or many, let us inquire whether one good government is not, relative to the object in question,

One government can collect and avail itself of the talents and experience of the ablest men, in whatever part

of the Union they may be found. It can move on uniform principles of policy. It can harmonize, assimilate,

and protect the several parts and members, and extend the benefit of its foresight and precautions to each. In

the formation of treaties, it will regard the interest of the whole, and the particular interests of the parts as

connected with that of the whole. It can apply the resources and power of the whole to the defense of any

particular part, and that more easily and expeditiously than State governments or separate confederacies can

possibly do, for want of concert and unity of system. It can place the militia under one plan of discipline, and,

by putting their officers in a proper line of subordination to the Chief Magistrate, will, as it were, consolidate

them into one corps, and thereby render them more efficient than if divided into thirteen or into three or four

What would the militia of Britain be if the English militia obeyed the government of England, if the Scotch

militia obeyed the government of Scotland, and if the Welsh militia obeyed the government of Wales?

Suppose an invasion; would those three governments (if they agreed at all) be able, with all their respective

forces, to operate against the enemy so effectually as the single government of Great Britain would? We have

heard much of the fleets of Britain, and the time may come, if we are wise, when the fleets of America may

engage attention. But if one national government, had not so regulated the navigation of Britain as to make it

a nursery for seamenif one national government had not called forth all the national means and materials

for forming fleets, their prowess and their thunder would never have been celebrated. Let England have its

navigation and fleetlet Scotland have its navigation and fleetlet Wales have its navigation and fleetlet

Ireland have its navigation and fleetlet those four of the constituent parts of the British empire be be under

four independent governments, and it is easy to perceive how soon they would each dwindle into comparative

Apply these facts to our own case. Leave America divided into thirteen or, if you please, into three or four

independent governmentswhat armies could they raise and paywhat fleets could they ever hope to have?

If one was attacked, would the others fly to its succor, and spend their blood and money in its defense?

Would there be no danger of their being flattered into neutrality by its specious promises, or seduced by a too

great fondness for peace to decline hazarding their tranquillity and present safety for the sake of neighbors, of

whom perhaps they have been jealous, and whose importance they are content to see diminished? Although

such conduct would not be wise, it would, nevertheless, be natural. The history of the states of Greece, and of

other countries, abounds with such instances, and it is not improbable that what has so often happened would,

But admit that they might be willing to help the invaded State or confederacy. How, and when, and in what

proportion shall aids of men and money be afforded? Who shall command the allied armies, and from which

of them shall he receive his orders? Who shall settle the terms of peace, and in case of disputes what umpire

shall decide between them and compel acquiescence? Various difficulties and inconveniences would be

inseparable from such a situation; whereas one government, watching over the general and common interests,

and combining and directing the powers and resources of the whole, would be free from all these

But whatever may be our situation, whether firmly united under one national government, or split into a

number of confederacies, certain it is, that foreign nations will know and view it exactly as it is; and they will

act toward us accordingly. If they see that our national government is efficient and well administered, our

trade prudently regulated, our militia properly organized and disciplined, our resources and finances

discreetly managed, our credit reestablished, our people free, contented, and united, they will be much more

disposed to cultivate our friendship than provoke our resentment. If, on the other hand, they find us either

destitute of an effectual government (each State doing right or wrong, as to its rulers may seem convenient),

or split into three or four independent and probably discordant republics or confederacies, one inclining to

Britain, another to France, and a third to Spain, and perhaps played off against each other by the three, what a

poor, pitiful figure will America make in their eyes! How liable would she become not only to their contempt

but to their outrage, and how soon would dearbought experience proclaim that when a people or family so

QUEEN ANNE, in her letter of the 1st July, 1706, to the Scotch Parliament, makes some observations on the

importance of the UNION then forming between England and Scotland, which merit our attention. I shall

present the public with one or two extracts from it: ``An entire and perfect union will be the solid foundation

of lasting peace: It will secure your religion, liberty, and property; remove the animosities amongst

yourselves, and the jealousies and differences betwixt our two kingdoms. It must increase your strength,

riches, and trade; and by this union the whole island, being joined in affection and free from all

apprehensions of different interest, will be ENABLED TO RESIST ALL ITS ENEMIES.'' ``We most

earnestly recommend to you calmness and unanimity in this great and weighty affair, that the union may be

brought to a happy conclusion, being the only EFFECTUAL way to secure our present and future happiness,

and disappoint the designs of our and your enemies, who will doubtless, on this occasion, USE THEIR

UTMOST ENDEAVORS TO PREVENT OR DELAY THIS UNION.'' It was remarked in the preceding

paper, that weakness and divisions at home would invite dangers from abroad; and that nothing would tend

more to secure us from them than union, strength, and good government within ourselves. This subject is

The history of Great Britain is the one with which we are in general the best acquainted, and it gives us many

We may profit by their experience without paying the price which it cost them. Although it seems obvious to

common sense that the people of such an island should be but one nation, yet we find that they were for ages

divided into three, and that those three were almost constantly embroiled in quarrels and wars with one

Notwithstanding their true interest with respect to the continental nations was really the same, yet by the arts

and policy and practices of those nations, their mutual jealousies were perpetually kept inflamed, and for a

long series of years they were far more inconvenient and troublesome than they were useful and assisting to

Should the people of America divide themselves into three or four nations, would not the same thing happen?

Would not similar jealousies arise, and be in like manner cherished? Instead of their being ``joined in

affection'' and free from all apprehension of different ``interests,'' envy and jealousy would soon extinguish

confidence and affection, and the partial interests of each confederacy, instead of the general interests of all

America, would be the only objects of their policy and pursuits. Hence, like most other BORDERING

nations, they would always be either involved in disputes and war, or live in the constant apprehension of

The most sanguine advocates for three or four confederacies cannot reasonably suppose that they would long

remain exactly on an equal footing in point of strength, even if it was possible to form them so at first; but,

admitting that to be practicable, yet what human contrivance can secure the continuance of such equality?

Independent of those local circumstances which tend to beget and increase power in one part and to impede

its progress in another, we must advert to the effects of that superior policy and good management which

would probably distinguish the government of one above the rest, and by which their relative equality in

strength and consideration would be destroyed. For it cannot be presumed that the same degree of sound

policy, prudence, and foresight would uniformly be observed by each of these confederacies for a long

Whenever, and from whatever causes, it might happen, and happen it would, that any one of these nations or

confederacies should rise on the scale of political importance much above the degree of her neighbors, that

moment would those neighbors behold her with envy and with fear. Both those passions would lead them to

countenance, if not to promote, whatever might promise to diminish her importance; and would also restrain

them from measures calculated to advance or even to secure her prosperity. Much time would not be

She would soon begin, not only to lose confidence in her neighbors, but also to feel a disposition equally

Distrust naturally creates distrust, and by nothing is goodwill and kind conduct more speedily changed than

The North is generally the region of strength, and many local circumstances render it probable that the most

Northern of the proposed confederacies would, at a period not very distant, be unquestionably more

formidable than any of the others. No sooner would this become evident than the NORTHERN HIVE would

excite the same ideas and sensations in the more southern parts of America which it formerly did in the

southern parts of Europe. Nor does it appear to be a rash conjecture that its young swarms might often be

tempted to gather honey in the more blooming fields and milder air of their luxurious and more delicate

They who well consider the history of similar divisions and confederacies will find abundant reason to

apprehend that those in contemplation would in no other sense be neighbors than as they would be borderers;

that they would neither love nor trust one another, but on the contrary would be a prey to discord, jealousy,

and mutual injuries; in short, that they would place us exactly in the situations in which some nations

From these considerations it appears that those gentlemen are greatly mistaken who suppose that alliances

offensive and defensive might be formed between these confederacies, and would produce that combination

and union of wills of arms and of resources, which would be necessary to put and keep them in a formidable

When did the independent states, into which Britain and Spain were formerly divided, combine in such

alliance, or unite their forces against a foreign enemy? The proposed confederacies will be DISTINCT

NATIONS. Each of them would have its commerce with foreigners to regulate by distinct treaties; and as

their productions and commodities are different and proper for different markets, so would those treaties be

Different commercial concerns must create different interests, and of course different degrees of political

attachment to and connection with different foreign nations. Hence it might and probably would happen that

the foreign nation with whom the SOUTHERN confederacy might be at war would be the one with whom the

NORTHERN confederacy would be the most desirous of preserving peace and friendship. An alliance so

contrary to their immediate interest would not therefore be easy to form, nor, if formed, would it be observed

Nay, it is far more probable that in America, as in Europe, neighboring nations, acting under the impulse of

opposite interests and unfriendly passions, would frequently be found taking different sides. Considering our

distance from Europe, it would be more natural for these confederacies to apprehend danger from one another

than from distant nations, and therefore that each of them should be more desirous to guard against the others

by the aid of foreign alliances, than to guard against foreign dangers by alliances between themselves. And

here let us not forget how much more easy it is to receive foreign fleets into our ports, and foreign armies into

How many conquests did the Romans and others make in the characters of allies, and what innovations did

they under the same character introduce into the governments of those whom they pretended to protect.

Let candid men judge, then, whether the division of America into any given number of independent

sovereignties would tend to secure us against the hostilities and improper interference of foreign nations.

THE three last numbers of this paper have been dedicated to an enumeration of the dangers to which we

should be exposed, in a state of disunion, from the arms and arts of foreign nations. I shall now proceed to

delineate dangers of a different and, perhaps, still more alarming kindthose which will in all probability

flow from dissensions between the States themselves, and from domestic factions and convulsions. These

have been already in some instances slightly anticipated; but they deserve a more particular and more full

A man must be far gone in Utopian speculations who can seriously doubt that, if these States should either be

wholly disunited, or only united in partial confederacies, the subdivisions into which they might be thrown

would have frequent and violent contests with each other. To presume a want of motives for such contests as

an argument against their existence, would be to forget that men are ambitious, vindictive, and rapacious. To

look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent, unconnected sovereignties in the same

neighborhood, would be to disregard the uniform course of human events, and to set at defiance the

The causes of hostility among nations are innumerable. There are some which have a general and almost

constant operation upon the collective bodies of society. Of this description are the love of power or the

desire of preeminence and dominionthe jealousy of power, or the desire of equality and safety. There are

others which have a more circumscribed though an equally operative influence within their spheres. Such are

the rivalships and competitions of commerce between commercial nations. And there are others, not less

numerous than either of the former, which take their origin entirely in private passions; in the attachments,

enmities, interests, hopes, and fears of leading individuals in the communities of which they are members.

Men of this class, whether the favorites of a king or of a people, have in too many instances abused the

confidence they possessed; and assuming the pretext of some public motive, have not scrupled to sacrifice the

The celebrated Pericles, in compliance with the resentment of a prostitute,1 at the expense of much of the

blood and treasure of his countrymen, attacked, vanquished, and destroyed the city of the SAMNIANS. The

same man, stimulated by private pique against the MEGARENSIANS,2 another nation of Greece, or to avoid

a prosecution with which he was threatened as an accomplice of a supposed theft of the statuary Phidias,3 or

to get rid of the accusations prepared to be brought against him for dissipating the funds of the state in the

purchase of popularity,4 or from a combination of all these causes, was the primitive author of that famous

and fatal war, distinguished in the Grecian annals by the name of the PELOPONNESIAN war; which, after

various vicissitudes, intermissions, and renewals, terminated in the ruin of the Athenian commonwealth.

The ambitious cardinal, who was prime minister to Henry VIII., permitting his vanity to aspire to the triple

crown,5 entertained hopes of succeeding in the acquisition of that splendid prize by the influence of the

Emperor Charles V. To secure the favor and interest of this enterprising and powerful monarch, he

precipitated England into a war with France, contrary to the plainest dictates of policy, and at the hazard of

the safety and independence, as well of the kingdom over which he presided by his counsels, as of Europe in

general. For if there ever was a sovereign who bid fair to realize the project of universal monarchy, it was the

Emperor Charles V., of whose intrigues Wolsey was at once the instrument and the dupe.

The influence which the bigotry of one female,6 the petulance of another,7 and the cabals of a third,8 had in

the contemporary policy, ferments, and pacifications, of a considerable part of Europe, are topics that have

To multiply examples of the agency of personal considerations in the production of great national events,

either foreign or domestic, according to their direction, would be an unnecessary waste of time.

Those who have but a superficial acquaintance with the sources from which they are to be drawn, will

themselves recollect a variety of instances; and those who have a tolerable knowledge of human nature will

not stand in need of such lights to form their opinion either of the reality or extent of that agency. Perhaps,

however, a reference, tending to illustrate the general principle, may with propriety be made to a case which

has lately happened among ourselves. If Shays had not been a DESPERATE DEBTOR, it is much to be

But notwithstanding the concurring testimony of experience, in this particular, there are still to be found

visionary or designing men, who stand ready to advocate the paradox of perpetual peace between the States,

though dismembered and alienated from each other. The genius of republics (say they) is pacific; the spirit of

commerce has a tendency to soften the manners of men, and to extinguish those inflammable humors which

have so often kindled into wars. Commercial republics, like ours, will never be disposed to waste themselves

in ruinous contentions with each other. They will be governed by mutual interest, and will cultivate a spirit of

Is it not (we may ask these projectors in politics) the true interest of all nations to cultivate the same

benevolent and philosophic spirit? If this be their true interest, have they in fact pursued it? Has it not, on the

contrary, invariably been found that momentary passions, and immediate interest, have a more active and

imperious control over human conduct than general or remote considerations of policy, utility or justice?

Have republics in practice been less addicted to war than monarchies? Are not the former administered by

MEN as well as the latter? Are there not aversions, predilections, rivalships, and desires of unjust

acquisitions, that affect nations as well as kings? Are not popular assemblies frequently subject to the

impulses of rage, resentment, jealousy, avarice, and of other irregular and violent propensities? Is it not well

known that their determinations are often governed by a few individuals in whom they place confidence, and

are, of course, liable to be tinctured by the passions and views of those individuals? Has commerce hitherto

done anything more than change the objects of war? Is not the love of wealth as domineering and enterprising

a passion as that of power or glory? Have there not been as many wars founded upon commercial motives

since that has become the prevailing system of nations, as were before occasioned by the cupidity of territory

or dominion? Has not the spirit of commerce, in many instances, administered new incentives to the appetite,

both for the one and for the other? Let experience, the least fallible guide of human opinions, be appealed to

Sparta, Athens, Rome, and Carthage were all republics; two of them, Athens and Carthage, of the commercial

kind. Yet were they as often engaged in wars, offensive and defensive, as the neighboring monarchies of the

same times. Sparta was little better than a wellregulated camp; and Rome was never sated of carnage and

Carthage, though a commercial republic, was the aggressor in the very war that ended in her destruction.

Hannibal had carried her arms into the heart of Italy and to the gates of Rome, before Scipio, in turn, gave

him an overthrow in the territories of Carthage, and made a conquest of the commonwealth.

Venice, in later times, figured more than once in wars of ambition, till, becoming an object to the other Italian

states, Pope Julius II. found means to accomplish that formidable league,9 which gave a deadly blow to the

The provinces of Holland, till they were overwhelmed in debts and taxes, took a leading and conspicuous part

in the wars of Europe. They had furious contests with England for the dominion of the sea, and were among

In the government of Britain the representatives of the people compose one branch of the national legislature.

Commerce has been for ages the predominant pursuit of that country. Few nations, nevertheless, have been

more frequently engaged in war; and the wars in which that kingdom has been engaged have, in numerous

There have been, if I may so express it, almost as many popular as royal wars. The cries of the nation and the

importunities of their representatives have, upon various occasions, dragged their monarchs into war, or

continued them in it, contrary to their inclinations, and sometimes contrary to the real interests of the State. In

that memorable struggle for superiority between the rival houses of AUSTRIA and BOURBON, which so

long kept Europe in a flame, it is well known that the antipathies of the English against the French, seconding

the ambition, or rather the avarice, of a favorite leader,10 protracted the war beyond the limits marked out by

sound policy, and for a considerable time in opposition to the views of the court.

The wars of these two lastmentioned nations have in a great measure grown out of commercial

considerations,the desire of supplanting and the fear of being supplanted, either in particular branches of

From this summary of what has taken place in other countries, whose situations have borne the nearest

resemblance to our own, what reason can we have to confide in those reveries which would seduce us into an

expectation of peace and cordiality between the members of the present confederacy, in a state of separation?

Have we not already seen enough of the fallacy and extravagance of those idle theories which have amused

us with promises of an exemption from the imperfections, weaknesses and evils incident to society in every

shape? Is it not time to awake from the deceitful dream of a golden age, and to adopt as a practical maxim for

the direction of our political conduct that we, as well as the other inhabitants of the globe, are yet remote

from the happy empire of perfect wisdom and perfect virtue? Let the point of extreme depression to which

our national dignity and credit have sunk, let the inconveniences felt everywhere from a lax and ill

administration of government, let the revolt of a part of the State of North Carolina, the late menacing

disturbances in Pennsylvania, and the actual insurrections and rebellions in Massachusetts, declare! So far

is the general sense of mankind from corresponding with the tenets of those who endeavor to lull asleep our

apprehensions of discord and hostility between the States, in the event of disunion, that it has from long

observation of the progress of society become a sort of axiom in politics, that vicinity or nearness of situation,

constitutes nations natural enemies. An intelligent writer expresses himself on this subject to this effect:

``NEIGHBORING NATIONS (says he) are naturally enemies of each other unless their common weakness

forces them to league in a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC, and their constitution prevents the differences that

neighborhood occasions, extinguishing that secret jealousy which disposes all states to aggrandize themselves

at the expense of their neighbors.''11 This passage, at the same time, points out the EVIL and suggests the

4 ] Ibid. Phidias was supposed to have stolen some public gold, with the connivance of Pericles, for the

9 The League of Cambray, comprehending the Emperor, the King of France, the King of Aragon, and most of

IT IS sometimes asked, with an air of seeming triumph, what inducements could the States have, if disunited,

to make war upon each other? It would be a full answer to this question to sayprecisely the same

inducements which have, at different times, deluged in blood all the nations in the world. But, unfortunately

for us, the question admits of a more particular answer. There are causes of differences within our immediate

contemplation, of the tendency of which, even under the restraints of a federal constitution, we have had

sufficient experience to enable us to form a judgment of what might be expected if those restraints were

Territorial disputes have at all times been found one of the most fertile sources of hostility among nations.

Perhaps the greatest proportion of wars that have desolated the earth have sprung from this origin. This cause

would exist among us in full force. We have a vast tract of unsettled territory within the boundaries of the

United States. There still are discordant and undecided claims between several of them, and the dissolution of

It is well known that they have heretofore had serious and animated discussion concerning the rights to the

lands which were ungranted at the time of the Revolution, and which usually went under the name of crown

lands. The States within the limits of whose colonial governments they were comprised have claimed them as

their property, the others have contended that the rights of the crown in this article devolved upon the Union;

especially as to all that part of the Western territory which, either by actual possession, or through the

submission of the Indian proprietors, was subjected to the jurisdiction of the king of Great Britain, till it was

relinquished in the treaty of peace. This, it has been said, was at all events an acquisition to the Confederacy

It has been the prudent policy of Congress to appease this controversy, by prevailing upon the States to make

cessions to the United States for the benefit of the whole. This has been so far accomplished as, under a

continuation of the Union, to afford a decided prospect of an amicable termination of the dispute. A

dismemberment of the Confederacy, however, would revive this dispute, and would create others on the same

subject. At present, a large part of the vacant Western territory is, by cession at least, if not by any anterior

right, the common property of the Union. If that were at an end, the States which made the cession, on a

principle of federal compromise, would be apt when the motive of the grant had ceased, to reclaim the lands

as a reversion. The other States would no doubt insist on a proportion, by right of representation. Their

argument would be, that a grant, once made, could not be revoked; and that the justice of participating in

territory acquired or secured by the joint efforts of the Confederacy, remained undiminished. If, contrary to

probability, it should be admitted by all the States, that each had a right to a share of this common stock, there

would still be a difficulty to be surmounted, as to a proper rule of apportionment. Different principles would

be set up by different States for this purpose; and as they would affect the opposite interests of the parties,

In the wide field of Western territory, therefore, we perceive an ample theatre for hostile pretensions, without

any umpire or common judge to interpose between the contending parties. To reason from the past to the

future, we shall have good ground to apprehend, that the sword would sometimes be appealed to as the arbiter

of their differences. The circumstances of the dispute between Connecticut and Pennsylvania, respecting the

land at Wyoming, admonish us not to be sanguine in expecting an easy accommodation of such differences.

The articles of confederation obliged the parties to submit the matter to the decision of a federal court. The

But Connecticut gave strong indications of dissatisfaction with that determination; nor did she appear to be

entirely resigned to it, till, by negotiation and management, something like an equivalent was found for the

loss she supposed herself to have sustained. Nothing here said is intended to convey the slightest censure on

the conduct of that State. She no doubt sincerely believed herself to have been injured by the decision; and

States, like individuals, acquiesce with great reluctance in determinations to their disadvantage.

Those who had an opportunity of seeing the inside of the transactions which attended the progress of the

controversy between this State and the district of Vermont, can vouch the opposition we experienced, as well

from States not interested as from those which were interested in the claim; and can attest the danger to which

the peace of the Confederacy might have been exposed, had this State attempted to assert its rights by force.

Two motives preponderated in that opposition: one, a jealousy entertained of our future power; and the other,

the interest of certain individuals of influence in the neighboring States, who had obtained grants of lands

under the actual government of that district. Even the States which brought forward claims, in contradiction

to ours, seemed more solicitous to dismember this State, than to establish their own pretensions. These were

New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Connecticut. New Jersey and Rhode Island, upon all occasions,

discovered a warm zeal for the independence of Vermont; and Maryland, till alarmed by the appearance of a

connection between Canada and that State, entered deeply into the same views. These being small States, saw

with an unfriendly eye the perspective of our growing greatness. In a review of these transactions we may

trace some of the causes which would be likely to embroil the States with each other, if it should be their

The competitions of commerce would be another fruitful source of contention. The States less favorably

circumstanced would be desirous of escaping from the disadvantages of local situation, and of sharing in the

Each State, or separate confederacy, would pursue a system of commercial policy peculiar to itself. This

would occasion distinctions, preferences, and exclusions, which would beget discontent. The habits of

intercourse, on the basis of equal privileges, to which we have been accustomed since the earliest settlement

of the country, would give a keener edge to those causes of discontent than they would naturally have

independent of this circumstance. WE SHOULD BE READY TO DENOMINATE INJURIES THOSE

SOVEREIGNTIES CONSULTING A DISTINCT INTEREST. The spirit of enterprise, which characterizes

the commercial part of America, has left no occasion of displaying itself unimproved. It is not at all probable

that this unbridled spirit would pay much respect to those regulations of trade by which particular States

might endeavor to secure exclusive benefits to their own citizens. The infractions of these regulations, on one

side, the efforts to prevent and repel them, on the other, would naturally lead to outrages, and these to

The opportunities which some States would have of rendering others tributary to them by commercial

regulations would be impatiently submitted to by the tributary States. The relative situation of New York,

Connecticut, and New Jersey would afford an example of this kind. New York, from the necessities of

revenue, must lay duties on her importations. A great part of these duties must be paid by the inhabitants of

the two other States in the capacity of consumers of what we import. New York would neither be willing nor

able to forego this advantage. Her citizens would not consent that a duty paid by them should be remitted in

favor of the citizens of her neighbors; nor would it be practicable, if there were not this impediment in the

way, to distinguish the customers in our own markets. Would Connecticut and New Jersey long submit to be

taxed by New York for her exclusive benefit? Should we be long permitted to remain in the quiet and

undisturbed enjoyment of a metropolis, from the possession of which we derived an advantage so odious to

our neighbors, and, in their opinion, so oppressive? Should we be able to preserve it against the incumbent

weight of Connecticut on the one side, and the cooperating pressure of New Jersey on the other? These are

The public debt of the Union would be a further cause of collision between the separate States or

confederacies. The apportionment, in the first instance, and the progressive extinguishment afterward, would

be alike productive of illhumor and animosity. How would it be possible to agree upon a rule of

apportionment satisfactory to all? There is scarcely any that can be proposed which is entirely free from real

objections. These, as usual, would be exaggerated by the adverse interest of the parties.

There are even dissimilar views among the States as to the general principle of discharging the public debt.

Some of them, either less impressed with the importance of national credit, or because their citizens have

little, if any, immediate interest in the question, feel an indifference, if not a repugnance, to the payment of

the domestic debt at any rate. These would be inclined to magnify the difficulties of a distribution. Others of

them, a numerous body of whose citizens are creditors to the public beyond proportion of the State in the

total amount of the national debt, would be strenuous for some equitable and effective provision. The

procrastinations of the former would excite the resentments of the latter. The settlement of a rule would, in

the meantime, be postponed by real differences of opinion and affected delays. The citizens of the States

interested would clamour; foreign powers would urge for the satisfaction of their just demands, and the peace

of the States would be hazarded to the double contingency of external invasion and internal contention.

Suppose the difficulties of agreeing upon a rule surmounted, and the apportionment made. Still there is great

room to suppose that the rule agreed upon would, upon experiment, be found to bear harder upon some States

than upon others. Those which were sufferers by it would naturally seek for a mitigation of the burden. The

others would as naturally be disinclined to a revision, which was likely to end in an increase of their own

incumbrances. Their refusal would be too plausible a pretext to the complaining States to withhold their

contributions, not to be embraced with avidity; and the noncompliance of these States with their

engagements would be a ground of bitter discussion and altercation. If even the rule adopted should in

practice justify the equality of its principle, still delinquencies in payments on the part of some of the States

would result from a diversity of other causesthe real deficiency of resources; the mismanagement of their

finances; accidental disorders in the management of the government; and, in addition to the rest, the

reluctance with which men commonly part with money for purposes that have outlived the exigencies which

produced them, and interfere with the supply of immediate wants. Delinquencies, from whatever causes,

would be productive of complaints, recriminations, and quarrels. There is, perhaps, nothing more likely to

disturb the tranquillity of nations than their being bound to mutual contributions for any common object that

does not yield an equal and coincident benefit. For it is an observation, as true as it is trite, that there is

Laws in violation of private contracts, as they amount to aggressions on the rights of those States whose

citizens are injured by them, may be considered as another probable source of hostility.

We are not authorized to expect that a more liberal or more equitable spirit would preside over the

legislations of the individual States hereafter, if unrestrained by any additional checks, than we have

heretofore seen in too many instances disgracing their several codes. We have observed the disposition to

retaliation excited in Connecticut in consequence of the enormities perpetrated by the Legislature of Rhode

Island; and we reasonably infer that, in similar cases, under other circumstances, a war, not of

PARCHMENT, but of the sword, would chastise such atrocious breaches of moral obligation and social

The probability of incompatible alliances between the different States or confederacies and different foreign

nations, and the effects of this situation upon the peace of the whole, have been sufficiently unfolded in some

preceding papers. From the view they have exhibited of this part of the subject, this conclusion is to be

drawn, that America, if not connected at all, or only by the feeble tie of a simple league, offensive and

defensive, would, by the operation of such jarring alliances, be gradually entangled in all the pernicious

labyrinths of European politics and wars; and by the destructive contentions of the parts into which she was

divided, would be likely to become a prey to the artifices and machinations of powers equally the enemies of

them all. Divide et impera1 must be the motto of every nation that either hates or fears us.2 PUBLIUS.

2 In order that the whole subject of these papers may as soon as possible be laid before the public, it is

proposed to publish them four times a weekon Tuesday in the New York Packet and on Thursday in the

ASSUMING it therefore as an established truth that the several States, in case of disunion, or such

combinations of them as might happen to be formed out of the wreck of the general Confederacy, would be

subject to those vicissitudes of peace and war, of friendship and enmity, with each other, which have fallen to

the lot of all neighboring nations not united under one government, let us enter into a concise detail of some

War between the States, in the first period of their separate existence, would be accompanied with much

greater distresses than it commonly is in those countries where regular military establishments have long

obtained. The disciplined armies always kept on foot on the continent of Europe, though they bear a

malignant aspect to liberty and economy, have, notwithstanding, been productive of the signal advantage of

rendering sudden conquests impracticable, and of preventing that rapid desolation which used to mark the

progress of war prior to their introduction. The art of fortification has contributed to the same ends. The

nations of Europe are encircled with chains of fortified places, which mutually obstruct invasion.

Campaigns are wasted in reducing two or three frontier garrisons, to gain admittance into an enemy's country.

Similar impediments occur at every step, to exhaust the strength and delay the progress of an invader.

Formerly, an invading army would penetrate into the heart of a neighboring country almost as soon as

intelligence of its approach could be received; but now a comparatively small force of disciplined troops,

acting on the defensive, with the aid of posts, is able to impede, and finally to frustrate, the enterprises of one

much more considerable. The history of war, in that quarter of the globe, is no longer a history of nations

subdued and empires overturned, but of towns taken and retaken; of battles that decide nothing; of retreats

In this country the scene would be altogether reversed. The jealousy of military establishments would

postpone them as long as possible. The want of fortifications, leaving the frontiers of one state open to

another, would facilitate inroads. The populous States would, with little difficulty, overrun their less populous

neighbors. Conquests would be as easy to be made as difficult to be retained. War, therefore, would be

PLUNDER and devastation ever march in the train of irregulars. The calamities of individuals would make

the principal figure in the events which would characterize our military exploits.

This picture is not too highly wrought; though, I confess, it would not long remain a just one. Safety from

external danger is the most powerful director of national conduct. Even the ardent love of liberty will, after a

time, give way to its dictates. The violent destruction of life and property incident to war, the continual effort

and alarm attendant on a state of continual danger, will compel nations the most attached to liberty to resort

for repose and security to institutions which have a tendency to destroy their civil and political rights. To be

The institutions chiefly alluded to are STANDING ARMIES and the correspondent appendages of military

establishments. Standing armies, it is said, are not provided against in the new Constitution; and it is therefore

inferred that they may exist under it.1 Their existence, however, from the very terms of the proposition, is, at

most, problematical and uncertain. But standing armies, it may be replied, must inevitably result from a

dissolution of the Confederacy. Frequent war and constant apprehension, which require a state of as constant

preparation, will infallibly produce them. The weaker States or confederacies would first have recourse to

them, to put themselves upon an equality with their more potent neighbors. They would endeavor to supply

the inferiority of population and resources by a more regular and effective system of defense, by disciplined

troops, and by fortifications. They would, at the same time, be necessitated to strengthen the executive arm of

government, in doing which their constitutions would acquire a progressive direction toward monarchy. It is

of the nature of war to increase the executive at the expense of the legislative authority.

The expedients which have been mentioned would soon give the States or confederacies that made use of

them a superiority over their neighbors. Small states, or states of less natural strength, under vigorous

governments, and with the assistance of disciplined armies, have often triumphed over large states, or states

Neither the pride nor the safety of the more important States or confederacies would permit them long to

submit to this mortifying and adventitious superiority. They would quickly resort to means similar to those by

which it had been effected, to reinstate themselves in their lost preeminence. Thus, we should, in a little

time, see established in every part of this country the same engines of despotism which have been the scourge

of the Old World. This, at least, would be the natural course of things; and our reasonings will be the more

These are not vague inferences drawn from supposed or speculative defects in a Constitution, the whole

power of which is lodged in the hands of a people, or their representatives and delegates, but they are solid

It may, perhaps, be asked, by way of objection to this, why did not standing armies spring up out of the

contentions which so often distracted the ancient republics of Greece? Different answers, equally satisfactory,

may be given to this question. The industrious habits of the people of the present day, absorbed in the

pursuits of gain, and devoted to the improvements of agriculture and commerce, are incompatible with the

condition of a nation of soldiers, which was the true condition of the people of those republics. The means of

revenue, which have been so greatly multiplied by the increase of gold and silver and of the arts of industry,

and the science of finance, which is the offspring of modern times, concurring with the habits of nations, have

produced an entire revolution in the system of war, and have rendered disciplined armies, distinct from the

There is a wide difference, also, between military establishments in a country seldom exposed by its situation

to internal invasions, and in one which is often subject to them, and always apprehensive of them. The rulers

of the former can have a good pretext, if they are even so inclined, to keep on foot armies so numerous as

must of necessity be maintained in the latter. These armies being, in the first case, rarely, if at all, called into

activity for interior defense, the people are in no danger of being broken to military subordination. The laws

are not accustomed to relaxations, in favor of military exigencies; the civil state remains in full vigor, neither

corrupted, nor confounded with the principles or propensities of the other state. The smallness of the army

renders the natural strength of the community an overmatch for it; and the citizens, not habituated to look up

to the military power for protection, or to submit to its oppressions, neither love nor fear the soldiery; they

view them with a spirit of jealous acquiescence in a necessary evil, and stand ready to resist a power which

The army under such circumstances may usefully aid the magistrate to suppress a small faction, or an

occasional mob, or insurrection; but it will be unable to enforce encroachments against the united efforts of

In a country in the predicament last described, the contrary of all this happens. The perpetual menacings of

danger oblige the government to be always prepared to repel it; its armies must be numerous enough for

instant defense. The continual necessity for their services enhances the importance of the soldier, and

proportionably degrades the condition of the citizen. The military state becomes elevated above the civil. The

inhabitants of territories, often the theatre of war, are unavoidably subjected to frequent infringements on

their rights, which serve to weaken their sense of those rights; and by degrees the people are brought to

consider the soldiery not only as their protectors, but as their superiors. The transition from this disposition to

that of considering them masters, is neither remote nor difficult; but it is very difficult to prevail upon a

people under such impressions, to make a bold or effectual resistance to usurpations supported by the military

An insular situation, and a powerful marine, guarding it in a great measure against the possibility of foreign

invasion, supersede the necessity of a numerous army within the kingdom. A sufficient force to make head

against a sudden descent, till the militia could have time to rally and embody, is all that has been deemed

requisite. No motive of national policy has demanded, nor would public opinion have tolerated, a larger

number of troops upon its domestic establishment. There has been, for a long time past, little room for the

operation of the other causes, which have been enumerated as the consequences of internal war. This peculiar

felicity of situation has, in a great degree, contributed to preserve the liberty which that country to this day

enjoys, in spite of the prevalent venality and corruption. If, on the contrary, Britain had been situated on the

continent, and had been compelled, as she would have been, by that situation, to make her military

establishments at home coextensive with those of the other great powers of Europe, she, like them, would in

all probability be, at this day, a victim to the absolute power of a single man. 'T is possible, though not easy,

that the people of that island may be enslaved from other causes; but it cannot be by the prowess of an army

If we are wise enough to preserve the Union we may for ages enjoy an advantage similar to that of an

Europe is at a great distance from us. Her colonies in our vicinity will be likely to continue too much

disproportioned in strength to be able to give us any dangerous annoyance. Extensive military establishments

cannot, in this position, be necessary to our security. But if we should be disunited, and the integral parts

should either remain separated, or, which is most probable, should be thrown together into two or three

confederacies, we should be, in a short course of time, in the predicament of the continental powers of Europe

our liberties would be a prey to the means of defending ourselves against the ambition and jealousy of

This is an idea not superficial or futile, but solid and weighty. It deserves the most serious and mature

consideration of every prudent and honest man of whatever party. If such men will make a firm and solemn

pause, and meditate dispassionately on the importance of this interesting idea; if they will contemplate it in

all its attitudes, and trace it to all its consequences, they will not hesitate to part with trivial objections to a

Constitution, the rejection of which would in all probability put a final period to the Union. The airy

phantoms that flit before the distempered imaginations of some of its adversaries would quickly give place to

1 This objection will be fully examined in its proper place, and it will be shown that the only natural

precaution which could have been taken on this subject has been taken; and a much better one than is to be

found in any constitution that has been heretofore framed in America, most of which contain no guard at all

A FIRM Union will be of the utmost moment to the peace and liberty of the States, as a barrier against

domestic faction and insurrection. It is impossible to read the history of the petty republics of Greece and

Italy without feeling sensations of horror and disgust at the distractions with which they were continually

agitated, and at the rapid succession of revolutions by which they were kept in a state of perpetual vibration

between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy. If they exhibit occasional calms, these only serve as

shortlived contrast to the furious storms that are to succeed. If now and then intervals of felicity open to

view, we behold them with a mixture of regret, arising from the reflection that the pleasing scenes before us

are soon to be overwhelmed by the tempestuous waves of sedition and party rage. If momentary rays of glory

break forth from the gloom, while they dazzle us with a transient and fleeting brilliancy, they at the same time

admonish us to lament that the vices of government should pervert the direction and tarnish the lustre of those

bright talents and exalted endowments for which the favored soils that produced them have been so justly

From the disorders that disfigure the annals of those republics the advocates of despotism have drawn

arguments, not only against the forms of republican government, but against the very principles of civil

liberty. They have decried all free government as inconsistent with the order of society, and have indulged

themselves in malicious exultation over its friends and partisans. Happily for mankind, stupendous fabrics

reared on the basis of liberty, which have flourished for ages, have, in a few glorious instances, refuted their

gloomy sophisms. And, I trust, America will be the broad and solid foundation of other edifices, not less

But it is not to be denied that the portraits they have sketched of republican government were too just copies

of the originals from which they were taken. If it had been found impracticable to have devised models of a

more perfect structure, the enlightened friends to liberty would have been obliged to abandon the cause of

that species of government as indefensible. The science of politics, however, like most other sciences, has

The efficacy of various principles is now well understood, which were either not known at all, or imperfectly

The regular distribution of power into distinct departments; the introduction of legislative balances and

checks; the institution of courts composed of judges holding their offices during good behavior; the

representation of the people in the legislature by deputies of their own election: these are wholly new

discoveries, or have made their principal progress towards perfection in modern times. They are means, and

powerful means, by which the excellences of republican government may be retained and its imperfections

lessened or avoided. To this catalogue of circumstances that tend to the amelioration of popular systems of

civil government, I shall venture, however novel it may appear to some, to add one more, on a principle

which has been made the foundation of an objection to the new Constitution; I mean the ENLARGEMENT

of the ORBIT within which such systems are to revolve, either in respect to the dimensions of a single State

or to the consolidation of several smaller States into one great Confederacy. The latter is that which

immediately concerns the object under consideration. It will, however, be of use to examine the principle in

The utility of a Confederacy, as well to suppress faction and to guard the internal tranquillity of States, as to

increase their external force and security, is in reality not a new idea. It has been practiced upon in different

countries and ages, and has received the sanction of the most approved writers on the subject of politics. The

opponents of the plan proposed have, with great assiduity, cited and circulated the observations of

Montesquieu on the necessity of a contracted territory for a republican government.

But they seem not to have been apprised of the sentiments of that great man expressed in another part of his

work, nor to have adverted to the consequences of the principle to which they subscribe with such ready

When Montesquieu recommends a small extent for republics, the standards he had in view were of

dimensions far short of the limits of almost every one of these States. Neither Virginia, Massachusetts,

Pennsylvania, New York, North Carolina, nor Georgia can by any means be compared with the models from

which he reasoned and to which the terms of his description apply. If we therefore take his ideas on this point

as the criterion of truth, we shall be driven to the alternative either of taking refuge at once in the arms of

monarchy, or of splitting ourselves into an infinity of little, jealous, clashing, tumultuous commonwealths,

the wretched nurseries of unceasing discord, and the miserable objects of universal pity or contempt. Some of

the writers who have come forward on the other side of the question seem to have been aware of the

dilemma; and have even been bold enough to hint at the division of the larger States as a desirable thing.

Such an infatuated policy, such a desperate expedient, might, by the multiplication of petty offices, answer

the views of men who possess not qualifications to extend their influence beyond the narrow circles of

personal intrigue, but it could never promote the greatness or happiness of the people of America.

Referring the examination of the principle itself to another place, as has been already mentioned, it will be

sufficient to remark here that, in the sense of the author who has been most emphatically quoted upon the

occasion, it would only dictate a reduction of the SIZE of the more considerable MEMBERS of the Union,

but would not militate against their being all comprehended in one confederate government. And this is the

So far are the suggestions of Montesquieu from standing in opposition to a general Union of the States, that

he explicitly treats of a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC as the expedient for extending the sphere of popular

government, and reconciling the advantages of monarchy with those of republicanism.

``It is very probable,'' (says he1) ``that mankind would have been obliged at length to live constantly under

the government of a single person, had they not contrived a kind of constitution that has all the internal

advantages of a republican, together with the external force of a monarchical government. I mean a

``This form of government is a convention by which several smaller STATES agree to become members of a

larger ONE, which they intend to form. It is a kind of assemblage of societies that constitute a new one,

capable of increasing, by means of new associations, till they arrive to such a degree of power as to be able to

``A republic of this kind, able to withstand an external force, may support itself without any internal

``If a single member should attempt to usurp the supreme authority, he could not be supposed to have an

equal authority and credit in all the confederate states. Were he to have too great influence over one, this

would alarm the rest. Were he to subdue a part, that which would still remain free might oppose him with

forces independent of those which he had usurped and overpower him before he could be settled in his

``Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the confederate states the others are able to quell it. Should

abuses creep into one part, they are reformed by those that remain sound. The state may be destroyed on one

side, and not on the other; the confederacy may be dissolved, and the confederates preserve their sovereignty.

``As this government is composed of small republics, it enjoys the internal happiness of each; and with

respect to its external situation, it is possessed, by means of the association, of all the advantages of large

monarchies.'' I have thought it proper to quote at length these interesting passages, because they contain a

luminous abridgment of the principal arguments in favor of the Union, and must effectually remove the false

impressions which a misapplication of other parts of the work was calculated to make. They have, at the same

time, an intimate connection with the more immediate design of this paper; which is, to illustrate the

A distinction, more subtle than accurate, has been raised between a CONFEDERACY and a

CONSOLIDATION of the States. The essential characteristic of the first is said to be, the restriction of its

authority to the members in their collective capacities, without reaching to the individuals of whom they are

composed. It is contended that the national council ought to have no concern with any object of internal

administration. An exact equality of suffrage between the members has also been insisted upon as a leading

feature of a confederate government. These positions are, in the main, arbitrary; they are supported neither by

principle nor precedent. It has indeed happened, that governments of this kind have generally operated in the

manner which the distinction taken notice of, supposes to be inherent in their nature; but there have been in

most of them extensive exceptions to the practice, which serve to prove, as far as example will go, that there

is no absolute rule on the subject. And it will be clearly shown in the course of this investigation that as far as

the principle contended for has prevailed, it has been the cause of incurable disorder and imbecility in the

The definition of a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC seems simply to be ``an assemblage of societies,'' or an

association of two or more states into one state. The extent, modifications, and objects of the federal authority

are mere matters of discretion. So long as the separate organization of the members be not abolished; so long

as it exists, by a constitutional necessity, for local purposes; though it should be in perfect subordination to

the general authority of the union, it would still be, in fact and in theory, an association of states, or a

confederacy. The proposed Constitution, so far from implying an abolition of the State governments, makes

them constituent parts of the national sovereignty, by allowing them a direct representation in the Senate, and

leaves in their possession certain exclusive and very important portions of sovereign power. This fully

corresponds, in every rational import of the terms, with the idea of a federal government.

In the Lycian confederacy, which consisted of twentythree CITIES or republics, the largest were entitled to

THREE votes in the COMMON COUNCIL, those of the middle class to TWO, and the smallest to ONE. The

COMMON COUNCIL had the appointment of all the judges and magistrates of the respective CITIES. This

was certainly the most, delicate species of interference in their internal administration; for if there be any

thing that seems exclusively appropriated to the local jurisdictions, it is the appointment of their own officers.

Yet Montesquieu, speaking of this association, says: ``Were I to give a model of an excellent Confederate

Republic, it would be that of Lycia.'' Thus we perceive that the distinctions insisted upon were not within the

contemplation of this enlightened civilian; and we shall be led to conclude, that they are the novel

AMONG the numerous advantages promised by a wellconstructed Union, none deserves to be more

accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction. The friend of popular

governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their

propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail, therefore, to set a due value on any plan which, without

violating the principles to which he is attached, provides a proper cure for it. The instability, injustice, and

confusion introduced into the public councils, have, in truth, been the mortal diseases under which popular

governments have everywhere perished; as they continue to be the favorite and fruitful topics from which the

adversaries to liberty derive their most specious declamations. The valuable improvements made by the

American constitutions on the popular models, both ancient and modern, cannot certainly be too much

admired; but it would be an unwarrantable partiality, to contend that they have as effectually obviated the

Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the friends of

public and private faith, and of public and personal liberty, that our governments are too unstable, that the

public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that measures are too often decided, not

according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested

However anxiously we may wish that these complaints had no foundation, the evidence, of known facts will

not permit us to deny that they are in some degree true. It will be found, indeed, on a candid review of our

situation, that some of the distresses under which we labor have been erroneously charged on the operation of

our governments; but it will be found, at the same time, that other causes will not alone account for many of

our heaviest misfortunes; and, particularly, for that prevailing and increasing distrust of public engagements,

and alarm for private rights, which are echoed from one end of the continent to the other. These must be

chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and injustice with which a factious spirit has tainted our

By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole,

who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of

There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by removing its causes; the other, by

There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one, by destroying the liberty which is

essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the

It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was worse than the disease. Liberty is to

faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to

abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the

annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.

The second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be unwise. As long as the reason of man

continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the

connection subsists between his reason and his selflove, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal

influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves. The

diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable

obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From

the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and

kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the

respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties.

The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into

different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society.

A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of

speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for preeminence and

power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have,

in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more

disposed to vex and oppress each other than to cooperate for their common good. So strong is this

propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the

most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite

their most violent conflicts. But the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and

unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed

Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a

manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of

necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and

views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation,

and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government.

No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment,

and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be

both judges and parties at the same time; yet what are many of the most important acts of legislation, but so

many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of

large bodies of citizens? And what are the different classes of legislators but advocates and parties to the

causes which they determine? Is a law proposed concerning private debts? It is a question to which the

Justice ought to hold the balance between them. Yet the parties are, and must be, themselves the judges; and

the most numerous party, or, in other words, the most powerful faction must be expected to prevail. Shall

domestic manufactures be encouraged, and in what degree, by restrictions on foreign manufactures? are

questions which would be differently decided by the landed and the manufacturing classes, and probably by

neither with a sole regard to justice and the public good. The apportionment of taxes on the various

descriptions of property is an act which seems to require the most exact impartiality; yet there is, perhaps, no

legislative act in which greater opportunity and temptation are given to a predominant party to trample on the

rules of justice. Every shilling with which they overburden the inferior number, is a shilling saved to their

It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests, and render them

all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm. Nor, in many cases,

can such an adjustment be made at all without taking into view indirect and remote considerations, which will

rarely prevail over the immediate interest which one party may find in disregarding the rights of another or

The inference to which we are brought is, that the CAUSES of faction cannot be removed, and that relief is

If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the

majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote. It may clog the administration, it may convulse the

society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the Constitution. When a

majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to

its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good

and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form

of popular government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed. Let me add that it is the

great desideratum by which this form of government can be rescued from the opprobrium under which it has

By what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of two only. Either the existence of the same

passion or interest in a majority at the same time must be prevented, or the majority, having such coexistent

passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into

effect schemes of oppression. If the impulse and the opportunity be suffered to coincide, we well know that

neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control. They are not found to be such on

the injustice and violence of individuals, and lose their efficacy in proportion to the number combined

From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure democracy, by which I mean a society

consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit

of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a

majority of the whole; a communication and concert result from the form of government itself; and there is

nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is that

such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible

with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have

Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have erroneously supposed that by

reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly

equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions.

A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a

different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it

varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy which it

The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the delegation of the

government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of

The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them

through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their

country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial

considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the

representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people

themselves, convened for the purpose. On the other hand, the effect may be inverted. Men of factious

tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first

obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests, of the people. The question resulting is, whether small or

extensive republics are more favorable to the election of proper guardians of the public weal; and it is clearly

decided in favor of the latter by two obvious considerations: In the first place, it is to be remarked that,

however small the republic may be, the representatives must be raised to a certain number, in order to guard

against the cabals of a few; and that, however large it may be, they must be limited to a certain number, in

order to guard against the confusion of a multitude. Hence, the number of representatives in the two cases not

being in proportion to that of the two constituents, and being proportionally greater in the small republic, it

follows that, if the proportion of fit characters be not less in the large than in the small republic, the former

will present a greater option, and consequently a greater probability of a fit choice.

In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the

small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success the vicious arts by

which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to

centre in men who possess the most attractive merit and the most diffusive and established characters.

It must be confessed that in this, as in most other cases, there is a mean, on both sides of which

inconveniences will be found to lie. By enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the

representatives too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests; as by reducing it

too much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to comprehend and pursue great and

national objects. The federal Constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate

interests being referred to the national, the local and particular to the State legislatures.

The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought

within the compass of republican than of democratic government; and it is this circumstance principally

which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded in the former than in the latter. The smaller the

society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct

parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the

number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the

more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a

greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a

common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more

difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other. Besides other

impediments, it may be remarked that, where there is a consciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes,

communication is always checked by distrust in proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary.

Hence, it clearly appears, that the same advantage which a republic has over a democracy, in controlling the

effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic,is enjoyed by the Union over the States

composing it. Does the advantage consist in the substitution of representatives whose enlightened views and

virtuous sentiments render them superior to local prejudices and schemes of injustice? It will not be denied

that the representation of the Union will be most likely to possess these requisite endowments. Does it consist

in the greater security afforded by a greater variety of parties, against the event of any one party being able to

outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal degree does the increased variety of parties comprised within the

Union, increase this security. Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles opposed to the concert and

accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority? Here, again, the extent of the

The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be unable to

spread a general conflagration through the other States. A religious sect may degenerate into a political

faction in a part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must secure

the national councils against any danger from that source. A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts,

for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the

whole body of the Union than a particular member of it; in the same proportion as such a malady is more

In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a republican remedy for the diseases

most incident to republican government. And according to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel in being

republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and supporting the character of Federalists.

THE importance of the Union, in a commercial light, is one of those points about which there is least room to

entertain a difference of opinion, and which has, in fact, commanded the most general assent of men who

This applies as well to our intercourse with foreign countries as with each other.

There are appearances to authorize a supposition that the adventurous spirit, which distinguishes the

commercial character of America, has already excited uneasy sensations in several of the maritime powers of

Europe. They seem to be apprehensive of our too great interference in that carrying trade, which is the

support of their navigation and the foundation of their naval strength. Those of them which have colonies in

America look forward to what this country is capable of becoming, with painful solicitude. They foresee the

dangers that may threaten their American dominions from the neighborhood of States, which have all the

dispositions, and would possess all the means, requisite to the creation of a powerful marine. Impressions of

this kind will naturally indicate the policy of fostering divisions among us, and of depriving us, as far as

possible, of an ACTIVE COMMERCE in our own bottoms. This would answer the threefold purpose of

preventing our interference in their navigation, of monopolizing the profits of our trade, and of clipping the

Did not prudence forbid the detail, it would not be difficult to trace, by facts, the workings of this policy to

If we continue united, we may counteract a policy so unfriendly to our prosperity in a variety of ways. By

prohibitory regulations, extending, at the same time, throughout the States, we may oblige foreign countries

to bid against each other, for the privileges of our markets. This assertion will not appear chimerical to those

who are able to appreciate the importance of the markets of three millions of peopleincreasing in rapid

progression, for the most part exclusively addicted to agriculture, and likely from local circumstances to

remain soto any manufacturing nation; and the immense difference there would be to the trade and

navigation of such a nation, between a direct communication in its own ships, and an indirect conveyance of

its products and returns, to and from America, in the ships of another country. Suppose, for instance, we had

a government in America, capable of excluding Great Britain (with whom we have at present no treaty of

commerce) from all our ports; what would be the probable operation of this step upon her politics? Would it

not enable us to negotiate, with the fairest prospect of success, for commercial privileges of the most valuable

and extensive kind, in the dominions of that kingdom? When these questions have been asked, upon other

occasions, they have received a plausible, but not a solid or satisfactory answer. It has been said that

prohibitions on our part would produce no change in the system of Britain, because she could prosecute her

trade with us through the medium of the Dutch, who would be her immediate customers and paymasters for

those articles which were wanted for the supply of our markets. But would not her navigation be materially

injured by the loss of the important advantage of being her own carrier in that trade? Would not the principal

part of its profits be intercepted by the Dutch, as a compensation for their agency and risk? Would not the

mere circumstance of freight occasion a considerable deduction? Would not so circuitous an intercourse

facilitate the competitions of other nations, by enhancing the price of British commodities in our markets, and

by transferring to other hands the management of this interesting branch of the British commerce? A mature

consideration of the objects suggested by these questions will justify a belief that the real disadvantages to

Britain from such a state of things, conspiring with the prepossessions of a great part of the nation in favor

of the American trade, and with the importunities of the West India islands, would produce a relaxation in her

present system, and would let us into the enjoyment of privileges in the markets of those islands elsewhere,

from which our trade would derive the most substantial benefits. Such a point gained from the British

government, and which could not be expected without an equivalent in exemptions and immunities in our

markets, would be likely to have a correspondent effect on the conduct of other nations, who would not be

A further resource for influencing the conduct of European nations toward us, in this respect, would arise

from the establishment of a federal navy. There can be no doubt that the continuance of the Union under an

efficient government would put it in our power, at a period not very distant, to create a navy which, if it could

not vie with those of the great maritime powers, would at least be of respectable weight if thrown into the

scale of either of two contending parties. This would be more peculiarly the case in relation to operations in

the West Indies. A few ships of the line, sent opportunely to the reinforcement of either side, would often be

sufficient to decide the fate of a campaign, on the event of which interests of the greatest magnitude were

suspended. Our position is, in this respect, a most commanding one. And if to this consideration we add that

of the usefulness of supplies from this country, in the prosecution of military operations in the West Indies, it

will readily be perceived that a situation so favorable would enable us to bargain with great advantage for

commercial privileges. A price would be set not only upon our friendship, but upon our neutrality. By a

steady adherence to the Union we may hope, erelong, to become the arbiter of Europe in America, and to be

able to incline the balance of European competitions in this part of the world as our interest may dictate.

But in the reverse of this eligible situation, we shall discover that the rivalships of the parts would make them

checks upon each other, and would frustrate all the tempting advantages which nature has kindly placed

within our reach. In a state so insignificant our commerce would be a prey to the wanton intermeddlings of all

nations at war with each other; who, having nothing to fear from us, would with little scruple or remorse,

supply their wants by depredations on our property as often as it fell in their way. The rights of neutrality will

only be respected when they are defended by an adequate power. A nation, despicable by its weakness,

Under a vigorous national government, the natural strength and resources of the country, directed to a

common interest, would baffle all the combinations of European jealousy to restrain our growth. This

situation would even take away the motive to such combinations, by inducing an impracticability of success.

An active commerce, an extensive navigation, and a flourishing marine would then be the offspring of moral

and physical necessity. We might defy the little arts of the little politicians to control or vary the irresistible

But in a state of disunion, these combinations might exist and might operate with success. It would be in the

power of the maritime nations, availing themselves of our universal impotence, to prescribe the conditions of

our political existence; and as they have a common interest in being our carriers, and still more in preventing

our becoming theirs, they would in all probability combine to embarrass our navigation in such a manner as

would in effect destroy it, and confine us to a PASSIVE COMMERCE. We should then be compelled to

content ourselves with the first price of our commodities, and to see the profits of our trade snatched from us

to enrich our enemies and p rsecutors. That unequaled spirit of enterprise, which signalizes the genius of the

American merchants and navigators, and which is in itself an inexhaustible mine of national wealth, would be

stifled and lost, and poverty and disgrace would overspread a country which, with wisdom, might make

There are rights of great moment to the trade of America which are rights of the UnionI allude to the

fisheries, to the navigation of the Western lakes, and to that of the Mississippi. The dissolution of the

Confederacy would give room for delicate questions concerning the future existence of these rights; which

the interest of more powerful partners would hardly fail to solve to our disadvantage. The disposition of

Spain with regard to the Mississippi needs no comment. France and Britain are concerned with us in the

fisheries, and view them as of the utmost moment to their navigation. They, of course, would hardly remain

long indifferent to that decided mastery, of which experience has shown us to be possessed in this valuable

branch of traffic, and by which we are able to undersell those nations in their own markets. What more

natural than that they should be disposed to exclude from the lists such dangerous competitors? This branch

of trade ought not to be considered as a partial benefit. All the navigating States may, in different degrees,

advantageously participate in it, and under circumstances of a greater extension of mercantile capital, would

not be unlikely to do it. As a nursery of seamen, it now is, or when time shall have more nearly assimilated

the principles of navigation in the several States, will become, a universal resource. To the establishment of a

To this great national object, a NAVY, union will contribute in various ways. Every institution will grow and

flourish in proportion to the quantity and extent of the means concentred towards its formation and support. A

navy of the United States, as it would embrace the resources of all, is an object far less remote than a navy of

any single State or partial confederacy, which would only embrace the resources of a single part. It happens,

indeed, that different portions of confederated America possess each some peculiar advantage for this

essential establishment. The more southern States furnish in greater abundance certain kinds of naval

storestar, pitch, and turpentine. Their wood for the construction of ships is also of a more solid and lasting

texture. The difference in the duration of the ships of which the navy might be composed, if chiefly

constructed of Southern wood, would be of signal importance, either in the view of naval strength or of

national economy. Some of the Southern and of the Middle States yield a greater plenty of iron, and of better

quality. Seamen must chiefly be drawn from the Northern hive. The necessity of naval protection to external

or maritime commerce does not require a particular elucidation, no more than the conduciveness of that

An unrestrained intercourse between the States themselves will advance the trade of each by an interchange

of their respective productions, not only for the supply of reciprocal wants at home, but for exportation to

foreign markets. The veins of commerce in every part will be replenished, and will acquire additional motion

Commercial enterprise will have much greater scope, from the diversity in the productions of different States.

When the staple of one fails from a bad harvest or unproductive crop, it can call to its aid the staple of

another. The variety, not less than the value, of products for exportation contributes to the activity of foreign

commerce. It can be conducted upon much better terms with a large number of materials of a given value

than with a small number of materials of the same value; arising from the competitions of trade and from the

fluctations of markets. Particular articles may be in great demand at certain periods, and unsalable at others;

but if there be a variety of articles, it can scarcely happen that they should all be at one time in the latter

predicament, and on this account the operations of the merchant would be less liable to any considerable

obstruction or stagnation. The speculative trader will at once perceive the force of these observations, and

will acknowledge that the aggregate balance of the commerce of the United States would bid fair to be much

more favorable than that of the thirteen States without union or with partial unions.

It may perhaps be replied to this, that whether the States are united or disunited, there would still be an

intimate intercourse between them which would answer the same ends; this intercourse would be fettered,

interrupted, and narrowed by a multiplicity of causes, which in the course of these papers have been amply

detailed. A unity of commercial, as well as political, interests, can only result from a unity of government.

There are other points of view in which this subject might be placed, of a striking and animating kind. But

they would lead us too far into the regions of futurity, and would involve topics not proper for a newspaper

discussion. I shall briefly observe, that our situation invites and our interests prompt us to aim at an ascendant

in the system of American affairs. The world may politically, as well as geographically, be divided into four

parts, each having a distinct set of interests. Unhappily for the other three, Europe, by her arms and by her

negotiations, by force and by fraud, has, in different degrees, extended her dominion over them all. Africa,

Asia, and America, have successively felt her domination. The superiority she has long maintained has

tempted her to plume herself as the Mistress of the World, and to consider the rest of mankind as created for

her benefit. Men admired as profound philosophers have, in direct terms, attributed to her inhabitants a

physical superiority, and have gravely asserted that all animals, and with them the human species, degenerate

in Americathat even dogs cease to bark after having breathed awhile in our atmosphere.1 Facts have too

long supported these arrogant pretensions of the Europeans. It belongs to us to vindicate the honor of the

human race, and to teach that assuming brother, moderation. Union will enable us to do it. Disunion will will

add another victim to his triumphs. Let Americans disdain to be the instruments of European greatness! Let

the thirteen States, bound together in a strict and indissoluble Union, concur in erecting one great American

system, superior to the control of all transatlantic force or influence, and able to dictate the terms of the

THE effects of Union upon the commercial prosperity of the States have been sufficiently delineated. Its

tendency to promote the interests of revenue will be the subject of our present inquiry.

The prosperity of commerce is now perceived and acknowledged by all enlightened statesmen to be the most

useful as well as the most productive source of national wealth, and has accordingly become a primary object

of their political cares. By multipying the means of gratification, by promoting the introduction and

circulation of the precious metals, those darling objects of human avarice and enterprise, it serves to vivify

and invigorate the channels of industry, and to make them flow with greater activity and copiousness. The

assiduous merchant, the laborious husbandman, the active mechanic, and the industrious manufacturer,all

orders of men, look forward with eager expectation and growing alacrity to this pleasing reward of their toils.

The oftenagitated question between agriculture and commerce has, from indubitable experience, received a

decision which has silenced the rivalship that once subsisted between them, and has proved, to the

satisfaction of their friends, that their interests are intimately blended and interwoven.

It has been found in various countries that, in proportion as commerce has flourished, land has risen in value.

And how could it have happened otherwise? Could that which procures a freer vent for the products of the

earth, which furnishes new incitements to the cultivation of land, which is the most powerful instrument in

increasing the quantity of money in a statecould that, in fine, which is the faithful handmaid of labor and

industry, in every shape, fail to augment that article, which is the prolific parent of far the greatest part of the

objects upon which they are exerted? It is astonishing that so simple a truth should ever have had an

adversary; and it is one, among a multitude of proofs, how apt a spirit of illinformed jealousy, or of too

great abstraction and refinement, is to lead men astray from the plainest truths of reason and conviction.

The ability of a country to pay taxes must always be proportioned, in a great degree, to the quantity of money

Commerce, contributing to both these objects, must of necessity render the payment of taxes easier, and

facilitate the requisite supplies to the treasury. The hereditary dominions of the Emperor of Germany contain

a great extent of fertile, cultivated, and populous territory, a large proportion of which is situated in mild and

luxuriant climates. In some parts of this territory are to be found the best gold and silver mines in Europe.

And yet, from the want of the fostering influence of commerce, that monarch can boast but slender revenues.

He has several times been compelled to owe obligations to the pecuniary succors of other nations for the

preservation of his essential interests, and is unable, upon the strength of his own resources, to sustain a long

But it is not in this aspect of the subject alone that Union will be seen to conduce to the purpose of revenue.

There are other points of view, in which its influence will appear more immediate and decisive. It is evident

from the state of the country, from the habits of the people, from the experience we have had on the point

itself, that it is impracticable to raise any very considerable sums by direct taxation. Tax laws have in vain

been multiplied; new methods to enforce the collection have in vain been tried; the public expectation has

been uniformly disappointed, and the treasuries of the States have remained empty. The popular system of

administration inherent in the nature of popular government, coinciding with the real scarcity of money

incident to a languid and mutilated state of trade, has hitherto defeated every experiment for extensive

collections, and has at length taught the different legislatures the folly of attempting them.

No person acquainted with what happens in other countries will be surprised at this circumstance. In so

opulent a nation as that of Britain, where direct taxes from superior wealth must be much more tolerable, and,

from the vigor of the government, much more practicable, than in America, far the greatest part of the

national revenue is derived from taxes of the indirect kind, from imposts, and from excises. Duties on

In America, it is evident that we must a long time depend for the means of revenue chiefly on such duties. In

most parts of it, excises must be confined within a narrow compass. The genius of the people will ill brook

the inquisitive and peremptory spirit of excise laws. The pockets of the farmers, on the other hand, will

reluctantly yield but scanty supplies, in the unwelcome shape of impositions on their houses and lands; and

personal property is too precarious and invisible a fund to be laid hold of in any other way than by the

If these remarks have any foundation, that state of things which will best enable us to improve and extend so

valuable a resource must be best adapted to our political welfare. And it cannot admit of a serious doubt, that

this state of things must rest on the basis of a general Union. As far as this would be conducive to the

interests of commerce, so far it must tend to the extension of the revenue to be drawn from that source. As far

as it would contribute to rendering regulations for the collection of the duties more simple and efficacious, so

far it must serve to answer the purposes of making the same rate of duties more productive, and of putting it

into the power of the government to increase the rate without prejudice to trade.

The relative situation of these States; the number of rivers with which they are intersected, and of bays that

wash there shores; the facility of communication in every direction; the affinity of language and manners; the

familiar habits of intercourse; all these are circumstances that would conspire to render an illicit trade

between them a matter of little difficulty, and would insure frequent evasions of the commercial regulations

of each other. The separate States or confederacies would be necessitated by mutual jealousy to avoid the

temptations to that kind of trade by the lowness of their duties. The temper of our governments, for a long

time to come, would not permit those rigorous precautions by which the European nations guard the avenues

into their respective countries, as well by land as by water; and which, even there, are found insufficient

In France, there is an army of patrols (as they are called) constantly employed to secure their fiscal

regulations against the inroads of the dealers in contraband trade. Mr. Neckar computes the number of these

patrols at upwards of twenty thousand. This shows the immense difficulty in preventing that species of

traffic, where there is an inland communication, and places in a strong light the disadvantages with which the

collection of duties in this country would be encumbered, if by disunion the States should be placed in a

situation, with respect to each other, resembling that of France with respect to her neighbors. The arbitrary

and vexatious powers with which the patrols are necessarily armed, would be intolerable in a free country.

If, on the contrary, there be but one government pervading all the States, there will be, as to the principal part

of our commerce, but ONE SIDE to guardthe ATLANTIC COAST. Vessels arriving directly from foreign

countries, laden with valuable cargoes, would rarely choose to hazard themselves to the complicated and

critical perils which would attend attempts to unlade prior to their coming into port. They would have to

dread both the dangers of the coast, and of detection, as well after as before their arrival at the places of their

final destination. An ordinary degree of vigilance would be competent to the prevention of any material

infractions upon the rights of the revenue. A few armed vessels, judiciously stationed at the entrances of our

ports, might at a small expense be made useful sentinels of the laws. And the government having the same

interest to provide against violations everywhere, the cooperation of its measures in each State would have a

powerful tendency to render them effectual. Here also we should preserve by Union, an advantage which

nature holds out to us, and which would be relinquished by separation. The United States lie at a great

distance from Europe, and at a considerable distance from all other places with which they would have

extensive connections of foreign trade. The passage from them to us, in a few hours, or in a single night, as

between the coasts of France and Britain, and of other neighboring nations, would be impracticable. This is a

prodigious security against a direct contraband with foreign countries; but a circuitous contraband to one

State, through the medium of another, would be both easy and safe. The difference between a direct

importation from abroad, and an indirect importation through the channel of a neighboring State, in small

parcels, according to time and opportunity, with the additional facilities of inland communication, must be

It is therefore evident, that one national government would be able, at much less expense, to extend the duties

on imports, beyond comparison, further than would be practicable to the States separately, or to any partial

confederacies. Hitherto, I believe, it may safely be asserted, that these duties have not upon an average

exceeded in any State three per cent. In France they are estimated to be about fifteen per cent., and in Britain

they exceed this proportion.1 There seems to be nothing to hinder their being increased in this country to at

least treble their present amount. The single article of ardent spirits, under federal regulation, might be made

to furnish a considerable revenue. Upon a ratio to the importation into this State, the whole quantity imported

into the United States may be estimated at four millions of gallons; which, at a shilling per gallon, would

produce two hundred thousand pounds. That article would well bear this rate of duty; and if it should tend to

diminish the consumption of it, such an effect would be equally favorable to the agriculture, to the economy,

to the morals, and to the health of the society. There is, perhaps, nothing so much a subject of national

What will be the consequence, if we are not able to avail ourselves of the resource in question in its full

extent? A nation cannot long exist without revenues. Destitute of this essential support, it must resign its

independence, and sink into the degraded condition of a province. This is an extremity to which no

government will of choice accede. Revenue, therefore, must be had at all events. In this country, if the

principal part be not drawn from commerce, it must fall with oppressive weight upon land. It has been

already intimated that excises, in their true signification, are too little in unison with the feelings of the

people, to admit of great use being made of that mode of taxation; nor, indeed, in the States where almost the

sole employment is agriculture, are the objects proper for excise sufficiently numerous to permit very ample

collections in that way. Personal estate (as has been before remarked), from the difficulty in tracing it, cannot

be subjected to large contributions, by any other means than by taxes on consumption. In populous cities, it

may be enough the subject of conjecture, to occasion the oppression of individuals, without much aggregate

benefit to the State; but beyond these circles, it must, in a great measure, escape the eye and the hand of the

taxgatherer. As the necessities of the State, nevertheless, must be satisfied in some mode or other, the defect

of other resources must throw the principal weight of public burdens on the possessors of land. And as, on the

other hand, the wants of the government can never obtain an adequate supply, unless all the sources of

revenue are open to its demands, the finances of the community, under such embarrassments, cannot be put

into a situation consistent with its respectability or its security. Thus we shall not even have the consolations

of a full treasury, to atone for the oppression of that valuable class of the citizens who are employed in the

cultivation of the soil. But public and private distress will keep pace with each other in gloomy concert; and

As CONNECTED with the subject of revenue, we may with propriety consider that of economy. The money

saved from one object may be usefully applied to another, and there will be so much the less to be drawn

from the pockets of the people. If the States are united under one government, there will be but one national

civil list to support; if they are divided into several confederacies, there will be as many different national

civil lists to be provided forand each of them, as to the principal departments, coextensive with that which

would be necessary for a government of the whole. The entire separation of the States into thirteen

unconnected sovereignties is a project too extravagant and too replete with danger to have many advocates.

The ideas of men who speculate upon the dismemberment of the empire seem generally turned toward three

confederaciesone consisting of the four Northern, another of the four Middle, and a third of the five

Southern States. There is little probability that there would be a greater number. According to this

distribution, each confederacy would comprise an extent of territory larger than that of the kingdom of Great

Britain. No wellinformed man will suppose that the affairs of such a confederacy can be properly regulated

by a government less comprehensive in its organs or institutions than that which has been proposed by the

When the dimensions of a State attain to a certain magnitude, it requires the same energy of government and

the same forms of administration which are requisite in one of much greater extent.

This idea admits not of precise demonstration, because there is no rule by which we can measure the

momentum of civil power necessary to the government of any given number of individuals; but when we

consider that the island of Britain, nearly commensurate with each of the supposed confederacies, contains

about eight millions of people, and when we reflect upon the degree of authority required to direct the

passions of so large a society to the public good, we shall see no reason to doubt that the like portion of

power would be sufficient to perform the same task in a society far more numerous.

Civil power, properly organized and exerted, is capable of diffusing its force to a very great extent; and can,

in a manner, reproduce itself in every part of a great empire by a judicious arrangement of subordinate

The supposition that each confederacy into which the States would be likely to be divided would require a

government not less comprehensive than the one proposed, will be strengthened by another supposition, more

probable than that which presents us with three confederacies as the alternative to a general Union. If we

attend carefully to geographical and commercial considerations, in conjunction with the habits and prejudices

of the different States, we shall be led to conclude that in case of disunion they will most naturally league

themselves under two governments. The four Eastern States, from all the causes that form the links of

national sympathy and connection, may with certainty be expected to unite. New York, situated as she is,

would never be unwise enough to oppose a feeble and unsupported flank to the weight of that confederacy.

New Jersey is too small a State to think of being a frontier, in opposition to this still more powerful

combination; nor do there appear to be any obstacles to her admission into it. Even Pennsylvania would have

strong inducements to join the Northern league. An active foreign commerce, on the basis of her own

navigation, is her true policy, and coincides with the opinions and dispositions of her citizens. The more

Southern States, from various circumstances, may not think themselves much interested in the encouragement

of navigation. They may prefer a system which would give unlimited scope to all nations to be the carriers as

well as the purchasers of their commodities. Pennsylvania may not choose to confound her interests in a

As she must at all events be a frontier, she may deem it most consistent with her safety to have her exposed

side turned towards the weaker power of the Southern, rather than towards the stronger power of the

Northern, Confederacy. This would give her the fairest chance to avoid being the Flanders of America.

Whatever may be the determination of Pennsylvania, if the Northern Confederacy includes New Jersey, there

Nothing can be more evident than that the thirteen States will be able to support a national government better

than one half, or one third, or any number less than the whole. This reflection must have great weight in

obviating that objection to the proposed plan, which is founded on the principle of expense; an objection,

however, which, when we come to take a nearer view of it, will appear in every light to stand on mistaken

If, in addition to the consideration of a plurality of civil lists, we take into view the number of persons who

must necessarily be employed to guard the inland communication between the different confederacies against

illicit trade, and who in time will infallibly spring up out of the necessities of revenue; and if we also take into

view the military establishments which it has been shown would unavoidably result from the jealousies and

conflicts of the several nations into which the States would be divided, we shall clearly discover that a

separation would be not less injurious to the economy, than to the tranquillity, commerce, revenue, and

WE HAVE seen the necessity of the Union, as our bulwark against foreign danger, as the conservator of

peace among ourselves, as the guardian of our commerce and other common interests, as the only substitute

for those military establishments which have subverted the liberties of the Old World, and as the proper

antidote for the diseases of faction, which have proved fatal to other popular governments, and of which

alarming symptoms have been betrayed by our own. All that remains, within this branch of our inquiries, is to

take notice of an objection that may be drawn from the great extent of country which the Union embraces. A

few observations on this subject will be the more proper, as it is perceived that the adversaries of the new

Constitution are availing themselves of the prevailing prejudice with regard to the practicable sphere of

republican administration, in order to supply, by imaginary difficulties, the want of those solid objections

The error which limits republican government to a narrow district has been unfolded and refuted in preceding

papers. I remark here only that it seems to owe its rise and prevalence chiefly to the confounding of a republic

with a democracy, applying to the former reasonings drawn from the nature of the latter. The true distinction

between these forms was also adverted to on a former occasion. It is, that in a democracy, the people meet

and exercise the government in person; in a republic, they assemble and administer it by their representatives

and agents. A democracy, consequently, will be confined to a small spot. A republic may be extended over a

To this accidental source of the error may be added the artifice of some celebrated authors, whose writings

have had a great share in forming the modern standard of political opinions. Being subjects either of an

absolute or limited monarchy, they have endeavored to heighten the advantages, or palliate the evils of those

forms, by placing in comparison the vices and defects of the republican, and by citing as specimens of the

latter the turbulent democracies of ancient Greece and modern Italy. Under the confusion of names, it has

been an easy task to transfer to a republic observations applicable to a democracy only; and among others, the

observation that it can never be established but among a small number of people, living within a small

Such a fallacy may have been the less perceived, as most of the popular governments of antiquity were of the

democratic species; and even in modern Europe, to which we owe the great principle of representation, no

example is seen of a government wholly popular, and founded, at the same time, wholly on that principle. If

Europe has the merit of discovering this great mechanical power in government, by the simple agency of

which the will of the largest political body may be concentred, and its force directed to any object which the

public good requires, America can claim the merit of making the discovery the basis of unmixed and

extensive republics. It is only to be lamented that any of her citizens should wish to deprive her of the

additional merit of displaying its full efficacy in the establishment of the comprehensive system now under

As the natural limit of a democracy is that distance from the central point which will just permit the most

remote citizens to assemble as often as their public functions demand, and will include no greater number

than can join in those functions; so the natural limit of a republic is that distance from the centre which will

barely allow the representatives to meet as often as may be necessary for the administration of public affairs.

Can it be said that the limits of the United States exceed this distance? It will not be said by those who

recollect that the Atlantic coast is the longest side of the Union, that during the term of thirteen years, the

representatives of the States have been almost continually assembled, and that the members from the most

distant States are not chargeable with greater intermissions of attendance than those from the States in the

That we may form a juster estimate with regard to this interesting subject, let us resort to the actual

dimensions of the Union. The limits, as fixed by the treaty of peace, are: on the east the Atlantic, on the south

the latitude of thirtyone degrees, on the west the Mississippi, and on the north an irregular line running in

some instances beyond the fortyfifth degree, in others falling as low as the fortysecond. The southern shore

of Lake Erie lies below that latitude. Computing the distance between the thirtyfirst and fortyfifth degrees,

it amounts to nine hundred and seventythree common miles; computing it from thirtyone to fortytwo

Taking the mean for the distance, the amount will be eight hundred and sixtyeight miles and threefourths.

The mean distance from the Atlantic to the Mississippi does not probably exceed seven hundred and fifty

miles. On a comparison of this extent with that of several countries in Europe, the practicability of rendering

our system commensurate to it appears to be demonstrable. It is not a great deal larger than Germany, where a

diet representing the whole empire is continually assembled; or than Poland before the late dismemberment,

where another national diet was the depositary of the supreme power. Passing by France and Spain, we find

that in Great Britain, inferior as it may be in size, the representatives of the northern extremity of the island

have as far to travel to the national council as will be required of those of the most remote parts of the Union.

Favorable as this view of the subject may be, some observations remain which will place it in a light still

In the first place it is to be remembered that the general government is not to be charged with the whole

power of making and administering laws. Its jurisdiction is limited to certain enumerated objects, which

concern all the members of the republic, but which are not to be attained by the separate provisions of any.

The subordinate governments, which can extend their care to all those other subjects which can be separately

provided for, will retain their due authority and activity. Were it proposed by the plan of the convention to

abolish the governments of the particular States, its adversaries would have some ground for their objection;

though it would not be difficult to show that if they were abolished the general government would be

compelled, by the principle of selfpreservation, to reinstate them in their proper jurisdiction.

A second observation to be made is that the immediate object of the federal Constitution is to secure the

union of the thirteen primitive States, which we know to be practicable; and to add to them such other States

as may arise in their own bosoms, or in their neighborhoods, which we cannot doubt to be equally

practicable. The arrangements that may be necessary for those angles and fractions of our territory which lie

on our northwestern frontier, must be left to those whom further discoveries and experience will render more

Let it be remarked, in the third place, that the intercourse throughout the Union will be facilitated by new

improvements. Roads will everywhere be shortened, and kept in better order; accommodations for travelers

will be multiplied and meliorated; an interior navigation on our eastern side will be opened throughout, or

nearly throughout, the whole extent of the thirteen States. The communication between the Western and

Atlantic districts, and between different parts of each, will be rendered more and more easy by those

numerous canals with which the beneficence of nature has intersected our country, and which art finds it so

A fourth and still more important consideration is, that as almost every State will, on one side or other, be a

frontier, and will thus find, in regard to its safety, an inducement to make some sacrifices for the sake of the

general protection; so the States which lie at the greatest distance from the heart of the Union, and which, of

course, may partake least of the ordinary circulation of its benefits, will be at the same time immediately

contiguous to foreign nations, and will consequently stand, on particular occasions, in greatest need of its

strength and resources. It may be inconvenient for Georgia, or the States forming our western or northeastern

borders, to send their representatives to the seat of government; but they would find it more so to struggle

alone against an invading enemy, or even to support alone the whole expense of those precautions which may

be dictated by the neighborhood of continual danger. If they should derive less benefit, therefore, from the

Union in some respects than the less distant States, they will derive greater benefit from it in other respects,

I submit to you, my fellowcitizens, these considerations, in full confidence that the good sense which has so

often marked your decisions will allow them their due weight and effect; and that you will never suffer

difficulties, however formidable in appearance, or however fashionable the error on which they may be

founded, to drive you into the gloomy and perilous scene into which the advocates for disunion would

conduct you. Hearken not to the unnatural voice which tells you that the people of America, knit together as

they are by so many cords of affection, can no longer live together as members of the same family; can no

longer continue the mutual guardians of their mutual happiness; can no longer be fellowcitizens of one great,

Hearken not to the voice which petulantly tells you that the form of government recommended for your

adoption is a novelty in the political world; that it has never yet had a place in the theories of the wildest

projectors; that it rashly attempts what it is impossible to accomplish. No, my countrymen, shut your ears

against this unhallowed language. Shut your hearts against the poison which it conveys; the kindred blood

which flows in the veins of American citizens, the mingled blood which they have shed in defense of their

sacred rights, consecrate their Union, and excite horror at the idea of their becoming aliens, rivals, enemies.

And if novelties are to be shunned, believe me, the most alarming of all novelties, the most wild of all

projects, the most rash of all attempts, is that of rendering us in pieces, in order to preserve our liberties and

promote our happiness. But why is the experiment of an extended republic to be rejected, merely because it

may comprise what is new? Is it not the glory of the people of America, that, whilst they have paid a decent

regard to the opinions of former times and other nations, they have not suffered a blind veneration for

antiquity, for custom, or for names, to overrule the suggestions of their own good sense, the knowledge of

their own situation, and the lessons of their own experience? To this manly spirit, posterity will be indebted

for the possession, and the world for the example, of the numerous innovations displayed on the American

theatre, in favor of private rights and public happiness. Had no important step been taken by the leaders of the

Revolution for which a precedent could not be discovered, no government established of which an exact

model did not present itself, the people of the United States might, at this moment have been numbered

among the melancholy victims of misguided councils, must at best have been laboring under the weight of

some of those forms which have crushed the liberties of the rest of mankind. Happily for America, happily,

we trust, for the whole human race, they pursued a new and more noble course. They accomplished a

revolution which has no parallel in the annals of human society. They reared the fabrics of governments

which have no model on the face of the globe. They formed the design of a great Confederacy, which it is

incumbent on their successors to improve and perpetuate. If their works betray imperfections, we wonder at

the fewness of them. If they erred most in the structure of the Union, this was the work most difficult to be

executed; this is the work which has been new modelled by the act of your convention, and it is that act on

IN THE course of the preceding papers, I have endeavored, my fellowcitizens, to place before you, in a

clear and convincing light, the importance of Union to your political safety and happiness. I have unfolded to

you a complication of dangers to which you would be exposed, should you permit that sacred knot which

binds the people of America together be severed or dissolved by ambition or by avarice, by jealousy or by

misrepresentation. In the sequel of the inquiry through which I propose to accompany you, the truths intended

to be inculcated will receive further confirmation from facts and arguments hitherto unnoticed. If the road

over which you will still have to pass should in some places appear to you tedious or irksome, you will

recollect that you are in quest of information on a subject the most momentous which can engage the

attention of a free people, that the field through which you have to travel is in itself spacious, and that the

difficulties of the journey have been unnecessarily increased by the mazes with which sophistry has beset the

way. It will be my aim to remove the obstacles from your progress in as compendious a manner as it can be

In pursuance of the plan which I have laid down for the discussion of the subject, the point next in order to be

examined is the ``insufficiency of the present Confederation to the preservation of the Union.'' It may perhaps

be asked what need there is of reasoning or proof to illustrate a position which is not either controverted or

doubted, to which the understandings and feelings of all classes of men assent, and which in substance is

admitted by the opponents as well as by the friends of the new Constitution. It must in truth be acknowledged

that, however these may differ in other respects, they in general appear to harmonize in this sentiment, at

least, that there are material imperfections in our national system, and that something is necessary to be done

to rescue us from impending anarchy. The facts that support this opinion are no longer objects of speculation.

They have forced themselves upon the sensibility of the people at large, and have at length extorted from

those, whose mistaken policy has had the principal share in precipitating the extremity at which we are

arrived, a reluctant confession of the reality of those defects in the scheme of our federal government, which

have been long pointed out and regretted by the intelligent friends of the Union.

We may indeed with propriety be said to have reached almost the last stage of national humiliation. There is

scarcely anything that can wound the pride or degrade the character of an independent nation which we do

not experience. Are there engagements to the performance of which we are held by every tie respectable

among men? These are the subjects of constant and unblushing violation. Do we owe debts to foreigners and

to our own citizens contracted in a time of imminent peril for the preservation of our political existence?

These remain without any proper or satisfactory provision for their discharge. Have we valuable territories

and important posts in the possession of a foreign power which, by express stipulations, ought long since to

have been surrendered? These are still retained, to the prejudice of our interests, not less than of our rights.

Are we in a condition to resent or to repel the aggression? We have neither troops, nor treasury, nor

government.1 Are we even in a condition to remonstrate with dignity? The just imputations on our own faith,

Are we entitled by nature and compact to a free participation in the navigation of the Mississippi? Spain

excludes us from it. Is public credit an indispensable resource in time of public danger? We seem to have

Is commerce of importance to national wealth? Ours is at the lowest point of declension. Is respectability in

the eyes of foreign powers a safeguard against foreign encroachments? The imbecility of our government

Is a violent and unnatural decrease in the value of land a symptom of national distress? The price of improved

land in most parts of the country is much lower than can be accounted for by the quantity of waste land at

market, and can only be fully explained by that want of private and public confidence, which are so

alarmingly prevalent among all ranks, and which have a direct tendency to depreciate property of every kind.

Is private credit the friend and patron of industry? That most useful kind which relates to borrowing and

lending is reduced within the narrowest limits, and this still more from an opinion of insecurity than from the

scarcity of money. To shorten an enumeration of particulars which can afford neither pleasure nor instruction,

it may in general be demanded, what indication is there of national disorder, poverty, and insignificance that

could befall a community so peculiarly blessed with natural advantages as we are, which does not form a part

of the dark catalogue of our public misfortunes? This is the melancholy situation to which we have been

brought by those very maxims and councils which would now deter us from adopting the proposed

Constitution; and which, not content with having conducted us to the brink of a precipice, seem resolved to

plunge us into the abyss that awaits us below. Here, my countrymen, impelled by every motive that ought to

influence an enlightened people, let us make a firm stand for our safety, our tranquillity, our dignity, our

reputation. Let us at last break the fatal charm which has too long seduced us from the paths of felicity and

It is true, as has been before observed that facts, too stubborn to be resisted, have produced a species of

general assent to the abstract proposition that there exist material defects in our national system; but the

usefulness of the concession, on the part of the old adversaries of federal measures, is destroyed by a

strenuous opposition to a remedy, upon the only principles that can give it a chance of success. While they

admit that the government of the United States is destitute of energy, they contend against conferring upon it

those powers which are requisite to supply that energy. They seem still to aim at things repugnant and

irreconcilable; at an augmentation of federal authority, without a diminution of State authority; at sovereignty

in the Union, and complete independence in the members. They still, in fine, seem to cherish with blind

devotion the political monster of an imperium in imperio. This renders a full display of the principal defects

of the Confederation necessary, in order to show that the evils we experience do not proceed from minute or

partial imperfections, but from fundamental errors in the structure of the building, which cannot be amended

otherwise than by an alteration in the first principles and main pillars of the fabric.

The great and radical vice in the construction of the existing Confederation is in the principle of

CAPACITIES, and as contradistinguished from the INDIVIDUALS of which they consist.

Though this principle does not run through all the powers delegated to the Union, yet it pervades and governs

those on which the efficacy of the rest depends. Except as to the rule of appointment, the United States has an

indefinite discretion to make requisitions for men and money; but they have no authority to raise either, by

regulations extending to the individual citizens of America. The consequence of this is, that though in theory

their resolutions concerning those objects are laws, constitutionally binding on the members of the Union, yet

in practice they are mere recommendations which the States observe or disregard at their option.

It is a singular instance of the capriciousness of the human mind, that after all the admonitions we have had

from experience on this head, there should still be found men who object to the new Constitution, for

deviating from a principle which has been found the bane of the old, and which is in itself evidently

incompatible with the idea of GOVERNMENT; a principle, in short, which, if it is to be executed at all, must

substitute the violent and sanguinary agency of the sword to the mild influence of the magistracy.

There is nothing absurd or impracticable in the idea of a league or alliance between independent nations for

certain defined purposes precisely stated in a treaty regulating all the details of time, place, circumstance, and

quantity; leaving nothing to future discretion; and depending for its execution on the good faith of the parties.

Compacts of this kind exist among all civilized nations, subject to the usual vicissitudes of peace and war, of

observance and nonobservance, as the interests or passions of the contracting powers dictate. In the early

part of the present century there was an epidemical rage in Europe for this species of compacts, from which

the politicians of the times fondly hoped for benefits which were never realized. With a view to establishing

the equilibrium of power and the peace of that part of the world, all the resources of negotiation were

exhausted, and triple and quadruple alliances were formed; but they were scarcely formed before they were

broken, giving an instructive but afflicting lesson to mankind, how little dependence is to be placed on

treaties which have no other sanction than the obligations of good faith, and which oppose general

considerations of peace and justice to the impulse of any immediate interest or passion.

If the particular States in this country are disposed to stand in a similar relation to each other, and to drop the

project of a general DISCRETIONARY SUPERINTENDENCE, the scheme would indeed be pernicious, and

would entail upon us all the mischiefs which have been enumerated under the first head; but it would have the

merit of being, at least, consistent and practicable Abandoning all views towards a confederate government,

this would bring us to a simple alliance offensive and defensive; and would place us in a situation to be

alternate friends and enemies of each other, as our mutual jealousies and rivalships, nourished by the

But if we are unwilling to be placed in this perilous situation; if we still will adhere to the design of a national

government, or, which is the same thing, of a superintending power, under the direction of a common

council, we must resolve to incorporate into our plan those ingredients which may be considered as forming

the characteristic difference between a league and a government; we must extend the authority of the Union

Government implies the power of making laws. It is essential to the idea of a law, that it be attended with a

sanction; or, in other words, a penalty or punishment for disobedience. If there be no penalty annexed to

disobedience, the resolutions or commands which pretend to be laws will, in fact, amount to nothing more

than advice or recommendation. This penalty, whatever it may be, can only be inflicted in two ways: by the

agency of the courts and ministers of justice, or by military force; by the COERCION of the magistracy, or

by the COERCION of arms. The first kind can evidently apply only to men; the last kind must of necessity,

be employed against bodies politic, or communities, or States. It is evident that there is no process of a court

by which the observance of the laws can, in the last resort, be enforced. Sentences may be denounced against

them for violations of their duty; but these sentences can only be carried into execution by the sword. In an

association where the general authority is confined to the collective bodies of the communities, that compose

it, every breach of the laws must involve a state of war; and military execution must become the only

instrument of civil obedience. Such a state of things can certainly not deserve the name of government, nor

There was a time when we were told that breaches, by the States, of the regulations of the federal authority

were not to be expected; that a sense of common interest would preside over the conduct of the respective

members, and would beget a full compliance with all the constitutional requisitions of the Union. This

language, at the present day, would appear as wild as a great part of what we now hear from the same quarter

will be thought, when we shall have received further lessons from that best oracle of wisdom, experience. It

at all times betrayed an ignorance of the true springs by which human conduct is actuated, and belied the

original inducements to the establishment of civil power. Why has government been instituted at all? Because

the passions of men will not conform to the dictates of reason and justice, without constraint. Has it been

found that bodies of men act with more rectitude or greater disinterestedness than individuals? The contrary

of this has been inferred by all accurate observers of the conduct of mankind; and the inference is founded

upon obvious reasons. Regard to reputation has a less active influence, when the infamy of a bad action is to

A spirit of faction, which is apt to mingle its poison in the deliberations of all bodies of men, will often hurry

the persons of whom they are composed into improprieties and excesses, for which they would blush in a

In addition to all this, there is, in the nature of sovereign power, an impatience of control, that disposes those

who are invested with the exercise of it, to look with an evil eye upon all external attempts to restrain or

direct its operations. From this spirit it happens, that in every political association which is formed upon the

principle of uniting in a common interest a number of lesser sovereignties, there will be found a kind of

eccentric tendency in the subordinate or inferior orbs, by the operation of which there will be a perpetual

effort in each to fly off from the common centre. This tendency is not difficult to be accounted for.

It has its origin in the love of power. Power controlled or abridged is almost always the rival and enemy of

that power by which it is controlled or abridged. This simple proposition will teach us how little reason there

is to expect, that the persons intrusted with the administration of the affairs of the particular members of a

confederacy will at all times be ready, with perfect goodhumor, and an unbiased regard to the public weal,

to execute the resolutions or decrees of the general authority. The reverse of this results from the constitution

If, therefore, the measures of the Confederacy cannot be executed without the intervention of the particular

administrations, there will be little prospect of their being executed at all. The rulers of the respective

members, whether they have a constitutional right to do it or not, will undertake to judge of the propriety of

the measures themselves. They will consider the conformity of the thing proposed or required to their

immediate interests or aims; the momentary conveniences or inconveniences that would attend its adoption.

All this will be done; and in a spirit of interested and suspicious scrutiny, without that knowledge of national

circumstances and reasons of state, which is essential to a right judgment, and with that strong predilection in

favor of local objects, which can hardly fail to mislead the decision. The same process must be repeated in

every member of which the body is constituted; and the execution of the plans, framed by the councils of the

whole, will always fluctuate on the discretion of the illinformed and prejudiced opinion of every part. Those

who have been conversant in the proceedings of popular assemblies; who have seen how difficult it often is,

where there is no exterior pressure of circumstances, to bring them to harmonious resolutions on important

points, will readily conceive how impossible it must be to induce a number of such assemblies, deliberating

at a distance from each other, at different times, and under different impressions, long to cooperate in the

In our case, the concurrence of thirteen distinct sovereign wills is requisite, under the Confederation, to the

It has happened as was to have been foreseen. The measures of the Union have not been executed; the

delinquencies of the States have, step by step, matured themselves to an extreme, which has, at length,

arrested all the wheels of the national government, and brought them to an awful stand. Congress at this time

scarcely possess the means of keeping up the forms of administration, till the States can have time to agree

upon a more substantial substitute for the present shadow of a federal government. Things did not come to

this desperate extremity at once. The causes which have been specified produced at first only unequal and

disproportionate degrees of compliance with the requisitions of the Union. The greater deficiencies of some

States furnished the pretext of example and the temptation of interest to the complying, or to the least

delinquent States. Why should we do more in proportion than those who are embarked with us in the same

political voyage? Why should we consent to bear more than our proper share of the common burden? These

were suggestions which human selfishness could not withstand, and which even speculative men, who looked

forward to remote consequences, could not, without hesitation, combat. Each State, yielding to the persuasive

voice of immediate interest or convenience, has successively withdrawn its support, till the frail and tottering

THE tendency of the principle of legislation for States, or communities, in their political capacities, as it has

been exemplified by the experiment we have made of it, is equally attested by the events which have befallen

all other governments of the confederate kind, of which we have any account, in exact proportion to its

prevalence in those systems. The confirmations of this fact will be worthy of a distinct and particular

I shall content myself with barely observing here, that of all the confederacies of antiquity, which history has

handed down to us, the Lycian and Achaean leagues, as far as there remain vestiges of them, appear to have

been most free from the fetters of that mistaken principle, and were accordingly those which have best

deserved, and have most liberally received, the applauding suffrages of political writers.

This exceptionable principle may, as truly as emphatically, be styled the parent of anarchy: It has been seen

that delinquencies in the members of the Union are its natural and necessary offspring; and that whenever

they happen, the only constitutional remedy is force, and the immediate effect of the use of it, civil war.

It remains to inquire how far so odious an engine of government, in its application to us, would even be

capable of answering its end. If there should not be a large army constantly at the disposal of the national

government it would either not be able to employ force at all, or, when this could be done, it would amount to

a war between parts of the Confederacy concerning the infractions of a league, in which the strongest

combination would be most likely to prevail, whether it consisted of those who supported or of those who

resisted the general authority. It would rarely happen that the delinquency to be redressed would be confined

to a single member, and if there were more than one who had neglected their duty, similarity of situation

would induce them to unite for common defense. Independent of this motive of sympathy, if a large and

influential State should happen to be the aggressing member, it would commonly have weight enough with

its neighbors to win over some of them as associates to its cause. Specious arguments of danger to the

common liberty could easily be contrived; plausible excuses for the deficiencies of the party could, without

difficulty, be invented to alarm the apprehensions, inflame the passions, and conciliate the goodwill, even of

those States which were not chargeable with any violation or omission of duty. This would be the more likely

to take place, as the delinquencies of the larger members might be expected sometimes to proceed from an

ambitious premeditation in their rulers, with a view to getting rid of all external control upon their designs of

personal aggrandizement; the better to effect which it is presumable they would tamper beforehand with

leading individuals in the adjacent States. If associates could not be found at home, recourse would be had to

the aid of foreign powers, who would seldom be disinclined to encouraging the dissensions of a Confederacy,

from the firm union of which they had so much to fear. When the sword is once drawn, the passions of men

observe no bounds of moderation. The suggestions of wounded pride, the instigations of irritated resentment,

would be apt to carry the States against which the arms of the Union were exerted, to any extremes necessary

to avenge the affront or to avoid the disgrace of submission. The first war of this kind would probably

Its more natural death is what we now seem to be on the point of experiencing, if the federal system be not

speedily renovated in a more substantial form. It is not probable, considering the genius of this country, that

the complying States would often be inclined to support the authority of the Union by engaging in a war

against the noncomplying States. They would always be more ready to pursue the milder course of putting

themselves upon an equal footing with the delinquent members by an imitation of their example. And the

guilt of all would thus become the security of all. Our past experience has exhibited the operation of this

spirit in its full light. There would, in fact, be an insuperable difficulty in ascertaining when force could with

propriety be employed. In the article of pecuniary contribution, which would be the most usual source of

delinquency, it would often be impossible to decide whether it had proceeded from disinclination or inability.

The pretense of the latter would always be at hand. And the case must be very flagrant in which its fallacy

could be detected with sufficient certainty to justify the harsh expedient of compulsion.

It is easy to see that this problem alone, as often as it should occur, would open a wide field for the exercise

of factious views, of partiality, and of oppression, in the majority that happened to prevail in the national

It seems to require no pains to prove that the States ought not to prefer a national Constitution which could

only be kept in motion by the instrumentality of a large army continually on foot to execute the ordinary

requisitions or decrees of the government. And yet this is the plain alternative involved by those who wish to

deny it the power of extending its operations to individuals. Such a scheme, if practicable at all, would

instantly degenerate into a military despotism; but it will be found in every light impracticable. The resources

of the Union would not be equal to the maintenance of an army considerable enough to confine the larger

States within the limits of their duty; nor would the means ever be furnished of forming such an army in the

first instance. Whoever considers the populousness and strength of several of these States singly at the

present juncture, and looks forward to what they will become, even at the distance of half a century, will at

once dismiss as idle and visionary any scheme which aims at regulating their movements by laws to operate

upon them in their collective capacities, and to be executed by a coercion applicable to them in the same

capacities. A project of this kind is little less romantic than the monstertaming spirit which is attributed to

Even in those confederacies which have been composed of members smaller than many of our counties, the

principle of legislation for sovereign States, supported by military coercion, has never been found effectual. It

has rarely been attempted to be employed, but against the weaker members; and in most instances attempts to

coerce the refractory and disobedient have been the signals of bloody wars, in which one half of the

The result of these observations to an intelligent mind must be clearly this, that if it be possible at any rate to

construct a federal government capable of regulating the common concerns and preserving the general

tranquillity, it must be founded, as to the objects committed to its care, upon the reverse of the principle

contended for by the opponents of the proposed Constitution. It must carry its agency to the persons of the

citizens. It must stand in need of no intermediate legislations; but must itself be empowered to employ the

arm of the ordinary magistrate to execute its own resolutions. The majesty of the national authority must be

manifested through the medium of the courts of justice. The government of the Union, like that of each State,

must be able to address itself immediately to the hopes and fears of individuals; and to attract to its support

those passions which have the strongest influence upon the human heart. It must, in short, possess all the

means, and have aright to resort to all the methods, of executing the powers with which it is intrusted, that are

To this reasoning it may perhaps be objected, that if any State should be disaffected to the authority of the

Union, it could at any time obstruct the execution of its laws, and bring the matter to the same issue of force,

The pausibility of this objection will vanish the moment we advert to the essential difference between a mere

NONCOMPLIANCE and a DIRECT and ACTIVE RESISTANCE. If the interposition of the State

legislatures be necessary to give effect to a measure of the Union, they have only NOT TO ACT, or to ACT

EVASIVELY, and the measure is defeated. This neglect of duty may be disguised under affected but

unsubstantial provisions, so as not to appear, and of course not to excite any alarm in the people for the safety

The State leaders may even make a merit of their surreptitious invasions of it on the ground of some

But if the execution of the laws of the national government should not require the intervention of the State

legislatures, if they were to pass into immediate operation upon the citizens themselves, the particular

governments could not interrupt their progress without an open and violent exertion of an unconstitutional

power. No omissions nor evasions would answer the end. They would be obliged to act, and in such a manner

as would leave no doubt that they had encroached on the national rights. An experiment of this nature would

always be hazardous in the face of a constitution in any degree competent to its own defense, and of a people

enlightened enough to distinguish between a legal exercise and an illegal usurpation of authority. The success

of it would require not merely a factious majority in the legislature, but the concurrence of the courts of

justice and of the body of the people. If the judges were not embarked in a conspiracy with the legislature,

they would pronounce the resolutions of such a majority to be contrary to the supreme law of the land,

unconstitutional, and void. If the people were not tainted with the spirit of their State representatives, they, as

the natural guardians of the Constitution, would throw their weight into the national scale and give it a

decided preponderancy in the contest. Attempts of this kind would not often be made with levity or rashness,

because they could seldom be made without danger to the authors, unless in cases of a tyrannical exercise of

If opposition to the national government should arise from the disorderly conduct of refractory or seditious

individuals, it could be overcome by the same means which are daily employed against the same evil under

the State governments. The magistracy, being equally the ministers of the law of the land, from whatever

source it might emanate, would doubtless be as ready to guard the national as the local regulations from the

As to those partial commotions and insurrections, which sometimes disquiet society, from the intrigues of an

inconsiderable faction, or from sudden or occasional illhumors that do not infect the great body of the

community the general government could command more extensive resources for the suppression of

disturbances of that kind than would be in the power of any single member. And as to those mortal feuds

which, in certain conjunctures, spread a conflagration through a whole nation, or through a very large

proportion of it, proceeding either from weighty causes of discontent given by the government or from the

contagion of some violent popular paroxysm, they do not fall within any ordinary rules of calculation. When

they happen, they commonly amount to revolutions and dismemberments of empire. No form of government

can always either avoid or control them. It is in vain to hope to guard against events too mighty for human

foresight or precaution, and it would be idle to object to a government because it could not perform

AN OBJECTION, of a nature different from that which has been stated and answered, in my last address,

may perhaps be likewise urged against the principle of legislation for the individual citizens of America. It

may be said that it would tend to render the government of the Union too powerful, and to enable it to absorb

those residuary authorities, which it might be judged proper to leave with the States for local purposes.

Allowing the utmost latitude to the love of power which any reasonable man can require, I confess I am at a

loss to discover what temptation the persons intrusted with the administration of the general government

could ever feel to divest the States of the authorities of that description. The regulation of the mere domestic

Commerce, finance, negotiation, and war seem to comprehend all the objects which have charms for minds

governed by that passion; and all the powers necessary to those objects ought, in the first instance, to be

lodged in the national depository. The administration of private justice between the citizens of the same State,

the supervision of agriculture and of other concerns of a similar nature, all those things, in short, which are

proper to be provided for by local legislation, can never be desirable cares of a general jurisdiction. It is

therefore improbable that there should exist a disposition in the federal councils to usurp the powers with

which they are connected; because the attempt to exercise those powers would be as troublesome as it would

be nugatory; and the possession of them, for that reason, would contribute nothing to the dignity, to the

But let it be admitted, for argument's sake, that mere wantonness and lust of domination would be sufficient

to beget that disposition; still it may be safely affirmed, that the sense of the constituent body of the national

representatives, or, in other words, the people of the several States, would control the indulgence of so

extravagant an appetite. It will always be far more easy for the State governments to encroach upon the

national authorities than for the national government to encroach upon the State authorities. The proof of this

proposition turns upon the greater degree of influence which the State governments if they administer their

affairs with uprightness and prudence, will generally possess over the people; a circumstance which at the

same time teaches us that there is an inherent and intrinsic weakness in all federal constitutions; and that too

much pains cannot be taken in their organization, to give them all the force which is compatible with the

The superiority of influence in favor of the particular governments would result partly from the diffusive

construction of the national government, but chiefly from the nature of the objects to which the attention of

It is a known fact in human nature, that its affections are commonly weak in proportion to the distance or

diffusiveness of the object. Upon the same principle that a man is more attached to his family than to his

neighborhood, to his neighborhood than to the community at large, the people of each State would be apt to

feel a stronger bias towards their local governments than towards the government of the Union; unless the

force of that principle should be destroyed by a much better administration of the latter.

This strong propensity of the human heart would find powerful auxiliaries in the objects of State regulation.

The variety of more minute interests, which will necessarily fall under the superintendence of the local

administrations, and which will form so many rivulets of influence, running through every part of the society,

cannot be particularized, without involving a detail too tedious and uninteresting to compensate for the

There is one transcendant advantage belonging to the province of the State governments, which alone suffices

to place the matter in a clear and satisfactory light,I mean the ordinary administration of criminal and civil

justice. This, of all others, is the most powerful, most universal, and most attractive source of popular

obedience and attachment. It is that which, being the immediate and visible guardian of life and property,

having its benefits and its terrors in constant activity before the public eye, regulating all those personal

interests and familiar concerns to which the sensibility of individuals is more immediately awake,

contributes, more than any other circumstance, to impressing upon the minds of the people, affection, esteem,

This great cement of society, which will diffuse itself almost wholly through the channels of the particular

governments, independent of all other causes of influence, would insure them so decided an empire over their

respective citizens as to render them at all times a complete counterpoise, and, not unfrequently, dangerous

The operations of the national government, on the other hand, falling less immediately under the observation

of the mass of the citizens, the benefits derived from it will chiefly be perceived and attended to by

speculative men. Relating to more general interests, they will be less apt to come home to the feelings of the

people; and, in proportion, less likely to inspire an habitual sense of obligation, and an active sentiment of

The reasoning on this head has been abundantly exemplified by the experience of all federal constitutions

with which we are acquainted, and of all others which have borne the least analogy to them.

Though the ancient feudal systems were not, strictly speaking, confederacies, yet they partook of the nature

of that species of association. There was a common head, chieftain, or sovereign, whose authority extended

over the whole nation; and a number of subordinate vassals, or feudatories, who had large portions of land

allotted to them, and numerous trains of INFERIOR vassals or retainers, who occupied and cultivated that

land upon the tenure of fealty or obedience, to the persons of whom they held it. Each principal vassal was a

kind of sovereign, within his particular demesnes. The consequences of this situation were a continual

opposition to authority of the sovereign, and frequent wars between the great barons or chief feudatories

themselves. The power of the head of the nation was commonly too weak, either to preserve the public peace,

or to protect the people against the oppressions of their immediate lords. This period of European affairs is

When the sovereign happened to be a man of vigorous and warlike temper and of superior abilities, he would

acquire a personal weight and influence, which answered, for the time, the purpose of a more regular

authority. But in general, the power of the barons triumphed over that of the prince; and in many instances his

dominion was entirely thrown off, and the great fiefs were erected into independent principalities or States. In

those instances in which the monarch finally prevailed over his vassals, his success was chiefly owing to the

tyranny of those vassals over their dependents. The barons, or nobles, equally the enemies of the sovereign

and the oppressors of the common people, were dreaded and detested by both; till mutual danger and mutual

interest effected a union between them fatal to the power of the aristocracy. Had the nobles, by a conduct of

clemency and justice, preserved the fidelity and devotion of their retainers and followers, the contests

between them and the prince must almost always have ended in their favor, and in the abridgment or

This is not an assertion founded merely in speculation or conjecture. Among other illustrations of its truth

which might be cited, Scotland will furnish a cogent example. The spirit of clanship which was, at an early

day, introduced into that kingdom, uniting the nobles and their dependants by ties equivalent to those of

kindred, rendered the aristocracy a constant overmatch for the power of the monarch, till the incorporation

with England subdued its fierce and ungovernable spirit, and reduced it within those rules of subordination

which a more rational and more energetic system of civil polity had previously established in the latter

The separate governments in a confederacy may aptly be compared with the feudal baronies; with this

advantage in their favor, that from the reasons already explained, they will generally possess the confidence

and goodwill of the people, and with so important a support, will be able effectually to oppose all

encroachments of the national government. It will be well if they are not able to counteract its legitimate and

necessary authority. The points of similitude consist in the rivalship of power, applicable to both, and in the

CONCENTRATION of large portions of the strength of the community into particular DEPOSITS, in one

case at the disposal of individuals, in the other case at the disposal of political bodies.

A concise review of the events that have attended confederate governments will further illustrate this

important doctrine; an inattention to which has been the great source of our political mistakes, and has given

AMONG the confederacies of antiquity, the most considerable was that of the Grecian republics, associated

under the Amphictyonic council. From the best accounts transmitted of this celebrated institution, it bore a

The members retained the character of independent and sovereign states, and had equal votes in the federal

council. This council had a general authority to propose and resolve whatever it judged necessary for the

common welfare of Greece; to declare and carry on war; to decide, in the last resort, all controversies

between the members; to fine the aggressing party; to employ the whole force of the confederacy against the

The Amphictyons were the guardians of religion, and of the immense riches belonging to the temple of

Delphos, where they had the right of jurisdiction in controversies between the inhabitants and those who

came to consult the oracle. As a further provision for the efficacy of the federal powers, they took an oath

mutually to defend and protect the united cities, to punish the violators of this oath, and to inflict vengeance

In theory, and upon paper, this apparatus of powers seems amply sufficient for all general purposes. In

several material instances, they exceed the powers enumerated in the articles of confederation.

The Amphictyons had in their hands the superstition of the times, one of the principal engines by which

government was then maintained; they had a declared authority to use coercion against refractory cities, and

Very different, nevertheless, was the experiment from the theory. The powers, like those of the present

Congress, were administered by deputies appointed wholly by the cities in their political capacities; and

exercised over them in the same capacities. Hence the weakness, the disorders, and finally the destruction of

the confederacy. The more powerful members, instead of being kept in awe and subordination, tyrannized

Athens, as we learn from Demosthenes, was the arbiter of Greece seventythree years. The Lacedaemonians

next governed it twentynine years; at a subsequent period, after the battle of Leuctra, the Thebans had their

It happened but too often, according to Plutarch, that the deputies of the strongest cities awed and corrupted

those of the weaker; and that judgment went in favor of the most powerful party.

Even in the midst of defensive and dangerous wars with Persia and Macedon, the members never acted in

concert, and were, more or fewer of them, eternally the dupes or the hirelings of the common enemy. The

intervals of foreign war were filled up by domestic vicissitudes convulsions, and carnage.

After the conclusion of the war with Xerxes, it appears that the Lacedaemonians required that a number of the

cities should be turned out of the confederacy for the unfaithful part they had acted. The Athenians, finding

that the Lacedaemonians would lose fewer partisans by such a measure than themselves, and would become

masters of the public deliberations, vigorously opposed and defeated the attempt. This piece of history proves

at once the inefficiency of the union, the ambition and jealousy of its most powerful members, and the

dependent and degraded condition of the rest. The smaller members, though entitled by the theory of their

system to revolve in equal pride and majesty around the common center, had become, in fact, satellites of the

Had the Greeks, says the Abbe Milot, been as wise as they were courageous, they would have been

admonished by experience of the necessity of a closer union, and would have availed themselves of the peace

which followed their success against the Persian arms, to establish such a reformation. Instead of this obvious

policy, Athens and Sparta, inflated with the victories and the glory they had acquired, became first rivals and

then enemies; and did each other infinitely more mischief than they had suffered from Xerxes.

Their mutual jealousies, fears, hatreds, and injuries ended in the celebrated Peloponnesian war; which itself

As a weak government, when not at war, is ever agitated by internal dissentions, so these never fail to bring

on fresh calamities from abroad. The Phocians having ploughed up some consecrated ground belonging to the

temple of Apollo, the Amphictyonic council, according to the superstition of the age, imposed a fine on the

sacrilegious offenders. The Phocians, being abetted by Athens and Sparta, refused to submit to the decree.

The Thebans, with others of the cities, undertook to maintain the authority of the Amphictyons, and to avenge

the violated god. The latter, being the weaker party, invited the assistance of Philip of Macedon, who had

secretly fostered the contest. Philip gladly seized the opportunity of executing the designs he had long

planned against the liberties of Greece. By his intrigues and bribes he won over to his interests the popular

leaders of several cities; by their influence and votes, gained admission into the Amphictyonic council; and

Such were the consequences of the fallacious principle on which this interesting establishment was founded.

Had Greece, says a judicious observer on her fate, been united by a stricter confederation, and persevered in

her union, she would never have worn the chains of Macedon; and might have proved a barrier to the vast

The Achaean league, as it is called, was another society of Grecian republics, which supplies us with valuable

The Union here was far more intimate, and its organization much wiser, than in the preceding instance. It will

accordingly appear, that though not exempt from a similar catastrophe, it by no means equally deserved it.

The cities composing this league retained their municipal jurisdiction, appointed their own officers, and

enjoyed a perfect equality. The senate, in which they were represented, had the sole and exclusive right of

peace and war; of sending and receiving ambassadors; of entering into treaties and alliances; of appointing a

chief magistrate or praetor, as he was called, who commanded their armies, and who, with the advice and

consent of ten of the senators, not only administered the government in the recess of the senate, but had a

great share in its deliberations, when assembled. According to the primitive constitution, there were two

praetors associated in the administration; but on trial a single one was preferred.

It appears that the cities had all the same laws and customs, the same weights and measures, and the same

money. But how far this effect proceeded from the authority of the federal council is left in uncertainty. It is

said only that the cities were in a manner compelled to receive the same laws and usages. When Lacedaemon

was brought into the league by Philopoemen, it was attended with an abolition of the institutions and laws of

Lycurgus, and an adoption of those of the Achaeans. The Amphictyonic confederacy, of which she had been

a member, left her in the full exercise of her government and her legislation. This circumstance alone proves

It is much to be regretted that such imperfect monuments remain of this curious political fabric. Could its

interior structure and regular operation be ascertained, it is probable that more light would be thrown by it on

the science of federal government, than by any of the like experiments with which we are acquainted.

One important fact seems to be witnessed by all the historians who take notice of Achaean affairs. It is, that

as well after the renovation of the league by Aratus, as before its dissolution by the arts of Macedon, there

was infinitely more of moderation and justice in the administration of its government, and less of violence

and sedition in the people, than were to be found in any of the cities exercising SINGLY all the prerogatives

of sovereignty. The Abbe Mably, in his observations on Greece, says that the popular government, which was

so tempestuous elsewhere, caused no disorders in the members of the Achaean republic, BECAUSE IT WAS

We are not to conclude too hastily, however, that faction did not, in a certain degree, agitate the particular

cities; much less that a due subordination and harmony reigned in the general system.

The contrary is sufficiently displayed in the vicissitudes and fate of the republic.

Whilst the Amphictyonic confederacy remained, that of the Achaeans, which comprehended the less

important cities only, made little figure on the theatre of Greece. When the former became a victim to

Macedon, the latter was spared by the policy of Philip and Alexander. Under the successors of these princes,

however, a different policy prevailed. The arts of division were practiced among the Achaeans. Each city was

seduced into a separate interest; the union was dissolved. Some of the cities fell under the tyranny of

Macedonian garrisons; others under that of usurpers springing out of their own confusions. Shame and

oppression erelong awaken their love of liberty. A few cities reunited. Their example was followed by others,

as opportunities were found of cutting off their tyrants. The league soon embraced almost the whole

Macedon saw its progress; but was hindered by internal dissensions from stopping it. All Greece caught the

enthusiasm and seemed ready to unite in one confederacy, when the jealousy and envy in Sparta and Athens,

of the rising glory of the Achaeans, threw a fatal damp on the enterprise. The dread of the Macedonian power

induced the league to court the alliance of the Kings of Egypt and Syria, who, as successors of Alexander,

This policy was defeated by Cleomenes, king of Sparta, who was led by his ambition to make an unprovoked

attack on his neighbors, the Achaeans, and who, as an enemy to Macedon, had interest enough with the

Egyptian and Syrian princes to effect a breach of their engagements with the league.

The Achaeans were now reduced to the dilemma of submitting to Cleomenes, or of supplicating the aid of

Macedon, its former oppressor. The latter expedient was adopted. The contests of the Greeks always afforded

a pleasing opportunity to that powerful neighbor of intermeddling in their affairs. A Macedonian army

quickly appeared. Cleomenes was vanquished. The Achaeans soon experienced, as often happens, that a

victorious and powerful ally is but another name for a master. All that their most abject compliances could

obtain from him was a toleration of the exercise of their laws. Philip, who was now on the throne of

Macedon, soon provoked by his tyrannies, fresh combinations among the Greeks. The Achaeans, though

weakenened by internal dissensions and by the revolt of Messene, one of its members, being joined by the

AEtolians and Athenians, erected the standard of opposition. Finding themselves, though thus supported,

unequal to the undertaking, they once more had recourse to the dangerous expedient of introducing the succor

of foreign arms. The Romans, to whom the invitation was made, eagerly embraced it. Philip was conquered;

A new crisis ensued to the league. Dissensions broke out among it members. These the Romans fostered.

Callicrates and other popular leaders became mercenary instruments for inveigling their countrymen. The

more effectually to nourish discord and disorder the Romans had, to the astonishment of those who confided

in their sincerity, already proclaimed universal liberty1 throughout Greece. With the same insidious views,

they now seduced the members from the league, by representing to their pride the violation it committed on

their sovereignty. By these arts this union, the last hope of Greece, the last hope of ancient liberty, was torn

into pieces; and such imbecility and distraction introduced, that the arms of Rome found little difficulty in

completing the ruin which their arts had commenced. The Achaeans were cut to pieces, and Achaia loaded

I have thought it not superfluous to give the outlines of this important portion of history; both because it

teaches more than one lesson, and because, as a supplement to the outlines of the Achaean constitution, it

emphatically illustrates the tendency of federal bodies rather to anarchy among the members, than to tyranny

1 This was but another name more specious for the independence of the members on the federal head.

THE examples of ancient confederacies, cited in my last paper, have not exhausted the source of

experimental instruction on this subject. There are existing institutions, founded on a similar principle, which

merit particular consideration. The first which presents itself is the Germanic body.

In the early ages of Christianity, Germany was occupied by seven distinct nations, who had no common

chief. The Franks, one of the number, having conquered the Gauls, established the kingdom which has taken

its name from them. In the ninth century Charlemagne, its warlike monarch, carried his victorious arms in

every direction; and Germany became a part of his vast dominions. On the dismemberment, which took place

under his sons, this part was erected into a separate and independent empire. Charlemagne and his immediate

descendants possessed the reality, as well as the ensigns and dignity of imperial power. But the principal

vassals, whose fiefs had become hereditary, and who composed the national diets which Charlemagne had

not abolished, gradually threw off the yoke and advanced to sovereign jurisdiction and independence. The

force of imperial sovereignty was insufficient to restrain such powerful dependants; or to preserve the unity

and tranquillity of the empire. The most furious private wars, accompanied with every species of calamity,

The imperial authority, unable to maintain the public order, declined by degrees till it was almost extinct in

the anarchy, which agitated the long interval between the death of the last emperor of the Suabian, and the

accession of the first emperor of the Austrian lines. In the eleventh century the emperors enjoyed full

sovereignty: In the fifteenth they had little more than the symbols and decorations of power.

Out of this feudal system, which has itself many of the important features of a confederacy, has grown the

federal system which constitutes the Germanic empire. Its powers are vested in a diet representing the

component members of the confederacy; in the emperor, who is the executive magistrate, with a negative on

the decrees of the diet; and in the imperial chamber and the aulic council, two judiciary tribunals having

supreme jurisdiction in controversies which concern the empire, or which happen among its members.

The diet possesses the general power of legislating for the empire; of making war and peace; contracting

alliances; assessing quotas of troops and money; constructing fortresses; regulating coin; admitting new

members; and subjecting disobedient members to the ban of the empire, by which the party is degraded from

his sovereign rights and his possessions forfeited. The members of the confederacy are expressly restricted

from entering into compacts prejudicial to the empire; from imposing tolls and duties on their mutual

intercourse, without the consent of the emperor and diet; from altering the value of money; from doing

injustice to one another; or from affording assistance or retreat to disturbers of the public peace. And the ban

is denounced against such as shall violate any of these restrictions. The members of the diet, as such, are

subject in all cases to be judged by the emperor and diet, and in their private capacities by the aulic council

The prerogatives of the emperor are numerous. The most important of them are: his exclusive right to make

propositions to the diet; to negative its resolutions; to name ambassadors; to confer dignities and titles; to fill

vacant electorates; to found universities; to grant privileges not injurious to the states of the empire; to receive

and apply the public revenues; and generally to watch over the public safety. In certain cases, the electors

form a council to him. In quality of emperor, he possesses no territory within the empire, nor receives any

revenue for his support. But his revenue and dominions, in other qualities, constitute him one of the most

From such a parade of constitutional powers, in the representatives and head of this confederacy, the natural

supposition would be, that it must form an exception to the general character which belongs to its kindred

systems. Nothing would be further from the reality. The fundamental principle on which it rests, that the

empire is a community of sovereigns, that the diet is a representation of sovereigns and that the laws are

addressed to sovereigns, renders the empire a nerveless body, incapable of regulating its own members,

insecure against external dangers, and agitated with unceasing fermentations in its own bowels.

The history of Germany is a history of wars between the emperor and the princes and states; of wars among

the princes and states themselves; of the licentiousness of the strong, and the oppression of the weak; of

foreign intrusions, and foreign intrigues; of requisitions of men and money disregarded, or partially complied

with; of attempts to enforce them, altogether abortive, or attended with slaughter and desolation, involving

In the sixteenth century, the emperor, with one part of the empire on his side, was seen engaged against the

other princes and states. In one of the conflicts, the emperor himself was put to flight, and very near being

The late king of Prussia was more than once pitted against his imperial sovereign; and commonly proved an

Controversies and wars among the members themselves have been so common, that the German annals are

crowded with the bloody pages which describe them. Previous to the peace of Westphalia, Germany was

desolated by a war of thirty years, in which the emperor, with one half of the empire, was on one side, and

Sweden, with the other half, on the opposite side. Peace was at length negotiated, and dictated by foreign

powers; and the articles of it, to which foreign powers are parties, made a fundamental part of the Germanic

If the nation happens, on any emergency, to be more united by the necessity of selfdefense, its situation is

Military preparations must be preceded by so many tedious discussions, arising from the jealousies, pride,

separate views, and clashing pretensions of sovereign bodies, that before the diet can settle the arrangements,

the enemy are in the field; and before the federal troops are ready to take it, are retiring into winter quarters.

The small body of national troops, which has been judged necessary in time of peace, is defectively kept up,

badly paid, infected with local prejudices, and supported by irregular and disproportionate contributions to

The impossibility of maintaining order and dispensing justice among these sovereign subjects, produced the

experiment of dividing the empire into nine or ten circles or districts; of giving them an interior organization,

and of charging them with the military execution of the laws against delinquent and contumacious members.

This experiment has only served to demonstrate more fully the radical vice of the constitution. Each circle is

the miniature picture of the deformities of this political monster. They either fail to execute their

commissions, or they do it with all the devastation and carnage of civil war. Sometimes whole circles are

defaulters; and then they increase the mischief which they were instituted to remedy.

We may form some judgment of this scheme of military coercion from a sample given by Thuanus. In

Donawerth, a free and imperial city of the circle of Suabia, the Abb 300 de St. Croix enjoyed certain

immunities which had been reserved to him. In the exercise of these, on some public occasions, outrages

were committed on him by the people of the city. The consequence was that the city was put under the ban of

the empire, and the Duke of Bavaria, though director of another circle, obtained an appointment to enforce it.

He soon appeared before the city with a corps of ten thousand troops, and finding it a fit occasion, as he had

secretly intended from the beginning, to revive an antiquated claim, on the pretext that his ancestors had

suffered the place to be dismembered from his territory,1 he took possession of it in his own name, disarmed,

It may be asked, perhaps, what has so long kept this disjointed machine from falling entirely to pieces? The

answer is obvious: The weakness of most of the members, who are unwilling to expose themselves to the

mercy of foreign powers; the weakness of most of the principal members, compared with the formidable

powers all around them; the vast weight and influence which the emperor derives from his separate and

heriditary dominions; and the interest he feels in preserving a system with which his family pride is

connected, and which constitutes him the first prince in Europe; these causes support a feeble and

precarious Union; whilst the repellant quality, incident to the nature of sovereignty, and which time

continually strengthens, prevents any reform whatever, founded on a proper consolidation. Nor is it to be

imagined, if this obstacle could be surmounted, that the neighboring powers would suffer a revolution to take

place which would give to the empire the force and preeminence to which it is entitled. Foreign nations have

long considered themselves as interested in the changes made by events in this constitution; and have, on

various occasions, betrayed their policy of perpetuating its anarchy and weakness.

If more direct examples were wanting, Poland, as a government over local sovereigns, might not improperly

be taken notice of. Nor could any proof more striking be given of the calamities flowing from such

institutions. Equally unfit for selfgovernment and selfdefense, it has long been at the mercy of its powerful

neighbors; who have lately had the mercy to disburden it of one third of its people and territories.

The connection among the Swiss cantons scarcely amounts to a confederacy; though it is sometimes cited as

They have no common treasury; no common troops even in war; no common coin; no common judicatory;

They are kept together by the peculiarity of their topographical position; by their individual weakness and

insignificancy; by the fear of powerful neighbors, to one of which they were formerly subject; by the few

sources of contention among a people of such simple and homogeneous manners; by their joint interest in

their dependent possessions; by the mutual aid they stand in need of, for suppressing insurrections and

rebellions, an aid expressly stipulated and often required and afforded; and by the necessity of some regular

and permanent provision for accomodating disputes among the cantons. The provision is, that the parties at

variance shall each choose four judges out of the neutral cantons, who, in case of disagreement, choose an

umpire. This tribunal, under an oath of impartiality, pronounces definitive sentence, which all the cantons are

bound to enforce. The competency of this regulation may be estimated by a clause in their treaty of 1683,

with Victor Amadeus of Savoy; in which he obliges himself to interpose as mediator in disputes between the

So far as the peculiarity of their case will admit of comparison with that of the United States, it serves to

confirm the principle intended to be established. Whatever efficacy the union may have had in ordinary cases,

it appears that the moment a cause of difference sprang up, capable of trying its strength, it failed.

The controversies on the subject of religion, which in three instances have kindled violent and bloody

contests, may be said, in fact, to have severed the league. The Protestant and Catholic cantons have since had

their separate diets, where all the most important concerns are adjusted, and which have left the general diet

It produced opposite alliances with foreign powers: of Berne, at the head of the Protestant association, with

the United Provinces; and of Luzerne, at the head of the Catholic association, with France.

1 Pfeffel, ``Nouvel Abreg. Chronol. de l'Hist., etc., d'Allemagne,'' says the pretext was to indemnify himself

THE United Netherlands are a confederacy of republics, or rather of aristocracies of a very remarkable

texture, yet confirming all the lessons derived from those which we have already reviewed.

The union is composed of seven coequal and sovereign states, and each state or province is a composition of

equal and independent cities. In all important cases, not only the provinces but the cities must be unanimous.

The sovereignty of the Union is represented by the StatesGeneral, consisting usually of about fifty deputies

appointed by the provinces. They hold their seats, some for life, some for six, three, and one years; from two

The StatesGeneral have authority to enter into treaties and alliances; to make war and peace; to raise armies

and equip fleets; to ascertain quotas and demand contributions. In all these cases, however, unanimity and the

sanction of their constituents are requisite. They have authority to appoint and receive ambassadors; to

execute treaties and alliances already formed; to provide for the collection of duties on imports and exports;

to regulate the mint, with a saving to the provincial rights; to govern as sovereigns the dependent territories.

The provinces are restrained, unless with the general consent, from entering into foreign treaties; from

establishing imposts injurious to others, or charging their neighbors with higher duties than their own

A council of state, a chamber of accounts, with five colleges of admiralty, aid and fortify the federal

The executive magistrate of the union is the stadtholder, who is now an hereditary prince. His principal

weight and influence in the republic are derived from this independent title; from his great patrimonial

estates; from his family connections with some of the chief potentates of Europe; and, more than all, perhaps,

from his being stadtholder in the several provinces, as well as for the union; in which provincial quality he

has the appointment of town magistrates under certain regulations, executes provincial decrees, presides

when he pleases in the provincial tribunals, and has throughout the power of pardon.

In his political capacity he has authority to settle disputes between the provinces, when other methods fail; to

assist at the deliberations of the StatesGeneral, and at their particular conferences; to give audiences to

foreign ambassadors, and to keep agents for his particular affairs at foreign courts.

In his military capacity he commands the federal troops, provides for garrisons, and in general regulates

military affairs; disposes of all appointments, from colonels to ensigns, and of the governments and posts of

In his marine capacity he is admiralgeneral, and superintends and directs every thing relative to naval forces

and other naval affairs; presides in the admiralties in person or by proxy; appoints lieutenantadmirals and

other officers; and establishes councils of war, whose sentences are not executed till he approves them.

His revenue, exclusive of his private income, amounts to three hundred thousand florins. The standing army

Such is the nature of the celebrated Belgic confederacy, as delineated on parchment. What are the characters

which practice has stamped upon it? Imbecility in the government; discord among the provinces; foreign

influence and indignities; a precarious existence in peace, and peculiar calamities from war.

It was long ago remarked by Grotius, that nothing but the hatred of his countrymen to the house of Austria

The union of Utrecht, says another respectable writer, reposes an authority in the StatesGeneral, seemingly

sufficient to secure harmony, but the jealousy in each province renders the practice very different from the

The same instrument, says another, obliges each province to levy certain contributions; but this article never

could, and probably never will, be executed; because the inland provinces, who have little commerce, cannot

In matters of contribution, it is the practice to waive the articles of the constitution. The danger of delay

obliges the consenting provinces to furnish their quotas, without waiting for the others; and then to obtain

reimbursement from the others, by deputations, which are frequent, or otherwise, as they can. The great

wealth and influence of the province of Holland enable her to effect both these purposes.

It has more than once happened, that the deficiencies had to be ultimately collected at the point of the

bayonet; a thing practicable, though dreadful, in a confedracy where one of the members exceeds in force all

the rest, and where several of them are too small to meditate resistance; but utterly impracticable in one

composed of members, several of which are equal to each other in strength and resources, and equal singly to

Foreign ministers, says Sir William Temple, who was himself a foreign minister, elude matters taken ad

referendum, by tampering with the provinces and cities. In 1726, the treaty of Hanover was delayed by these

In critical emergencies, the StatesGeneral are often compelled to overleap their constitutional bounds. In

1688, they concluded a treaty of themselves at the risk of their heads. The treaty of Westphalia, in 1648, by

which their independence was formerly and finally recognized, was concluded without the consent of

Even as recently as the last treaty of peace with Great Britain, the constitutional principle of unanimity was

departed from. A weak constitution must necessarily terminate in dissolution, for want of proper powers, or

the usurpation of powers requisite for the public safety. Whether the usurpation, when once begun, will stop

at the salutary point, or go forward to the dangerous extreme, must depend on the contingencies of the

moment. Tyranny has perhaps oftener grown out of the assumptions of power, called for, on pressing

exigencies, by a defective constitution, than out of the full exercise of the largest constitutional authorities.

Notwithstanding the calamities produced by the stadtholdership, it has been supposed that without his

influence in the individual provinces, the causes of anarchy manifest in the confederacy would long ago have

dissolved it. ``Under such a government,'' says the Abbe Mably, ``the Union could never have subsisted, if

the provinces had not a spring within themselves, capable of quickening their tardiness, and compelling them

to the same way of thinking. This spring is the stadtholder.'' It is remarked by Sir William Temple, ``that in

the intermissions of the stadtholdership, Holland, by her riches and her authority, which drew the others into

a sort of dependence, supplied the place.'' These are not the only circumstances which have controlled the

tendency to anarchy and dissolution. The surrounding powers impose an absolute necessity of union to a

certain degree, at the same time that they nourish by their intrigues the constitutional vices which keep the

The true patriots have long bewailed the fatal tendency of these vices, and have made no less than four

regular experiments by EXTRAORDINARY ASSEMBLIES, convened for the special purpose, to apply a

remedy. As many times has their laudable zeal found it impossible to UNITE THE PUBLIC COUNCILS in

reforming the known, the acknowledged, the fatal evils of the existing constitution. Let us pause, my

fellowcitizens, for one moment, over this melancholy and monitory lesson of history; and with the tear that

drops for the calamities brought on mankind by their adverse opinions and selfish passions, let our gratitude

mingle an ejaculation to Heaven, for the propitious concord which has distinguished the consultations for our

A design was also conceived of establishing a general tax to be administered by the federal authority. This

This unhappy people seem to be now suffering from popular convulsions, from dissensions among the states,

and from the actual invasion of foreign arms, the crisis of their distiny. All nations have their eyes fixed on

the awful spectacle. The first wish prompted by humanity is, that this severe trial may issue in such a

revolution of their government as will establish their union, and render it the parent of tranquillity, freedom

and happiness: The next, that the asylum under which, we trust, the enjoyment of these blessings will

speedily be secured in this country, may receive and console them for the catastrophe of their own.

I make no apology for having dwelt so long on the contemplation of these federal precedents. Experience is

the oracle of truth; and where its responses are unequivocal, they ought to be conclusive and sacred. The

important truth, which it unequivocally pronounces in the present case, is that a sovereignty over sovereigns,

a government over governments, a legislation for communities, as contradistinguished from individuals, as it

is a solecism in theory, so in practice it is subversive of the order and ends of civil polity, by substituting

VIOLENCE in place of LAW, or the destructive COERCION of the SWORD in place of the mild and

HAVING in the three last numbers taken a summary review of the principal circumstances and events which

have depicted the genius and fate of other confederate governments, I shall now proceed in the enumeration

of the most important of those defects which have hitherto disappointed our hopes from the system

established among ourselves. To form a safe and satisfactory judgment of the proper remedy, it is absolutely

necessary that we should be well acquainted with the extent and malignity of the disease.

The next most palpable defect of the subsisting Confederation, is the total want of a SANCTION to its laws.

The United States, as now composed, have no powers to exact obedience, or punish disobedience to their

resolutions, either by pecuniary mulcts, by a suspension or divestiture of privileges, or by any other

constitutional mode. There is no express delegation of authority to them to use force against delinquent

members; and if such a right should be ascribed to the federal head, as resulting from the nature of the social

compact between the States, it must be by inference and construction, in the face of that part of the second

article, by which it is declared, ``that each State shall retain every power, jurisdiction, and right, not

EXPRESSLY delegated to the United States in Congress assembled.'' There is, doubtless, a striking absurdity

in supposing that a right of this kind does not exist, but we are reduced to the dilemma either of embracing

that supposition, preposterous as it may seem, or of contravening or explaining away a provision, which has

been of late a repeated theme of the eulogies of those who oppose the new Constitution; and the want of

which, in that plan, has been the subject of much plausible animadversion, and severe criticism. If we are

unwilling to impair the force of this applauded provision, we shall be obliged to conclude, that the United

States afford the extraordinary spectacle of a government destitute even of the shadow of constitutional

power to enforce the execution of its own laws. It will appear, from the specimens which have been cited,

that the American Confederacy, in this particular, stands discriminated from every other institution of a

similar kind, and exhibits a new and unexampled phenomenon in the political world.

The want of a mutual guaranty of the State governments is another capital imperfection in the federal plan.

There is nothing of this kind declared in the articles that compose it; and to imply a tacit guaranty from

considerations of utility, would be a still more flagrant departure from the clause which has been mentioned,

than to imply a tacit power of coercion from the like considerations . The want of a guaranty, though it might

in its consequences endanger the Union, does not so immediately attack its existence as the want of a

Without a guaranty the assistance to be derived from the Union in repelling those domestic dangers which

may sometimes threaten the existence of the State constitutions, must be renounced. Usurpation may rear its

crest in each State, and trample upon the liberties of the people, while the national government could legally

do nothing more than behold its encroachments with indignation and regret. A successful faction may erect a

tyranny on the ruins of order and law, while no succor could constitutionally be afforded by the Union to the

friends and supporters of the government. The tempestuous situation from which Massachusetts has scarcely

emerged, evinces that dangers of this kind are not merely speculative. Who can determine what might have

been the issue of her late convulsions, if the malcontents had been headed by a Caesar or by a Cromwell?

Who can predict what effect a despotism, established in Massachusetts, would have upon the liberties of New

Hampshire or Rhode Island, of Connecticut or New York? The inordinate pride of State importance has

suggested to some minds an objection to the principle of a guaranty in the federal government, as involving

an officious interference in the domestic concerns of the members. A scruple of this kind would deprive us of

one of the principal advantages to be expected from union, and can only flow from a misapprehension of the

nature of the provision itself. It could be no impediment to reforms of the State constitution by a majority of

the people in a legal and peaceable mode. This right would remain undiminished. The guaranty could only

operate against changes to be effected by violence. Towards the preventions of calamities of this kind, too

many checks cannot be provided. The peace of society and the stability of government depend absolutely on

the efficacy of the precautions adopted on this head. Where the whole power of the government is in the

hands of the people, there is the less pretense for the use of violent remedies in partial or occasional

distempers of the State. The natural cure for an illadministration, in a popular or representative constitution,

is a change of men. A guaranty by the national authority would be as much levelled against the usurpations of

rulers as against the ferments and outrages of faction and sedition in the community.

The principle of regulating the contributions of the States to the common treasury by QUOTAS is another

fundamental error in the Confederation. Its repugnancy to an adequate supply of the national exigencies has

been already pointed out, and has sufficiently appeared from the trial which has been made of it. I speak of it

now solely with a view to equality among the States. Those who have been accustomed to contemplate the

circumstances which produce and constitute national wealth, must be satisfied that there is no common

standard or barometer by which the degrees of it can be ascertained. Neither the value of lands, nor the

numbers of the people, which have been successively proposed as the rule of State contributions, has any

If we compare the wealth of the United Netherlands with that of Russia or Germany, or even of France, and if

we at the same time compare the total value of the lands and the aggregate population of that contracted

district with the total value of the lands and the aggregate population of the immense regions of either of the

three lastmentioned countries, we shall at once discover that there is no comparison between the proportion

of either of these two objects and that of the relative wealth of those nations. If the like parallel were to be run

between several of the American States, it would furnish a like result. Let Virginia be contrasted with North

Carolina, Pennsylvania with Connecticut, or Maryland with New Jersey, and we shall be convinced that the

respective abilities of those States, in relation to revenue, bear little or no analogy to their comparative stock

The position may be equally illustrated by a similar process between the counties of the same State. No man

who is acquainted with the State of New York will doubt that the active wealth of King's County bears a

much greater proportion to that of Montgomery than it would appear to be if we should take either the total

value of the lands or the total number of the people as a criterion! The wealth of nations depends upon an

Situation, soil, climate, the nature of the productions, the nature of the government, the genius of the citizens,

the degree of information they possess, the state of commerce, of arts, of industry, these circumstances and

many more, too complex, minute, or adventitious to admit of a particular specification, occasion differences

hardly conceivable in the relative opulence and riches of different countries. The consequence clearly is that

there can be no common measure of national wealth, and, of course, no general or stationary rule by which

the ability of a state to pay taxes can be determined. The attempt, therefore, to regulate the contributions of

the members of a confederacy by any such rule, cannot fail to be productive of glaring inequality and extreme

This inequality would of itself be sufficient in America to work the eventual destruction of the Union, if any

mode of enforcing a compliance with its requisitions could be devised. The suffering States would not long

consent to remain associated upon a principle which distributes the public burdens with so unequal a hand,

and which was calculated to impoverish and oppress the citizens of some States, while those of others would

scarcely be conscious of the small proportion of the weight they were required to sustain. This, however, is an

There is no method of steering clear of this inconvenience, but by authorizing the national government to

raise its own revenues in its own way. Imposts, excises, and, in general, all duties upon articles of

consumption, may be compared to a fluid, which will, in time, find its level with the means of paying them.

The amount to be contributed by each citizen will in a degree be at his own option, and can be regulated by

an attention to his resources. The rich may be extravagant, the poor can be frugal; and private oppression may

always be avoided by a judicious selection of objects proper for such impositions. If inequalities should arise

in some States from duties on particular objects, these will, in all probability, be counterbalanced by

proportional inequalities in other States, from the duties on other objects. In the course of time and things, an

equilibrium, as far as it is attainable in so complicated a subject, will be established everywhere. Or, if

inequalities should still exist, they would neither be so great in their degree, so uniform in their operation, nor

so odious in their appearance, as those which would necessarily spring from quotas, upon any scale that can

It is a signal advantage of taxes on articles of consumption, that they contain in their own nature a security

They prescribe their own limit; which cannot be exceeded without defeating the end proposed, that is, an

When applied to this object, the saying is as just as it is witty, that, ``in political arithmetic, two and two do

not always make four .'' If duties are too high, they lessen the consumption; the collection is eluded; and the

product to the treasury is not so great as when they are confined within proper and moderate bounds.

This forms a complete barrier against any material oppression of the citizens by taxes of this class, and is

Impositions of this kind usually fall under the denomination of indirect taxes, and must for a long time

constitute the chief part of the revenue raised in this country. Those of the direct kind, which principally

relate to land and buildings, may admit of a rule of apportionment. Either the value of land, or the number of

the people, may serve as a standard. The state of agriculture and the populousness of a country have been

considered as nearly connected with each other. And, as a rule, for the purpose intended, numbers, in the

view of simplicity and certainty, are entitled to a preference. In every country it is a herculean task to obtain a

valuation of the land; in a country imperfectly settled and progressive in improvement, the difficulties are

increased almost to impracticability. The expense of an accurate valuation is, in all situations, a formidable

objection. In a branch of taxation where no limits to the discretion of the government are to be found in the

nature of things, the establishment of a fixed rule, not incompatible with the end, may be attended with fewer

IN ADDITION to the defects already enumerated in the existing federal system, there are others of not less

importance, which concur in rendering it altogether unfit for the administration of the affairs of the Union.

The want of a power to regulate commerce is by all parties allowed to be of the number. The utility of such a

power has been anticipated under the first head of our inquiries; and for this reason, as well as from the

universal conviction entertained upon the subject, little need be added in this place. It is indeed evident, on

the most superficial view, that there is no object, either as it respects the interests of trade or finance, that

more strongly demands a federal superintendence. The want of it has already operated as a bar to the

formation of beneficial treaties with foreign powers, and has given occasions of dissatisfaction between the

States. No nation acquainted with the nature of our political association would be unwise enough to enter into

stipulations with the United States, by which they conceded privileges of any importance to them, while they

were apprised that the engagements on the part of the Union might at any moment be violated by its

members, and while they found from experience that they might enjoy every advantage they desired in our

markets, without granting us any return but such as their momentary convenience might suggest. It is not,

therefore, to be wondered at that Mr. Jenkinson, in ushering into the House of Commons a bill for regulating

the temporary intercourse between the two countries, should preface its introduction by a declaration that

similar provisions in former bills had been found to answer every purpose to the commerce of Great Britain,

and that it would be prudent to persist in the plan until it should appear whether the American government

was likely or not to acquire greater consistency. [1] Several States have endeavored, by separate prohibitions,

restrictions, and exclusions, to influence the conduct of that kingdom in this particular, but the want of

concert, arising from the want of a general authority and from clashing and dissimilar views in the State, has

hitherto frustrated every experiment of the kind, and will continue to do so as long as the same obstacles to a

The interfering and unneighborly regulations of some States, contrary to the true spirit of the Union, have, in

different instances, given just cause of umbrage and complaint to others, and it is to be feared that examples

of this nature, if not restrained by a national control, would be multiplied and extended till they became not

less serious sources of animosity and discord than injurious impediments to the intcrcourse between the

different parts of the Confederacy. ``The commerce of the German empire [2] is in continual trammels from

the multiplicity of the duties which the several princes and states exact upon the merchandises passing

through their territories, by means of which the fine streams and navigable rivers with which Germany is so

happily watered are rendered almost useless.'' Though the genius of the people of this country might never

permit this description to be strictly applicable to us, yet we may reasonably expect, from the gradual

conflicts of State regulations, that the citizens of each would at length come to be considered and treated by

The power of raising armies, by the most obvious construction of the articles of the Confederation, is merely

a power of making requisitions upon the States for quotas of men. This practice in the course of the late war,

was found replete with obstructions to a vigorous and to an economical system of defense. It gave birth to a

competition between the States which created a kind of auction for men. In order to furnish the quotas

required of them, they outbid each other till bounties grew to an enormous and insupportable size.

The hope of a still further increase afforded an inducement to those who were disposed to serve to

procrastinate their enlistment, and disinclined them from engaging for any considerable periods.

Hence, slow and scanty levies of men, in the most critical emergencies of our affairs; short enlistments at an

unparalleled expense; continual fluctuations in the troops, ruinous to their discipline and subjecting the public

safety frequently to the perilous crisis of a disbanded army. Hence, also, those oppressive expedients for

raising men which were upon several occasions practiced, and which nothing but the enthusiasm of liberty

This method of raising troops is not more unfriendly to economy and vigor than it is to an equal distribution

of the burden. The States near the seat of war, influenced by motives of selfpreservation, made efforts to

furnish their quotas, which even exceeded their abilities; while those at a distance from danger were, for the

most part, as remiss as the others were diligent, in their exertions. The immediate pressure of this inequality

was not in this case, as in that of the contributions of money, alleviated by the hope of a final liquidation. The

States which did not pay their proportions of money might at least be charged with their deficiencies; but no

account could be formed of the deficiencies in the supplies of men. We shall not, however, see much reason

to reget the want of this hope, when we consider how little prospect there is, that the most delinquent States

will ever be able to make compensation for their pecuniary failures. The system of quotas and requisitions,

whether it be applied to men or money, is, in every view, a system of imbecility in the Union, and of

The right of equal suffrage among the States is another exceptionable part of the Confederation. Every idea of

proportion and every rule of fair representation conspire to condemn a principle, which gives to Rhode Island

an equal weight in the scale of power with Massachusetts, or Connecticut, or New York; and to Deleware an

equal voice in the national deliberations with Pennsylvania, or Virginia, or North Carolina. Its operation

contradicts the fundamental maxim of republican government, which requires that the sense of the majority

should prevail. Sophistry may reply, that sovereigns are equal, and that a majority of the votes of the States

will be a majority of confederated America. But this kind of logical legerdemain will never counteract the

plain suggestions of justice and commonsense. It may happen that this majority of States is a small minority

of the people of America [3]; and two thirds of the people of America could not long be persuaded, upon the

credit of artificial distinctions and syllogistic subtleties, to submit their interests to the management and

disposal of one third. The larger States would after a while revolt from the idea of receiving the law from the

smaller. To acquiesce in such a privation of their due importance in the political scale, would be not merely to

be insensible to the love of power, but even to sacrifice the desire of equality. It is neither rational to expect

the first, nor just to require the last. The smaller States, considering how peculiarly their safety and welfare

depend on union, ought readily to renounce a pretension which, if not relinquished, would prove fatal to its

It may be objected to this, that not seven but nine States, or two thirds of the whole number, must consent to

the most important resolutions; and it may be thence inferred that nine States would always comprehend a

majority of the Union. But this does not obviate the impropriety of an equal vote between States of the most

unequal dimensions and populousness; nor is the inference accurate in point of fact; for we can enumerate

nine States which contain less than a majority of the people [4]; and it is constitutionally possible that these

nine may give the vote. Besides, there are matters of considerable moment determinable by a bare majority;

and there are others, concerning which doubts have been entertained, which, if interpreted in favor of the

sufficiency of a vote of seven States, would extend its operation to interests of the first magnitude. In addition

to this, it is to be observed that there is a probability of an increase in the number of States, and no provision

But this is not all: what at first sight may seem a remedy, is, in reality, a poison. To give a minority a negative

upon the majority (which is always the case where more than a majority is requisite to a decision), is, in its

tendency, to subject the sense of the greater number to that of the lesser. Congress, from the nonattendance of

a few States, have been frequently in the situation of a Polish diet, where a single VOTE has been sufficient

to put a stop to all their movements. A sixtieth part of the Union, which is about the proportion of Delaware

and Rhode Island, has several times been able to oppose an entire bar to its operations. This is one of those

refinements which, in practice, has an effect the reverse of what is expected from it in theory. The necessity

of unanimity in public bodies, or of something approaching towards it, has been founded upon a supposition

But its real operation is to embarrass the administration, to destroy the energy of the government, and to

substitute the pleasure, caprice, or artifices of an insignificant, turbulent, or corrupt junto, to the regular

deliberations and decisions of a respectable majority. In those emergencies of a nation, in which the goodness

or badness, the weakness or strength of its government, is of the greatest importance, there is commonly a

necessity for action. The public business must, in some way or other, go forward.

If a pertinacious minority can control the opinion of a majority, respecting the best mode of conducting it, the

majority, in order that something may be done, must conform to the views of the minority; and thus the sense

of the smaller number will overrule that of the greater, and give a tone to the national proceedings.

Hence, tedious delays; continual negotiation and intrigue; contemptible compromises of the public good. And

yet, in such a system, it is even happy when such compromises can take place: for upon some occasions

things will not admit of accommodation; and then the measures of government must be injuriously

suspended, or fatally defeated. It is often, by the impracticability of obtaining the concurrence of the

necessary number of votes, kept in a state of inaction. Its situation must always savor of weakness, sometimes

It is not difficult to discover, that a principle of this kind gives greater scope to foreign corruption, as well as

to domestic faction, than that which permits the sense of the majority to decide; though the contrary of this

has been presumed. The mistake has proceeded from not attending with due care to the mischiefs that may be

occasioned by obstructing the progress of government at certain critical seasons. When the concurrence of a

large number is required by the Constitution to the doing of any national act, we are apt to rest satisfied that

all is safe, because nothing improper will be likely TO BE DONE, but we forget how much good may be

prevented, and how much ill may be produced, by the power of hindering the doing what may be necessary,

and of keeping affairs in the same unfavorable posture in which they may happen to stand at particular

Suppose, for instance, we were engaged in a war, in conjunction with one foreign nation, against another.

Suppose the necessity of our situation demanded peace, and the interest or ambition of our ally led him to

seek the prosecution of the war, with views that might justify us in making separate terms. In such a state of

things, this ally of ours would evidently find it much easier, by his bribes and intrigues, to tie up the hands of

government from making peace, where two thirds of all the votes were requisite to that object, than where a

simple majority would suffice. In the first case, he would have to corrupt a smaller number; in the last, a

greater number. Upon the same principle, it would be much easier for a foreign power with which we were at

war to perplex our councils and embarrass our exertions. And, in a commercial view, we may be subjected to

similar inconveniences. A nation, with which we might have a treaty of commerce, could with much greater

facility prevent our forming a connection with her competitor in trade, though such a connection should be

One of the weak sides of republics, among their numerous advantages, is that they afford too easy an inlet to

foreign corruption. An hereditary monarch, though often disposed to sacrifice his subjects to his ambition,

has so great a personal interest in the government and in the external glory of the nation, that it is not easy for

a foreign power to give him an equivalent for what he would sacrifice by treachery to the state. The world has

accordingly been witness to few examples of this species of royal prostitution, though there have been

In republics, persons elevated from the mass of the community, by the suffrages of their fellowcitizens, to

stations of great preeminence and power, may find compensations for betraying their trust, which, to any

but minds animated and guided by superior virtue, may appear to exceed the proportion of interest they have

in the common stock, and to overbalance the obligations of duty. Hence it is that history furnishes us with so

many mortifying examples of the prevalency of foreign corruption in republican governments. How much

this contributed to the ruin of the ancient commonwealths has been already delineated. It is well known that

the deputies of the United Provinces have, in various instances, been purchased by the emissaries of the

neighboring kingdoms. The Earl of Chesterfield (if my memory serves me right), in a letter to his court,

intimates that his success in an important negotiation must depend on his obtaining a major's commission for

one of those deputies. And in Sweden the parties were alternately bought by France and England in so

barefaced and notorious a manner that it excited universal disgust in the nation, and was a principal cause that

the most limited monarch in Europe, in a single day, without tumult, violence, or opposition, became one of

A circumstance which crowns the defects of the Confederation remains yet to be mentioned, the want of a

judiciary power. Laws are a dead letter without courts to expound and define their true meaning and

operation. The treaties of the United States, to have any force at all, must be considered as part of the law of

Their true import, as far as respects individuals, must, like all other laws, be ascertained by judicial

determinations. To produce uniformity in these determinations, they ought to be submitted, in the last resort,

to one SUPREME TRIBUNAL. And this tribunal ought to be instituted under the same authority which

forms the treaties themselves. These ingredients are both indispensable. If there is in each State a court of

final jurisdiction, there may be as many different final determinations on the same point as there are courts.

There are endless diversities in the opinions of men. We often see not only different courts but the judges of

the came court differing from each other. To avoid the confusion which would unavoidably result from the

contradictory decisions of a number of independent judicatories, all nations have found it necessary to

establish one court paramount to the rest, possessing a general superintendence, and authorized to settle and

This is the more necessary where the frame of the government is so compounded that the laws of the whole

are in danger of being contravened by the laws of the parts. In this case, if the particular tribunals are invested

with a right of ultimate jurisdiction, besides the contradictions to be expected from difference of opinion,

there will be much to fear from the bias of local views and prejudices, and from the interference of local

regulations. As often as such an interference was to happen, there would be reason to apprehend that the

provisions of the particular laws might be preferred to those of the general laws; for nothing is more natural

to men in office than to look with peculiar deference towards that authority to which they owe their official

existence. The treaties of the United States, under the present Constitution, are liable to the infractions of

thirteen different legislatures, and as many different courts of final jurisdiction, acting under the authority of

those legislatures. The faith, the reputation, the peace of the whole Union, are thus continually at the mercy of

the prejudices, the passions, and the interests of every member of which it is composed. Is it possible that

foreign nations can either respect or confide in such a government? Is it possible that the people of America

will longer consent to trust their honor, their happiness, their safety, on so precarious a foundation? In this

review of the Confederation, I have confined myself to the exhibition of its most material defects; passing

over those imperfections in its details by which even a great part of the power intended to be conferred upon

it has been in a great measure rendered abortive. It must be by this time evident to all men of reflection, who

can divest themselves of the prepossessions of preconceived opinions, that it is a system so radically vicious

and unsound, as to admit not of amendment but by an entire change in its leading features and characters.

The organization of Congress is itself utterly improper for the exercise of those powers which are necessary

to be deposited in the Union. A single assembly may be a proper receptacle of those slender, or rather

fettered, authorities, which have been heretofore delegated to the federal head; but it would be inconsistent

with all the principles of good government, to intrust it with those additional powers which, even the

moderate and more rational adversaries of the proposed Constitution admit, ought to reside in the United

States. If that plan should not be adopted, and if the necessity of the Union should be able to withstand the

ambitious aims of those men who may indulge magnificent schemes of personal aggrandizement from its

dissolution, the probability would be, that we should run into the project of conferring supplementary powers

upon Congress, as they are now constituted; and either the machine, from the intrinsic feebleness of its

structure, will moulder into pieces, in spite of our illjudged efforts to prop it; or, by successive

augmentations of its force an energy, as necessity might prompt, we shall finally accumulate, in a single

body, all the most important prerogatives of sovereignty, and thus entail upon our posterity one of the most

execrable forms of government that human infatuation ever contrived. Thus, we should create in reality that

very tyranny which the adversaries of the new Constitution either are, or affect to be, solicitous to avert.

It has not a little contributed to the infirmities of the existing federal system, that it never had a ratification by

the PEOPLE. Resting on no better foundation than the consent of the several legislatures, it has been exposed

to frequent and intricate questions concerning the validity of its powers, and has, in some instances, given

birth to the enormous doctrine of a right of legislative repeal. Owing its ratification to the law of a State, it

has been contended that the same authority might repeal the law by which it was ratified. However gross a

heresy it may be to maintain that a PARTY to a COMPACT has a right to revoke that COMPACT, the

doctrine itself has had respectable advocates. The possibility of a question of this nature proves the necessity

of laying the foundations of our national government deeper than in the mere sanction of delegated authority.

The fabric of American empire ought to rest on the solid basis of THE CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE. The

streams of national power ought to flow immediately from that pure, original fountain of all legitimate

FNA1@1 This, as nearly as I can recollect, was the sense of his speech on introducing the last bill.

FNA1@2 Encyclopedia, article ``Empire.'' FNA1@3 New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New Jersey,

Delaware, Georgia, South Carolina, and Maryland are a majority of the whole number of the States, but they

FNA1@4 Add New York and Connecticut to the foregoing seven, and they will be less than a majority.

THE necessity of a Constitution, at least equally energetic with the one proposed, to the preservation of the

This inquiry will naturally divide itself into three branches the objects to be provided for by the federal

government, the quantity of power necessary to the accomplishment of those objects, the persons upon whom

that power ought to operate. Its distribution and organization will more properly claim our attention under the

The principal purposes to be answered by union are these the common defense of the members; the

preservation of the public peace as well against internal convulsions as external attacks; the regulation of

commerce with other nations and between the States; the superintendence of our intercourse, political and

The authorities essential to the common defense are these: to raise armies; to build and equip fleets; to

prescribe rules for the government of both; to direct their operations; to provide for their support. These

powers ought to exist without limitation, BECAUSE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO FORESEE OR DEFINE THE

that endanger the safety of nations are infinite, and for this reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be

imposed on the power to which the care of it is committed. This power ought to be coextensive with all the

possible combinations of such circumstances; and ought to be under the direction of the same councils which

This is one of those truths which, to a correct and unprejudiced mind, carries its own evidence along with it;

and may be obscured, but cannot be made plainer by argument or reasoning. It rests upon axioms as simple as

they are universal; the MEANS ought to be proportioned to the END; the persons, from whose agency the

attainment of any END is expected, ought to possess the MEANS by which it is to be attained.

Whether there ought to be a federal government intrusted with the care of the common defense, is a question

in the first instance, open for discussion; but the moment it is decided in the affirmative, it will follow, that

that government ought to be clothed with all the powers requisite to complete execution of its trust. And

unless it can be shown that the circumstances which may affect the public safety are reducible within certain

determinate limits; unless the contrary of this position can be fairly and rationally disputed, it must be

admitted, as a necessary consequence, that there can be no limitation of that authority which is to provide for

the defense and protection of the community, in any matter essential to its efficacy that is, in any matter

Defective as the present Confederation has been proved to be, this principle appears to have been fully

recognized by the framers of it; though they have not made proper or adequate provision for its exercise.

Congress have an unlimited discretion to make requisitions of men and money; to govern the army and navy;

to direct their operations. As their requisitions are made constitutionally binding upon the States, who are in

fact under the most solemn obligations to furnish the supplies required of them, the intention evidently was

that the United States should command whatever resources were by them judged requisite to the ``common

defense and general welfare.'' It was presumed that a sense of their true interests, and a regard to the dictates

of good faith, would be found sufficient pledges for the punctual performance of the duty of the members to

The experiment has, however, demonstrated that this expectation was illfounded and illusory; and the

observations, made under the last head, will, I imagine, have sufficed to convince the impartial and

discerning, that there is an absolute necessity for an entire change in the first principles of the system; that if

we are in earnest about giving the Union energy and duration, we must abandon the vain project of legislating

upon the States in their collective capacities; we must extend the laws of the federal government to the

individual citizens of America; we must discard the fallacious scheme of quotas and requisitions, as equally

impracticable and unjust. The result from all this is that the Union ought to be invested with full power to

levy troops; to build and equip fleets; and to raise the revenues which will be required for the formation and

support of an army and navy, in the customary and ordinary modes practiced in other governments.

If the circumstances of our country are such as to demand a compound instead of a simple, a confederate

instead of a sole, government, the essential point which will remain to be adjusted will be to discriminate the

OBJECTS, as far as it can be done, which shall appertain to the different provinces or departments of power;

allowing to each the most ample authority for fulfilling the objects committed to its charge. Shall the Union

be constituted the guardian of the common safety? Are fleets and armies and revenues necessary to this

purpose? The government of the Union must be empowered to pass all laws, and to make all regulations

which have relation to them. The same must be the case in respect to commerce, and to every other matter to

which its jurisdiction is permitted to extend. Is the administration of justice between the citizens of the same

State the proper department of the local governments? These must possess all the authorities which are

connected with this object, and with every other that may be allotted to their particular cognizance and

direction. Not to confer in each case a degree of power commensurate to the end, would be to violate the

most obvious rules of prudence and propriety, and improvidently to trust the great interests of the nation to

Who is likely to make suitable provisions for the public defense, as that body to which the guardianship of

the public safety is confided; which, as the centre of information, will best understand the extent and urgency

of the dangers that threaten; as the representative of the WHOLE, will feel itself most deeply interested in the

preservation of every part; which, from the responsibility implied in the duty assigned to it, will be most

sensibly impressed with the necessity of proper exertions; and which, by the extension of its authority

throughout the States, can alone establish uniformity and concert in the plans and measures by which the

common safety is to be secured? Is there not a manifest inconsistency in devolving upon the federal

government the care of the general defense, and leaving in the State governments the EFFECTIVE powers by

which it is to be provided for? Is not a want of cooperation the infallible consequence of such a system?

And will not weakness, disorder, an undue distribution of the burdens and calamities of war, an unnecessary

and intolerable increase of expense, be its natural and inevitable concomitants? Have we not had unequivocal

experience of its effects in the course of the revolution which we have just accomplished? Every view we

may take of the subject, as candid inquirers after truth, will serve to convince us, that it is both unwise and

dangerous to deny the federal government an unconfined authority, as to all those objects which are intrusted

to its management. It will indeed deserve the most vigilant and careful attention of the people, to see that it be

modeled in such a manner as to admit of its being safely vested with the requisite powers. If any plan which

has been, or may be, offered to our consideration, should not, upon a dispassionate inspection, be found to

answer this description, it ought to be rejected. A government, the constitution of which renders it unfit to be

trusted with all the powers which a free people OUGHT TO DELEGATE TO ANY GOVERNMENT, would

Wherever THESE can with propriety be confided, the coincident powers may safely accompany them. This is

the true result of all just reasoning upon the subject. And the adversaries of the plan promulgated by the

convention ought to have confined themselves to showing, that the internal structure of the proposed

government was such as to render it unworthy of the confidence of the people. They ought not to have

wandered into inflammatory declamations and unmeaning cavils about the extent of the powers. The

POWERS are not too extensive for the OBJECTS of federal administration, or, in other words, for the

management of our NATIONAL INTERESTS; nor can any satisfactory argument be framed to show that

they are chargeable with such an excess. If it be true, as has been insinuated by some of the writers on the

other side, that the difficulty arises from the nature of the thing, and that the extent of the country will not

permit us to form a government in which such ample powers can safely be reposed, it would prove that we

ought to contract our views, and resort to the expedient of separate confederacies, which will move within

more practicable spheres. For the absurdity must continually stare us in the face of confiding to a government

the direction of the most essential national interests, without daring to trust it to the authorities which are

indispensible to their proper and efficient management. Let us not attempt to reconcile contradictions, but

I trust, however, that the impracticability of one general system cannot be shown. I am greatly mistaken, if

any thing of weight has yet been advanced of this tendency; and I flatter myself, that the observations which

have been made in the course of these papers have served to place the reverse of that position in as clear a

light as any matter still in the womb of time and experience can be susceptible of. This, at all events, must be

evident, that the very difficulty itself, drawn from the extent of the country, is the strongest argument in favor

of an energetic government; for any other can certainly never preserve the Union of so large an empire.

If we embrace the tenets of those who oppose the adoption of the proposed Constitution, as the standard of

our political creed, we cannot fail to verify the gloomy doctrines which predict the impracticability of a

To THE powers proposed to be conferred upon the federal government, in respect to the creation and

direction of the national forces, I have met with but one specific objection, which, if I understand it right, is

this, that proper provision has not been made against the existence of standing armies in time of peace; an

objection which, I shall now endeavor to show, rests on weak and unsubstantial foundations.

It has indeed been brought forward in the most vague and general form, supported only by bold assertions,

without the appearance of argument; without even the sanction of theoretical opinions; in contradiction to the

practice of other free nations, and to the general sense of America, as expressed in most of the existing

constitutions. The proprietory of this remark will appear, the moment it is recollected that the objection under

consideration turns upon a supposed necessity of restraining the LEGISLATIVE authority of the nation, in

the article of military establishments; a principle unheard of, except in one or two of our State constitutions,

A stranger to our politics, who was to read our newspapers at the present juncture, without having previously

inspected the plan reported by the convention, would be naturally led to one of two conclusions: either that it

contained a positive injunction, that standing armies should be kept up in time of peace; or that it vested in

the EXECUTIVE the whole power of levying troops, without subjecting his discretion, in any shape, to the

If he came afterwards to peruse the plan itself, he would be surprised to discover, that neither the one nor the

other was the case; that the whole power of raising armies was lodged in the LEGISLATURE, not in the

EXECUTIVE; that this legislature was to be a popular body, consisting of the representatives of the people

periodically elected; and that instead of the provision he had supposed in favor of standing armies, there was

to be found, in respect to this object, an important qualification even of the legislative discretion, in that

clause which forbids the appropriation of money for the support of an army for any longer period than two

years a precaution which, upon a nearer view of it, will appear to be a great and real security against the

Disappointed in his first surmise, the person I have supposed would be apt to pursue his conjectures a little

further. He would naturally say to himself, it is impossible that all this vehement and pathetic declamation

can be without some colorable pretext. It must needs be that this people, so jealous of their liberties, have, in

all the preceding models of the constitutions which they have established, inserted the most precise and rigid

precautions on this point, the omission of which, in the new plan, has given birth to all this apprehension and

If, under this impression, he proceeded to pass in review the several State constitutions, how great would be

his disappointment to find that TWO ONLY of them [1] contained an interdiction of standing armies in time

of peace; that the other eleven had either observed a profound silence on the subject, or had in express terms

Still, however he would be persuaded that there must be some plausible foundation for the cry raised on this

head. He would never be able to imagine, while any source of information remained unexplored, that it was

nothing more than an experiment upon the public credulity, dictated either by a deliberate intention to

deceive, or by the overflowings of a zeal too intemperate to be ingenuous. It would probably occur to him,

that he would be likely to find the precautions he was in search of in the primitive compact between the

States. Here, at length, he would expect to meet with a solution of the enigma. No doubt, he would observe to

himself, the existing Confederation must contain the most explicit provisions against military establishments

in time of peace; and a departure from this model, in a favorite point, has occasioned the discontent which

If he should now apply himself to a careful and critical survey of the articles of Confederation, his

astonishment would not only be increased, but would acquire a mixture of indignation, at the unexpected

discovery, that these articles, instead of containing the prohibition he looked for, and though they had, with

jealous circumspection, restricted the authority of the State legislatures in this particular, had not imposed a

single restraint on that of the United States. If he happened to be a man of quick sensibility, or ardent temper,

he could now no longer refrain from regarding these clamors as the dishonest artifices of a sinister and

unprincipled opposition to a plan which ought at least to receive a fair and candid examination from all

sincere lovers of their country! How else, he would say, could the authors of them have been tempted to vent

such loud censures upon that plan, about a point in which it seems to have conformed itself to the general

sense of America as declared in its different forms of government, and in which it has even superadded a new

and powerful guard unknown to any of them? If, on the contrary, he happened to be a man of calm and

dispassionate feelings, he would indulge a sigh for the frailty of human nature, and would lament, that in a

matter so interesting to the happiness of millions, the true merits of the question should be perplexed and

entangled by expedients so unfriendly to an impartial and right determination. Even such a man could hardly

forbear remarking, that a conduct of this kind has too much the appearance of an intention to mislead the

people by alarming their passions, rather than to convince them by arguments addressed to their

But however little this objection may be countenanced, even by precedents among ourselves, it may be

satisfactory to take a nearer view of its intrinsic merits. From a close examination it will appear that restraints

upon the discretion of the legislature in respect to military establishments in time of peace, would be

improper to be imposed, and if imposed, from the necessities of society, would be unlikely to be observed.

Though a wide ocean separates the United States from Europe, yet there are various considerations that warn

us against an excess of confidence or security. On one side of us, and stretching far into our rear, are growing

On the other side, and extending to meet the British settlements, are colonies and establishments subject to

This situation and the vicinity of the West India Islands, belonging to these two powers create between them,

in respect to their American possessions and in relation to us, a common interest.

The savage tribes on our Western frontier ought to be regarded as our natural enemies, their natural allies,

because they have most to fear from us, and most to hope from them. The improvements in the art of

navigation have, as to the facility of communication, rendered distant nations, in a great measure, neighbors.

Britain and Spain are among the principal maritime powers of Europe. A future concert of views between

these nations ought not to be regarded as improbable. The increasing remoteness of consanguinity is every

day diminishing the force of the family compact between France and Spain. And politicians have ever with

great reason considered the ties of blood as feeble and precarious links of political connection. These

circumstances combined, admonish us not to be too sanguine in considering ourselves as entirely out of the

Previous to the Revolution, and ever since the peace, there has been a constant necessity for keeping small

garrisons on our Western frontier. No person can doubt that these will continue to be indispensable, if it

should only be against the ravages and depredations of the Indians. These garrisons must either be furnished

by occasional detachments from the militia, or by permanent corps in the pay of the government. The first is

impracticable; and if practicable, would be pernicious. The militia would not long, if at all, submit to be

dragged from their occupations and families to perform that most disagreeable duty in times of profound

peace. And if they could be prevailed upon or compelled to do it, the increased expense of a frequent rotation

of service, and the loss of labor and disconcertion of the industrious pursuits of individuals, would form

conclusive objections to the scheme. It would be as burdensome and injurious to the public as ruinous to

private citizens. The latter resource of permanent corps in the pay of the government amounts to a standing

army in time of peace; a small one, indeed, but not the less real for being small.

Here is a simple view of the subject, that shows us at once the impropriety of a constitutional interdiction of

such establishments, and the necessity of leaving the matter to the discretion and prudence of the legislature.

In proportion to our increase in strength, it is probable, nay, it may be said certain, that Britain and Spain

would augment their military establishments in our neighborhood. If we should not be willing to be exposed,

in a naked and defenseless condition, to their insults and encroachments, we should find it expedient to

increase our frontier garrisons in some ratio to the force by which our Western settlements might be annoyed.

There are, and will be, particular posts, the possession of which will include the command of large districts of

territory, and facilitate future invasions of the remainder. It may be added that some of those posts will be

keys to the trade with the Indian nations. Can any man think it would be wise to leave such posts in a

situation to be at any instant seized by one or the other of two neighboring and formidable powers? To act

If we mean to be a commercial people, or even to be secure on our Atlantic side, we must endeavor, as soon

as possible, to have a navy. To this purpose there must be dockyards and arsenals; and for the defense of

When a nation has become so powerful by sea that it can protect its dockyards by its fleets, this supersedes

the necessity of garrisons for that purpose; but where naval establishments are in their infancy, moderate

garrisons will, in all likelihood, be found an indispensable security against descents for the destruction of the

FNA1@1 This statement of the matter is taken from the printed collection of State constitutions.

Pennsylvania and North Carolina are the two which contain the interdiction in these words: ``As standing

armies in time of peace are dangerous to liberty, THEY OUGHT NOT to be kept up.'' This is, in truth, rather

a CAUTION than a PROHIBITION. New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Delaware, and Maryland have, in each

of their bils of rights, a clause to this effect: ``Standing armies are dangerous to liberty, and ought not to be

raised or kept up WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE LEGISLATURE''; which is a formal admission of

the authority of the Legislature. New York has no bills of rights, and her constitution says not a word about

the matter. No bills of rights appear annexed to the constitutions of the other States, except the foregoing, and

their constitutions are equally silent. I am told, however that one or two States have bills of rights which do

not appear in this collection; but that those also recognize the right of the legislative authority in this respect.

IT MAY perhaps be urged that the objects enumerated in the preceding number ought to be provided for by

the State governments, under the direction of the Union. But this would be, in reality, an inversion of the

primary principle of our political association, as it would in practice transfer the care of the common defense

from the federal head to the individual members: a project oppressive to some States, dangerous to all, and

The territories of Britain, Spain, and of the Indian nations in our neighborhood do not border on particular

States, but encircle the Union from Maine to Georgia. The danger, though in different degrees, is therefore

common. And the means of guarding against it ought, in like manner, to be the objects of common councils

and of a common treasury. It happens that some States, from local situation, are more directly exposed. New

York is of this class. Upon the plan of separate provisions, New York would have to sustain the whole weight

of the establishments requisite to her immediate safety, and to the mediate or ultimate protection of her

This would neither be equitable as it respected New York nor safe as it respected the other States. Various

inconveniences would attend such a system. The States, to whose lot it might fall to support the necessary

establishments, would be as little able as willing, for a considerable time to come, to bear the burden of

competent provisions. The security of all would thus be subjected to the parsimony, improvidence, or

inability of a part. If the resources of such part becoming more abundant and extensive, its provisions should

be proportionally enlarged, the other States would quickly take the alarm at seeing the whole military force of

the Union in the hands of two or three of its members, and those probably amongst the most powerful. They

would each choose to have some counterpoise, and pretenses could easily be contrived. In this situation,

military establishments, nourished by mutual jealousy, would be apt to swell beyond their natural or proper

size; and being at the separate disposal of the members, they would be engines for the abridgment or

Reasons have been already given to induce a supposition that the State governments will too naturally be

prone to a rivalship with that of the Union, the foundation of which will be the love of power; and that in any

contest between the federal head and one of its members the people will be most apt to unite with their local

government. If, in addition to this immense advantage, the ambition of the members should be stimulated by

the separate and independent possession of military forces, it would afford too strong a temptation and too

great a facility to them to make enterprises upon, and finally to subvert, the constitutional authority of the

Union. On the other hand, the liberty of the people would be less safe in this state of things than in that which

left the national forces in the hands of the national government. As far as an army may be considered as a

dangerous weapon of power, it had better be in those hands of which the people are most likely to be jealous

than in those of which they are least likely to be jealous. For it is a truth, which the experience of ages has

attested, that the people are always most in danger when the means of injuring their rights are in the

The framers of the existing Confederation, fully aware of the danger to the Union from the separate

possession of military forces by the States, have, in express terms, prohibited them from having either ships

or troops, unless with the consent of Congress. The truth is, that the existence of a federal government and

military establishments under State authority are not less at variance with each other than a due supply of the

There are other lights besides those already taken notice of, in which the impropriety of restraints on the

discretion of the national legislature will be equally manifest. The design of the objection, which has been

mentioned, is to preclude standing armies in time of peace, though we have never been informed how far it is

designed the prohibition should extend; whether to raising armies as well as to KEEPING THEM UP in a

If it be confined to the latter it will have no precise signification, and it will be ineffectual for the purpose

When armies are once raised what shall be denominated ``keeping them up,'' contrary to the sense of the

Constitution? What time shall be requisite to ascertain the violation? Shall it be a week, a month, a year? Or

shall we say they may be continued as long as the danger which occasioned their being raised continues? This

would be to admit that they might be kept up IN TIME OF PEACE, against threatening or impending danger,

which would be at once to deviate from the literal meaning of the prohibition, and to introduce an extensive

latitude of construction. Who shall judge of the continuance of the danger? This must undoubtedly be

submitted to the national government, and the matter would then be brought to this issue, that the national

government, to provide against apprehended danger, might in the first instance raise troops, and might

afterwards keep them on foot as long as they supposed the peace or safety of the community was in any

degree of jeopardy. It is easy to perceive that a discretion so latitudinary as this would afford ample room for

The supposed utility of a provision of this kind can only be founded on the supposed probability, or at least

possibility, of a combination between the executive and the legislative, in some scheme of usurpation. Should

this at any time happen, how easy would it be to fabricate pretenses of approaching danger! Indian hostilities,

Provocations to produce the desired appearances might even be given to some foreign power, and appeased

again by timely concessions. If we can reasonably presume such a combination to have been formed, and that

the enterprise is warranted by a sufficient prospect of success, the army, when once raised, from whatever

If, to obviate this consequence, it should be resolved to extend the prohibition to the RAISING of armies in

time of peace, the United States would then exhibit the most extraordinary spectacle which the world has yet

seen, that of a nation incapacitated by its Constitution to prepare for defense, before it was actually invaded.

As the ceremony of a formal denunciation of war has of late fallen into disuse, the presence of an enemy

within our territories must be waited for, as the legal warrant to the government to begin its levies of men for

the protection of the State. We must receive the blow, before we could even prepare to return it. All that kind

of policy by which nations anticipate distant danger, and meet the gathering storm, must be abstained from,

as contrary to the genuine maxims of a free government. We must expose our property and liberty to the

mercy of foreign invaders, and invite them by our weakness to seize the naked and defenseless prey, because

we are afraid that rulers, created by our choice, dependent on our will, might endanger that liberty, by an

Here I expect we shall be told that the militia of the country is its natural bulwark, and would be at all times

equal to the national defense. This doctrine, in substance, had like to have lost us our independence. It cost

millions to the United States that might have been saved. The facts which, from our own experience, forbid a

reliance of this kind, are too recent to permit us to be the dupes of such a suggestion. The steady operations of

war against a regular and disciplined army can only be successfully conducted by a force of the same kind.

Considerations of economy, not less than of stability and vigor, confirm this position. The American militia,

in the course of the late war, have, by their valor on numerous occasions, erected eternal monuments to their

fame; but the bravest of them feel and know that the liberty of their country could not have been established

by their efforts alone, however great and valuable they were. War, like most other things, is a science to be

acquired and perfected by diligence, by perserverance, by time, and by practice.

All violent policy, as it is contrary to the natural and experienced course of human affairs, defeats itself.

The Bill of Rights of that State declares that standing armies are dangerous to liberty, and ought not to be

Pennsylvania, nevertheless, in a time of profound peace, from the existence of partial disorders in one or two

of her counties, has resolved to raise a body of troops; and in all probability will keep them up as long as

there is any appearance of danger to the public peace. The conduct of Massachusetts affords a lesson on the

same subject, though on different ground. That State (without waiting for the sanction of Congress, as the

articles of the Confederation require) was compelled to raise troops to quell a domestic insurrection, and still

keeps a corps in pay to prevent a revival of the spirit of revolt. The particular constitution of Massachusetts

opposed no obstacle to the measure; but the instance is still of use to instruct us that cases are likely to occur

under our government, as well as under those of other nations, which will sometimes render a military force

in time of peace essential to the security of the society, and that it is therefore improper in this respect to

control the legislative discretion. It also teaches us, in its application to the United States, how little the rights

of a feeble government are likely to be respected, even by its own constituents. And it teaches us, in addition

to the rest, how unequal parchment provisions are to a struggle with public necessity .

It was a fundamental maxim of the Lacedaemonian commonwealth, that the post of admiral should not be

conferred twice on the same person. The Peloponnesian confederates, having suffered a severe defeat at sea

from the Athenians, demanded Lysander, who had before served with success in that capacity, to command

The Lacedaemonians, to gratify their allies, and yet preserve the semblance of an adherence to their ancient

institutions, had recourse to the flimsy subterfuge of investing Lysander with the real power of admiral, under

This instance is selected from among a multitude that might be cited to confirm the truth already advanced

and illustrated by domestic examples; which is, that nations pay little regard to rules and maxims calculated

in their very nature to run counter to the necessities of society. Wise politicians will be cautious about

fettering the government with restrictions that cannot be observed, because they know that every breach of

the fundamental laws, though dictated by necessity, impairs that sacred reverence which ought to be

maintained in the breast of rulers towards the constitution of a country, and forms a precedent for other

breaches where the same plea of necessity does not exist at all, or is less urgent and palpable.

IT WAS a thing hardly to be expected that in a popular revolution the minds of men should stop at that happy

mean which marks the salutary boundary between POWER and PRIVILEGE, and combines the energy of

government with the security of private rights. A failure in this delicate and important point is the great

source of the inconveniences we experience, and if we are not cautious to avoid a repetition of the error, in

our future attempts to rectify and ameliorate our system, we may travel from one chimerical project to

another; we may try change after change; but we shall never be likely to make any material change for the

The idea of restraining the legislative authority, in the means of providing for the national defense, is one of

those refinements which owe their origin to a zeal for liberty more ardent than enlightened. We have seen,

however, that it has not had thus far an extensive prevalency; that even in this country, where it made its first

appearance, Pennsylvania and North Carolina are the only two States by which it has been in any degree

patronized; and that all the others have refused to give it the least countenance; wisely judging that

confidence must be placed somewhere; that the necessity of doing it, is implied in the very act of delegating

power; and that it is better to hazard the abuse of that confidence than to embarrass the government and

endanger the public safety by impolitic restrictions on the legislative authority. The opponents of the

proposed Constitution combat, in this respect, the general decision of America; and instead of being taught by

experience the propriety of correcting any extremes into which we may have heretofore run, they appear

disposed to conduct us into others still more dangerous, and more extravagant. As if the tone of government

had been found too high, or too rigid, the doctrines they teach are calculated to induce us to depress or to

relax it, by expedients which, upon other occasions, have been condemned or forborne. It may be affirmed

without the imputation of invective, that if the principles they inculcate, on various points, could so far obtain

as to become the popular creed, they would utterly unfit the people of this country for any species of

government whatever. But a danger of this kind is not to be apprehended. The citizens of America have too

much discernment to be argued into anarchy. And I am much mistaken, if experience has not wrought a deep

and solemn conviction in the public mind, that greater energy of government is essential to the welfare and

It may not be amiss in this place concisely to remark the origin and progress of the idea, which aims at the

exclusion of military establishments in time of peace. Though in speculative minds it may arise from a

contemplation of the nature and tendency of such institutions, fortified by the events that have happened in

other ages and countries, yet as a national sentiment, it must be traced to those habits of thinking which we

derive from the nation from whom the inhabitants of these States have in general sprung.

In England, for a long time after the Norman Conquest, the authority of the monarch was almost unlimited.

Inroads were gradually made upon the prerogative, in favor of liberty, first by the barons, and afterwards by

the people, till the greatest part of its most formidable pretensions became extinct. But it was not till the

revolution in 1688, which elevated the Prince of Orange to the throne of Great Britain, that English liberty

was completely triumphant. As incident to the undefined power of making war, an acknowledged prerogative

of the crown, Charles II. had, by his own authority, kept on foot in time of peace a body of 5,000 regular

troops. And this number James II. increased to 30,000; who were paid out of his civil list. At the revolution,

to abolish the exercise of so dangerous an authority, it became an article of the Bill of Rights then framed,

that ``the raising or keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, UNLESS WITH THE

CONSENT OF PARLIAMENT, was against law.'' In that kingdom, when the pulse of liberty was at its

highest pitch, no security against the danger of standing armies was thought requisite, beyond a prohibition of

their being raised or kept up by the mere authority of the executive magistrate. The patriots, who effected that

memorable revolution, were too temperate, too wellinformed, to think of any restraint on the legislative

discretion. They were aware that a certain number of troops for guards and garrisons were indispensable; that

no precise bounds could be set to the national exigencies; that a power equal to every possible contingency

must exist somewhere in the government: and that when they referred the exercise of that power to the

judgment of the legislature, they had arrived at the ultimate point of precaution which was reconcilable with

From the same source, the people of America may be said to have derived an hereditary impression of danger

to liberty, from standing armies in time of peace. The circumstances of a revolution quickened the public

sensibility on every point connected with the security of popular rights, and in some instances raise the

warmth of our zeal beyond the degree which consisted with the due temperature of the body politic. The

attempts of two of the States to restrict the authority of the legislature in the article of military establishments,

are of the number of these instances. The principles which had taught us to be jealous of the power of an

hereditary monarch were by an injudicious excess extended to the representatives of the people in their

popular assemblies. Even in some of the States, where this error was not adopted, we find unnecessary

declarations that standing armies ought not to be kept up, in time of peace, WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF

THE LEGISLATURE. I call them unnecessary, because the reason which had introduced a similar provision

into the English Bill of Rights is not applicable to any of the State constitutions. The power of raising armies

at all, under those constitutions, can by no construction be deemed to reside anywhere else, than in the

legislatures themselves; and it was superfluous, if not absurd, to declare that a matter should not be done

without the consent of a body, which alone had the power of doing it. Accordingly, in some of these

constitutions, and among others, in that of this State of New York, which has been justly celebrated, both in

Europe and America, as one of the best of the forms of government established in this country, there is a total

It is remarkable, that even in the two States which seem to have meditated an interdiction of military

establishments in time of peace, the mode of expression made use of is rather cautionary than prohibitory. It

is not said, that standing armies SHALL NOT BE kept up, but that they OUGHT NOT to be kept up, in time

of peace. This ambiguity of terms appears to have been the result of a conflict between jealousy and

conviction; between the desire of excluding such establishments at all events, and the persuasion that an

Can it be doubted that such a provision, whenever the situation of public affairs was understood to require a

departure from it, would be interpreted by the legislature into a mere admonition, and would be made to yield

to the necessities or supposed necessities of the State? Let the fact already mentioned, with respect to

Pennsylvania, decide. What then (it may be asked) is the use of such a provision, if it cease to operate the

moment there is an inclination to disregard it? Let us examine whether there be any comparison, in point of

efficacy, between the provision alluded to and that which is contained in the new Constitution, for restraining

the appropriations of money for military purposes to the period of two years. The former, by aiming at too

much, is calculated to effect nothing; the latter, by steering clear of an imprudent extreme, and by being

perfectly compatible with a proper provision for the exigencies of the nation, will have a salutary and

The legislature of the United States will be OBLIGED, by this provision, once at least in every two years, to

deliberate upon the propriety of keeping a military force on foot; to come to a new resolution on the point;

and to declare their sense of the matter, by a formal vote in the face of their constituents. They are not AT

LIBERTY to vest in the executive department permanent funds for the support of an army, if they were even

incautious enough to be willing to repose in it so improper a confidence. As the spirit of party, in different

degrees, must be expected to infect all political bodies, there will be, no doubt, persons in the national

legislature willing enough to arraign the measures and criminate the views of the majority. The provision for

the support of a military force will always be a favorable topic for declamation. As often as the question

comes forward, the public attention will be roused and attracted to the subject, by the party in opposition; and

if the majority should be really disposed to exceed the proper limits, the community will be warned of the

danger, and will have an opportunity of taking measures to guard against it. Independent of parties in the

national legislature itself, as often as the period of discussion arrived, the State legislatures, who will always

be not only vigilant but suspicious and jealous guardians of the rights of the citizens against encroachments

from the federal government, will constantly have their attention awake to the conduct of the national rulers,

and will be ready enough, if any thing improper appears, to sound the alarm to the people, and not only to be

Schemes to subvert the liberties of a great community REQUIRE TIME to mature them for execution. An

army, so large as seriously to menace those liberties, could only be formed by progressive augmentations;

which would suppose, not merely a temporary combination between the legislature and executive, but a

continued conspiracy for a series of time. Is it probable that such a combination would exist at all? Is it

probable that it would be persevered in, and transmitted along through all the successive variations in a

representative body, which biennial elections would naturally produce in both houses? Is it presumable, that

every man, the instant he took his seat in the national Senate or House of Representatives, would commence a

traitor to his constituents and to his country? Can it be supposed that there would not be found one man,

discerning enough to detect so atrocious a conspiracy, or bold or honest enough to apprise his constituents of

their danger? If such presumptions can fairly be made, there ought at once to be an end of all delegated

authority. The people should resolve to recall all the powers they have heretofore parted with out of their own

hands, and to divide themselves into as many States as there are counties, in order that they may be able to

If such suppositions could even be reasonably made, still the concealment of the design, for any duration,

It would be announced, by the very circumstance of augmenting the army to so great an extent in time of

profound peace. What colorable reason could be assigned, in a country so situated, for such vast

augmentations of the military force? It is impossible that the people could be long deceived; and the

destruction of the project, and of the projectors, would quickly follow the discovery.

It has been said that the provision which limits the appropriation of money for the support of an army to the

period of two years would be unavailing, because the Executive, when once possessed of a force large

enough to awe the people into submission, would find resources in that very force sufficient to enable him to

dispense with supplies from the acts of the legislature. But the question again recurs, upon what pretense

could he be put in possession of a force of that magnitude in time of peace? If we suppose it to have been

created in consequence of some domestic insurrection or foreign war, then it becomes a case not within the

principles of the objection; for this is levelled against the power of keeping up troops in time of peace. Few

persons will be so visionary as seriously to contend that military forces ought not to be raised to quell a

rebellion or resist an invasion; and if the defense of the community under such circumstances should make it

necessary to have an army so numerous as to hazard its liberty, this is one of those calamaties for which there

is neither preventative nor cure. It cannot be provided against by any possible form of government; it might

even result from a simple league offensive and defensive, if it should ever be necessary for the confederates

But it is an evil infinitely less likely to attend us in a united than in a disunited state; nay, it may be safely

asserted that it is an evil altogether unlikely to attend us in the latter situation. It is not easy to conceive a

possibility that dangers so formidable can assail the whole Union, as to demand a force considerable enough

to place our liberties in the least jeopardy, especially if we take into our view the aid to be derived from the

militia, which ought always to be counted upon as a valuable and powerful auxiliary. But in a state of

disunion (as has been fully shown in another place), the contrary of this supposition would become not only

IT HAS been urged, in different shapes, that a Constitution of the kind proposed by the convention cannot

operate without the aid of a military force to execute its laws. This, however, like most other things that have

been alleged on that side, rests on mere general assertion, unsupported by any precise or intelligible

designation of the reasons upon which it is founded. As far as I have been able to divine the latent meaning of

the objectors, it seems to originate in a presupposition that the people will be disinclined to the exercise of

federal authority in any matter of an internal nature. Waiving any exception that might be taken to the

inaccuracy or inexplicitness of the distinction between internal and external, let us inquire what ground there

is to presuppose that disinclination in the people. Unless we presume at the same time that the powers of the

general government will be worse administered than those of the State government, there seems to be no

room for the presumption of illwill, disaffection, or opposition in the people. I believe it may be laid down

as a general rule that their confidence in and obedience to a government will commonly be proportioned to

the goodness or badness of its administration. It must be admitted that there are exceptions to this rule; but

these exceptions depend so entirely on accidental causes, that they cannot be considered as having any

relation to the intrinsic merits or demerits of a constitution. These can only be judged of by general principles

Various reasons have been suggested, in the course of these papers, to induce a probability that the general

government will be better administered than the particular governments; the principal of which reasons are

that the extension of the spheres of election will present a greater option, or latitude of choice, to the people;

that through the medium of the State legislatures which are select bodies of men, and which are to appoint the

members of the national Senate there is reason to expect that this branch will generally be composed with

peculiar care and judgment; that these circumstances promise greater knowledge and more extensive

information in the national councils, and that they will be less apt to be tainted by the spirit of faction, and

more out of the reach of those occasional illhumors, or temporary prejudices and propensities, which, in

smaller societies, frequently contaminate the public councils, beget injustice and oppression of a part of the

community, and engender schemes which, though they gratify a momentary inclination or desire, terminate in

Several additional reasons of considerable force, to fortify that probability, will occur when we come to

survey, with a more critical eye, the interior structure of the edifice which we are invited to erect. It will be

sufficient here to remark, that until satisfactory reasons can be assigned to justify an opinion, that the federal

government is likely to be administered in such a manner as to render it odious or contemptible to the people,

there can be no reasonable foundation for the supposition that the laws of the Union will meet with any

greater obstruction from them, or will stand in need of any other methods to enforce their execution, than the

The hope of impunity is a strong incitement to sedition; the dread of punishment, a proportionably strong

Will not the government of the Union, which, if possessed of a due degree of power, can call to its aid the

collective resources of the whole Confederacy, be more likely to repress the FORMER sentiment and to

inspire the LATTER, than that of a single State, which can only command the resources within itself? A

turbulent faction in a State may easily suppose itself able to contend with the friends to the government in

that State; but it can hardly be so infatuated as to imagine itself a match for the combined efforts of the

Union. If this reflection be just, there is less danger of resistance from irregular combinations of individuals

I will, in this place, hazard an observation, which will not be the less just because to some it may appear new;

which is, that the more the operations of the national authority are intermingled in the ordinary exercise of

government, the more the citizens are accustomed to meet with it in the common occurrences of their

political life, the more it is familiarized to their sight and to their feelings, the further it enters into those

objects which touch the most sensible chords and put in motion the most active springs of the human heart,

the greater will be the probability that it will conciliate the respect and attachment of the community. Man is

very much a creature of habit. A thing that rarely strikes his senses will generally have but little influence

upon his mind. A government continually at a distance and out of sight can hardly be expected to interest the

sensations of the people. The inference is, that the authority of the Union, and the affections of the citizens

towards it, will be strengthened, rather than weakened, by its extension to what are called matters of internal

concern; and will have less occasion to recur to force, in proportion to the familiarity and comprehensiveness

of its agency. The more it circulates through those channls and currents in which the passions of mankind

naturally flow, the less will it require the aid of the violent and perilous expedients of compulsion.

One thing, at all events, must be evident, that a government like the one proposed would bid much fairer to

avoid the necessity of using force, than that species of league contend for by most of its opponents; the

authority of which should only operate upon the States in their political or collective capacities. It has been

shown that in such a Confederacy there can be no sanction for the laws but force; that frequent delinquencies

in the members are the natural offspring of the very frame of the government; and that as often as these

The plan reported by the convention, by extending the authority of the federal head to the individual citizens

of the several States, will enable the government to employ the ordinary magistracy of each, in the execution

of its laws. It is easy to perceive that this will tend to destroy, in the common apprehension, all distinction

between the sources from which they might proceed; and will give the federal government the same

advantage for securing a due obedience to its authority which is enjoyed by the government of each State, in

addition to the influence on public opinion which will result from the important consideration of its having

It merits particular attention in this place, that the laws of the Confederacy, as to the ENUMERATED and

LEGITIMATE objects of its jurisdiction, will become the SUPREME LAW of the land; to the observance of

which all officers, legislative, executive, and judicial, in each State, will be bound by the sanctity of an oath.

Thus the legislatures, courts, and magistrates, of the respective members, will be incorporated into the

operations of the national government AS FAR AS ITS JUST AND CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY

EXTENDS; and will be rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws. [1%] Any man who will pursue, by

his own reflections, the consequences of this situation, will perceive that there is good ground to calculate

upon a regular and peaceable execution of the laws of the Union, if its powers are administered with a

common share of prudence. If we will arbitrarily suppose the contrary, we may deduce any inferences we

please from the supposition; for it is certainly possible, by an injudicious exercise of the authorities of the

best government that ever was, or ever can be instituted, to provoke and precipitate the people into the

wildest excesses. But though the adversaries of the proposed Constitution should presume that the national

rulers would be insensible to the motives of public good, or to the obligations of duty, I would still ask them

how the interests of ambition, or the views of encroachment, can be promoted by such a conduct? PUBLIUS.

FNA1@1 The sophistry which has been employed to show that this will tend to the destruction of the State

THAT there may happen cases in which the national government may be necessitated to resort to force,

cannot be denied. Our own experience has corroborated the lessons taught by the examples of other nations;

that emergencies of this sort will sometimes arise in all societies, however constituted; that seditions and

insurrections are, unhappily, maladies as inseparable from the body politic as tumors and eruptions from the

natural body; that the idea of governing at all times by the simple force of law (which we have been told is

the only admissible principle of republican government), has no place but in the reveries of those political

Should such emergencies at any time happen under the national government, there could be no remedy but

force. The means to be employed must be proportioned to the extent of the mischief. If it should be a slight

commotion in a small part of a State, the militia of the residue would be adequate to its suppression; and the

An insurrection, whatever may be its immediate cause, eventually endangers all government. Regard to the

public peace, if not to the rights of the Union, would engage the citizens to whom the contagion had not

communicated itself to oppose the insurgents; and if the general government should be found in practice

conducive to the prosperity and felicity of the people, it were irrational to believe that they would be

If, on the contrary, the insurrection should pervade a whole State, or a principal part of it, the employment of

a different kind of force might become unavoidable. It appears that Massachusetts found it necessary to raise

troops for repressing the disorders within that State; that Pennsylvania, from the mere apprehension of

commotions among a part of her citizens, has thought proper to have recourse to the same measure. Suppose

the State of New York had been inclined to reestablish her lost jurisdiction over the inhabitants of Vermont,

could she have hoped for success in such an enterprise from the efforts of the militia alone? Would she not

have been compelled to raise and to maintain a more regular force for the execution of her design? If it must

then be admitted that the necessity of recurring to a force different from the militia, in cases of this

extraordinary nature, is applicable to the State governments themselves, why should the possibility, that the

national government might be under a like necessity, in similar extremities, be made an objection to its

existence? Is it not surprising that men who declare an attachment to the Union in the abstract, should urge as

an objection to the proposed Constitution what applies with tenfold weight to the plan for which they

contend; and what, as far as it has any foundation in truth, is an inevitable consequence of civil society upon

an enlarged scale? Who would not prefer that possibility to the unceasing agitations and frequent revolutions

which are the continual scourges of petty republics? Let us pursue this examination in another light. Suppose,

in lieu of one general system, two, or three, or even four Confederacies were to be formed, would not the

same difficulty oppose itself to the operations of either of these Confederacies? Would not each of them be

exposed to the same casualties; and when these happened, be obliged to have recourse to the same expedients

for upholding its authority which are objected to in a government for all the States? Would the militia, in this

supposition, be more ready or more able to support the federal authority than in the case of a general union?

All candid and intelligent men must, upon due consideration, acknowledge that the principle of the objection

is equally applicable to either of the two cases; and that whether we have one government for all the States, or

different governments for different parcels of them, or even if there should be an entire separation of the

States, there might sometimes be a necessity to make use of a force constituted differently from the militia, to

preserve the peace of the community and to maintain the just authority of the laws against those violent

Independent of all other reasonings upon the subject, it is a full answer to those who require a more

peremptory provision against military establishments in time of peace, to say that the whole power of the

proposed government is to be in the hands of the representatives of the people. This is the essential, and, after

all, only efficacious security for the rights and privileges of the people, which is attainable in civil society. [1]

If the representatives of the people betray their constituents, there is then no resource left but in the exertion

of that original right of selfdefense which is paramount to all positive forms of government, and which

against the usurpations of the national rulers, may be exerted with infinitely better prospect of success than

against those of the rulers of an individual state. In a single state, if the persons intrusted with supreme power

become usurpers, the different parcels, subdivisions, or districts of which it consists, having no distinct

government in each, can take no regular measures for defense. The citizens must rush tumultuously to arms,

without concert, without system, without resource; except in their courage and despair. The usurpers, clothed

with the forms of legal authority, can too often crush the opposition in embryo.

The smaller the extent of the territory, the more difficult will it be for the people to form a regular or

systematic plan of opposition, and the more easy will it be to defeat their early efforts. Intelligence can be

more speedily obtained of their preparations and movements, and the military force in the possession of the

usurpers can be more rapidly directed against the part where the opposition has begun. In this situation there

must be a peculiar coincidence of circumstances to insure success to the popular resistance.

The obstacles to usurpation and the facilities of resistance increase with the increased extent of the state,

The natural strength of the people in a large community, in proportion to the artificial strength of the

government, is greater than in a small, and of course more competent to a struggle with the attempts of the

government to establish a tyranny. But in a confederacy the people, without exaggeration, may be said to be

entirely the masters of their own fate. Power being almost always the rival of power, the general government

will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state governments, and these will have the same

disposition towards the general government. The people, by throwing themselves into either scale, will

infallibly make it preponderate. If their rights are invaded by either, they can make use of the other as the

instrument of redress. How wise will it be in them by cherishing the union to preserve to themselves an

advantage which can never be too highly prized! It may safely be received as an axiom in our political

system, that the State governments will, in all possible contingencies, afford complete security against

invasions of the public liberty by the national authority. Projects of usurpation cannot be masked under

pretenses so likely to escape the penetration of select bodies of men, as of the people at large. The legislatures

will have better means of information. They can discover the danger at a distance; and possessing all the

organs of civil power, and the confidence of the people, they can at once adopt a regular plan of opposition,

in which they can combine all the resources of the community. They can readily communicate with each

other in the different States, and unite their common forces for the protection of their common liberty.

The great extent of the country is a further security. We have already experienced its utility against the

attacks of a foreign power. And it would have precisely the same effect against the enterprises of ambitious

rulers in the national councils. If the federal army should be able to quell the resistance of one State, the

distant States would have it in their power to make head with fresh forces. The advantages obtained in one

place must be abandoned to subdue the opposition in others; and the moment the part which had been

reduced to submission was left to itself, its efforts would be renewed, and its resistance revive.

We should recollect that the extent of the military force must, at all events, be regulated by the resources of

the country. For a long time to come, it will not be possible to maintain a large army; and as the means of

doing this increase, the population and natural strength of the community will proportionably increase. When

will the time arrive that the federal government can raise and maintain an army capable of erecting a

despotism over the great body of the people of an immense empire, who are in a situation, through the

medium of their State governments, to take measures for their own defense, with all the celerity, regularity,

and system of independent nations? The apprehension may be considered as a disease, for which there can be

THE power of regulating the militia, and of commanding its services in times of insurrection and invasion are

natural incidents to the duties of superintending the common defense, and of watching over the internal peace

It requires no skill in the science of war to discern that uniformity in the organization and discipline of the

militia would be attended with the most beneficial effects, whenever they were called into service for the

public defense. It would enable them to discharge the duties of the camp and of the field with mutual

intelligence and concert an advantage of peculiar moment in the operations of an army; and it would fit them

much sooner to acquire the degree of proficiency in military functions which would be essential to their

usefulness. This desirable uniformity can only be accomplished by confiding the regulation of the militia to

the direction of the national authority. It is, therefore, with the most evident propriety, that the plan of the

convention proposes to empower the Union ``to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia,

and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, RESERVING

CONGRESS.'' Of the different grounds which have been taken in opposition to the plan of the convention,

there is none that was so little to have been expected, or is so untenable in itself, as the one from which this

particular provision has been attacked. If a wellregulated militia be the most natural defense of a free

country, it ought certainly to be under the regulation and at the disposal of that body which is constituted the

guardian of the national security. If standing armies are dangerous to liberty, an efficacious power over the

militia, in the body to whose care the protection of the State is committed, ought, as far as possible, to take

away the inducement and the pretext to such unfriendly institutions. If the federal government can command

the aid of the militia in those emergencies which call for the military arm in support of the civil magistrate, it

can the better dispense with the employment of a different kind of force. If it cannot avail itself of the former,

it will be obliged to recur to the latter. To render an army unnecessary, will be a more certain method of

In order to cast an odium upon the power of calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, it has

been remarked that there is nowhere any provision in the proposed Constitution for calling out the POSSE

COMITATUS, to assist the magistrate in the execution of his duty, whence it has been inferred, that military

force was intended to be his only auxiliary. There is a striking incoherence in the objections which have

appeared, and sometimes even from the same quarter, not much calculated to inspire a very favorable opinion

The same persons who tell us in one breath, that the powers of the federal government will be despotic and

unlimited, inform us in the next, that it has not authority sufficient even to call out the POSSE COMITATUS.

The latter, fortunately, is as much short of the truth as the former exceeds it. It would be as absurd to doubt,

that a right to pass all laws NECESSARY AND PROPER to execute its declared powers, would include that

of requiring the assistance of the citizens to the officers who may be intrusted with the execution of those

laws, as it would be to believe, that a right to enact laws necessary and proper for the imposition and

collection of taxes would involve that of varying the rules of descent and of the alienation of landed property,

or of abolishing the trial by jury in cases relating to it. It being therefore evident that the supposition of a want

of power to require the aid of the POSSE COMITATUS is entirely destitute of color, it will follow, that the

conclusion which has been drawn from it, in its application to the authority of the federal government over

the militia, is as uncandid as it is illogical. What reason could there be to infer, that force was intended to be

the sole instrument of authority, merely because there is a power to make use of it when necessary? What

shall we think of the motives which could induce men of sense to reason in this manner? How shall we

prevent a conflict between charity and judgment? By a curious refinement upon the spirit of republican

jealousy, we are even taught to apprehend danger from the militia itself, in the hands of the federal

government. It is observed that select corps may be formed, composed of the young and ardent, who may be

rendered subservient to the views of arbitrary power. What plan for the regulation of the militia may be

pursued by the national government, is impossible to be foreseen. But so far from viewing the matter in the

same light with those who object to select corps as dangerous, were the Constitution ratified, and were I to

deliver my sentiments to a member of the federal legislature from this State on the subject of a militia

establishment, I should hold to him, in substance, the following discourse: ``The project of disciplining all the

militia of the United States is as futile as it would be injurious, if it were capable of being carried into

execution. A tolerable expertness in military movements is a business that requires time and practice. It is not

To oblige the great body of the yeomanry, and of the other classes of the citizens, to be under arms for the

purpose of going through military exercises and evolutions, as often as might be necessary to acquire the

degree of perfection which would entitle them to the character of a wellregulated militia, would be a real

grievance to the people, and a serious public inconvenience and loss. It would form an annual deduction from

the productive labor of the country, to an amount which, calculating upon the present numbers of the people,

would not fall far short of the whole expense of the civil establishments of all the States. To attempt a thing

which would abridge the mass of labor and industry to so considerable an extent, would be unwise: and the

experiment, if made, could not succeed, because it would not long be endured. Little more can reasonably be

aimed at, with respect to the people at large, than to have them properly armed and equipped; and in order to

see that this be not neglected, it will be necessary to assemble them once or twice in the course of a year.

``But though the scheme of disciplining the whole nation must be abandoned as mischievous or

impracticable; yet it is a matter of the utmost importance that a welldigested plan should, as soon as

The attention of the government ought particularly to be directed to the formation of a select corps of

moderate extent, upon such principles as will really fit them for service in case of need. By thus

circumscribing the plan, it will be possible to have an excellent body of welltrained militia, ready to take the

field whenever the defense of the State shall require it. This will not only lessen the call for military

establishments, but if circumstances should at any time oblige the government to form an army of any

magnitude that army can never be formidable to the liberties of the people while there is a large body of

citizens, little, if at all, inferior to them in discipline and the use of arms, who stand ready to defend their own

rights and those of their fellowcitizens. This appears to me the only substitute that can be devised for a

standing army, and the best possible security against it, if it should exist.'' Thus differently from the

adversaries of the proposed Constitution should I reason on the same subject, deducing arguments of safety

from the very sources which they represent as fraught with danger and perdition. But how the national

legislature may reason on the point, is a thing which neither they nor I can foresee.

There is something so farfetched and so extravagant in the idea of danger to liberty from the militia, that one

is at a loss whether to treat it with gravity or with raillery; whether to consider it as a mere trial of skill, like

the paradoxes of rhetoricians; as a disingenuous artifice to instil prejudices at any price; or as the serious

offspring of political fanaticism. Where in the name of commonsense, are our fears to end if we may not

trust our sons, our brothers, our neighbors, our fellowcitizens? What shadow of danger can there be from

men who are daily mingling with the rest of their countrymen and who participate with them in the same

feelings, sentiments, habits and interests? What reasonable cause of apprehension can be inferred from a

power in the Union to prescribe regulations for the militia, and to command its services when necessary,

while the particular States are to have the SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE APPOINTMENT OF THE OFFICERS?

If it were possible seriously to indulge a jealousy of the militia upon any conceivable establishment under the

federal government, the circumstance of the officers being in the appointment of the States ought at once to

extinguish it. There can be no doubt that this circumstance will always secure to them a preponderating

In reading many of the publications against the Constitution, a man is apt to imagine that he is perusing some

illwritten tale or romance, which instead of natural and agreeable images, exhibits to the mind nothing but

frightful and distorted shapes ``Gorgons, hydras, and chimeras dire''; discoloring and disfiguring whatever it

A sample of this is to be observed in the exaggerated and improbable suggestions which have taken place

respecting the power of calling for the services of the militia. That of New Hampshire is to be marched to

Georgia, of Georgia to New Hampshire, of New York to Kentucky, and of Kentucky to Lake Champlain.

Nay, the debts due to the French and Dutch are to be paid in militiamen instead of louis d'ors and ducats. At

one moment there is to be a large army to lay prostrate the liberties of the people; at another moment the

militia of Virginia are to be dragged from their homes five or six hundred miles, to tame the republican

contumacy of Massachusetts; and that of Massachusetts is to be transported an equal distance to subdue the

Do the persons who rave at this rate imagine that their art or their eloquence can impose any conceits or

absurdities upon the people of America for infallible truths? If there should be an army to be made use of as

the engine of despotism, what need of the militia? If there should be no army, whither would the militia,

irritated by being called upon to undertake a distant and hopeless expedition, for the purpose of riveting the

chains of slavery upon a part of their countrymen, direct their course, but to the seat of the tyrants, who had

meditated so foolish as well as so wicked a project, to crush them in their imagined intrenchments of power,

and to make them an example of the just vengeance of an abused and incensed people? Is this the way in

which usurpers stride to dominion over a numerous and enlightened nation? Do they begin by exciting the

detestation of the very instruments of their intended usurpations? Do they usually commence their career by

wanton and disgustful acts of power, calculated to answer no end, but to draw upon themselves universal

hatred and execration? Are suppositions of this sort the sober admonitions of discerning patriots to a

discerning people? Or are they the inflammatory ravings of incendiaries or distempered enthusiasts? If we

were even to suppose the national rulers actuated by the most ungovernable ambition, it is impossible to

believe that they would employ such preposterous means to accomplish their designs.

In times of insurrection, or invasion, it would be natural and proper that the militia of a neighboring State

should be marched into another, to resist a common enemy, or to guard the republic against the violence of

faction or sedition. This was frequently the case, in respect to the first object, in the course of the late war;

and this mutual succor is, indeed, a principal end of our political association. If the power of affording it be

placed under the direction of the Union, there will be no danger of a supine and listless inattention to the

dangers of a neighbor, till its near approach had superadded the incitements of selfpreservation to the too

IT HAS been already observed that the federal government ought to possess the power of providing for the

support of the national forces; in which proposition was intended to be included the expense of raising troops,

of building and equipping fleets, and all other expenses in any wise connected with military arrangements and

operations. But these are not the only objects to which the jurisdiction of the Union, in respect to revenue,

must necessarily be empowered to extend. It must embrace a provision for the support of the national civil

list; for the payment of the national debts contracted, or that may be contracted; and, in general, for all those

matters which will call for disbursements out of the national treasury. The conclusion is, that there must be

interwoven, in the frame of the government, a general power of taxation, in one shape or another.

Money is, with propriety, considered as the vital principle of the body politic; as that which sustains its life

and motion, and enables it to perform its most essential functions. A complete power, therefore, to procure a

regular and adequate supply of it, as far as the resources of the community will permit, may be regarded as an

indispensable ingredient in every constitution. From a deficiency in this particular, one of two evils must

ensue; either the people must be subjected to continual plunder, as a substitute for a more eligible mode of

supplying the public wants, or the government must sink into a fatal atrophy, and, in a short course of time,

In the Ottoman or Turkish empire, the sovereign, though in other respects absolute master of the lives and

fortunes of his subjects, has no right to impose a new tax. The consequence is that he permits the bashaws or

governors of provinces to pillage the people without mercy; and, in turn, squeezes out of them the sums of

which he stands in need, to satisfy his own exigencies and those of the state. In America, from a like cause,

the government of the Union has gradually dwindled into a state of decay, approaching nearly to annihilation.

Who can doubt, that the happiness of the people in both countries would be promoted by competent

authorities in the proper hands, to provide the revenues which the necessities of the public might require? The

present Confederation, feeble as it is intended to repose in the United States, an unlimited power of providing

for the pecuniary wants of the Union. But proceeding upon an erroneous principle, it has been done in such a

manner as entirely to have frustrated the intention. Congress, by the articles which compose that compact (as

has already been stated), are authorized to ascertain and call for any sums of money necessary, in their

judgment, to the service of the United States; and their requisitions, if conformable to the rule of

apportionment, are in every constitutional sense obligatory upon the States. These have no right to question

the propriety of the demand; no discretion beyond that of devising the ways and means of furnishing the sums

demanded. But though this be strictly and truly the case; though the assumption of such a right would be an

infringement of the articles of Union; though it may seldom or never have been avowedly claimed, yet in

practice it has been constantly exercised, and would continue to be so, as long as the revenues of the

Confederacy should remain dependent on the intermediate agency of its members. What the consequences of

this system have been, is within the knowledge of every man the least conversant in our public affairs, and

has been amply unfolded in different parts of these inquiries. It is this which has chiefly contributed to reduce

us to a situation, which affords ample cause both of mortification to ourselves, and of triumph to our enemies.

What remedy can there be for this situation, but in a change of the system which has produced it in a change

of the fallacious and delusive system of quotas and requisitions? What substitute can there be imagined for

this ignis fatuus in finance, but that of permitting the national government to raise its own revenues by the

ordinary methods of taxation authorized in every wellordered constitution of civil government? Ingenious

men may declaim with plausibility on any subject; but no human ingenuity can point out any other expedient

to rescue us from the inconveniences and embarrassments naturally resulting from defective supplies of the

The more intelligent adversaries of the new Constitution admit the force of this reasoning; but they qualify

their admission by a distinction between what they call INTERNAL and EXTERNAL taxation.

The former they would reserve to the State governments; the latter, which they explain into commercial

imposts, or rather duties on imported articles, they declare themselves willing to concede to the federal head.

This distinction, however, would violate the maxim of good sense and sound policy, which dictates that every

POWER ought to be in proportion to its OBJECT; and would still leave the general government in a kind of

tutelage to the State governments, inconsistent with every idea of vigor or efficiency.

Who can pretend that commercial imposts are, or would be, alone equal to the present and future exigencies

of the Union? Taking into the account the existing debt, foreign and domestic, upon any plan of

extinguishment which a man moderately impressed with the importance of public justice and public credit

could approve, in addition to the establishments which all parties will acknowledge to be necessary, we could

not reasonably flatter ourselves, that this resource alone, upon the most improved scale, would even suffice

for its present necessities. Its future necessities admit not of calculation or limitation; and upon the principle,

more than once adverted to, the power of making provision for them as they arise ought to be equally

unconfined. I believe it may be regarded as a position warranted by the history of mankind, that, IN THE

To say that deficiencies may be provided for by requisitions upon the States, is on the one hand to

acknowledge that this system cannot be depended upon, and on the other hand to depend upon it for every

thing beyond a certain limit. Those who have carefully attended to its vices and deformities as they have been

exhibited by experience or delineated in the course of these papers, must feel invincible repugnancy to

trusting the national interests in any degree to its operation. Its inevitable tendency, whenever it is brought

into activity, must be to enfeeble the Union, and sow the seeds of discord and contention between the federal

head and its members, and between the members themselves. Can it be expected that the deficiencies would

be better supplied in this mode than the total wants of the Union have heretofore been supplied in the same

mode? It ought to be recollected that if less will be required from the States, they will have proportionably

less means to answer the demand. If the opinions of those who contend for the distinction which has been

mentioned were to be received as evidence of truth, one would be led to conclude that there was some known

point in the economy of national affairs at which it would be safe to stop and to say: Thus far the ends of

public happiness will be promoted by supplying the wants of government, and all beyond this is unworthy of

our care or anxiety. How is it possible that a government half supplied and always necessitous, can fulfill the

purposes of its institution, can provide for the security, advance the prosperity, or support the reputation of

the commonwealth? How can it ever possess either energy or stability, dignity or credit, confidence at home

or respectability abroad? How can its administration be any thing else than a succession of expedients

temporizing, impotent, disgraceful? How will it be able to avoid a frequent sacrifice of its engagements to

immediate necessity? How can it undertake or execute any liberal or enlarged plans of public good? Let us

attend to what would be the effects of this situation in the very first war in which we should happen to be

engaged. We will presume, for argument's sake, that the revenue arising from the impost duties answers the

purposes of a provision for the public debt and of a peace establishment for the Union. Thus circumstanced, a

war breaks out. What would be the probable conduct of the government in such an emergency? Taught by

experience that proper dependence could not be placed on the success of requisitions, unable by its own

authority to lay hold of fresh resources, and urged by considerations of national danger, would it not be

driven to the expedient of diverting the funds already appropriated from their proper objects to the defense of

the State? It is not easy to see how a step of this kind could be avoided; and if it should be taken, it is evident

that it would prove the destruction of public credit at the very moment that it was becoming essential to the

public safety. To imagine that at such a crisis credit might be dispensed with, would be the extreme of

In the modern system of war, nations the most wealthy are obliged to have recourse to large loans. A country

so little opulent as ours must feel this necessity in a much stronger degree. But who would lend to a

government that prefaced its overtures for borrowing by an act which demonstrated that no reliance could be

placed on the steadiness of its measures for paying? The loans it might be able to procure would be as limited

in their extent as burdensome in their conditions. They would be made upon the same principles that usurers

commonly lend to bankrupt and fraudulent debtors, with a sparing hand and at enormous premiums.

It may perhaps be imagined that, from the scantiness of the resources of the country, the necessity of

diverting the established funds in the case supposed would exist, though the national government should

possess an unrestrained power of taxation. But two considerations will serve to quiet all apprehension on this

head: one is, that we are sure the resources of the community, in their full extent, will be brought into activity

for the benefit of the Union; the other is, that whatever deficiences there may be, can without difficulty be

The power of creating new funds upon new objects of taxation, by its own authority, would enable the

national government to borrow as far as its necessities might require. Foreigners, as well as the citizens of

America, could then reasonably repose confidence in its engagements; but to depend upon a government that

must itself depend upon thirteen other governments for the means of fulfilling its contracts, when once its

situation is clearly understood, would require a degree of credulity not often to be met with in the pecuniary

transactions of mankind, and little reconcilable with the usual sharpsightedness of avarice.

Reflections of this kind may have trifling weight with men who hope to see realized in America the halcyon

scenes of the poetic or fabulous age; but to those who believe we are likely to experience a common portion

of the vicissitudes and calamities which have fallen to the lot of other nations, they must appear entitled to

serious attention. Such men must behold the actual situation of their country with painful solicitude, and

deprecate the evils which ambition or revenge might, with too much facility, inflict upon it.

IN DISQUISITIONS of every kind, there are certain primary truths, or first principles, upon which all

subsequent reasonings must depend. These contain an internal evidence which, antecedent to all reflection or

Where it produces not this effect, it must proceed either from some defect or disorder in the organs of

perception, or from the influence of some strong interest, or passion, or prejudice. Of this nature are the

maxims in geometry, that ``the whole is greater than its part; things equal to the same are equal to one

another; two straight lines cannot enclose a space; and all right angles are equal to each other.'' Of the same

nature are these other maxims in ethics and politics, that there cannot be an effect without a cause; that the

means ought to be proportioned to the end; that every power ought to be commensurate with its object; that

there ought to be no limitation of a power destined to effect a purpose which is itself incapable of limitation.

And there are other truths in the two latter sciences which, if they cannot pretend to rank in the class of

axioms, are yet such direct inferences from them, and so obvious in themselves, and so agreeable to the

natural and unsophisticated dictates of commonsense, that they challenge the assent of a sound and unbiased

The objects of geometrical inquiry are so entirely abstracted from those pursuits which stir up and put in

motion the unruly passions of the human heart, that mankind, without difficulty, adopt not only the more

simple theorems of the science, but even those abstruse paradoxes which, however they may appear

susceptible of demonstration, are at variance with the natural conceptions which the mind, without the aid of

philosophy, would be led to entertain upon the subject. The INFINITE DIVISIBILITY of matter, or, in other

words, the INFINITE divisibility of a FINITE thing, extending even to the minutest atom, is a point agreed

among geometricians, though not less incomprehensible to commonsense than any of those mysteries in

religion, against which the batteries of infidelity have been so industriously leveled.

But in the sciences of morals and politics, men are found far less tractable. To a certain degree, it is right and

useful that this should be the case. Caution and investigation are a necessary armor against error and

imposition. But this untractableness may be carried too far, and may degenerate into obstinacy, perverseness,

or disingenuity. Though it cannot be pretended that the principles of moral and political knowledge have, in

general, the same degree of certainty with those of the mathematics, yet they have much better claims in this

respect than, to judge from the conduct of men in particular situations, we should be disposed to allow them.

The obscurity is much oftener in the passions and prejudices of the reasoner than in the subject. Men, upon

too many occasions, do not give their own understandings fair play; but, yielding to some untoward bias, they

How else could it happen (if we admit the objectors to be sincere in their opposition), that positions so clear

as those which manifest the necessity of a general power of taxation in the government of the Union, should

have to encounter any adversaries among men of discernment? Though these positions have been elsewhere

fully stated, they will perhaps not be improperly recapitulated in this place, as introductory to an examination

of what may have been offered by way of objection to them. They are in substance as follows: A government

ought to contain in itself every power requisite to the full accomplishment of the objects committed to its

care, and to the complete execution of the trusts for which it is responsible, free from every other control but

As the duties of superintending the national defense and of securing the public peace against foreign or

domestic violence involve a provision for casualties and dangers to which no possible limits can be assigned,

the power of making that provision ought to know no other bounds than the exigencies of the nation and the

As revenue is the essential engine by which the means of answering the national exigencies must be

procured, the power of procuring that article in its full extent must necessarily be comprehended in that of

As theory and practice conspire to prove that the power of procuring revenue is unavailing when exercised

over the States in their collective capacities, the federal government must of necessity be invested with an

Did not experience evince the contrary, it would be natural to conclude that the propriety of a general power

of taxation in the national government might safely be permitted to rest on the evidence of these propositions,

unassisted by any additional arguments or illustrations. But we find, in fact, that the antagonists of the

proposed Constitution, so far from acquiescing in their justness or truth, seem to make their principal and

most zealous effort against this part of the plan. It may therefore be satisfactory to analyze the arguments with

Those of them which have been most labored with that view, seem in substance to amount to this: ``It is not

true, because the exigencies of the Union may not be susceptible of limitation, that its power of laying taxes

ought to be unconfined. Revenue is as requisite to the purposes of the local administrations as to those of the

Union; and the former are at least of equal importance with the latter to the happiness of the people. It is,

therefore, as necessary that the State governments should be able to command the means of supplying their

wants, as that the national government should possess the like faculty in respect to the wants of the Union.

But an indefinite power of taxation in the LATTER might, and probably would in time, deprive the

FORMER of the means of providing for their own necessities; and would subject them entirely to the mercy

of the national legislature. As the laws of the Union are to become the supreme law of the land, as it is to

have power to pass all laws that may be NECESSARY for carrying into execution the authorities with which

it is proposed to vest it, the national government might at any time abolish the taxes imposed for State objects

upon the pretense of an interference with its own. It might allege a necessity of doing this in order to give

efficacy to the national revenues. And thus all the resources of taxation might by degrees become the subjects

of federal monopoly, to the entire exclusion and destruction of the State governments.'' This mode of

reasoning appears sometimes to turn upon the supposition of usurpation in the national government; at other

times it seems to be designed only as a deduction from the constitutional operation of its intended powers. It

is only in the latter light that it can be admitted to have any pretensions to fairness. The moment we launch

into conjectures about the usurpations of the federal government, we get into an unfathomable abyss, and

Imagination may range at pleasure till it gets bewildered amidst the labyrinths of an enchanted castle, and

knows not on which side to turn to extricate itself from the perplexities into which it has so rashly

adventured. Whatever may be the limits or modifications of the powers of the Union, it is easy to imagine an

endless train of possible dangers; and by indulging an excess of jealousy and timidity, we may bring

ourselves to a state of absolute scepticism and irresolution. I repeat here what I have observed in substance in

another place, that all observations founded upon the danger of usurpation ought to be referred to the

composition and structure of the government, not to the nature or extent of its powers. The State

governments, by their original constitutions, are invested with complete sovereignty. In what does our

security consist against usurpation from that quarter? Doubtless in the manner of their formation, and in a due

dependence of those who are to administer them upon the people. If the proposed construction of the federal

government be found, upon an impartial examination of it, to be such as to afford, to a proper extent, the

same species of security, all apprehensions on the score of usurpation ought to be discarded.

It should not be forgotten that a disposition in the State governments to encroach upon the rights of the Union

is quite as probable as a disposition in the Union to encroach upon the rights of the State governments. What

side would be likely to prevail in such a conflict, must depend on the means which the contending parties

could employ toward insuring success. As in republics strength is always on the side of the people, and as

there are weighty reasons to induce a belief that the State governments will commonly possess most influence

over them, the natural conclusion is that such contests will be most apt to end to the disadvantage of the

Union; and that there is greater probability of encroachments by the members upon the federal head, than by

the federal head upon the members. But it is evident that all conjectures of this kind must be extremely vague

and fallible: and that it is by far the safest course to lay them altogether aside, and to confine our attention

wholly to the nature and extent of the powers as they are delineated in the Constitution. Every thing beyond

this must be left to the prudence and firmness of the people; who, as they will hold the scales in their own

hands, it is to be hoped, will always take care to preserve the constitutional equilibrium between the general

and the State governments. Upon this ground, which is evidently the true one, it will not be difficult to

obviate the objections which have been made to an indefinite power of taxation in the United States.

ALTHOUGH I am of opinion that there would be no real danger of the consequences which seem to be

apprehended to the State governments from a power in the Union to control them in the levies of money,

because I am persuaded that the sense of the people, the extreme hazard of provoking the resentments of the

State governments, and a conviction of the utility and necessity of local administrations for local purposes,

would be a complete barrier against the oppressive use of such a power; yet I am willing here to allow, in its

full extent, the justness of the reasoning which requires that the individual States should possess an

independent and uncontrollable authority to raise their own revenues for the supply of their own wants. And

making this concession, I affirm that (with the sole exception of duties on imports and exports) they would,

under the plan of the convention, retain that authority in the most absolute and unqualified sense; and that an

attempt on the part of the national government to abridge them in the exercise of it, would be a violent

An entire consolidation of the States into one complete national sovereignty would imply an entire

subordination of the parts; and whatever powers might remain in them, would be altogether dependent on the

general will. But as the plan of the convention aims only at a partial union or consolidation, the State

governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before had, and which were not, by

that act, EXCLUSIVELY delegated to the United States. This exclusive delegation, or rather this alienation,

of State sovereignty, would only exist in three cases: where the Constitution in express terms granted an

exclusive authority to the Union; where it granted in one instance an authority to the Union, and in another

prohibited the States from exercising the like authority; and where it granted an authority to the Union, to

which a similar authority in the States would be absolutely and totally CONTRADICTORY and

REPUGNANT. I use these terms to distinguish this last case from another which might appear to resemble it,

but which would, in fact, be essentially different; I mean where the exercise of a concurrent jurisdiction might

be productive of occasional interferences in the POLICY of any branch of administration, but would not

imply any direct contradiction or repugnancy in point of constitutional authority. These three cases of

exclusive jurisdiction in the federal government may be exemplified by the following instances: The last

clause but one in the eighth section of the first article provides expressly that Congress shall exercise

``EXCLUSIVE LEGISLATION'' over the district to be appropriated as the seat of government. This answers

to the first case. The first clause of the same section empowers Congress ``TO LAY AND COLLECT

TAXES, DUTIES, IMPOSTS AND EXCISES''; and the second clause of the tenth section of the same article

declares that, ``NO STATE SHALL, without the consent of Congress, LAY ANY IMPOSTS OR DUTIES

ON IMPORTS OR EXPORTS, except for the purpose of executing its inspection laws.'' Hence would result

an exclusive power in the Union to lay duties on imports and exports, with the particular exception

mentioned; but this power is abridged by another clause, which declares that no tax or duty shall be laid on

articles exported from any State; in consequence of which qualification, it now only extends to the DUTIES

ON IMPORTS. This answers to the second case. The third will be found in that clause which declares that

Congress shall have power ``to establish an UNIFORM RULE of naturalization throughout the United

States.'' This must necessarily be exclusive; because if each State had power to prescribe a DISTINCT RULE,

A case which may perhaps be thought to resemble the latter, but which is in fact widely different, affects the

question immediately under consideration. I mean the power of imposing taxes on all articles other than

exports and imports. This, I contend, is manifestly a concurrent and coequal authority in the United States

and in the individual States. There is plainly no expression in the granting clause which makes that power

There is no independent clause or sentence which prohibits the States from exercising it. So far is this from

being the case, that a plain and conclusive argument to the contrary is to be deduced from the restraint laid

upon the States in relation to duties on imports and exports. This restriction implies an admission that, if it

were not inserted, the States would possess the power it excludes; and it implies a further admission, that as

to all other taxes, the authority of the States remains undiminished. In any other view it would be both

unnecessary and dangerous; it would be unnecessary, because if the grant to the Union of the power of laying

such duties implied the exclusion of the States, or even their subordination in this particular, there could be

no need of such a restriction; it would be dangerous, because the introduction of it leads directly to the

conclusion which has been mentioned, and which, if the reasoning of the objectors be just, could not have

been intended; I mean that the States, in all cases to which the restriction did not apply, would have a

concurrent power of taxation with the Union. The restriction in question amounts to what lawyers call a

NEGATIVE PREGNANT that is, a NEGATION of one thing, and an AFFIRMANCE of another; a negation

of the authority of the States to impose taxes on imports and exports, and an affirmance of their authority to

impose them on all other articles. It would be mere sophistry to argue that it was meant to exclude them

ABSOLUTELY from the imposition of taxes of the former kind, and to leave them at liberty to lay others

SUBJECT TO THE CONTROL of the national legislature. The restraining or prohibitory clause only says,

that they shall not, WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF CONGRESS, lay such duties; and if we are to

understand this in the sense last mentioned, the Constitution would then be made to introduce a formal

provision for the sake of a very absurd conclusion; which is, that the States, WITH THE CONSENT of the

national legislature, might tax imports and exports; and that they might tax every other article, UNLESS

CONTROLLED by the same body. If this was the intention, why not leave it, in the first instance, to what is

alleged to be the natural operation of the original clause, conferring a general power of taxation upon the

Union? It is evident that this could not have been the intention, and that it will not bear a construction of the

As to a supposition of repugnancy between the power of taxation in the States and in the Union, it cannot be

supported in that sense which would be requisite to work an exclusion of the States. It is, indeed, possible that

a tax might be laid on a particular article by a State which might render it INEXPEDIENT that thus a further

tax should be laid on the same article by the Union; but it would not imply a constitutional inability to impose

a further tax. The quantity of the imposition, the expediency or inexpediency of an increase on either side,

would be mutually questions of prudence; but there would be involved no direct contradiction of power. The

particular policy of the national and of the State systems of finance might now and then not exactly coincide,

and might require reciprocal forbearances. It is not, however a mere possibility of inconvenience in the

exercise of powers, but an immediate constitutional repugnancy that can by implication alienate and

The necessity of a concurrent jurisdiction in certain cases results from the division of the sovereign power;

and the rule that all authorities, of which the States are not explicitly divested in favor of the Union, remain

with them in full vigor, is not a theoretical consequence of that division, but is clearly admitted by the whole

tenor of the instrument which contains the articles of the proposed Constitution. We there find that,

notwithstanding the affirmative grants of general authorities, there has been the most pointed care in those

cases where it was deemed improper that the like authorities should reside in the States, to insert negative

clauses prohibiting the exercise of them by the States. The tenth section of the first article consists altogether

This circumstance is a clear indication of the sense of the convention, and furnishes a rule of interpretation

out of the body of the act, which justifies the position I have advanced and refutes every hypothesis to the

THE residue of the argument against the provisions of the Constitution in respect to taxation is ingrafted

upon the following clause. The last clause of the eighth section of the first article of the plan under

consideration authorizes the national legislature ``to make all laws which shall be NECESSARY and

PROPER for carrying into execution THE POWERS by that Constitution vested in the government of the

United States, or in any department or officer thereof''; and the second clause of the sixth article declares,

``that the Constitution and the laws of the United States made IN PURSUANCE THEREOF, and the treaties

made by their authority shall be the SUPREME LAW of the land, any thing in the constitution or laws of any

State to the contrary notwithstanding.'' These two clauses have been the source of much virulent invective

They have been held up to the people in all the exaggerated colors of misrepresentation as the pernicious

engines by which their local governments were to be destroyed and their liberties exterminated; as the

hideous monster whose devouring jaws would spare neither sex nor age, nor high nor low, nor sacred nor

profane; and yet, strange as it may appear, after all this clamor, to those who may not have happened to

contemplate them in the same light, it may be affirmed with perfect confidence that the constitutional

operation of the intended government would be precisely the same, if these clauses were entirely obliterated,

They are only declaratory of a truth which would have resulted by necessary and unavoidable implication

from the very act of constituting a federal government, and vesting it with certain specified powers. This is so

clear a proposition, that moderation itself can scarcely listen to the railings which have been so copiously

vented against this part of the plan, without emotions that disturb its equanimity.

What is a power, but the ability or faculty of doing a thing? What is the ability to do a thing, but the power of

employing the MEANS necessary to its execution? What is a LEGISLATIVE power, but a power of making

LAWS? What are the MEANS to execute a LEGISLATIVE power but LAWS? What is the power of laying

and collecting taxes, but a LEGISLATIVE POWER, or a power of MAKING LAWS, to lay and collect

taxes? What are the propermeans of executing such a power, but NECESSARY and PROPER laws? This

simple train of inquiry furnishes us at once with a test by which to judge of the true nature of the clause

complained of. It conducts us to this palpable truth, that a power to lay and collect taxes must be a power to

pass all laws NECESSARY and PROPER for the execution of that power; and what does the unfortunate and

culumniated provision in question do more than declare the same truth, to wit, that the national legislature, to

whom the power of laying and collecting taxes had been previously given, might, in the execution of that

power, pass all laws NECESSARY and PROPER to carry it into effect? I have applied these observations

thus particularly to the power of taxation, because it is the immediate subject under consideration, and

because it is the most important of the authorities proposed to be conferred upon the Union. But the same

process will lead to the same result, in relation to all other powers declared in the Constitution. And it is

EXPRESSLY to execute these powers that the sweeping clause, as it has been affectedly called, authorizes

the national legislature to pass all NECESSARY and PROPER laws. If there is any thing exceptionable, it

must be sought for in the specific powers upon which this general declaration is predicated. The declaration

itself, though it may be chargeable with tautology or redundancy, is at least perfectly harmless.

But SUSPICION may ask, Why then was it introduced? The answer is, that it could only have been done for

greater caution, and to guard against all cavilling refinements in those who might hereafter feel a disposition

to curtail and evade the legitimatb authorities of the Union. The Convention probably foresaw, what it has

been a principal aim of these papers to inculcate, that the danger which most threatens our political welfare is

that the State governments will finally sap the foundations of the Union; and might therefore think it

necessary, in so cardinal a point, to leave nothing to construction. Whatever may have been the inducement to

it, the wisdom of the precaution is evident from the cry which has been raised against it; as that very cry

betrays a disposition to question the great and essential truth which it is manifestly the object of that

But it may be again asked, Who is to judge of the NECESSITY and PROPRIETY of the laws to be passed for

executing the powers of the Union? I answer, first, that this question arises as well and as fully upon the

simple grant of those powers as upon the declaratory clause; and I answer, in the second place, that the

national government, like every other, must judge, in the first instance, of the proper exercise of its powers,

If the federal government should overpass the just bounds of its authority and make a tyrannical use of its

powers, the people, whose creature it is, must appeal to the standard they have formed, and take such

measures to redress the injury done to the Constitution as the exigency may suggest and prudence justify. The

propriety of a law, in a constitutional light, must always be determined by the nature of the powers upon

which it is founded. Suppose, by some forced constructions of its authority (which, indeed, cannot easily be

imagined), the Federal legislature should attempt to vary the law of descent in any State, would it not be

evident that, in making such an attempt, it had exceeded its jurisdiction, and infringed upon that of the State?

Suppose, again, that upon the pretense of an interference with its revenues, it should undertake to abrogate a

landtax imposed by the authority of a State; would it not be equally evident that this was an invasion of that

concurrent jurisdiction in respect to this species of tax, which its Constitution plainly supposes to exist in the

State governments? If there ever should be a doubt on this head, the credit of it will be entirely due to those

reasoners who, in the imprudent zeal of their animosity to the plan of the convention, have labored to envelop

But it is said that the laws of the Union are to be the SUPREME LAW of the land. But what inference can be

drawn from this, or what would they amount to, if they were not to be supreme? It is evident they would

amount to nothing. A LAW, by the very meaning of the term, includes supremacy. It is a rule which those to

whom it is prescribed are bound to observe. This results from every political association. If individuals enter

into a state of society, the laws of that society must be the supreme regulator of their conduct. If a number of

political societies enter into a larger political society, the laws which the latter may enact, pursuant to the

powers intrusted to it by its constitution, must necessarily be supreme over those societies, and the

It would otherwise be a mere treaty, dependent on the good faith of the parties, and not a goverment, which is

only another word for POLITICAL POWER AND SUPREMACY. But it will not follow from this doctrine

that acts of the large society which are NOT PURSUANT to its constitutional powers, but which are

invasions of the residuary authorities of the smaller societies, will become the supreme law of the land. These

will be merely acts of usurpation, and will deserve to be treated as such. Hence we perceive that the clause

which declares the supremacy of the laws of the Union, like the one we have just before considered, only

declares a truth, which flows immediately and necessarily from the institution of a federal government. It will

not, I presume, have escaped observation, that it EXPRESSLY confines this supremacy to laws made

PURSUANT TO THE CONSTITUTION; which I mention merely as an instance of caution in the

convention; since that limitation would have been to be understood, though it had not been expressed.

Though a law, therefore, laying a tax for the use of the United States would be supreme in its nature, and

could not legally be opposed or controlled, yet a law for abrogating or preventing the collection of a tax laid

by the authority of the State, (unless upon imports and exports), would not be the supreme law of the land,

but a usurpation of power not granted by the Constitution. As far as an improper accumulation of taxes on the

same object might tend to render the collection difficult or precarious, this would be a mutual inconvenience,

not arising from a superiority or defect of power on either side, but from an injudicious exercise of power by

one or the other, in a manner equally disadvantageous to both. It is to be hoped and presumed, however, that

mutual interest would dictate a concert in this respect which would avoid any material inconvenience. The

inference from the whole is, that the individual States would, under the proposed Constitution, retain an

independent and uncontrollable authority to raise revenue to any extent of which they may stand in need, by

every kind of taxation, except duties on imports and exports. It will be shown in the next paper that this

CONCURRENT JURISDICTION in the article of taxation was the only admissible substitute for an entire

subordination, in respect to this branch of power, of the State authority to that of the Union.

I FLATTER myself it has been clearly shown in my last number that the particular States, under the proposed

Constitution, would have COEQUAL authority with the Union in the article of revenue, except as to duties

on imports. As this leaves open to the States far the greatest part of the resources of the community, there can

be no color for the assertion that they would not possess means as abundant as could be desired for the supply

of their own wants, independent of all external control. That the field is sufficiently wide will more fully

appear when we come to advert to the inconsiderable share of the public expenses for which it will fall to the

To argue upon abstract principles that this coordinate authority cannot exist, is to set up supposition and

theory against fact and reality. However proper such reasonings might be to show that a thing OUGHT NOT

TO EXIST, they are wholly to be rejected when they are made use of to prove that it does not exist contrary

to the evidence of the fact itself. It is well known that in the Roman republic the legislative authority, in the

last resort, resided for ages in two different political bodies not as branches of the same legislature, but as

distinct and independent legislatures, in each of which an opposite interest prevailed: in one the patrician; in

the other, the plebian. Many arguments might have been adduced to prove the unfitness of two such

seemingly contradictory authorities, each having power to ANNUL or REPEAL the acts of the other. But a

man would have been regarded as frantic who should have attempted at Rome to disprove their existence. It

will be readily understood that I allude to the COMITIA CENTURIATA and the COMITIA TRIBUTA.

The former, in which the people voted by centuries, was so arranged as to give a superiority to the patrician

interest; in the latter, in which numbers prevailed, the plebian interest had an entire predominancy. And yet

these two legislatures coexisted for ages, and the Roman republic attained to the utmost height of human

In the case particularly under consideration, there is no such contradiction as appears in the example cited;

there is no power on either side to annul the acts of the other. And in practice there is little reason to

apprehend any inconvenience; because, in a short course of time, the wants of the States will naturally reduce

themselves within A VERY NARROW COMPASS; and in the interim, the United States will, in all

probability, find it convenient to abstain wholly from those objects to which the particular States would be

To form a more precise judgment of the true merits of this question, it will be well to advert to the proportion

between the objects that will require a federal provision in respect to revenue, and those which will require a

State provision. We shall discover that the former are altogether unlimited, and that the latter are

circumscribed within very moderate bounds. In pursuing this inquiry, we must bear in mind that we are not to

Constitutions of civil government are not to be framed upon a calculation of existing exigencies, but upon a

combination of these with the probable exigencies of ages, according to the natural and tried course of human

affairs. Nothing, therefore, can be more fallacious than to infer the extent of any power, proper to be lodged

in the national government, from an estimate of its immediate necessities. There ought to be a CAPACITY to

provide for future contingencies as they may happen; and as these are illimitable in their nature, it is

impossible safely to limit that capacity. It is true, perhaps, that a computation might be made with sufficient

accuracy to answer the purpose of the quantity of revenue requisite to discharge the subsisting engagements

of the Union, and to maintain those establishments which, for some time to come, would suffice in time of

peace. But would it be wise, or would it not rather be the extreme of folly, to stop at this point, and to leave

the government intrusted with the care of the national defense in a state of absolute incapacity to provide for

the protection of the community against future invasions of the public peace, by foreign war or domestic

convulsions? If, on the contrary, we ought to exceed this point, where can we stop, short of an indefinite

power of providing for emergencies as they may arise? Though it is easy to assert, in general terms, the

possibility of forming a rational judgment of a due provision against probable dangers, yet we may safely

challenge those who make the assertion to bring forward their data, and may affirm that they would be found

as vague and uncertain as any that could be produced to establish the probable duration of the world.

Observations confined to the mere prospects of internal attacks can deserve no weight; though even these will

admit of no satisfactory calculation: but if we mean to be a commercial people, it must form a part of our

policy to be able one day to defend that commerce. The support of a navy and of naval wars would involve

Admitting that we ought to try the novel and absurd experiment in politics of tying up the hands of

government from offensive war founded upon reasons of state, yet certainly we ought not to disable it from

guarding the community against the ambition or enmity of other nations. A cloud has been for some time

hanging over the European world. If it should break forth into a storm, who can insure us that in its progress a

part of its fury would not be spent upon us? No reasonable man would hastily pronounce that we are entirely

out of its reach. Or if the combustible materials that now seem to be collecting should be dissipated without

coming to maturity, or if a flame should be kindled without extending to us, what security can we have that

our tranquillity will long remain undisturbed from some other cause or from some other quarter? Let us

recollect that peace or war will not always be left to our option; that however moderate or unambitious we

may be, we cannot count upon the moderation, or hope to extinguish the ambition of others. Who could have

imagined at the conclusion of the last war that France and Britain, wearied and exhausted as they both were,

would so soon have looked with so hostile an aspect upon each other? To judge from the history of mankind,

we shall be compelled to conclude that the fiery and destructive passions of war reign in the human breast

with much more powerful sway than the mild and beneficent sentiments of peace; and that to model our

political systems upon speculations of lasting tranquillity, is to calculate on the weaker springs of the human

What are the chief sources of expense in every government? What has occasioned that enormous

accumulation of debts with which several of the European nations are oppressed? The answers plainly is,

wars and rebellions; the support of those institutions which are necessary to guard the body politic against

these two most mortal diseases of society. The expenses arising from those institutions which are relative to

the mere domestic police of a state, to the support of its legislative, executive, and judicial departments, with

their different appendages, and to the encouragement of agriculture and manufactures (which will

comprehend almost all the objects of state expenditure), are insignificant in comparison with those which

In the kingdom of Great Britain, where all the ostentatious apparatus of monarchy is to be provided for, not

above a fifteenth part of the annual income of the nation is appropriated to the class of expenses last

mentioned; the other fourteen fifteenths are absorbed in the payment of the interest of debts contracted for

carrying on the wars in which that country has been engaged, and in the maintenance of fleets and armies. If,

on the one hand, it should be observed that the expenses incurred in the prosecution of the ambitious

enterprises and vainglorious pursuits of a monarchy are not a proper standard by which to judge of those

which might be necessary in a republic, it ought, on the other hand, to be remarked that there should be as

great a disproportion between the profusion and extravagance of a wealthy kingdom in its domestic

administration, and the frugality and economy which in that particular become the modest simplicity of

If we balance a proper deduction from one side against that which it is supposed ought to be made from the

But let us advert to the large debt which we have ourselves contracted in a single war, and let us only

calculate on a common share of the events which disturb the peace of nations, and we shall instantly perceive,

without the aid of any elaborate illustration, that there must always be an immense disproportion between the

objects of federal and state expenditures. It is true that several of the States, separately, are encumbered with

considerable debts, which are an excrescence of the late war. But this cannot happen again, if the proposed

system be adopted; and when these debts are discharged, the only call for revenue of any consequence, which

the State governments will continue to experience, will be for the mere support of their respective civil list; to

which, if we add all contingencies, the total amount in every State ought to fall considerably short of two

In framing a government for posterity as well as ourselves, we ought, in those provisions which are designed

to be permanent, to calculate, not on temporary, but on permanent causes of expense. If this principle be a

just one our attention would be directed to a provision in favor of the State governments for an annual sum of

about two hundred thousand pounds; while the exigencies of the Union could be susceptible of no limits,

even in imagination. In this view of the subject, by what logic can it be maintained that the local governments

ought to command, in perpetuity, an EXCLUSIVE source of revenue for any sum beyond the extent of two

hundred thousand pounds? To extend its power further, in EXCLUSION of the authority of the Union, would

be to take the resources of the community out of those hands which stood in need of them for the public

welfare, in order to put them into other hands which could have no just or proper occasion for them.

Suppose, then, the convention had been inclined to proceed upon the principle of a repartition of the objects

of revenue, between the Union and its members, in PROPORTION to their comparative necessities; what

particular fund could have been selected for the use of the States, that would not either have been too much or

too little too little for their present, too much for their future wants? As to the line of separation between

external and internal taxes, this would leave to the States, at a rough computation, the command of two thirds

of the resources of the community to defray from a tenth to a twentieth part of its expenses; and to the Union,

one third of the resources of the community, to defray from nine tenths to nineteen twentieths of its expenses.

If we desert this boundary and content ourselves with leaving to the States an exclusive power of taxing

houses and lands, there would still be a great disproportion between the MEANS and the END; the

possession of one third of the resources of the community to supply, at most, one tenth of its wants. If any

fund could have been selected and appropriated, equal to and not greater than the object, it would have been

inadequate to the discharge of the existing debts of the particular States, and would have left them dependent

The preceding train of observation will justify the position which has been elsewhere laid down, that ``A

CONCURRENT JURISDICTION in the article of taxation was the only admissible substitute for an entire

subordination, in respect to this branch of power, of State authority to that of the Union.'' Any separation of

the objects of revenue that could have been fallen upon, would have amounted to a sacrifice of the great

INTERESTS of the Union to the POWER of the individual States. The convention thought the concurrent

jurisdiction preferable to that subordination; and it is evident that it has at least the merit of reconciling an

indefinite constitutional power of taxation in the Federal government with an adequate and independent

power in the States to provide for their own necessities. There remain a few other lights, in which this

BEFORE we proceed to examine any other objections to an indefinite power of taxation in the Union, I shall

make one general remark; which is, that if the jurisdiction of the national government, in the article of

revenue, should be restricted to particular objects, it would naturally occasion an undue proportion of the

public burdens to fall upon those objects. Two evils would spring from this source: the oppression of

particular branches of industry; and an unequal distribution of the taxes, as well among the several States as

Suppose, as has been contended for, the federal power of taxation were to be confined to duties on imports, it

is evident that the government, for want of being able to command other resources, would frequently be

tempted to extend these duties to an injurious excess. There are persons who imagine that they can never be

carried to too great a length; since the higher they are, the more it is alleged they will tend to discourage an

extravagant consumption, to produce a favorable balance of trade, and to promote domestic manufactures.

But all extremes are pernicious in various ways. Exorbitant duties on imported articles would beget a general

spirit of smuggling; which is always prejudicial to the fair trader, and eventually to the revenue itself: they

tend to render other classes of the community tributary, in an improper degree, to the manufacturing classes,

to whom they give a premature monopoly of the markets; they sometimes force industry out of its more

natural channels into others in which it flows with less advantage; and in the last place, they oppress the

merchant, who is often obliged to pay them himself without any retribution from the consumer. When the

demand is equal to the quantity of goods at market, the consumer generally pays the duty; but when the

markets happen to be overstocked, a great proportion falls upon the merchant, and sometimes not only

exhausts his profits, but breaks in upon his capital. I am apt to think that a division of the duty, between the

It is not always possible to raise the price of a commodity in exact proportion to every additional imposition

laid upon it. The merchant, especially in a country of small commercial capital, is often under a necessity of

The maxim that the consumer is the payer, is so much oftener true than the reverse of the proposition, that it

is far more equitable that the duties on imports should go into a common stock, than that they should redound

to the exclusive benefit of the importing States. But it is not so generally true as to render it equitable, that

When they are paid by the merchant they operate as an additional tax upon the importing State, whose

citizens pay their proportion of them in the character of consumers. In this view they are productive of

inequality among the States; which inequality would be increased with the increased extent of the duties. The

confinement of the national revenues to this species of imposts would be attended with inequality, from a

different cause, between the manufacturing and the nonmanufacturing States. The States which can go

farthest towards the supply of their own wants, by their own manufactures, will not, according to their

numbers or wealth, consume so great a proportion of imported articles as those States which are not in the

same favorable situation. They would not, therefore, in this mode alone contribute to the public treasury in a

ratio to their abilities. To make them do this it is necessary that recourse be had to excises, the proper objects

of which are particular kinds of manufactures. New York is more deeply interested in these considerations

than such of her citizens as contend for limiting the power of the Union to external taxation may be aware of.

New York is an importing State, and is not likely speedily to be, to any great extent, a manufacturing State.

She would, of course, suffer in a double light from restraining the jurisdiction of the Union to commercial

So far as these observations tend to inculcate a danger of the import duties being extended to an injurious

extreme it may be observed, conformably to a remark made in another part of these papers, that the interest of

the revenue itself would be a sufficient guard against such an extreme. I readily admit that this would be the

case, as long as other resources were open; but if the avenues to them were closed, HOPE, stimulated by

necessity, would beget experiments, fortified by rigorous precautions and additional penalties, which, for a

time, would have the intended effect, till there had been leisure to contrive expedients to elude these new

precautions. The first success would be apt to inspire false opinions, which it might require a long course of

subsequent experience to correct. Necessity, especially in politics, often occasions false hopes, false

reasonings, and a system of measures correspondingly erroneous. But even if this supposed excess should not

be a consequence of the limitation of the federal power of taxation, the inequalities spoken of would still

ensue, though not in the same degree, from the other causes that have been noticed.

One which, if we may judge from the frequency of its repetition, seems most to be relied on, is, that the

House of Representatives is not sufficiently numerous for the reception of all the different classes of citizens,

in order to combine the interests and feelings of every part of the community, and to produce a due sympathy

between the representative body and its constituents. This argument presents itself under a very specious and

seducing form; and is well calculated to lay hold of the prejudices of those to whom it is addressed. But when

we come to dissect it with attention, it will appear to be made up of nothing but fairsounding words. The

object it seems to aim at is, in the first place, impracticable, and in the sense in which it is contended for, is

unnecessary. I reserve for another place the discussion of the question which relates to the sufficiency of the

representative body in respect to numbers, and shall content myself with examining here the particular use

which has been made of a contrary supposition, in reference to the immediate subject of our inquiries.

The idea of an actual representation of all classes of the people, by persons of each class, is altogether

visionary. Unless it were expressly provided in the Constitution, that each different occupation should send

one or more members, the thing would never take place in practice. Mechanics and manufacturers will

always be inclined, with few exceptions, to give their votes to merchants, in preference to persons of their

own professions or trades. Those discerning citizens are well aware that the mechanic and manufacturing arts

furnish the materials of mercantile enterprise and industry. Many of them, indeed, are immediately connected

with the operations of commerce. They know that the merchant is their natural patron and friend; and they are

aware, that however great the confidence they may justly feel in their own good sense, their interests can be

more effectually promoted by the merchant than by themselves. They are sensible that their habits in life have

not been such as to give them those acquired endowments, without which, in a deliberative assembly, the

greatest natural abilities are for the most part useless; and that the influence and weight, and superior

acquirements of the merchants render them more equal to a contest with any spirit which might happen to

infuse itself into the public councils, unfriendly to the manufacturing and trading interests. These

considerations, and many others that might be mentioned prove, and experience confirms it, that artisans and

manufacturers will commonly be disposed to bestow their votes upon merchants and those whom they

recommend. We must therefore consider merchants as the natural representatives of all these classes of the

With regard to the learned professions, little need be observed; they truly form no distinct interest in society,

and according to their situation and talents, will be indiscriminately the objects of the confidence and choice

Nothing remains but the landed interest; and this, in a political view, and particularly in relation to taxes, I

take to be perfectly united, from the wealthiest landlord down to the poorest tenant. No tax can be laid on

land which will not affect the proprietor of millions of acres as well as the proprietor of a single acre. Every

landholder will therefore have a common interest to keep the taxes on land as low as possible; and common

interest may always be reckoned upon as the surest bond of sympathy. But if we even could suppose a

distinction of interest between the opulent landholder and the middling farmer, what reason is there to

conclude, that the first would stand a better chance of being deputed to the national legislature than the last?

If we take fact as our guide, and look into our own senate and assembly, we shall find that moderate

proprietors of land prevail in both; nor is this less the case in the senate, which consists of a smaller number,

than in the assembly, which is composed of a greater number. Where the qualifications of the electors are the

same, whether they have to choose a small or a large number, their votes will fall upon those in whom they

have most confidence; whether these happen to be men of large fortunes, or of moderate property, or of no

It is said to be necessary, that all classes of citizens should have some of their own number in the

representative body, in order that their feelings and interests may be the better understood and attended to.

But we have seen that this will never happen under any arrangement that leaves the votes of the people free.

Where this is the case, the representative body, with too few exceptions to have any influence on the spirit of

the government, will be composed of landholders, merchants, and men of the learned professions. But where

is the danger that the interests and feelings of the different classes of citizens will not be understood or

attended to by these three descriptions of men? Will not the landholder know and feel whatever will promote

or insure the interest of landed property? And will he not, from his own interest in that species of property, be

sufficiently prone to resist every attempt to prejudice or encumber it? Will not the merchant understand and

be disposed to cultivate, as far as may be proper, the interests of the mechanic and manufacturing arts, to

which his commerce is so nearly allied? Will not the man of the learned profession, who will feel a neutrality

to the rivalships between the different branches of industry, be likely to prove an impartial arbiter between

them, ready to promote either, so far as it shall appear to him conducive to the general interests of the

society? If we take into the account the momentary humors or dispositions which may happen to prevail in

particular parts of the society, and to which a wise administration will never be inattentive, is the man whose

situation leads to extensive inquiry and information less likely to be a competent judge of their nature, extent,

and foundation than one whose observation does not travel beyond the circle of his neighbors and

acquaintances? Is it not natural that a man who is a candidate for the favor of the people, and who is

dependent on the suffrages of his fellowcitizens for the continuance of his public honors, should take care to

inform himself of their dispositions and inclinations, and should be willing to allow them their proper degree

of influence upon his conduct? This dependence, and the necessity of being bound himself, and his posterity,

by the laws to which he gives his assent, are the true, and they are the strong chords of sympathy between the

There is no part of the administration of government that requires extensive information and a thorough

knowledge of the principles of political economy, so much as the business of taxation.

The man who understands those principles best will be least likely to resort to oppressive expedients, or

sacrifice any particular class of citizens to the procurement of revenue. It might be demonstrated that the most

productive system of finance will always be the least burdensome. There can be no doubt that in order to a

judicious exercise of the power of taxation, it is necessary that the person in whose hands it should be

acquainted with the general genius, habits, and modes of thinking of the people at large, and with the

resources of the country. And this is all that can be reasonably meant by a knowledge of the interests and

feelings of the people. In any other sense the proposition has either no meaning, or an absurd one. And in that

sense let every considerate citizen judge for himself where the requisite qualification is most likely to be

WE HAVE seen that the result of the observations, to which the foregoing number has been principally

devoted, is, that from the natural operation of the different interests and views of the various classes of the

community, whether the representation of the people be more or less numerous, it will consist almost entirely

of proprietors of land, of merchants, and of members of the learned professions, who will truly represent all

those different interests and views. If it should be objected that we have seen other descriptions of men in the

local legislatures, I answer that it is admitted there are exceptions to the rule, but not in sufficient number to

influence the general complexion or character of the government. There are strong minds in every walk of

life that will rise superior to the disadvantages of situation, and will command the tribute due to their merit,

not only from the classes to which they particularly belong, but from the society in general. The door ought to

be equally open to all; and I trust, for the credit of human nature, that we shall see examples of such vigorous

plants flourishing in the soil of federal as well as of State legislation; but occasional instances of this sort will

not render the reasoning founded upon the general course of things, less conclusive.

The subject might be placed in several other lights that would all lead to the same result; and in particular it

might be asked, What greater affinity or relation of interest can be conceived between the carpenter and

blacksmith, and the linen manufacturer or stocking weaver, than between the merchant and either of them? It

is notorious that there are often as great rivalships between different branches of the mechanic or

manufacturing arts as there are between any of the departments of labor and industry; so that, unless the

representative body were to be far more numerous than would be consistent with any idea of regularity or

wisdom in its deliberations, it is impossible that what seems to be the spirit of the objection we have been

considering should ever be realized in practice. But I forbear to dwell any longer on a matter which has

hitherto worn too loose a garb to admit even of an accurate inspection of its real shape or tendency.

There is another objection of a somewhat more precise nature that claims our attention. It has been asserted

that a power of internal taxation in the national legislature could never be exercised with advantage, as well

from the want of a sufficient knowledge of local circumstances, as from an interference between the revenue

laws of the Union and of the particular States. The supposition of a want of proper knowledge seems to be

entirely destitute of foundation. If any question is depending in a State legislature respecting one of the

counties, which demands a knowledge of local details, how is it acquired? No doubt from the information of

the members of the county. Cannot the like knowledge be obtained in the national legislature from the

representatives of each State? And is it not to be presumed that the men who will generally be sent there will

be possessed of the necessary degree of intelligence to be able to communicate that information? Is the

knowledge of local circumstances, as applied to taxation, a minute topographical acquaintance with all the

mountains, rivers, streams, highways, and bypaths in each State; or is it a general acquaintance with its

situation and resources, with the state of its agriculture, commerce, manufactures, with the nature of its

products and consumptions, with the different degrees and kinds of its wealth, property, and industry?

Nations in general, even under governments of the more popular kind, usually commit the administration of

their finances to single men or to boards composed of a few individuals, who digest and prepare, in the first

instance, the plans of taxation, which are afterwards passed into laws by the authority of the sovereign or

Inquisitive and enlightened statesmen are deemed everywhere best qualified to make a judicious selection of

the objects proper for revenue; which is a clear indication, as far as the sense of mankind can have weight in

the question, of the species of knowledge of local circumstances requisite to the purposes of taxation.

The taxes intended to be comprised under the general denomination of internal taxes may be subdivided into

those of the DIRECT and those of the INDIRECT kind. Though the objection be made to both, yet the

reasoning upon it seems to be confined to the former branch. And indeed, as to the latter, by which must be

understood duties and excises on articles of consumption, one is at a loss to conceive what can be the nature

of the difficulties apprehended. The knowledge relating to them must evidently be of a kind that will either be

suggested by the nature of the article itself, or can easily be procured from any wellinformed man,

especially of the mercantile class. The circumstances that may distinguish its situation in one State from its

situation in another must be few, simple, and easy to be comprehended. The principal thing to be attended to,

would be to avoid those articles which had been previously appropriated to the use of a particular State; and

there could be no difficulty in ascertaining the revenue system of each. This could always be known from the

respective codes of laws, as well as from the information of the members from the several States.

The objection, when applied to real property or to houses and lands, appears to have, at first sight, more

foundation, but even in this view it will not bear a close examination. Land taxes are co monly laid in one of

two modes, either by ACTUAL valuations, permanent or periodical, or by OCCASIONAL assessments, at

the discretion, or according to the best judgment, of certain officers whose duty it is to make them. In either

case, the EXECUTION of the business, which alone requires the knowledge of local details, must be

devolved upon discreet persons in the character of commissioners or assessors, elected by the people or

appointed by the government for the purpose. All that the law can do must be to name the persons or to

prescribe the manner of their election or appointment, to fix their numbers and qualifications and to draw the

general outlines of their powers and duties. And what is there in all this that cannot as well be performed by

the national legislature as by a State legislature? The attention of either can only reach to general principles;

local details, as already observed, must be referred to those who are to execute the plan.

But there is a simple point of view in which this matter may be placed that must be altogether satisfactory.

The national legislature can make use of the SYSTEM OF EACH STATE WITHIN THAT STATE. The

method of laying and collecting this species of taxes in each State can, in all its parts, be adopted and

Let it be recollected that the proportion of these taxes is not to be left to the discretion of the national

legislature, but is to be determined by the numbers of each State, as described in the second section of the

first article. An actual census or enumeration of the people must furnish the rule, a circumstance which

effectually shuts the door to partiality or oppression. The abuse of this power of taxation seems to have been

provided against with guarded circumspection. In addition to the precaution just mentioned, there is a

provision that ``all duties, imposts, and excises shall be UNIFORM throughout the United States.'' It has been

very properly observed by different speakers and writers on the side of the Constitution, that if the exercise of

the power of internal taxation by the Union should be discovered on experiment to be really inconvenient, the

federal government may then forbear the use of it, and have recourse to requisitions in its stead. By way of

answer to this, it has been triumphantly asked, Why not in the first instance omit that ambiguous power, and

rely upon the latter resource? Two solid answers may be given. The first is, that the exercise of that power, if

convenient, will be preferable, because it will be more effectual; and it is impossible to prove in theory, or

otherwise than by the experiment, that it cannot be advantageously exercised. The contrary, indeed, appears

most probable. The second answer is, that the existence of such a power in the Constitution will have a strong

influence in giving efficacy to requisitions. When the States know that the Union can apply itself without

As to the interference of the revenue laws of the Union, and of its members, we have already seen that there

can be no clashing or repugnancy of authority. The laws cannot, therefore, in a legal sense, interfere with

each other; and it is far from impossible to avoid an interference even in the policy of their different systems.

An effectual expedient for this purpose will be, mutually, to abstain from those objects which either side may

have first had recourse to. As neither can CONTROL the other, each will have an obvious and sensible

interest in this reciprocal forbearance. And where there is an IMMEDIATE common interest, we may safely

count upon its operation. When the particular debts of the States are done away, and their expenses come to

be limited within their natural compass, the possibility almost of interference will vanish.

A small land tax will answer the purpose of the States, and will be their most simple and most fit resource.

Many spectres have been raised out of this power of internal taxation, to excite the apprehensions of the

people: double sets of revenue officers, a duplication of their burdens by double taxations, and the frightful

forms of odious and oppressive polltaxes, have been played off with all the ingenious dexterity of political

As to the first point, there are two cases in which there can be no room for double sets of officers: one, where

the right of imposing the tax is exclusively vested in the Union, which applies to the duties on imports; the

other, where the object has not fallen under any State regulation or provision, which may be applicable to a

variety of objects. In other cases, the probability is that the United States will either wholly abstain from the

objects preoccupied for local purposes, or will make use of the State officers and State regulations for

collecting the additional imposition. This will best answer the views of revenue, because it will save expense

in the collection, and will best avoid any occasion of disgust to the State governments and to the people. At

all events, here is a practicable expedient for avoiding such an inconvenience; and nothing more can be

required than to show that evils predicted to not necessarily result from the plan.

As to any argument derived from a supposed system of influence, it is a sufficient answer to say that it ought

not to be presumed; but the supposition is susceptible of a more precise answer. If such a spirit should infest

the councils of the Union, the most certain road to the accomplishment of its aim would be to employ the

State officers as much as possible, and to attach them to the Union by an accumulation of their emoluments.

This would serve to turn the tide of State influence into the channels of the national government, instead of

making federal influence flow in an opposite and adverse current. But all suppositions of this kind are

invidious, and ought to be banished from the consideration of the great question before the people. They can

The wants of the Union are to be supplied in one way or another; if to be done by the authority of the federal

government, it will not be to be done by that of the State government. The quantity of taxes to be paid by the

community must be the same in either case; with this advantage, if the provision is to be made by the Union

that the capital resource of commercial imposts, which is the most convenient branch of revenue, can be

prudently improved to a much greater extent under federal than under State regulation, and of course will

render it less necessary to recur to more inconvenient methods; and with this further advantage, that as far as

there may be any real difficulty in the exercise of the power of internal taxation, it will impose a disposition

to greater care in the choice and arrangement of the means; and must naturally tend to make it a fixed point of

policy in the national administration to go as far as may be practicable in making the luxury of the rich

tributary to the public treasury, in order to diminish the necessity of those impositions which might create

dissatisfaction in the poorer and most numerous classes of the society. Happy it is when the interest which the

government has in the preservation of its own power, coincides with a proper distribution of the public

burdens, and tends to guard the least wealthy part of the community from oppression! As to poll taxes, I,

without scruple, confess my disapprobation of them; and though they have prevailed from an early period in

those States [1] which have uniformly been the most tenacious of their rights, I should lament to see them

introduced into practice under the national government. But does it follow because there is a power to lay

them that they will actually be laid? Every State in the Union has power to impose taxes of this kind; and yet

in several of them they are unknown in practice. Are the State governments to be stigmatized as tyrannies,

because they possess this power? If they are not, with what propriety can the like power justify such a charge

against the national government, or even be urged as an obstacle to its adoption? As little friendly as I am to

the species of imposition, I still feel a thorough conviction that the power of having recourse to it ought to

exist in the federal government. There are certain emergencies of nations, in which expedients, that in the

ordinary state of things ought to be forborne, become essential to the public weal. And the government, from

the possibility of such emergencies, ought ever to have the option of making use of them. The real scarcity of

objects in this country, which may be considered as productive sources of revenue, is a reason peculiar to

itself, for not abridging the discretion of the national councils in this respect. There may exist certain critical

and tempestuous conjunctures of the State, in which a poll tax may become an inestimable resource. And as I

know nothing to exempt this portion of the globe from the common calamities that have befallen other parts

of it, I acknowledge my aversion to every project that is calculated to disarm the government of a single

weapon, which in any possible contingency might be usefully employed for the general defense and security.

I have now gone through the examination of such of the powers proposed to be vested in the United States,

which may be considered as having an immediate relation to the energy of the government; and have

endeavored to answer the principal objections which have been made to them. I have passed over in silence

those minor authorities, which are either too inconsiderable to have been thought worthy of the hostilities of

the opponents of the Constitution, or of too manifest propriety to admit of controversy.

The mass of judiciary power, however, might have claimed an investigation under this head, had it not been

for the consideration that its organization and its extent may be more advantageously considered in

connection. This has determined me to refer it to the branch of our inquiries upon which we shall next enter.

IN REVIEWING the defects of the existing Confederation, and showing that they cannot be supplied by a

government of less energy than that before the public, several of the most important principles of the latter

fell of course under consideration. But as the ultimate object of these papers is to determine clearly and fully

the merits of this Constitution, and the expediency of adopting it, our plan cannot be complete without taking

a more critical and thorough survey of the work of the convention, without examining it on all its sides,

That this remaining task may be executed under impressions conducive to a just and fair result, some

It is a misfortune, inseparable from human affairs, that public measures are rarely investigated with that spirit

of moderation which is essential to a just estimate of their real tendency to advance or obstruct the public

good; and that this spirit is more apt to be diminished than promoted, by those occasions which require an

unusual exercise of it. To those who have been led by experience to attend to this consideration, it could not

appear surprising, that the act of the convention, which recommends so many important changes and

innovations, which may be viewed in so many lights and relations, and which touches the springs of so many

passions and interests, should find or excite dispositions unfriendly, both on one side and on the other, to a

fair discussion and accurate judgment of its merits. In some, it has been too evident from their own

publications, that they have scanned the proposed Constitution, not only with a predisposition to censure, but

with a predetermination to condemn; as the language held by others betrays an opposite predetermination or

bias, which must render their opinions also of little moment in the question. In placing, however, these

different characters on a level, with respect to the weight of their opinions, I wish not to insinuate that there

may not be a material difference in the purity of their intentions. It is but just to remark in favor of the latter

description, that as our situation is universally admitted to be peculiarly critical, and to require indispensably

that something should be done for our relief, the predetermined patron of what has been actually done may

have taken his bias from the weight of these considerations, as well as from considerations of a sinister

nature. The predetermined adversary, on the other hand, can have been governed by no venial motive

whatever. The intentions of the first may be upright, as they may on the contrary be culpable. The views of

the last cannot be upright, and must be culpable. But the truth is, that these papers are not addressed to

persons falling under either of these characters. They solicit the attention of those only, who add to a sincere

zeal for the happiness of their country, a temper favorable to a just estimate of the means of promoting it.

Persons of this character will proceed to an examination of the plan submitted by the convention, not only

without a disposition to find or to magnify faults; but will see the propriety of reflecting, that a faultless plan

was not to be expected. Nor will they barely make allowances for the errors which may be chargeable on the

fallibility to which the convention, as a body of men, were liable; but will keep in mind, that they themselves

also are but men, and ought not to assume an infallibility in rejudging the fallible opinions of others.

With equal readiness will it be perceived, that besides these inducements to candor, many allowances ought

to be made for the difficulties inherent in the very nature of the undertaking referred to the convention.

The novelty of the undertaking immediately strikes us. It has been shown in the course of these papers, that

the existing Confederation is founded on principles which are fallacious; that we must consequently change

this first foundation, and with it the superstructure resting upon it. It has been shown, that the other

confederacies which could be consulted as precedents have been vitiated by the same erroneous principles,

and can therefore furnish no other light than that of beacons, which give warning of the course to be shunned,

without pointing out that which ought to be pursued. The most that the convention could do in such a

situation, was to avoid the errors suggested by the past experience of other countries, as well as of our own;

and to provide a convenient mode of rectifying their own errors, as future experiences may unfold them.

Among the difficulties encountered by the convention, a very important one must have lain in combining the

requisite stability and energy in government, with the inviolable attention due to liberty and to the republican

form. Without substantially accomplishing this part of their undertaking, they would have very imperfectly

fulfilled the object of their appointment, or the expectation of the public; yet that it could not be easily

accomplished, will be denied by no one who is unwilling to betray his ignorance of the subject. Energy in

government is essential to that security against external and internal danger, and to that prompt and salutary

execution of the laws which enter into the very definition of good government. Stability in government is

essential to national character and to the advantages annexed to it, as well as to that repose and confidence in

the minds of the people, which are among the chief blessings of civil society. An irregular and mutable

legislation is not more an evil in itself than it is odious to the people; and it may be pronounced with

assurance that the people of this country, enlightened as they are with regard to the nature, and interested, as

the great body of them are, in the effects of good government, will never be satisfied till some remedy be

applied to the vicissitudes and uncertainties which characterize the State administrations. On comparing,

however, these valuable ingredients with the vital principles of liberty, we must perceive at once the

difficulty of mingling them together in their due proportions. The genius of republican liberty seems to

demand on one side, not only that all power should be derived from the people, but that those intrusted with it

should be kept in independence on the people, by a short duration of their appointments; and that even during

this short period the trust should be placed not in a few, but a number of hands. Stability, on the contrary,

requires that the hands in which power is lodged should continue for a length of time the same. A frequent

change of men will result from a frequent return of elections; and a frequent change of measures from a

frequent change of men: whilst energy in government requires not only a certain duration of power, but the

How far the convention may have succeeded in this part of their work, will better appear on a more accurate

view of it. From the cursory view here taken, it must clearly appear to have been an arduous part.

Not less arduous must have been the task of marking the proper line of partition between the authority of the

general and that of the State governments. Every man will be sensible of this difficulty, in proportion as he

has been accustomed to contemplate and discriminate objects extensive and complicated in their nature.

The faculties of the mind itself have never yet been distinguished and defined, with satisfactory precision, by

all the efforts of the most acute and metaphysical philosophers. Sense, perception, judgment, desire, volition,

memory, imagination, are found to be separated by such delicate shades and minute gradations that their

boundaries have eluded the most subtle investigations, and remain a pregnant source of ingenious disquisition

and controversy. The boundaries between the great kingdom of nature, and, still more, between the various

provinces, and lesser portions, into which they are subdivided, afford another illustration of the same

important truth. The most sagacious and laborious naturalists have never yet succeeded in tracing with

certainty the line which separates the district of vegetable life from the neighboring region of unorganized

matter, or which marks the ermination of the former and the commencement of the animal empire. A still

greater obscurity lies in the distinctive characters by which the objects in each of these great departments of

When we pass from the works of nature, in which all the delineations are perfectly accurate, and appear to be

otherwise only from the imperfection of the eye which surveys them, to the institutions of man, in which the

obscurity arises as well from the object itself as from the organ by which it is contemplated, we must perceive

the necessity of moderating still further our expectations and hopes from the efforts of human sagacity.

Experience has instructed us that no skill in the science of government has yet been able to discriminate and

define, with sufficient certainty, its three great provinces the legislative, executive, and judiciary; or even the

Questions daily occur in the course of practice, which prove the obscurity which reins in these subjects, and

The experience of ages, with the continued and combined labors of the most enlightened legislatures and

jurists, has been equally unsuccessful in delineating the several objects and limits of different codes of laws

and different tribunals of justice. The precise extent of the common law, and the statute law, the maritime

law, the ecclesiastical law, the law of corporations, and other local laws and customs, remains still to be

clearly and finally established in Great Britain, where accuracy in such subjects has been more industriously

The jurisdiction of her several courts, general and local, of law, of equity, of admiralty, etc., is not less a

source of frequent and intricate discussions, sufficiently denoting the indeterminate limits by which they are

respectively circumscribed. All new laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill, and passed on the

fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until their

meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and adjudications.

Besides the obscurity arising from the complexity of objects, and the imperfection of the human faculties, the

medium through which the conceptions of men are conveyed to each other adds a fresh embarrassment. The

use of words is to express ideas. Perspicuity, therefore, requires not only that the ideas should be distinctly

formed, but that they should be expressed by words distinctly and exclusively appropriate to them. But no

language is so copious as to supply words and phrases for every complex idea, or so correct as not to include

many equivocally denoting different ideas. Hence it must happen that however accurately objects may be

discriminated in themselves, and however accurately the discrimination may be considered, the definition of

them may be rendered inaccurate by the inaccuracy of the terms in which it is delivered. And this

unavoidable inaccuracy must be greater or less, according to the complexity and novelty of the objects

defined. When the Almighty himself condescends to address mankind in their own language, his meaning,

luminous as it must be, is rendered dim and doubtful by the cloudy medium through which it is

Here, then, are three sources of vague and incorrect definitions: indistinctness of the object, imperfection of

the organ of conception, inadequateness of the vehicle of ideas. Any one of these must produce a certain

degree of obscurity. The convention, in delineating the boundary between the federal and State jurisdictions,

To the difficulties already mentioned may be added the interfering pretensions of the larger and smaller

States. We cannot err in supposing that the former would contend for a participation in the government, fully

proportioned to their superior wealth and importance; and that the latter would not be less tenacious of the

equality at present enjoyed by them. We may well suppose that neither side would entirely yield to the other,

and consequently that the struggle could be terminated only by compromise. It is extremely probable, also,

that after the ratio of representation had been adjusted, this very compromise must have produced a fresh

struggle between the same parties, to give such a turn to the organization of the government, and to the

distribution of its powers, as would increase the importance of the branches, in forming which they had

There are features in the Constitution which warrant each of these suppositions; and as far as either of them is

well founded, it shows that the convention must have been compelled to sacrifice theoretical propriety to the

Nor could it have been the large and small States only, which would marshal themselves in opposition to

each other on various points. Other combinations, resulting from a difference of local position and policy,

must have created additional difficulties. As every State may be divided into different districts, and its

citizens into different classes, which give birth to contending interests and local jealousies, so the different

parts of the United States are distinguished from each other by a variety of circumstances, which produce a

like effect on a larger scale. And although this variety of interests, for reasons sufficiently explained in a

former paper, may have a salutary influence on the administration of the government when formed, yet every

one must be sensible of the contrary influence, which must have been experienced in the task of forming it.

Would it be wonderful if, under the pressure of all these difficulties, the convention should have been forced

into some deviations from that artificial structure and regular symmetry which an abstract view of the subject

might lead an ingenious theorist to bestow on a Constitution planned in his closet or in his imagination? The

real wonder is that so many difficulties should have been surmounted, and surmounted with a unanimity

almost as unprecedented as it must have been unexpected. It is impossible for any man of candor to reflect on

this circumstance without partaking of the astonishment. It is impossible for the man of pious reflection not to

perceive in it a finger of that Almighty hand which has been so frequently and signally extended to our relief

We had occasion, in a former paper, to take notice of the repeated trials which have been unsuccessfully

made in the United Netherlands for reforming the baneful and notorious vices of their constitution. The

history of almost all the great councils and consultations held among mankind for reconciling their discordant

opinions, assuaging their mutual jealousies, and adjusting their respective interests, is a history of factions,

contentions, and disappointments, and may be classed among the most dark and degraded pictures which

display the infirmities and depravities of the human character. If, in a few scattered instances, a brighter

aspect is presented, they serve only as exceptions to admonish us of the general truth; and by their lustre to

darken the gloom of the adverse prospect to which they are contrasted. In revolving the causes from which

these exceptions result, and applying them to the particular instances before us, we are necessarily led to two

important conclusions. The first is, that the convention must have enjoyed, in a very singular degree, an

exemption from the pestilential influence of party animosities the disease most incident to deliberative

bodies, and most apt to contaminate their proceedings. The second conclusion is that all the deputations

composing the convention were satisfactorily accommodated by the final act, or were induced to accede to it

by a deep conviction of the necessity of sacrificing private opinions and partial interests to the public good,

and by a despair of seeing this necessity diminished by delays or by new experiments.

IT IS not a little remarkable that in every case reported by ancient history, in which government has been

established with deliberation and consent, the task of framing it has not been committed to an assembly of

men, but has been performed by some individual citizen of preeminent wisdom and approved integrity.

Minos, we learn, was the primitive founder of the government of Crete, as Zaleucus was of that of the

Locrians. Theseus first, and after him Draco and Solon, instituted the government of Athens.

Lycurgus was the lawgiver of Sparta. The foundation of the original government of Rome was laid by

Romulus, and the work completed by two of his elective successors, Numa and Tullius Hostilius. On the

abolition of royalty the consular administration was substituted by Brutus, who stepped forward with a

project for such a reform, which, he alleged, had been prepared by Tullius Hostilius, and to which his address

obtained the assent and ratification of the senate and people. This remark is applicable to confederate

governments also. Amphictyon, we are told, was the author of that which bore his name. The Achaean league

What degree of agency these reputed lawgivers might have in their respective establishments, or how far they

might be clothed with the legitimate authority of the people, cannot in every instance be ascertained. In some,

however, the proceeding was strictly regular. Draco appears to have been intrusted by the people of Athens

with indefinite powers to reform its government and laws. And Solon, according to Plutarch, was in a manner

compelled, by the universal suffrage of his fellowcitizens, to take upon him the sole and absolute power of

newmodeling the constitution. The proceedings under Lycurgus were less regular; but as far as the

advocates for a regular reform could prevail, they all turned their eyes towards the single efforts of that

celebrated patriot and sage, instead of seeking to bring about a revolution by the intervention of a deliberative

Whence could it have proceeded, that a people, jealous as the Greeks were of their liberty, should so far

abandon the rules of caution as to place their destiny in the hands of a single citizen? Whence could it have

proceeded, that the Athenians, a people who would not suffer an army to be commanded by fewer than ten

generals, and who required no other proof of danger to their liberties than the illustrious merit of a

fellowcitizen, should consider one illustrious citizen as a more eligible depositary of the fortunes of

themselves and their posterity, than a select body of citizens, from whose common deliberations more

wisdom, as well as more safety, might have been expected? These questions cannot be fully answered,

without supposing that the fears of discord and disunion among a number of counsellors exceeded the

apprehension of treachery or incapacity in a single individual. History informs us, likewise, of the difficulties

with which these celebrated reformers had to contend, as well as the expedients which they were obliged to

employ in order to carry their reforms into effect. Solon, who seems to have indulged a more temporizing

policy, confessed that he had not given to his countrymen the government best suited to their happiness, but

most tolerable to their prejudices. And Lycurgus, more true to his object, was under the necessity of mixing a

portion of violence with the authority of superstition, and of securing his final success by a voluntary

renunciation, first of his country, and then of his life. If these lessons teach us, on one hand, to admire the

improvement made by America on the ancient mode of preparing and establishing regular plans of

government, they serve not less, on the other, to admonish us of the hazards and difficulties incident to such

Is it an unreasonable conjecture, that the errors which may be contained in the plan of the convention are such

as have resulted rather from the defect of antecedent experience on this complicated and difficult subject,

than from a want of accuracy or care in the investigation of it; and, consequently such as will not be

ascertained until an actual trial shall have pointed them out? This conjecture is rendered probable, not only by

many considerations of a general nature, but by the particular case of the Articles of Confederation. It is

observable that among the numerous objections and amendments suggested by the several States, when these

articles were submitted for their ratification, not one is found which alludes to the great and radical error

which on actual trial has discovered itself. And if we except the observations which New Jersey was led to

make, rather by her local situation, than by her peculiar foresight, it may be questioned whether a single

suggestion was of sufficient moment to justify a revision of the system. There is abundant reason,

nevertheless, to suppose that immaterial as these objections were, they would have been adhered to with a

very dangerous inflexibility, in some States, had not a zeal for their opinions and supposed interests been

stifled by the more powerful sentiment of selfpreservation. One State, we may remember, persisted for

several years in refusing her concurrence, although the enemy remained the whole period at our gates, or

rather in the very bowels of our country. Nor was her pliancy in the end effected by a less motive, than the

fear of being chargeable with protracting the public calamities, and endangering the event of the contest.

A patient who finds his disorder daily growing worse, and that an efficacious remedy can no longer be

delayed without extreme danger, after coolly revolving his situation, and the characters of different

physicians, selects and calls in such of them as he judges most capable of administering relief, and best

entitled to his confidence. The physicians attend; the case of the patient is carefully examined; a consultation

is held; they are unanimously agreed that the symptoms are critical, but that the case, with proper and timely

relief, is so far from being desperate, that it may be made to issue in an improvement of his constitution. They

are equally unanimous in prescribing the remedy, by which this happy effect is to be produced. The

prescription is no sooner made known, however, than a number of persons interpose, and, without denying

the reality or danger of the disorder, assure the patient that the prescription will be poison to his constitution,

and forbid him, under pain of certain death, to make use of it. Might not the patient reasonably demand,

before he ventured to follow this advice, that the authors of it should at least agree among themselves on

some other remedy to be substituted? And if he found them differing as much from one another as from his

first counsellors, would he not act prudently in trying the experiment unanimously recommended by the

latter, rather than be hearkening to those who could neither deny the necessity of a speedy remedy, nor agree

in proposing one? Such a patient and in such a situation is America at this moment.

She has been sensible of her malady. She has obtained a regular and unanimous advice from men of her own

deliberate choice. And she is warned by others against following this advice under pain of the most fatal

consequences. Do the monitors deny the reality of her danger? No. Do they deny the necessity of some

speedy and powerful remedy? No. Are they agreed, are any two of them agreed, in their objections to the

remedy proposed, or in the proper one to be substituted? Let them speak for themselves. This one tells us that

the proposed Constitution ought to be rejected, because it is not a confederation of the States, but a

Another admits that it ought to be a government over individuals to a certain extent, but by no means to the

extent proposed. A third does not object to the government over individuals, or to the extent proposed, but to

the want of a bill of rights. A fourth concurs in the absolute necessity of a bill of rights, but contends that it

ought to be declaratory, not of the personal rights of individuals, but of the rights reserved to the States in

A fifth is of opinion that a bill of rights of any sort would be superfluous and misplaced, and that the plan

would be unexceptionable but for the fatal power of regulating the times and places of election. An objector

in a large State exclaims loudly against the unreasonable equality of representation in the Senate.

An objector in a small State is equally loud against the dangerous inequality in the House of Representatives.

From this quarter, we are alarmed with the amazing expense, from the number of persons who are to

administer the new government. From another quarter, and sometimes from the same quarter, on another

occasion, the cry is that the Congress will be but a shadow of a representation, and that the government would

be far less objectionable if the number and the expense were doubled. A patriot in a State that does not import

or export, discerns insuperable objections against the power of direct taxation. The patriotic adversary in a

State of great exports and imports, is not less dissatisfied that the whole burden of taxes may be thrown on

consumption. This politician discovers in the Constitution a direct and irresistible tendency to monarchy; that

is equally sure it will end in aristocracy. Another is puzzled to say which of these shapes it will ultimately

assume, but sees clearly it must be one or other of them; whilst a fourth is not wanting, who with no less

confidence affirms that the Constitution is so far from having a bias towards either of these dangers, that the

weight on that side will not be sufficient to keep it upright and firm against its opposite propensities. With

another class of adversaries to the Constitution the language is that the legislative, executive, and judiciary

departments are intermixed in such a manner as to contradict all the ideas of regular government and all the

requisite precautions in favor of liberty. Whilst this objection circulates in vague and general expressions,

there are but a few who lend their sanction to it. Let each one come forward with his particular explanation,

and scarce any two are exactly agreed upon the subject. In the eyes of one the junction of the Senate with the

President in the responsible function of appointing to offices, instead of vesting this executive power in the

Executive alone, is the vicious part of the organization. To another, the exclusion of the House of

Representatives, whose numbers alone could be a due security against corruption and partiality in the

exercise of such a power, is equally obnoxious. With another, the admission of the President into any share of

a power which ever must be a dangerous engine in the hands of the executive magistrate, is an unpardonable

violation of the maxims of republican jealousy. No part of the arrangement, according to some, is more

inadmissible than the trial of impeachments by the Senate, which is alternately a member both of the

legislative and executive departments, when this power so evidently belonged to the judiciary department.

``We concur fully,'' reply others, ``in the objection to this part of the plan, but we can never agree that a

reference of impeachments to the judiciary authority would be an amendment of the error. Our principal

dislike to the organization arises from the extensive powers already lodged in that department.'' Even among

the zealous patrons of a council of state the most irreconcilable variance is discovered concerning the mode in

The demand of one gentleman is, that the council should consist of a small number to be appointed by the

most numerous branch of the legislature. Another would prefer a larger number, and considers it as a

fundamental condition that the appointment should be made by the President himself.

As it can give no umbrage to the writers against the plan of the federal Constitution, let us suppose, that as

they are the most zealous, so they are also the most sagacious, of those who think the late convention were

unequal to the task assigned them, and that a wiser and better plan might and ought to be substituted. Let us

further suppose that their country should concur, both in this favorable opinion of their merits, and in their

unfavorable opinion of the convention; and should accordingly proceed to form them into a second

convention, with full powers, and for the express purpose of revising and remoulding the work of the first.

Were the experiment to be seriously made, though it required some effort to view it seriously even in fiction,

I leave it to be decided by the sample of opinions just exhibited, whether, with all their enmity to their

predecessors, they would, in any one point, depart so widely from their example, as in the discord and

ferment that would mark their own deliberations; and whether the Constitution, now before the public, would

not stand as fair a chance for immortality, as Lycurgus gave to that of Sparta, by making its change to depend

on his own return from exile and death, if it were to be immediately adopted, and were to continue in force,

not until a BETTER, but until ANOTHER should be agreed upon by this new assembly of lawgivers.

It is a matter both of wonder and regret, that those who raise so many objections against the new Constitution

should never call to mind the defects of that which is to be exchanged for it. It is not necessary that the former

should be perfect; it is sufficient that the latter is more imperfect. No man would refuse to give brass for

silver or gold, because the latter had some alloy in it. No man would refuse to quit a shattered and tottering

habitation for a firm and commodious building, because the latter had not a porch to it, or because some of

the rooms might be a little larger or smaller, or the ceilings a little higher or lower than his fancy would have

planned them. But waiving illustrations of this sort, is it not manifest that most of the capital objections urged

against the new system lie with tenfold weight against the existing Confederation? Is an indefinite power to

raise money dangerous in the hands of the federal government? The present Congress can make requisitions

to any amount they please, and the States are constitutionally bound to furnish them; they can emit bills of

credit as long as they will pay for the paper; they can borrow, both abroad and at home, as long as a shilling

will be lent. Is an indefinite power to raise troops dangerous? The Confederation gives to Congress that

power also; and they have already begun to make use of it. Is it improper and unsafe to intermix the different

powers of government in the same body of men? Congress, a single body of men, are the sole depositary of

all the federal powers. Is it particularly dangerous to give the keys of the treasury, and the command of the

army, into the same hands? The Confederation places them both in the hands of Congress. Is a bill of rights

essential to liberty? The Confederation has no bill of rights. Is it an objection against the new Constitution,

that it empowers the Senate, with the concurrence of the Executive, to make treaties which are to be the laws

of the land? The existing Congress, without any such control, can make treaties which they themselves have

declared, and most of the States have recognized, to be the supreme law of the land. Is the importation of

slaves permitted by the new Constitution for twenty years? By the old it is permitted forever.

I shall be told, that however dangerous this mixture of powers may be in theory, it is rendered harmless by

the dependence of Congress on the State for the means of carrying them into practice; that however large the

mass of powers may be, it is in fact a lifeless mass. Then, say I, in the first place, that the Confederation is

chargeable with the still greater folly of declaring certain powers in the federal government to be absolutely

necessary, and at the same time rendering them absolutely nugatory; and, in the next place, that if the Union

is to continue, and no better government be substituted, effective powers must either be granted to, or

assumed by, the existing Congress; in either of which events, the contrast just stated will hold good. But this

is not all. Out of this lifeless mass has already grown an excrescent power, which tends to realize all the

dangers that can be apprehended from a defective construction of the supreme government of the Union. It is

now no longer a point of speculation and hope, that the Western territory is a mine of vast wealth to the

United States; and although it is not of such a nature as to extricate them from their present distresses, or for

some time to come, to yield any regular supplies for the public expenses, yet must it hereafter be able, under

proper management, both to effect a gradual discharge of the domestic debt, and to furnish, for a certain

period, liberal tributes to the federal treasury. A very large proportion of this fund has been already

surrendered by individual States; and it may with reason be expected that the remaining States will not persist

in withholding similar proofs of their equity and generosity. We may calculate, therefore, that a rich and

fertile country, of an area equal to the inhabited extent of the United States, will soon become a national

stock. Congress have assumed the administration of this stock. They have begun to render it productive.

Congress have undertaken to do more: they have proceeded to form new States, to erect temporary

governments, to appoint officers for them, and to prescribe the conditions on which such States shall be

admitted into the Confederacy. All this has been done; and done without the least color of constitutional

authority. Yet no blame has been whispered; no alarm has been sounded. A GREAT and INDEPENDENT

fund of revenue is passing into the hands of a SINGLE BODY of men, who can RAISE TROOPS to an

INDEFINITE NUMBER, and appropriate money to their support for an INDEFINITE PERIOD OF TIME.

And yet there are men, who have not only been silent spectators of this prospect, but who are advocates for

the system which exhibits it; and, at the same time, urge against the new system the objections which we

have heard. Would they not act with more consistency, in urging the establishment of the latter, as no less

necessary to guard the Union against the future powers and resources of a body constructed like the existing

Congress, than to save it from the dangers threatened by the present impotency of that Assembly? I mean not,

by any thing here said, to throw censure on the measures which have been pursued by Congress. I am

sensible they could not have done otherwise. The public interest, the necessity of the case, imposed upon

them the task of overleaping their constitutional limits. But is not the fact an alarming proof of the danger

resulting from a government which does not possess regular powers commensurate to its objects? A

dissolution or usurpation is the dreadful dilemma to which it is continually exposed.

THE last paper having concluded the observations which were meant to introduce a candid survey of the plan

of government reported by the convention, we now proceed to the execution of that part of our undertaking.

The first question that offers itself is, whether the general form and aspect of the government be strictly

republican. It is evident that no other form would be reconcilable with the genius of the people of America;

with the fundamental principles of the Revolution; or with that honorable determination which animates

every votary of freedom, to rest all our political experiments on the capacity of mankind for selfgovernment.

If the plan of the convention, therefore, be found to depart from the republican character, its advocates must

What, then, are the distinctive characters of the republican form? Were an answer to this question to be

sought, not by recurring to principles, but in the application of the term by political writers, to the constitution

of different States, no satisfactory one would ever be found. Holland, in which no particle of the supreme

authority is derived from the people, has passed almost universally under the denomination of a republic. The

same title has been bestowed on Venice, where absolute power over the great body of the people is exercised,

in the most absolute manner, by a small body of hereditary nobles. Poland, which is a mixture of aristocracy

and of monarchy in their worst forms, has been dignified with the same appellation. The government of

England, which has one republican branch only, combined with an hereditary aristocracy and monarchy, has,

with equal impropriety, been frequently placed on the list of republics. These examples, which are nearly as

dissimilar to each other as to a genuine republic, show the extreme inaccuracy with which the term has been

If we resort for a criterion to the different principles on which different forms of government are established,

we may define a republic to be, or at least may bestow that name on, a government which derives all its

powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people, and is administered by persons holding their

offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior. It is ESSENTIAL to such a

government that it be derived from the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a

favored class of it; otherwise a handful of tyrannical nobles, exercising their oppressions by a delegation of

their powers, might aspire to the rank of republicans, and claim for their government the honorable title of

republic. It is SUFFICIENT for such a government that the persons administering it be appointed, either

directly or indirectly, by the people; and that they hold their appointments by either of the tenures just

specified; otherwise every government in the United States, as well as every other popular government that

has been or can be well organized or well executed, would be degraded from the republican character.

According to the constitution of every State in the Union, some or other of the officers of government are

appointed indirectly only by the people. According to most of them, the chief magistrate himself is so

appointed. And according to one, this mode of appointment is extended to one of the coordinate branches of

the legislature. According to all the constitutions, also, the tenure of the highest offices is extended to a

definite period, and in many instances, both within the legislative and executive departments, to a period of

years. According to the provisions of most of the constitutions, again, as well as according to the most

respectable and received opinions on the subject, the members of the judiciary department are to retain their

On comparing the Constitution planned by the convention with the standard here fixed, we perceive at once

that it is, in the most rigid sense, conformable to it. The House of Representatives, like that of one branch at

least of all the State legislatures, is elected immediately by the great body of the people. The Senate, like the

present Congress, and the Senate of Maryland, derives its appointment indirectly from the people. The

President is indirectly derived from the choice of the people, according to the example in most of the States.

Even the judges, with all other officers of the Union, will, as in the several States, be the choice, though a

remote choice, of the people themselves, the duration of the appointments is equally conformable to the

republican standard, and to the model of State constitutions The House of Representatives is periodically

elective, as in all the States; and for the period of two years, as in the State of South Carolina. The Senate is

elective, for the period of six years; which is but one year more than the period of the Senate of Maryland,

and but two more than that of the Senates of New York and Virginia. The President is to continue in office

for the period of four years; as in New York and Delaware, the chief magistrate is elected for three years, and

in South Carolina for two years. In the other States the election is annual. In several of the States, however,

no constitutional provision is made for the impeachment of the chief magistrate. And in Delaware and

The President of the United States is impeachable at any time during his continuance in office. The tenure by

which the judges are to hold their places, is, as it unquestionably ought to be, that of good behavior. The

tenure of the ministerial offices generally, will be a subject of legal regulation, conformably to the reason of

Could any further proof be required of the republican complexion of this system, the most decisive one might

be found in its absolute prohibition of titles of nobility, both under the federal and the State governments; and

``But it was not sufficient,'' say the adversaries of the proposed Constitution, ``for the convention to adhere to

the republican form. They ought, with equal care, to have preserved the FEDERAL form, which regards the

Union as a CONFEDERACY of sovereign states; instead of which, they have framed a NATIONAL

government, which regards the Union as a CONSOLIDATION of the States.'' And it is asked by what

authority this bold and radical innovation was undertaken? The handle which has been made of this objection

Without inquiring into the accuracy of the distinction on which the objection is founded, it will be necessary

to a just estimate of its force, first, to ascertain the real character of the government in question; secondly, to

inquire how far the convention were authorized to propose such a government; and thirdly, how far the duty

First. In order to ascertain the real character of the government, it may be considered in relation to the

foundation on which it is to be established; to the sources from which its ordinary powers are to be drawn; to

the operation of those powers; to the extent of them; and to the authority by which future changes in the

On examining the first relation, it appears, on one hand, that the Constitution is to be founded on the assent

and ratification of the people of America, given by deputies elected for the special purpose; but, on the other,

that this assent and ratification is to be given by the people, not as individuals composing one entire nation,

but as composing the distinct and independent States to which they respectively belong. It is to be the assent

and ratification of the several States, derived from the supreme authority in each State, the authority of the

The act, therefore, establishing the Constitution, will not be a NATIONAL, but a FEDERAL act.

That it will be a federal and not a national act, as these terms are understood by the objectors; the act of the

people, as forming so many independent States, not as forming one aggregate nation, is obvious from this

single consideration, that it is to result neither from the decision of a MAJORITY of the people of the Union,

nor from that of a MAJORITY of the States. It must result from the UNANIMOUS assent of the several

States that are parties to it, differing no otherwise from their ordinary assent than in its being expressed, not

by the legislative authority, but by that of the people themselves. Were the people regarded in this transaction

as forming one nation, the will of the majority of the whole people of the United States would bind the

minority, in the same manner as the majority in each State must bind the minority; and the will of the

majority must be determined either by a comparison of the individual votes, or by considering the will of the

majority of the States as evidence of the will of a majority of the people of the United States. Neither of these

rules have been adopted. Each State, in ratifying the Constitution, is considered as a sovereign body,

independent of all others, and only to be bound by its own voluntary act. In this relation, then, the new

Constitution will, if established, be a FEDERAL, and not a NATIONAL constitution.

The next relation is, to the sources from which the ordinary powers of government are to be derived. The

House of Representatives will derive its powers from the people of America; and the people will be

represented in the same proportion, and on the same principle, as they are in the legislature of a particular

State. So far the government is NATIONAL, not FEDERAL. The Senate, on the other hand, will derive its

powers from the States, as political and coequal societies; and these will be represented on the principle of

equality in the Senate, as they now are in the existing Congress. So far the government is FEDERAL, not

The immediate election of the President is to be made by the States in their political characters. The votes

allotted to them are in a compound ratio, which considers them partly as distinct and coequal societies, partly

as unequal members of the same society. The eventual election, again, is to be made by that branch of the

legislature which consists of the national representatives; but in this particular act they are to be thrown into

the form of individual delegations, from so many distinct and coequal bodies politic. From this aspect of the

government it appears to be of a mixed character, presenting at least as many FEDERAL as NATIONAL

The difference between a federal and national government, as it relates to the OPERATION OF THE

GOVERNMENT, is supposed to consist in this, that in the former the powers operate on the political bodies

composing the Confederacy, in their political capacities; in the latter, on the individual citizens composing

the nation, in their individual capacities. On trying the Constitution by this criterion, it falls under the

NATIONAL, not the FEDERAL character; though perhaps not so completely as has been understood. In

several cases, and particularly in the trial of controversies to which States may be parties, they must be

viewed and proceeded against in their collective and political capacities only. So far the national countenance

of the government on this side seems to be disfigured by a few federal features. But this blemish is perhaps

unavoidable in any plan; and the operation of the government on the people, in their individual capacities, in

its ordinary and most essential proceedings, may, on the whole, designate it, in this relation, a NATIONAL

But if the government be national with regard to the OPERATION of its powers, it changes its aspect again

when we contemplate it in relation to the EXTENT of its powers. The idea of a national government involves

in it, not only an authority over the individual citizens, but an indefinite supremacy over all persons and

things, so far as they are objects of lawful government. Among a people consolidated into one nation, this

supremacy is completely vested in the national legislature. Among communities united for particular

purposes, it is vested partly in the general and partly in the municipal legislatures. In the former case, all local

authorities are subordinate to the supreme; and may be controlled, directed, or abolished by it at pleasure. In

the latter, the local or municipal authorities form distinct and independent portions of the supremacy, no more

subject, within their respective spheres, to the general authority, than the general authority is subject to them,

within its own sphere. In this relation, then, the proposed government cannot be deemed a NATIONAL one;

since its jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States a residuary

and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects. It is true that in controversies relating to the boundary

between the two jurisdictions, the tribunal which is ultimately to decide, is to be established under the general

government. But this does not change the principle of the case. The decision is to be impartially made,

according to the rules of the Constitution; and all the usual and most effectual precautions are taken to secure

Some such tribunal is clearly essential to prevent an appeal to the sword and a dissolution of the compact; and

that it ought to be established under the general rather than under the local governments, or, to speak more

properly, that it could be safely established under the first alone, is a position not likely to be combated.

If we try the Constitution by its last relation to the authority by which amendments are to be made, we find it

neither wholly NATIONAL nor wholly FEDERAL. Were it wholly national, the supreme and ultimate

authority would reside in the MAJORITY of the people of the Union; and this authority would be competent

at all times, like that of a majority of every national society, to alter or abolish its established government.

Were it wholly federal, on the other hand, the concurrence of each State in the Union would be essential to

every alteration that would be binding on all. The mode provided by the plan of the convention is not founded

on either of these principles. In requiring more than a majority, and principles. In requiring more than a

majority, and particularly in computing the proportion by STATES, not by CITIZENS, it departs from the

NATIONAL and advances towards the FEDERAL character; in rendering the concurrence of less than the

whole number of States sufficient, it loses again the FEDERAL and partakes of the NATIONAL character.

The proposed Constitution, therefore, is, in strictness, neither a national nor a federal Constitution, but a

In its foundation it is federal, not national; in the sources from which the ordinary powers of the government

are drawn, it is partly federal and partly national; in the operation of these powers, it is national, not federal;

in the extent of them, again, it is federal, not national; and, finally, in the authoritative mode of introducing

THE SECOND point to be examined is, whether the convention were authorized to frame and propose this

mixed Constitution. The powers of the convention ought, in strictness, to be determined by an inspection of

the commissions given to the members by their respective constituents. As all of these, however, had

reference, either to the recommendation from the meeting at Annapolis, in September, 1786, or to that from

Congress, in February, 1787, it will be sufficient to recur to these particular acts. The act from Annapolis

recommends the ``appointment of commissioners to take into consideration the situation of the United States;

to devise SUCH FURTHER PROVISIONS as shall appear to them necessary to render the Constitution of

the federal government ADEQUATE TO THE EXIGENCIES OF THE UNION; and to report such an act for

that purpose, to the United States in Congress assembled, as when agreed to by them, and afterwards

confirmed by the legislature of every State, will effectually provide for the same. ''The recommendatory act

of Congress is in the words following:``WHEREAS, There is provision in the articles of Confederation and

perpetual Union, for making alterations therein, by the assent of a Congress of the United States, and of the

legislatures of the several States; and whereas experience hath evinced, that there are defects in the present

Confederation; as a mean to remedy which, several of the States, and PARTICULARLY THE STATE OF

NEW YORK, by express instructions to their delegates in Congress, have suggested a convention for the

purposes expressed in the following resolution; and such convention appearing to be the most probable mean

of establishing in these States A FIRM NATIONAL GOVERNMENT:``Resolved, That in the opinion of

Congress it is expedient, that on the second Monday of May next a convention of delegates, who shall have

been appointed by the several States, be held at Philadelphia, for the sole and express purpose OF REVISING

THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, and reporting to Congress and the several legislatures such

ALTERATIONS AND PROVISIONS THEREIN, as shall, when agreed to in Congress, and confirmed by

the States, render the federal Constitution ADEQUATE TO THE EXIGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT AND

THE PRESERVATION OF THE UNION. ''From these two acts, it appears, 1st, that the object of the

convention was to establish, in these States, A FIRM NATIONAL GOVERNMENT; 2d, that this

government was to be such as would be ADEQUATE TO THE EXIGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT and

THE PRESERVATION OF THE UNION; 3d, that these purposes were to be effected by ALTERATIONS

AND PROVISIONS IN THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, as it is expressed in the act of Congress,

recommendatory act from Annapolis; 4th, that the alterations and provisions were to be reported to Congress,

and to the States, in order to be agreed to by the former and confirmed by the latter. From a comparison and

fair construction of these several modes of expression, is to be deduced the authority under which the

convention acted. They were to frame a NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, adequate to the EXIGENCIES OF

GOVERNMENT, and OF THE UNION; and to reduce the articles of Confederation into such form as to

There are two rules of construction, dictated by plain reason, as well as founded on legal axioms. The one is,

that every part of the expression ought, if possible, to be allowed some meaning, and be made to conspire to

some common end. The other is, that where the several parts cannot be made to coincide, the less important

should give way to the more important part; the means should be sacrificed to the end, rather than the end to

the means. Suppose, then, that the expressions defining the authority of the convention were irreconcilably at

variance with each other; that a NATIONAL and ADEQUATE GOVERNMENT could not possibly, in the

judgment of the convention, be affected by ALTERATIONS and PROVISIONS in the ARTICLES OF

CONFEDERATION; which part of the definition ought to have been embraced, and which rejected? Which

was the more important, which the less important part? Which the end; which the means? Let the most

scrupulous expositors of delegated powers; let the most inveterate objectors against those exercised by the

convention, answer these questions. Let them declare, whether it was of most importance to the happiness of

the people of America, that the articles of Confederation should be disregarded, and an adequate government

be provided, and the Union preserved; or that an adequate government should be omitted, and the articles of

Confederation preserved. Let them declare, whether the preservation of these articles was the end, for

securing which a reform of the government was to be introduced as the means; or whether the establishment

of a government, adequate to the national happiness, was the end at which these articles themselves originally

aimed, and to which they ought, as insufficient means, to have been sacrificed. But is it necessary to suppose

that these expressions are absolutely irreconcilable to each other; that no ALTERATIONS or PROVISIONS

in THE ARTICLES OF THE CONFEDERATION could possibly mould them into a national and adequate

government; into such a government as has been proposed by the convention? No stress, it is presumed, will,

in this case, be laid on the TITLE; a change of that could never be deemed an exercise of ungranted power.

ALTERATIONS in the body of the instrument are expressly authorized. NEW PROVISIONS therein are also

expressly authorized. Here then is a power to change the title; to insert new articles; to alter old ones. Must it

of necessity be admitted that this power is infringed, so long as a part of the old articles remain? Those who

maintain the affirmative ought at least to mark the boundary between authorized and usurped innovations;

between that degree of change which lies within the compass of ALTERATIONS AND FURTHER

PROVISIONS, and that which amounts to a TRANSMUTATION of the government. Will it be said that the

alterations ought not to have touched the substance of the Confederation? The States would never have

appointed a convention with so much solemnity, nor described its objects with so much latitude, if some

SUBSTANTIAL reform had not been in contemplation. Will it be said that the FUNDAMENTAL

PRINCIPLES of the Confederation were not within the purview of the convention, and ought not to have

been varied? I ask, What are these principles? Do they require that, in the establishment of the Constitution,

the States should be regarded as distinct and independent sovereigns? They are so regarded by the

Constitution proposed. Do they require that the members of the government should derive their appointment

from the legislatures, not from the people of the States? One branch of the new government is to be appointed

by these legislatures; and under the Confederation, the delegates to Congress MAY ALL be appointed

immediately by the people, and in two States1 are actually so appointed. Do they require that the powers of

the government should act on the States, and not immediately on individuals? In some instances, as has been

shown, the powers of the new government will act on the States in their collective characters. In some

instances, also, those of the existing government act immediately on individuals. In cases of capture; of

piracy; of the post office; of coins, weights, and measures; of trade with the Indians; of claims under grants of

land by different States; and, above all, in the case of trials by courtsmarshal in the army and navy, by

which death may be inflicted without the intervention of a jury, or even of a civil magistrate; in all these cases

the powers of the Confederation operate immediately on the persons and interests of individual citizens. Do

these fundamental principles require, particularly, that no tax should be levied without the intermediate

agency of the States? The Confederation itself authorizes a direct tax, to a certain extent, on the post office.

The power of coinage has been so construed by Congress as to levy a tribute immediately from that source

also. But pretermitting these instances, was it not an acknowledged object of the convention and the universal

expectation of the people, that the regulation of trade should be submitted to the general government in such a

form as would render it an immediate source of general revenue? Had not Congress repeatedly recommended

this measure as not inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the Confederation? Had not every State

but one; had not New York herself, so far complied with the plan of Congress as to recognize the

PRINCIPLE of the innovation? Do these principles, in fine, require that the powers of the general

government should be limited, and that, beyond this limit, the States should be left in possession of their

sovereignty and independence? We have seen that in the new government, as in the old, the general powers

are limited; and that the States, in all unenumerated cases, are left in the enjoyment of their sovereign and

independent jurisdiction. The truth is, that the great principles of the Constitution proposed by the convention

may be considered less as absolutely new, than as the expansion of principles which are found in the articles

of Confederation. The misfortune under the latter system has been, that these principles are so feeble and

confined as to justify all the charges of inefficiency which have been urged against it, and to require a degree

of enlargement which gives to the new system the aspect of an entire transformation of the old. In one

particular it is admitted that the convention have departed from the tenor of their commission. Instead of

reporting a plan requiring the confirmation OF THE LEGISLATURES OF ALL THE STATES, they have

reported a plan which is to be confirmed by the PEOPLE, and may be carried into effect by NINE STATES

ONLY. It is worthy of remark that this objection, though the most plausible, has been the least urged in the

publications which have swarmed against the convention. The forbearance can only have proceeded from an

irresistible conviction of the absurdity of subjecting the fate of twelve States to the perverseness or corruption

of a thirteenth; from the example of inflexible opposition given by a MAJORITY of one sixtieth of the people

of America to a measure approved and called for by the voice of twelve States, comprising fiftynine

sixtieths of the people an example still fresh in the memory and indignation of every citizen who has felt for

the wounded honor and prosperity of his country. As this objection, therefore, has been in a manner waived

by those who have criticised the powers of the convention, I dismiss it without further observation. The

THIRD point to be inquired into is, how far considerations of duty arising out of the case itself could have

supplied any defect of regular authority. In the preceding inquiries the powers of the convention have been

analyzed and tried with the same rigor, and by the same rules, as if they had been real and final powers for

the establishment of a Constitution for the United States. We have seen in what manner they have borne the

trial even on that supposition. It is time now to recollect that the powers were merely advisory and

recommendatory; that they were so meant by the States, and so understood by the convention; and that the

latter have accordingly planned and proposed a Constitution which is to be of no more consequence than the

paper on which it is written, unless it be stamped with the approbation of those to whom it is addressed. This

reflection places the subject in a point of view altogether different, and will enable us to judge with propriety

of the course taken by the convention. Let us view the ground on which the convention stood. It may be

collected from their proceedings, that they were deeply and unanimously impressed with the crisis, which had

led their country almost with one voice to make so singular and solemn an experiment for correcting the

errors of a system by which this crisis had been produced; that they were no less deeply and unanimously

convinced that such a reform as they have proposed was absolutely necessary to effect the purposes of their

appointment. It could not be unknown to them that the hopes and expectations of the great body of citizens,

throughout this great empire, were turned with the keenest anxiety to the event of their deliberations. They

had every reason to believe that the contrary sentiments agitated the minds and bosoms of every external and

internal foe to the liberty and prosperity of the United States. They had seen in the origin and progress of the

experiment, the alacrity with which the PROPOSITION, made by a single State (Virginia), towards a partial

amendment of the Confederation, had been attended to and promoted. They had seen the LIBERTY

ASSUMED by a VERY FEW deputies from a VERY FEW States, convened at Annapolis, of recommending

a great and critical object, wholly foreign to their commission, not only justified by the public opinion, but

actually carried into effect by twelve out of the thirteen States. They had seen, in a variety of instances,

assumptions by Congress, not only of recommendatory, but of operative, powers, warranted, in the public

estimation, by occasions and objects infinitely less urgent than those by which their conduct was to be

governed. They must have reflected, that in all great changes of established governments, forms ought to give

way to substance; that a rigid adherence in such cases to the former, would render nominal and nugatory the

transcendent and precious right of the people to ``abolish or alter their governments as to them shall seem

most likely to effect their safety and happiness,''2 since it is impossible for the people spontaneously and

universally to move in concert towards their object; and it is therefore essential that such changes be

instituted by some INFORMAL AND UNAUTHORIZED PROPOSITIONS, made by some patriotic and

respectable citizen or number of citizens. They must have recollected that it was by this irregular and

assumed privilege of proposing to the people plans for their safety and happiness, that the States were first

united against the danger with which they were threatened by their ancient government; that committees and

congresses were formed for concentrating their efforts and defending their rights; and that CONVENTIONS

were ELECTED in THE SEVERAL STATES for establishing the constitutions under which they are now

governed; nor could it have been forgotten that no little illtimed scruples, no zeal for adhering to ordinary

forms, were anywhere seen, except in those who wished to indulge, under these masks, their secret enmity to

the substance contended for. They must have borne in mind, that as the plan to be framed and proposed was

to be submitted TO THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, the disapprobation of this supreme authority would

destroy it forever; its approbation blot out antecedent errors and irregularities. It might even have occurred to

them, that where a disposition to cavil prevailed, their neglect to execute the degree of power vested in them,

and still more their recommendation of any measure whatever, not warranted by their commission, would not

less excite animadversion, than a recommendation at once of a measure fully commensurate to the national

exigencies. Had the convention, under all these impressions, and in the midst of all these considerations,

instead of exercising a manly confidence in their country, by whose confidence they had been so peculiarly

distinguished, and of pointing out a system capable, in their judgment, of securing its happiness, taken the

cold and sullen resolution of disappointing its ardent hopes, of sacrificing substance to forms, of committing

the dearest interests of their country to the uncertainties of delay and the hazard of events, let me ask the man

who can raise his mind to one elevated conception, who can awaken in his bosom one patriotic emotion, what

judgment ought to have been pronounced by the impartial world, by the friends of mankind, by every

virtuous citizen, on the conduct and character of this assembly? Or if there be a man whose propensity to

condemn is susceptible of no control, let me then ask what sentence he has in reserve for the twelve States

who USURPED THE POWER of sending deputies to the convention, a body utterly unknown to their

constitutions; for Congress, who recommended the appointment of this body, equally unknown to the

Confederation; and for the State of New York, in particular, which first urged and then complied with this

unauthorized interposition? But that the objectors may be disarmed of every pretext, it shall be granted for a

moment that the convention were neither authorized by their commission, nor justified by circumstances in

proposing a Constitution for their country: does it follow that the Constitution ought, for that reason alone, to

be rejected? If, according to the noble precept, it be lawful to accept good advice even from an enemy, shall

we set the ignoble example of refusing such advice even when it is offered by our friends? The prudent

inquiry, in all cases, ought surely to be, not so much FROM WHOM the advice comes, as whether the advice

be GOOD. The sum of what has been here advanced and proved is, that the charge against the convention of

exceeding their powers, except in one instance little urged by the objectors, has no foundation to support it;

that if they had exceeded their powers, they were not only warranted, but required, as the confidential

servants of their country, by the circumstances in which they were placed, to exercise the liberty which they

assume; and that finally, if they had violated both their powers and their obligations, in proposing a

Constitution, this ought nevertheless to be embraced, if it be calculated to accomplish the views and

happiness of the people of America. How far this character is due to the Constitution, is the subject under

THE Constitution proposed by the convention may be considered under two general points of view. The

FIRST relates to the sum or quantity of power which it vests in the government, including the restraints

imposed on the States. The SECOND, to the particular structure of the government, and the distribution of

this power among its several branches. Under the FIRST view of the subject, two important questions arise:

1. Whether any part of the powers transferred to the general government be unnecessary or improper? 2.

Whether the entire mass of them be dangerous to the portion of jurisdiction left in the several States? Is the

aggregate power of the general government greater than ought to have been vested in it? This is the FIRST

question. It cannot have escaped those who have attended with candor to the arguments employed against the

extensive powers of the government, that the authors of them have very little considered how far these

powers were necessary means of attaining a necessary end. They have chosen rather to dwell on the

inconveniences which must be unavoidably blended with all political advantages; and on the possible abuses

which must be incident to every power or trust, of which a beneficial use can be made. This method of

handling the subject cannot impose on the good sense of the people of America. It may display the subtlety of

the writer; it may open a boundless field for rhetoric and declamation; it may inflame the passions of the

unthinking, and may confirm the prejudices of the misthinking: but cool and candid people will at once

reflect, that the purest of human blessings must have a portion of alloy in them; that the choice must always

be made, if not of the lesser evil, at least of the GREATER, not the PERFECT, good; and that in every

political institution, a power to advance the public happiness involves a discretion which may be misapplied

and abused. They will see, therefore, that in all cases where power is to be conferred, the point first to be

decided is, whether such a power be necessary to the public good; as the next will be, in case of an

affirmative decision, to guard as effectually as possible against a perversion of the power to the public

detriment. That we may form a correct judgment on this subject, it will be proper to review the several

powers conferred on the government of the Union; and that this may be the more conveniently done they may

be reduced into different classes as they relate to the following different objects: 1. Security against foreign

Maintenance of harmony and proper intercourse among the States; 4. Certain miscellaneous objects of

Provisions for giving due efficacy to all these powers. The powers falling within the FIRST class are those of

declaring war and granting letters of marque; of providing armies and fleets; of regulating and calling forth

the militia; of levying and borrowing money. Security against foreign danger is one of the primitive objects

of civil society. It is an avowed and essential object of the American Union. The powers requisite for

attaining it must be effectually confided to the federal councils. Is the power of declaring war necessary? No

man will answer this question in the negative. It would be superfluous, therefore, to enter into a proof of the

affirmative. The existing Confederation establishes this power in the most ample form. Is the power of raising

armies and equipping fleets necessary? This is involved in the foregoing power. It is involved in the power of

selfdefense. But was it necessary to give an INDEFINITE POWER of raising TROOPS, as well as

providing fleets; and of maintaining both in PEACE, as well as in war? The answer to these questions has

been too far anticipated in another place to admit an extensive discussion of them in this place. The answer

indeed seems to be so obvious and conclusive as scarcely to justify such a discussion in any place. With what

color of propriety could the force necessary for defense be limited by those who cannot limit the force of

offense? If a federal Constitution could chain the ambition or set bounds to the exertions of all other nations,

then indeed might it prudently chain the discretion of its own government, and set bounds to the exertions for

How could a readiness for war in time of peace be safely prohibited, unless we could prohibit, in like manner,

the preparations and establishments of every hostile nation? The means of security can only be regulated by

the means and the danger of attack. They will, in fact, be ever determined by these rules, and by no others. It

is in vain to oppose constitutional barriers to the impulse of selfpreservation. It is worse than in vain;

because it plants in the Constitution itself necessary usurpations of power, every precedent of which is a germ

of unnecessary and multiplied repetitions. If one nation maintains constantly a disciplined army, ready for the

service of ambition or revenge, it obliges the most pacific nations who may be within the reach of its

The fifteenth century was the unhappy epoch of military establishments in the time of peace. They were

introduced by Charles VII. of France. All Europe has followed, or been forced into, the example. Had the

example not been followed by other nations, all Europe must long ago have worn the chains of a universal

monarch. Were every nation except France now to disband its peace establishments, the same event might

follow. The veteran legions of Rome were an overmatch for the undisciplined valor of all other nations and

rendered her the mistress of the world. Not the less true is it, that the liberties of Rome proved the final victim

to her military triumphs; and that the liberties of Europe, as far as they ever existed, have, with few

exceptions, been the price of her military establishments. A standing force, therefore, is a dangerous, at the

same time that it may be a necessary, provision. On the smallest scale it has its inconveniences. On an

extensive scale its consequences may be fatal. On any scale it is an object of laudable circumspection and

precaution. A wise nation will combine all these considerations; and, whilst it does not rashly preclude itself

from any resource which may become essential to its safety, will exert all its prudence in diminishing both

the necessity and the danger of resorting to one which may be inauspicious to its liberties. The clearest marks

of this prudence are stamped on the proposed Constitution. The Union itself, which it cements and secures,

destroys every pretext for a military establishment which could be dangerous. America united, with a handful

of troops, or without a single soldier, exhibits a more forbidding posture to foreign ambition than America

disunited, with a hundred thousand veterans ready for combat. It was remarked, on a former occasion, that the

want of this pretext had saved the liberties of one nation in Europe. Being rendered by her insular situation

and her maritime resources impregnable to the armies of her neighbors, the rulers of Great Britain have never

been able, by real or artificial dangers, to cheat the public into an extensive peace establishment. The distance

of the United States from the powerful nations of the world gives them the same happy security. A dangerous

establishment can never be necessary or plausible, so long as they continue a united people. But let it never,

for a moment, be forgotten that they are indebted for this advantage to the Union alone. The moment of its

dissolution will be the date of a new order of things. The fears of the weaker, or the ambition of the stronger

States, or Confederacies, will set the same example in the New, as Charles VII. did in the Old World. The

example will be followed here from the same motives which produced universal imitation there. Instead of

deriving from our situation the precious advantage which Great Britain has derived from hers, the face of

America will be but a copy of that of the continent of Europe. It will present liberty everywhere crushed

between standing armies and perpetual taxes. The fortunes of disunited America will be even more disastrous

than those of Europe. The sources of evil in the latter are confined to her own limits. No superior powers of

another quarter of the globe intrigue among her rival nations, inflame their mutual animosities, and render

them the instruments of foreign ambition, jealousy, and revenge. In America the miseries springing from her

internal jealousies, contentions, and wars, would form a part only of her lot. A plentiful addition of evils

would have their source in that relation in which Europe stands to this quarter of the earth, and which no

other quarter of the earth bears to Europe. This picture of the consequences of disunion cannot be too highly

colored, or too often exhibited. Every man who loves peace, every man who loves his country, every man

who loves liberty, ought to have it ever before his eyes, that he may cherish in his heart a due attachment to

the Union of America, and be able to set a due value on the means of preserving it.

Next to the effectual establishment of the Union, the best possible precaution against danger from standing

armies is a limitation of the term for which revenue may be appropriated to their support. This precaution the

Constitution has prudently added. I will not repeat here the observations which I flatter myself have placed

this subject in a just and satisfactory light. But it may not be improper to take notice of an argument against

this part of the Constitution, which has been drawn from the policy and practice of Great Britain. It is said

that the continuance of an army in that kingdom requires an annual vote of the legislature; whereas the

American Constitution has lengthened this critical period to two years. This is the form in which the

comparison is usually stated to the public: but is it a just form? Is it a fair comparison? Does the British

Constitution restrain the parliamentary discretion to one year? Does the American impose on the Congress

appropriations for two years? On the contrary, it cannot be unknown to the authors of the fallacy themselves,

that the British Constitution fixes no limit whatever to the discretion of the legislature, and that the American

ties down the legislature to two years, as the longest admissible term. Had the argument from the British

example been truly stated, it would have stood thus: The term for which supplies may be appropriated to the

army establishment, though unlimited by the British Constitution, has nevertheless, in practice, been limited

by parliamentary discretion to a single year. Now, if in Great Britain, where the House of Commons is

elected for seven years; where so great a proportion of the members are elected by so small a proportion of

the people; where the electors are so corrupted by the representatives, and the representatives so corrupted by

the Crown, the representative body can possess a power to make appropriations to the army for an indefinite

term, without desiring, or without daring, to extend the term beyond a single year, ought not suspicion herself

to blush, in pretending that the representatives of the United States, elected FREELY by the WHOLE BODY

of the people, every SECOND YEAR, cannot be safely intrusted with the discretion over such appropriations,

expressly limited to the short period of TWO YEARS? A bad cause seldom fails to betray itself. Of this truth,

the management of the opposition to the federal government is an unvaried exemplification. But among all

the blunders which have been committed, none is more striking than the attempt to enlist on that side the

prudent jealousy entertained by the people, of standing armies. The attempt has awakened fully the public

attention to that important subject; and has led to investigations which must terminate in a thorough and

universal conviction, not only that the constitution has provided the most effectual guards against danger

from that quarter, but that nothing short of a Constitution fully adequate to the national defense and the

preservation of the Union, can save America from as many standing armies as it may be split into States or

Confederacies, and from such a progressive augmentation, of these establishments in each, as will render

them as burdensome to the properties and ominous to the liberties of the people, as any establishment that can

become necessary, under a united and efficient government, must be tolerable to the former and safe to the

latter. The palpable necessity of the power to provide and maintain a navy has protected that part of the

Constitution against a spirit of censure, which has spared few other parts. It must, indeed, be numbered

among the greatest blessings of America, that as her Union will be the only source of her maritime strength,

so this will be a principal source of her security against danger from abroad. In this respect our situation bears

another likeness to the insular advantage of Great Britain. The batteries most capable of repelling foreign

enterprises on our safety, are happily such as can never be turned by a perfidious government against our

liberties. The inhabitants of the Atlantic frontier are all of them deeply interested in this provision for naval

protection, and if they have hitherto been suffered to sleep quietly in their beds; if their property has remained

safe against the predatory spirit of licentious adventurers; if their maritime towns have not yet been

compelled to ransom themselves from the terrors of a conflagration, by yielding to the exactions of daring

and sudden invaders, these instances of good fortune are not to be ascribed to the capacity of the existing

government for the protection of those from whom it claims allegiance, but to causes that are fugitive and

fallacious. If we except perhaps Virginia and Maryland, which are peculiarly vulnerable on their eastern

frontiers, no part of the Union ought to feel more anxiety on this subject than New York. Her seacoast is

extensive. A very important district of the State is an island. The State itself is penetrated by a large navigable

river for more than fifty leagues. The great emporium of its commerce, the great reservoir of its wealth, lies

every moment at the mercy of events, and may almost be regarded as a hostage for ignominious compliances

with the dictates of a foreign enemy, or even with the rapacious demands of pirates and barbarians. Should a

war be the result of the precarious situation of European affairs, and all the unruly passions attending it be let

loose on the ocean, our escape from insults and depredations, not only on that element, but every part of the

other bordering on it, will be truly miraculous. In the present condition of America, the States more

immediately exposed to these calamities have nothing to hope from the phantom of a general government

which now exists; and if their single resources were equal to the task of fortifying themselves against the

danger, the object to be protected would be almost consumed by the means of protecting them. The power of

regulating and calling forth the militia has been already sufficiently vindicated and explained. The power of

levying and borrowing money, being the sinew of that which is to be exerted in the national defense, is

properly thrown into the same class with it. This power, also, has been examined already with much attention,

and has, I trust, been clearly shown to be necessary, both in the extent and form given to it by the

Constitution. I will address one additional reflection only to those who contend that the power ought to have

been restrained to external taxation by which they mean, taxes on articles imported from other countries. It

cannot be doubted that this will always be a valuable source of revenue; that for a considerable time it must

be a principal source; that at this moment it is an essential one. But we may form very mistaken ideas on this

subject, if we do not call to mind in our calculations, that the extent of revenue drawn from foreign commerce

must vary with the variations, both in the extent and the kind of imports; and that these variations do not

correspond with the progress of population, which must be the general measure of the public wants. As long

as agriculture continues the sole field of labor, the importation of manufactures must increase as the

consumers multiply. As soon as domestic manufactures are begun by the hands not called for by agriculture,

the imported manufactures will decrease as the numbers of people increase. In a more remote stage, the

imports may consist in a considerable part of raw materials, which will be wrought into articles for

exportation, and will, therefore, require rather the encouragement of bounties, than to be loaded with

discouraging duties. A system of government, meant for duration, ought to contemplate these revolutions,

and be able to accommodate itself to them. Some, who have not denied the necessity of the power of taxation,

have grounded a very fierce attack against the Constitution, on the language in which it is defined. It has been

urged and echoed, that the power ``to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts, and

provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States,'' amounts to an unlimited

commission to exercise every power which may be alleged to be necessary for the common defense or

general welfare. No stronger proof could be given of the distress under which these writers labor for

objections, than their stooping to such a misconstruction. Had no other enumeration or definition of the

powers of the Congress been found in the Constitution, than the general expressions just cited, the authors of

the objection might have had some color for it; though it would have been difficult to find a reason for so

awkward a form of describing an authority to legislate in all possible cases. A power to destroy the freedom

of the press, the trial by jury, or even to regulate the course of descents, or the forms of conveyances, must be

very singularly expressed by the terms ``to raise money for the general welfare. ''But what color can the

objection have, when a specification of the objects alluded to by these general terms immediately follows,

and is not even separated by a longer pause than a semicolon? If the different parts of the same instrument

ought to be so expounded, as to give meaning to every part which will bear it, shall one part of the same

sentence be excluded altogether from a share in the meaning; and shall the more doubtful and indefinite terms

be retained in their full extent, and the clear and precise expressions be denied any signification whatsoever?

For what purpose could the enumeration of particular powers be inserted, if these and all others were meant

to be included in the preceding general power? Nothing is more natural nor common than first to use a

general phrase, and then to explain and qualify it by a recital of particulars. But the idea of an enumeration of

particulars which neither explain nor qualify the general meaning, and can have no other effect than to

confound and mislead, is an absurdity, which, as we are reduced to the dilemma of charging either on the

authors of the objection or on the authors of the Constitution, we must take the liberty of supposing, had not

its origin with the latter. The objection here is the more extraordinary, as it appears that the language used by

the convention is a copy from the articles of Confederation. The objects of the Union among the States, as

described in article third, are ``their common defense, security of their liberties, and mutual and general

welfare. '' The terms of article eighth are still more identical: ``All charges of war and all other expenses that

shall be incurred for the common defense or general welfare, and allowed by the United States in Congress,

shall be defrayed out of a common treasury,'' etc. A similar language again occurs in article ninth. Construe

either of these articles by the rules which would justify the construction put on the new Constitution, and they

But what would have been thought of that assembly, if, attaching themselves to these general expressions,

and disregarding the specifications which ascertain and limit their import, they had exercised an unlimited

power of providing for the common defense and general welfare? I appeal to the objectors themselves,

whether they would in that case have employed the same reasoning in justification of Congress as they now

make use of against the convention. How difficult it is for error to escape its own condemnation! PUBLIUS.

THE SECOND class of powers, lodged in the general government, consists of those which regulate the

intercourse with foreign nations, to wit: to make treaties; to send and receive ambassadors, other public

ministers, and consuls; to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses

against the law of nations; to regulate foreign commerce, including a power to prohibit, after the year 1808,

the importation of slaves, and to lay an intermediate duty of ten dollars per head, as a discouragement to such

importations. This class of powers forms an obvious and essential branch of the federal administration. If we

are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other nations. The powers to make

treaties and to send and receive ambassadors, speak their own propriety. Both of them are comprised in the

articles of Confederation, with this difference only, that the former is disembarrassed, by the plan of the

convention, of an exception, under which treaties might be substantially frustrated by regulations of the

States; and that a power of appointing and receiving ``other public ministers and consuls,'' is expressly and

very properly added to the former provision concerning ambassadors. The term ambassador, if taken strictly,

as seems to be required by the second of the articles of Confederation, comprehends the highest grade only of

public ministers, and excludes the grades which the United States will be most likely to prefer, where foreign

embassies may be necessary. And under no latitude of construction will the term comprehend consuls. Yet it

has been found expedient, and has been the practice of Congress, to employ the inferior grades of public

ministers, and to send and receive consuls. It is true, that where treaties of commerce stipulate for the mutual

appointment of consuls, whose functions are connected with commerce, the admission of foreign consuls

may fall within the power of making commercial treaties; and that where no such treaties exist, the mission of

American consuls into foreign countries may PERHAPS be covered under the authority, given by the ninth

article of the Confederation, to appoint all such civil officers as may be necessary for managing the general

affairs of the United States. But the admission of consuls into the United States, where no previous treaty has

stipulated it, seems to have been nowhere provided for. A supply of the omission is one of the lesser instances

in which the convention have improved on the model before them. But the most minute provisions become

important when they tend to obviate the necessity or the pretext for gradual and unobserved usurpations of

power. A list of the cases in which Congress have been betrayed, or forced by the defects of the

Confederation, into violations of their chartered authorities, would not a little surprise those who have paid no

attention to the subject; and would be no inconsiderable argument in favor of the new Constitution, which

seems to have provided no less studiously for the lesser, than the more obvious and striking defects of the

old. The power to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against

the law of nations, belongs with equal propriety to the general government, and is a still greater improvement

on the articles of Confederation. These articles contain no provision for the case of offenses against the law of

nations; and consequently leave it in the power of any indiscreet member to embroil the Confederacy with

foreign nations. The provision of the federal articles on the subject of piracies and felonies extends no further

than to the establishment of courts for the trial of these offenses. The definition of piracies might, perhaps,

without inconveniency, be left to the law of nations; though a legislative definition of them is found in most

A definition of felonies on the high seas is evidently requisite. Felony is a term of loose signification, even in

the common law of England; and of various import in the statute law of that kingdom. But neither the

common nor the statute law of that, or of any other nation, ought to be a standard for the proceedings of this,

unless previously made its own by legislative adoption. The meaning of the term, as defined in the codes of

the several States, would be as impracticable as the former would be a dishonorable and illegitimate guide. It

is not precisely the same in any two of the States; and varies in each with every revision of its criminal laws.

For the sake of certainty and uniformity, therefore, the power of defining felonies in this case was in every

The regulation of foreign commerce, having fallen within several views which have been taken of this

subject, has been too fully discussed to need additional proofs here of its being properly submitted to the

federal administration. It were doubtless to be wished, that the power of prohibiting the importation of slaves

had not been postponed until the year 1808, or rather that it had been suffered to have immediate operation.

But it is not difficult to account, either for this restriction on the general government, or for the manner in

which the whole clause is expressed. It ought to be considered as a great point gained in favor of humanity,

that a period of twenty years may terminate forever, within these States, a traffic which has so long and so

loudly upbraided the barbarism of modern policy; that within that period, it will receive a considerable

discouragement from the federal government, and may be totally abolished, by a concurrence of the few

States which continue the unnatural traffic, in the prohibitory example which has been given by so great a

majority of the Union. Happy would it be for the unfortunate Africans, if an equal prospect lay before them of

being redeemed from the oppressions of their European brethren! Attempts have been made to pervert this

clause into an objection against the Constitution, by representing it on one side as a criminal toleration of an

illicit practice, and on another as calculated to prevent voluntary and beneficial emigrations from Europe to

America. I mention these misconstructions, not with a view to give them an answer, for they deserve none,

but as specimens of the manner and spirit in which some have thought fit to conduct their opposition to the

proposed government. The powers included in the THIRD class are those which provide for the harmony and

proper intercourse among the States. Under this head might be included the particular restraints imposed on

the authority of the States, and certain powers of the judicial department; but the former are reserved for a

distinct class, and the latter will be particularly examined when we arrive at the structure and organization of

the government. I shall confine myself to a cursory review of the remaining powers comprehended under this

third description, to wit: to regulate commerce among the several States and the Indian tribes; to coin money,

regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin; to provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the current

coin and secureties of the United States; to fix the standard of weights and measures; to establish a uniform

rule of naturalization, and uniform laws of bankruptcy, to prescribe the manner in which the public acts,

records, and judicial proceedings of each State shall be proved, and the effect they shall have in other States;

and to establish post offices and post roads. The defect of power in the existing Confederacy to regulate the

commerce between its several members, is in the number of those which have been clearly pointed out by

experience. To the proofs and remarks which former papers have brought into view on this subject, it may be

added that without this supplemental provision, the great and essential power of regulating foreign commerce

would have been incomplete and ineffectual. A very material object of this power was the relief of the States

which import and export through other States, from the improper contributions levied on them by the latter.

Were these at liberty to regulate the trade between State and State, it must be foreseen that ways would be

found out to load the articles of import and export, during the passage through their jurisdiction, with duties

which would fall on the makers of the latter and the consumers of the former. We may be assured by past

experience, that such a practice would be introduced by future contrivances; and both by that and a common

knowledge of human affairs, that it would nourish unceasing animosities, and not improbably terminate in

serious interruptions of the public tranquillity. To those who do not view the question through the medium of

passion or of interest, the desire of the commercial States to collect, in any form, an indirect revenue from

their uncommercial neighbors, must appear not less impolitic than it is unfair; since it would stimulate the

injured party, by resentment as well as interest, to resort to less convenient channels for their foreign trade.

But the mild voice of reason, pleading the cause of an enlarged and permanent interest, is but too often

drowned, before public bodies as well as individuals, by the clamors of an impatient avidity for immediate

and immoderate gain. The necessity of a superintending authority over the reciprocal trade of confederated

States, has been illustrated by other examples as well as our own. In Switzerland, where the Union is so very

slight, each canton is obliged to allow to merchandises a passage through its jurisdiction into other cantons,

without an augmentation of the tolls. In Germany it is a law of the empire, that the princes and states shall not

lay tolls or customs on bridges, rivers, or passages, without the consent of the emperor and the diet; though it

appears from a quotation in an antecedent paper, that the practice in this, as in many other instances in that

confederacy, has not followed the law, and has produced there the mischiefs which have been foreseen here.

Among the restraints imposed by the Union of the Netherlands on its members, one is, that they shall not

establish imposts disadvantageous to their neighbors, without the general permission. The regulation of

commerce with the Indian tribes is very properly unfettered from two limitations in the articles of

Confederation, which render the provision obscure and contradictory. The power is there restrained to

Indians, not members of any of the States, and is not to violate or infringe the legislative right of any State

within its own limits. What description of Indians are to be deemed members of a State, is not yet settled, and

has been a question of frequent perplexity and contention in the federal councils. And how the trade with

Indians, though not members of a State, yet residing within its legislative jurisdiction, can be regulated by an

external authority, without so far intruding on the internal rights of legislation, is absolutely

incomprehensible. This is not the only case in which the articles of Confederation have inconsiderately

endeavored to accomplish impossibilities; to reconcile a partial sovereignty in the Union, with complete

sovereignty in the States; to subvert a mathematical axiom, by taking away a part, and letting the whole

remain. All that need be remarked on the power to coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign

coin, is, that by providing for this last case, the Constitution has supplied a material omission in the articles of

Confederation. The authority of the existing Congress is restrained to the regulation of coin STRUCK by

their own authority, or that of the respective States. It must be seen at once that the proposed uniformity in

the VALUE of the current coin might be destroyed by subjecting that of foreign coin to the different

regulations of the different States. The punishment of counterfeiting the public securities, as well as the

current coin, is submitted of course to that authority which is to secure the value of both. The regulation of

weights and measures is transferred from the articles of Confederation, and is founded on like considerations

The dissimilarity in the rules of naturalization has long been remarked as a fault in our system, and as laying

a foundation for intricate and delicate questions. In the fourth article of the Confederation, it is declared ``that

the FREE INHABITANTS of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice, excepted,

shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of FREE CITIZENS in the several States; and THE

PEOPLE of each State shall, in every other, enjoy all the privileges of trade and commerce,'' etc. There is a

confusion of language here, which is remarkable. Why the terms FREE INHABITANTS are used in one part

of the article, FREE CITIZENS in another, and PEOPLE in another; or what was meant by superadding to

``all privileges and immunities of free citizens,'' ``all the privileges of trade and commerce,'' cannot easily be

determined. It seems to be a construction scarcely avoidable, however, that those who come under the

denomination of FREE INHABITANTS of a State, although not citizens of such State, are entitled, in every

other State, to all the privileges of FREE CITIZENS of the latter; that is, to greater privileges than they may

be entitled to in their own State: so that it may be in the power of a particular State, or rather every State is

laid under a necessity, not only to confer the rights of citizenship in other States upon any whom it may admit

to such rights within itself, but upon any whom it may allow to become inhabitants within its jurisdiction. But

were an exposition of the term ``inhabitants'' to be admitted which would confine the stipulated privileges to

citizens alone, the difficulty is diminished only, not removed. The very improper power would still be

retained by each State, of naturalizing aliens in every other State. In one State, residence for a short term

confirms all the rights of citizenship: in another, qualifications of greater importance are required. An alien,

therefore, legally incapacitated for certain rights in the latter, may, by previous residence only in the former,

elude his incapacity; and thus the law of one State be preposterously rendered paramount to the law of

another, within the jurisdiction of the other. We owe it to mere casualty, that very serious embarrassments on

this subject have been hitherto escaped. By the laws of several States, certain descriptions of aliens, who had

rendered themselves obnoxious, were laid under interdicts inconsistent not only with the rights of citizenship

but with the privilege of residence. What would have been the consequence, if such persons, by residence or

otherwise, had acquired the character of citizens under the laws of another State, and then asserted their rights

as such, both to residence and citizenship, within the State proscribing them? Whatever the legal

consequences might have been, other consequences would probably have resulted, of too serious a nature not

to be provided against. The new Constitution has accordingly, with great propriety, made provision against

them, and all others proceeding from the defect of the Confederation on this head, by authorizing the general

government to establish a uniform rule of naturalization throughout the United States. The power of

establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy is so intimately connected with the regulation of commerce, and will

prevent so many frauds where the parties or their property may lie or be removed into different States, that

the expediency of it seems not likely to be drawn into question. The power of prescribing by general laws, the

manner in which the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of each State shall be proved, and the effect

they shall have in other States, is an evident and valuable improvement on the clause relating to this subject

in the articles of Confederation. The meaning of the latter is extremely indeterminate, and can be of little

importance under any interpretation which it will bear. The power here established may be rendered a very

convenient instrument of justice, and be particularly beneficial on the borders of contiguous States, where the

effects liable to justice may be suddenly and secretly translated, in any stage of the process, within a foreign

jurisdiction. The power of establishing post roads must, in every view, be a harmless power, and may,

perhaps, by judicious management, become productive of great public conveniency.

Nothing which tends to facilitate the intercourse between the States can be deemed unworthy of the public

A power ``to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing, for a limited time, to authors and

''The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged,

in Great Britain, to be a right of common law. The right to useful inventions seems with equal reason to

The public good fully coincides in both cases with the claims of individuals. The States cannot separately

make effectual provisions for either of the cases, and most of them have anticipated the decision of this point,

by laws passed at the instance of Congress. 2. ``To exercise exclusive legislation, in all cases whatsoever,

over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular States and the acceptance

of Congress, become the seat of the government of the United States; and to exercise like authority over all

places purchased by the consent of the legislatures of the States in which the same shall be, for the erection of

forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings. ''The indispensable necessity of complete

authority at the seat of government, carries its own evidence with it. It is a power exercised by every

legislature of the Union, I might say of the world, by virtue of its general supremacy. Without it, not only the

public authority might be insulted and its proceedings interrupted with impunity; but a dependence of the

members of the general government on the State comprehending the seat of the government, for protection in

the exercise of their duty, might bring on the national councils an imputation of awe or influence, equally

dishonorable to the government and dissatisfactory to the other members of the Confederacy. This

consideration has the more weight, as the gradual accumulation of public improvements at the stationary

residence of the government would be both too great a public pledge to be left in the hands of a single State,

and would create so many obstacles to a removal of the government, as still further to abridge its necessary

independence. The extent of this federal district is sufficiently circumscribed to satisfy every jealousy of an

opposite nature. And as it is to be appropriated to this use with the consent of the State ceding it; as the State

will no doubt provide in the compact for the rights and the consent of the citizens inhabiting it; as the

inhabitants will find sufficient inducements of interest to become willing parties to the cession; as they will

have had their voice in the election of the government which is to exercise authority over them; as a

municipal legislature for local purposes, derived from their own suffrages, will of course be allowed them;

and as the authority of the legislature of the State, and of the inhabitants of the ceded part of it, to concur in

the cession, will be derived from the whole people of the State in their adoption of the Constitution, every

imaginable objection seems to be obviated. The necessity of a like authority over forts, magazines, etc. ,

established by the general government, is not less evident. The public money expended on such places, and

the public property deposited in them, requires that they should be exempt from the authority of the particular

State. Nor would it be proper for the places on which the security of the entire Union may depend, to be in

any degree dependent on a particular member of it. All objections and scruples are here also obviated, by

requiring the concurrence of the States concerned, in every such establishment. 3. ``To declare the

punishment of treason, but no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture, except during

the life of the person attained. ''As treason may be committed against the United States, the authority of the

United States ought to be enabled to punish it. But as newfangled and artificial treasons have been the great

engines by which violent factions, the natural offspring of free government, have usually wreaked their

alternate malignity on each other, the convention have, with great judgment, opposed a barrier to this peculiar

danger, by inserting a constitutional definition of the crime, fixing the proof necessary for conviction of it,

and restraining the Congress, even in punishing it, from extending the consequences of guilt beyond the

person of its author. 4. ``To admit new States into the Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected

within the jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the junction of two or more States, or

parts of States, without the consent of the legislatures of the States concerned, as well as of the Congress.

''In the articles of Confederation, no provision is found on this important subject. Canada was to be admitted

of right, on her joining in the measures of the United States; and the other COLONIES, by which were

evidently meant the other British colonies, at the discretion of nine States. The eventual establishment of

NEW STATES seems to have been overlooked by the compilers of that instrument. We have seen the

inconvenience of this omission, and the assumption of power into which Congress have been led by it. With

great propriety, therefore, has the new system supplied the defect. The general precaution, that no new States

shall be formed, without the concurrence of the federal authority, and that of the States concerned, is

consonant to the principles which ought to govern such transactions. The particular precaution against the

erection of new States, by the partition of a State without its consent, quiets the jealousy of the larger States;

as that of the smaller is quieted by a like precaution, against a junction of States without their consent.

5. ``To dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property

belonging to the United States, with a proviso, that nothing in the Constitution shall be so construed as to

prejudice any claims of the United States, or of any particular State. ''This is a power of very great

importance, and required by considerations similar to those which show the propriety of the former. The

proviso annexed is proper in itself, and was probably rendered absolutely necessary by jealousies and

questions concerning the Western territory sufficiently known to the public. 6. ``To guarantee to every State

in the Union a republican form of government; to protect each of them against invasion; and on application of

the legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened), against domestic violence. ''In a

confederacy founded on republican principles, and composed of republican members, the superintending

government ought clearly to possess authority to defend the system against aristocratic or monarchial

innovations. The more intimate the nature of such a union may be, the greater interest have the members in

the political institutions of each other; and the greater right to insist that the forms of government under

which the compact was entered into should be SUBSTANTIALLY maintained. But a right implies a remedy;

and where else could the remedy be deposited, than where it is deposited by the Constitution? Governments

of dissimilar principles and forms have been found less adapted to a federal coalition of any sort, than those

of a kindred nature. ``As the confederate republic of Germany,'' says Montesquieu, ``consists of free cities

and petty states, subject to different princes, experience shows us that it is more imperfect than that of

Holland and Switzerland. '' ``Greece was undone,'' he adds, ``as soon as the king of Macedon obtained a seat

among the Amphictyons. '' In the latter case, no doubt, the disproportionate force, as well as the monarchical

form, of the new confederate, had its share of influence on the events. It may possibly be asked, what need

there could be of such a precaution, and whether it may not become a pretext for alterations in the State

governments, without the concurrence of the States themselves. These questions admit of ready answers. If

the interposition of the general government should not be needed, the provision for such an event will be a

harmless superfluity only in the Constitution. But who can say what experiments may be produced by the

caprice of particular States, by the ambition of enterprising leaders, or by the intrigues and influence of

foreign powers? To the second question it may be answered, that if the general government should interpose

by virtue of this constitutional authority, it will be, of course, bound to pursue the authority. But the authority

extends no further than to a GUARANTY of a republican form of government, which supposes a

preexisting government of the form which is to be guaranteed. As long, therefore, as the existing republican

forms are continued by the States, they are guaranteed by the federal Constitution. Whenever the States may

choose to substitute other republican forms, they have a right to do so, and to claim the federal guaranty for

the latter. The only restriction imposed on them is, that they shall not exchange republican for antirepublican

Constitutions; a restriction which, it is presumed, will hardly be considered as a grievance.

A protection against invasion is due from every society to the parts composing it. The latitude of the

expression here used seems to secure each State, not only against foreign hostility, but against ambitious or

vindictive enterprises of its more powerful neighbors. The history, both of ancient and modern confederacies,

proves that the weaker members of the union ought not to be insensible to the policy of this article. Protection

against domestic violence is added with equal propriety. It has been remarked, that even among the Swiss

cantons, which, properly speaking, are not under one government, provision is made for this object; and the

history of that league informs us that mutual aid is frequently claimed and afforded; and as well by the most

democratic, as the other cantons. A recent and wellknown event among ourselves has warned us to be

prepared for emergencies of a like nature. At first view, it might seem not to square with the republican

theory, to suppose, either that a majority have not the right, or that a minority will have the force, to subvert a

government; and consequently, that the federal interposition can never be required, but when it would be

improper. But theoretic reasoning, in this as in most other cases, must be qualified by the lessons of practice.

Why may not illicit combinations, for purposes of violence, be formed as well by a majority of a State,

especially a small State as by a majority of a county, or a district of the same State; and if the authority of the

State ought, in the latter case, to protect the local magistracy, ought not the federal authority, in the former, to

support the State authority? Besides, there are certain parts of the State constitutions which are so interwoven

with the federal Constitution, that a violent blow cannot be given to the one without communicating the

Insurrections in a State will rarely induce a federal interposition, unless the number concerned in them bear

some proportion to the friends of government. It will be much better that the violence in such cases should be

repressed by the superintending power, than that the majority should be left to maintain their cause by a

bloody and obstinate contest. The existence of a right to interpose, will generally prevent the necessity of

exerting it. Is it true that force and right are necessarily on the same side in republican governments? May not

the minor party possess such a superiority of pecuniary resources, of military talents and experience, or of

secret succors from foreign powers, as will render it superior also in an appeal to the sword? May not a more

compact and advantageous position turn the scale on the same side, against a superior number so situated as

to be less capable of a prompt and collected exertion of its strength? Nothing can be more chimerical than to

imagine that in a trial of actual force, victory may be calculated by the rules which prevail in a census of the

inhabitants, or which determine the event of an election! May it not happen, in fine, that the minority of

CITIZENS may become a majority of PERSONS, by the accession of alien residents, of a casual concourse

of adventurers, or of those whom the constitution of the State has not admitted to the rights of suffrage? I take

no notice of an unhappy species of population abounding in some of the States, who, during the calm of

regular government, are sunk below the level of men; but who, in the tempestuous scenes of civil violence,

may emerge into the human character, and give a superiority of strength to any party with which they may

associate themselves. In cases where it may be doubtful on which side justice lies, what better umpires could

be desired by two violent factions, flying to arms, and tearing a State to pieces, than the representatives of

confederate States, not heated by the local flame? To the impartiality of judges, they would unite the affection

of friends. Happy would it be if such a remedy for its infirmities could be enjoyed by all free governments; if

a project equally effectual could be established for the universal peace of mankind! Should it be asked, what

is to be the redress for an insurrection pervading all the States, and comprising a superiority of the entire

force, though not a constitutional right? the answer must be, that such a case, as it would be without the

compass of human remedies, so it is fortunately not within the compass of human probability; and that it is a

sufficient recommendation of the federal Constitution, that it diminishes the risk of a calamity for which no

possible constitution can provide a cure. Among the advantages of a confederate republic enumerated by

Montesquieu, an important one is, ``that should a popular insurrection happen in one of the States, the others

are able to quell it. Should abuses creep into one part, they are reformed by those that remain sound. ''7. ``To

consider all debts contracted, and engagements entered into, before the adoption of this Constitution, as being

no less valid against the United States, under this Constitution, than under the Confederation. ''This can only

be considered as a declaratory proposition; and may have been inserted, among other reasons, for the

satisfaction of the foreign creditors of the United States, who cannot be strangers to the pretended doctrine,

that a change in the political form of civil society has the magical effect of dissolving its moral obligations.

Among the lesser criticisms which have been exercised on the Constitution, it has been remarked that the

validity of engagements ought to have been asserted in favor of the United States, as well as against them;

and in the spirit which usually characterizes little critics, the omission has been transformed and magnified

into a plot against the national rights. The authors of this discovery may be told, what few others need to be

informed of, that as engagements are in their nature reciprocal, an assertion of their validity on one side,

necessarily involves a validity on the other side; and that as the article is merely declaratory, the

establishment of the principle in one case is sufficient for every case. They may be further told, that every

constitution must limit its precautions to dangers that are not altogether imaginary; and that no real danger

can exist that the government would DARE, with, or even without, this constitutional declaration before it, to

``To provide for amendments to be ratified by three fourths of the States under two exceptions only. ''That

useful alterations will be suggested by experience, could not but be foreseen. It was requisite, therefore, that a

mode for introducing them should be provided. The mode preferred by the convention seems to be stamped

with every mark of propriety. It guards equally against that extreme facility, which would render the

Constitution too mutable; and that extreme difficulty, which might perpetuate its discovered faults. It,

moreover, equally enables the general and the State governments to originate the amendment of errors, as

they may be pointed out by the experience on one side, or on the other. The exception in favor of the equality

of suffrage in the Senate, was probably meant as a palladium to the residuary sovereignty of the States,

implied and secured by that principle of representation in one branch of the legislature; and was probably

insisted on by the States particularly attached to that equality. The other exception must have been admitted

``The ratification of the conventions of nine States shall be sufficient for the establishment of this

Constitution between the States, ratifying the same. ''This article speaks for itself.

The express authority of the people alone could give due validity to the Constitution. To have required the

unanimous ratification of the thirteen States, would have subjected the essential interests of the whole to the

caprice or corruption of a single member. It would have marked a want of foresight in the convention, which

our own experience would have rendered inexcusable. Two questions of a very delicate nature present

themselves on this occasion: 1. On what principle the Confederation, which stands in the solemn form of a

compact among the States, can be superseded without the unanimous consent of the parties to it? 2. What

relation is to subsist between the nine or more States ratifying the Constitution, and the remaining few who

do not become parties to it? The first question is answered at once by recurring to the absolute necessity of

the case; to the great principle of selfpreservation; to the transcendent law of nature and of nature's God,

which declares that the safety and happiness of society are the objects at which all political institutions aim,

and to which all such institutions must be sacrificed. PERHAPS, also, an answer may be found without

searching beyond the principles of the compact itself. It has been heretofore noted among the defects of the

Confederation, that in many of the States it had received no higher sanction than a mere legislative

ratification. The principle of reciprocality seems to require that its obligation on the other States should be

reduced to the same standard. A compact between independent sovereigns, founded on ordinary acts of

legislative authority, can pretend to no higher validity than a league or treaty between the parties. It is an

established doctrine on the subject of treaties, that all the articles are mutually conditions of each other; that a

breach of any one article is a breach of the whole treaty; and that a breach, committed by either of the parties,

absolves the others, and authorizes them, if they please, to pronounce the compact violated and void. Should

it unhappily be necessary to appeal to these delicate truths for a justification for dispensing with the consent

of particular States to a dissolution of the federal pact, will not the complaining parties find it a difficult task

to answer the MULTIPLIED and IMPORTANT infractions with which they may be confronted? The time

has been when it was incumbent on us all to veil the ideas which this paragraph exhibits. The scene is now

changed, and with it the part which the same motives dictate. The second question is not less delicate; and the

flattering prospect of its being merely hypothetical forbids an overcurious discussion of it. It is one of those

cases which must be left to provide for itself. In general, it may be observed, that although no political

relation can subsist between the assenting and dissenting States, yet the moral relations will remain

uncancelled. The claims of justice, both on one side and on the other, will be in force, and must be fulfilled;

the rights of humanity must in all cases be duly and mutually respected; whilst considerations of a common

interest, and, above all, the remembrance of the endearing scenes which are past, and the anticipation of a

speedy triumph over the obstacles to reunion, will, it is hoped, not urge in vain MODERATION on one side,

A FIFTH class of provisions in favor of the federal authority consists of the following restrictions on the

authority of the several States:1. ``No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; grant letters

of marque and reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit; make any thing but gold and silver a legal tender in

payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder, expostfacto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts;

or grant any title of nobility. ''The prohibition against treaties, alliances, and confederations makes a part of

the existing articles of Union; and for reasons which need no explanation, is copied into the new Constitution.

The prohibition of letters of marque is another part of the old system, but is somewhat extended in the new.

According to the former, letters of marque could be granted by the States after a declaration of war; according

to the latter, these licenses must be obtained, as well during war as previous to its declaration, from the

government of the United States. This alteration is fully justified by the advantage of uniformity in all points

which relate to foreign powers; and of immediate responsibility to the nation in all those for whose conduct

The right of coining money, which is here taken from the States, was left in their hands by the Confederation,

as a concurrent right with that of Congress, under an exception in favor of the exclusive right of Congress to

regulate the alloy and value. In this instance, also, the new provision is an improvement on the old. Whilst the

alloy and value depended on the general authority, a right of coinage in the particular States could have no

other effect than to multiply expensive mints and diversify the forms and weights of the circulating pieces.

The latter inconveniency defeats one purpose for which the power was originally submitted to the federal

head; and as far as the former might prevent an inconvenient remittance of gold and silver to the central mint

for recoinage, the end can be as well attained by local mints established under the general authority.

The extension of the prohibition to bills of credit must give pleasure to every citizen, in proportion to his love

of justice and his knowledge of the true springs of public prosperity. The loss which America has sustained

since the peace, from the pestilent effects of paper money on the necessary confidence between man and man,

on the necessary confidence in the public councils, on the industry and morals of the people, and on the

character of republican government, constitutes an enormous debt against the States chargeable with this

unadvised measure, which must long remain unsatisfied; or rather an accumulation of guilt, which can be

expiated no otherwise than by a voluntary sacrifice on the altar of justice, of the power which has been the

instrument of it. In addition to these persuasive considerations, it may be observed, that the same reasons

which show the necessity of denying to the States the power of regulating coin, prove with equal force that

they ought not to be at liberty to substitute a paper medium in the place of coin. Had every State a right to

regulate the value of its coin, there might be as many different currencies as States, and thus the intercourse

among them would be impeded; retrospective alterations in its value might be made, and thus the citizens of

other States be injured, and animosities be kindled among the States themselves. The subjects of foreign

powers might suffer from the same cause, and hence the Union be discredited and embroiled by the

indiscretion of a single member. No one of these mischiefs is less incident to a power in the States to emit

paper money, than to coin gold or silver. The power to make any thing but gold and silver a tender in

payment of debts, is withdrawn from the States, on the same principle with that of issuing a paper currency.

Bills of attainder, expostfacto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts, are contrary to the first

principles of the social compact, and to every principle of sound legislation. The two former are expressly

prohibited by the declarations prefixed to some of the State constitutions, and all of them are prohibited by

the spirit and scope of these fundamental charters. Our own experience has taught us, nevertheless, that

additional fences against these dangers ought not to be omitted. Very properly, therefore, have the convention

added this constitutional bulwark in favor of personal security and private rights; and I am much deceived if

they have not, in so doing, as faithfully consulted the genuine sentiments as the undoubted interests of their

constituents. The sober people of America are weary of the fluctuating policy which has directed the public

councils. They have seen with regret and indignation that sudden changes and legislative interferences, in

cases affecting personal rights, become jobs in the hands of enterprising and influential speculators, and

snares to the moreindustrious and lessinformed part of the community. They have seen, too, that one

legislative interference is but the first link of a long chain of repetitions, every subsequent interference being

naturally produced by the effects of the preceding. They very rightly infer, therefore, that some thorough

reform is wanting, which will banish speculations on public measures, inspire a general prudence and

industry, and give a regular course to the business of society. The prohibition with respect to titles of nobility

is copied from the articles of Confederation and needs no comment. 2. ``No State shall, without the consent

of the Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for

executing its inspection laws, and the net produce of all duties and imposts laid by any State on imports or

exports, shall be for the use of the treasury of the United States; and all such laws shall be subject to the

revision and control of the Congress. No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty on

tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another

State, or with a foreign power, or engage in war unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will

not admit of delay. ''The restraint on the power of the States over imports and exports is enforced by all the

arguments which prove the necessity of submitting the regulation of trade to the federal councils. It is

needless, therefore, to remark further on this head, than that the manner in which the restraint is qualified

seems well calculated at once to secure to the States a reasonable discretion in providing for the conveniency

of their imports and exports, and to the United States a reasonable check against the abuse of this discretion.

The remaining particulars of this clause fall within reasonings which are either so obvious, or have been so

fully developed, that they may be passed over without remark. The SIXTH and last class consists of the

several powers and provisions by which efficacy is given to all the rest. 1. Of these the first is, the ``power to

make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all

other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or

officer thereof. ''Few parts of the Constitution have been assailed with more intemperance than this; yet on a

fair investigation of it, no part can appear more completely invulnerable. Without the SUBSTANCE of this

power, the whole Constitution would be a dead letter. Those who object to the article, therefore, as a part of

the Constitution, can only mean that the FORM of the provision is improper. But have they considered

whether a better form could have been substituted? There are four other possible methods which the

Constitution might have taken on this subject. They might have copied the second article of the existing

Confederation, which would have prohibited the exercise of any power not EXPRESSLY delegated; they

might have attempted a positive enumeration of the powers comprehended under the general terms

``necessary and proper''; they might have attempted a negative enumeration of them, by specifying the

powers excepted from the general definition; they might have been altogether silent on the subject, leaving

these necessary and proper powers to construction and inference. Had the convention taken the first method

of adopting the second article of Confederation, it is evident that the new Congress would be continually

exposed, as their predecessors have been, to the alternative of construing the term ``EXPRESSLY'' with so

much rigor, as to disarm the government of all real authority whatever, or with so much latitude as to destroy

It would be easy to show, if it were necessary, that no important power, delegated by the articles of

Confederation, has been or can be executed by Congress, without recurring more or less to the doctrine of

CONSTRUCTION or IMPLICATION. As the powers delegated under the new system are more extensive,

the government which is to administer it would find itself still more distressed with the alternative of

betraying the public interests by doing nothing, or of violating the Constitution by exercising powers

indispensably necessary and proper, but, at the same time, not EXPRESSLY granted. Had the convention

attempted a positive enumeration of the powers necessary and proper for carrying their other powers into

effect, the attempt would have involved a complete digest of laws on every subject to which the Constitution

relates; accommodated too, not only to the existing state of things, but to all the possible changes which

futurity may produce; for in every new application of a general power, the PARTICULAR POWERS, which

are the means of attaining the OBJECT of the general power, must always necessarily vary with that object,

Had they attempted to enumerate the particular powers or means not necessary or proper for carrying the

general powers into execution, the task would have been no less chimerical; and would have been liable to

this further objection, that every defect in the enumeration would have been equivalent to a positive grant of

authority. If, to avoid this consequence, they had attempted a partial enumeration of the exceptions, and

described the residue by the general terms, NOT NECESSARY OR PROPER, it must have happened that the

enumeration would comprehend a few of the excepted powers only; that these would be such as would be

least likely to be assumed or tolerated, because the enumeration would of course select such as would be least

necessary or proper; and that the unnecessary and improper powers included in the residuum, would be less

forcibly excepted, than if no partial enumeration had been made. Had the Constitution been silent on this

head, there can be no doubt that all the particular powers requisite as means of executing the general powers

would have resulted to the government, by unavoidable implication. No axiom is more clearly established in

law, or in reason, than that wherever the end is required, the means are authorized; wherever a general power

to do a thing is given, every particular power necessary for doing it is included. Had this last method,

therefore, been pursued by the convention, every objection now urged against their plan would remain in all

its plausibility; and the real inconveniency would be incurred of not removing a pretext which may be seized

on critical occasions for drawing into question the essential powers of the Union. If it be asked what is to be

the consequence, in case the Congress shall misconstrue this part of the Constitution, and exercise powers not

warranted by its true meaning, I answer, the same as if they should misconstrue or enlarge any other power

vested in them; as if the general power had been reduced to particulars, and any one of these were to be

violated; the same, in short, as if the State legislatures should violate the irrespective constitutional

authorities. In the first instance, the success of the usurpation will depend on the executive and judiciary

departments, which are to expound and give effect to the legislative acts; and in the last resort a remedy must

be obtained from the people who can, by the election of more faithful representatives, annul the acts of the

usurpers. The truth is, that this ultimate redress may be more confided in against unconstitutional acts of the

federal than of the State legislatures, for this plain reason, that as every such act of the former will be an

invasion of the rights of the latter, these will be ever ready to mark the innovation, to sound the alarm to the

people, and to exert their local influence in effecting a change of federal representatives. There being no such

intermediate body between the State legislatures and the people interested in watching the conduct of the

former, violations of the State constitutions are more likely to remain unnoticed and unredressed. 2. ``This

Constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties

made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land,

and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any State to the

contrary notwithstanding. ''The indiscreet zeal of the adversaries to the Constitution has betrayed them into an

attack on this part of it also, without which it would have been evidently and radically defective. To be fully

sensible of this, we need only suppose for a moment that the supremacy of the State constitutions had been

left complete by a saving clause in their favor. In the first place, as these constitutions invest the State

legislatures with absolute sovereignty, in all cases not excepted by the existing articles of Confederation, all

the authorities contained in the proposed Constitution, so far as they exceed those enumerated in the

Confederation, would have been annulled, and the new Congress would have been reduced to the same

impotent condition with their predecessors. In the next place, as the constitutions of some of the States do not

even expressly and fully recognize the existing powers of the Confederacy, an express saving of the

supremacy of the former would, in such States, have brought into question every power contained in the

proposed Constitution. In the third place, as the constitutions of the States differ much from each other, it

might happen that a treaty or national law, of great and equal importance to the States, would interfere with

some and not with other constitutions, and would consequently be valid in some of the States, at the same

time that it would have no effect in others. In fine, the world would have seen, for the first time, a system of

government founded on an inversion of the fundamental principles of all government; it would have seen the

authority of the whole society every where subordinate to the authority of the parts; it would have seen a

monster, in which the head was under the direction of the members. 3. ``The Senators and Representatives,

and the members of the several State legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of the United

States and the several States, shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support this Constitution. ''It has been

asked why it was thought necessary, that the State magistracy should be bound to support the federal

Constitution, and unnecessary that a like oath should be imposed on the officers of the United States, in favor

of the State constitutions. Several reasons might be assigned for the distinction. I content myself with one,

which is obvious and conclusive. The members of the federal government will have no agency in carrying the

State constitutions into effect. The members and officers of the State governments, on the contrary, will have

an essential agency in giving effect to the federal Constitution. The election of the President and Senate will

depend, in all cases, on the legislatures of the several States. And the election of the House of Representatives

will equally depend on the same authority in the first instance; and will, probably, forever be conducted by

the officers, and according to the laws, of the States. 4. Among the provisions for giving efficacy to the

federal powers might be added those which belong to the executive and judiciary departments: but as these

are reserved for particular examination in another place, I pass them over in this. We have now reviewed, in

detail, all the articles composing the sum or quantity of power delegated by the proposed Constitution to the

federal government, and are brought to this undeniable conclusion, that no part of the power is unnecessary or

improper for accomplishing the necessary objects of the Union. The question, therefore, whether this amount

of power shall be granted or not, resolves itself into another question, whether or not a government

commensurate to the exigencies of the Union shall be established; or, in other words, whether the Union itself

HAVING shown that no one of the powers transferred to the federal government is unnecessary or improper,

the next question to be considered is, whether the whole mass of them will be dangerous to the portion of

authority left in the several States. The adversaries to the plan of the convention, instead of considering in the

first place what degree of power was absolutely necessary for the purposes of the federal government, have

exhausted themselves in a secondary inquiry into the possible consequences of the proposed degree of power

to the governments of the particular States. But if the Union, as has been shown, be essential to the security of

the people of America against foreign danger; if it be essential to their security against contentions and wars

among the different States; if it be essential to guard them against those violent and oppressive factions which

embitter the blessings of liberty, and against those military establishments which must gradually poison its

very fountain; if, in a word, the Union be essential to the happiness of the people of America, is it not

preposterous, to urge as an objection to a government, without which the objects of the Union cannot be

attained, that such a government may derogate from the importance of the governments of the individual

States? Was, then, the American Revolution effected, was the American Confederacy formed, was the

precious blood of thousands spilt, and the hardearned substance of millions lavished, not that the people of

America should enjoy peace, liberty, and safety, but that the government of the individual States, that

particular municipal establishments, might enjoy a certain extent of power, and be arrayed with certain

dignities and attributes of sovereignty? We have heard of the impious doctrine in the Old World, that the

people were made for kings, not kings for the people. Is the same doctrine to be revived in the New, in

another shape that the solid happiness of the people is to be sacrificed to the views of political institutions of

a different form? It is too early for politicians to presume on our forgetting that the public good, the real

welfare of the great body of the people, is the supreme object to be pursued; and that no form of government

whatever has any other value than as it may be fitted for the attainment of this object. Were the plan of the

convention adverse to the public happiness, my voice would be, Reject the plan. Were the Union itself

inconsistent with the public happiness, it would be, Abolish the Union. In like manner, as far as the

sovereignty of the States cannot be reconciled to the happiness of the people, the voice of every good citizen

must be, Let the former be sacrificed to the latter. How far the sacrifice is necessary, has been shown. How

far the unsacrificed residue will be endangered, is the question before us. Several important considerations

have been touched in the course of these papers, which discountenance the supposition that the operation of

the federal government will by degrees prove fatal to the State governments. The more I revolve the subject,

the more fully I am persuaded that the balance is much more likely to be disturbed by the preponderancy of

the last than of the first scale. We have seen, in all the examples of ancient and modern confederacies, the

strongest tendency continually betraying itself in the members, to despoil the general government of its

authorities, with a very ineffectual capacity in the latter to defend itself against the encroachments. Although,

in most of these examples, the system has been so dissimilar from that under consideration as greatly to

weaken any inference concerning the latter from the fate of the former, yet, as the States will retain, under the

proposed Constitution, a very extensive portion of active sovereignty, the inference ought not to be wholly

disregarded. In the Achaean league it is probable that the federal head had a degree and species of power,

which gave it a considerable likeness to the government framed by the convention. The Lycian Confederacy,

as far as its principles and form are transmitted, must have borne a still greater analogy to it. Yet history does

not inform us that either of them ever degenerated, or tended to degenerate, into one consolidated

government. On the contrary, we know that the ruin of one of them proceeded from the incapacity of the

federal authority to prevent the dissensions, and finally the disunion, of the subordinate authorities. These

cases are the more worthy of our attention, as the external causes by which the component parts were pressed

together were much more numerous and powerful than in our case; and consequently less powerful ligaments

within would be sufficient to bind the members to the head, and to each other. In the feudal system, we have

seen a similar propensity exemplified. Notwithstanding the want of proper sympathy in every instance

between the local sovereigns and the people, and the sympathy in some instances between the general

sovereign and the latter, it usually happened that the local sovereigns prevailed in the rivalship for

Had no external dangers enforced internal harmony and subordination, and particularly, had the local

sovereigns possessed the affections of the people, the great kingdoms in Europe would at this time consist of

as many independent princes as there were formerly feudatory barons. The State government will have the

advantage of the Federal government, whether we compare them in respect to the immediate dependence of

the one on the other; to the weight of personal influence which each side will possess; to the powers

respectively vested in them; to the predilection and probable support of the people; to the disposition and

faculty of resisting and frustrating the measures of each other. The State governments may be regarded as

constituent and essential parts of the federal government; whilst the latter is nowise essential to the operation

or organization of the former. Without the intervention of the State legislatures, the President of the United

States cannot be elected at all. They must in all cases have a great share in his appointment, and will, perhaps,

in most cases, of themselves determine it. The Senate will be elected absolutely and exclusively by the State

legislatures. Even the House of Representatives, though drawn immediately from the people, will be chosen

very much under the influence of that class of men, whose influence over the people obtains for themselves

an election into the State legislatures. Thus, each of the principal branches of the federal government will owe

its existence more or less to the favor of the State governments, and must consequently feel a dependence,

which is much more likely to beget a disposition too obsequious than too overbearing towards them. On the

other side, the component parts of the State governments will in no instance be indebted for their appointment

to the direct agency of the federal government, and very little, if at all, to the local influence of its members.

The number of individuals employed under the Constitution of the United States will be much smaller than

There will consequently be less of personal influence on the side of the former than of the latter. The

members of the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments of thirteen and more States, the justices of

peace, officers of militia, ministerial officers of justice, with all the county, corporation, and town officers,

for three millions and more of people, intermixed, and having particular acquaintance with every class and

circle of people, must exceed, beyond all proportion, both in number and influence, those of every description

who will be employed in the administration of the federal system. Compare the members of the three great

departments of the thirteen States, excluding from the judiciary department the justices of peace, with the

members of the corresponding departments of the single government of the Union; compare the militia

officers of three millions of people with the military and marine officers of any establishment which is within

the compass of probability, or, I may add, of possibility, and in this view alone, we may pronounce the

advantage of the States to be decisive. If the federal government is to have collectors of revenue, the State

governments will have theirs also. And as those of the former will be principally on the seacoast, and not very

numerous, whilst those of the latter will be spread over the face of the country, and will be very numerous,

It is true, that the Confederacy is to possess, and may exercise, the power of collecting internal as well as

external taxes throughout the States; but it is probable that this power will not be resorted to, except for

supplemental purposes of revenue; that an option will then be given to the States to supply their quotas by

previous collections of their own; and that the eventual collection, under the immediate authority of the

Union, will generally be made by the officers, and according to the rules, appointed by the several States.

Indeed it is extremely probable, that in other instances, particularly in the organization of the judicial power,

the officers of the States will be clothed with the correspondent authority of the Union.

Should it happen, however, that separate collectors of internal revenue should be appointed under the federal

government, the influence of the whole number would not bear a comparison with that of the multitude of

Within every district to which a federal collector would be allotted, there would not be less than thirty or

forty, or even more, officers of different descriptions, and many of them persons of character and weight,

whose influence would lie on the side of the State. The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the

federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous

and indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and

foreign commerce; with which last the power of taxation will, for the most part, be connected. The powers

reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern

the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the

State. The operations of the federal government will be most extensive and important in times of war and

danger; those of the State governments, in times of peace and security. As the former periods will probably

bear a small proportion to the latter, the State governments will here enjoy another advantage over the federal

government. The more adequate, indeed, the federal powers may be rendered to the national defense, the less

frequent will be those scenes of danger which might favor their ascendancy over the governments of the

particular States. If the new Constitution be examined with accuracy and candor, it will be found that the

change which it proposes consists much less in the addition of NEW POWERS to the Union, than in the

invigoration of its ORIGINAL POWERS. The regulation of commerce, it is true, is a new power; but that

seems to be an addition which few oppose, and from which no apprehensions are entertained. The powers

relating to war and peace, armies and fleets, treaties and finance, with the other more considerable powers,

are all vested in the existing Congress by the articles of Confederation. The proposed change does not enlarge

these powers; it only substitutes a more effectual mode of administering them. The change relating to taxation

may be regarded as the most important; and yet the present Congress have as complete authority to

REQUIRE of the States indefinite supplies of money for the common defense and general welfare, as the

future Congress will have to require them of individual citizens; and the latter will be no more bound than the

States themselves have been, to pay the quotas respectively taxed on them. Had the States complied

punctually with the articles of Confederation, or could their compliance have been enforced by as peaceable

means as may be used with success towards single persons, our past experience is very far from

countenancing an opinion, that the State governments would have lost their constitutional powers, and have

gradually undergone an entire consolidation. To maintain that such an event would have ensued, would be to

say at once, that the existence of the State governments is incompatible with any system whatever that

RESUMING the subject of the last paper, I proceed to inquire whether the federal government or the State

governments will have the advantage with regard to the predilection and support of the people.

Notwithstanding the different modes in which they are appointed, we must consider both of them as

I assume this position here as it respects the first, reserving the proofs for another place. The federal and State

governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people, constituted with different powers, and

designed for different purposes. The adversaries of the Constitution seem to have lost sight of the people

altogether in their reasonings on this subject; and to have viewed these different establishments, not only as

mutual rivals and enemies, but as uncontrolled by any common superior in their efforts to usurp the

authorities of each other. These gentlemen must here be reminded of their error. They must be told that the

ultimate authority, wherever the derivative may be found, resides in the people alone, and that it will not

depend merely on the comparative ambition or address of the different governments, whether either, or which

of them, will be able to enlarge its sphere of jurisdiction at the expense of the other. Truth, no less than

decency, requires that the event in every case should be supposed to depend on the sentiments and sanction of

their common constituents. Many considerations, besides those suggested on a former occasion, seem to

place it beyond doubt that the first and most natural attachment of the people will be to the governments of

Into the administration of these a greater number of individuals will expect to rise. From the gift of these a

greater number of offices and emoluments will flow. By the superintending care of these, all the more

domestic and personal interests of the people will be regulated and provided for. With the affairs of these, the

people will be more familiarly and minutely conversant. And with the members of these, will a greater

proportion of the people have the ties of personal acquaintance and friendship, and of family and party

attachments; on the side of these, therefore, the popular bias may well be expected most strongly to incline.

Experience speaks the same language in this case. The federal administration, though hitherto very defective

in comparison with what may be hoped under a better system, had, during the war, and particularly whilst the

independent fund of paper emissions was in credit, an activity and importance as great as it can well have in

It was engaged, too, in a course of measures which had for their object the protection of everything that was

dear, and the acquisition of everything that could be desirable to the people at large. It was, nevertheless,

invariably found, after the transient enthusiasm for the early Congresses was over, that the attention and

attachment of the people were turned anew to their own particular governments; that the federal council was

at no time the idol of popular favor; and that opposition to proposed enlargements of its powers and

importance was the side usually taken by the men who wished to build their political consequence on the

prepossessions of their fellowcitizens. If, therefore, as has been elsewhere remarked, the people should in

future become more partial to the federal than to the State governments, the change can only result from such

manifest and irresistible proofs of a better administration, as will overcome all their antecedent propensities.

And in that case, the people ought not surely to be precluded from giving most of their confidence where they

may discover it to be most due; but even in that case the State governments could have little to apprehend,

because it is only within a certain sphere that the federal power can, in the nature of things, be

advantageously administered. The remaining points on which I propose to compare the federal and State

governments, are the disposition and the faculty they may respectively possess, to resist and frustrate the

measures of each other. It has been already proved that the members of the federal will be more dependent on

the members of the State governments, than the latter will be on the former. It has appeared also, that the

prepossessions of the people, on whom both will depend, will be more on the side of the State governments,

than of the federal government. So far as the disposition of each towards the other may be influenced by these

But in a distinct and very important point of view, the advantage will lie on the same side. The

prepossessions, which the members themselves will carry into the federal government, will generally be

favorable to the States; whilst it will rarely happen, that the members of the State governments will carry into

the public councils a bias in favor of the general government. A local spirit will infallibly prevail much more

in the members of Congress, than a national spirit will prevail in the legislatures of the particular States.

Every one knows that a great proportion of the errors committed by the State legislatures proceeds from the

disposition of the members to sacrifice the comprehensive and permanent interest of the State, to the

particular and separate views of the counties or districts in which they reside. And if they do not sufficiently

enlarge their policy to embrace the collective welfare of their particular State, how can it be imagined that

they will make the aggregate prosperity of the Union, and the dignity and respectability of its government, the

objects of their affections and consultations? For the same reason that the members of the State legislatures

will be unlikely to attach themselves sufficiently to national objects, the members of the federal legislature

will be likely to attach themselves too much to local objects. The States will be to the latter what counties and

towns are to the former. Measures will too often be decided according to their probable effect, not on the

national prosperity and happiness, but on the prejudices, interests, and pursuits of the governments and

people of the individual States. What is the spirit that has in general characterized the proceedings of

Congress? A perusal of their journals, as well as the candid acknowledgments of such as have had a seat in

that assembly, will inform us, that the members have but too frequently displayed the character, rather of

partisans of their respective States, than of impartial guardians of a common interest; that where on one

occasion improper sacrifices have been made of local considerations, to the aggrandizement of the federal

government, the great interests of the nation have suffered on a hundred, from an undue attention to the local

prejudices, interests, and views of the particular States. I mean not by these reflections to insinuate, that the

new federal government will not embrace a more enlarged plan of policy than the existing government may

have pursued; much less, that its views will be as confined as those of the State legislatures; but only that it

will partake sufficiently of the spirit of both, to be disinclined to invade the rights of the individual States, or

the preorgatives of their governments. The motives on the part of the State governments, to augment their

prerogatives by defalcations from the federal government, will be overruled by no reciprocal predispositions

in the members. Were it admitted, however, that the Federal government may feel an equal disposition with

the State governments to extend its power beyond the due limits, the latter would still have the advantage in

the means of defeating such encroachments. If an act of a particular State, though unfriendly to the national

government, be generally popular in that State and should not too grossly violate the oaths of the State

officers, it is executed immediately and, of course, by means on the spot and depending on the State alone.

The opposition of the federal government, or the interposition of federal officers, would but inflame the zeal

of all parties on the side of the State, and the evil could not be prevented or repaired, if at all, without the

employment of means which must always be resorted to with reluctance and difficulty.

On the other hand, should an unwarrantable measure of the federal government be unpopular in particular

States, which would seldom fail to be the case, or even a warrantable measure be so, which may sometimes

be the case, the means of opposition to it are powerful and at hand. The disquietude of the people; their

repugnance and, perhaps, refusal to cooperate with the officers of the Union; the frowns of the executive

magistracy of the State; the embarrassments created by legislative devices, which would often be added on

such occasions, would oppose, in any State, difficulties not to be despised; would form, in a large State, very

serious impediments; and where the sentiments of several adjoining States happened to be in unison, would

present obstructions which the federal government would hardly be willing to encounter. But ambitious

encroachments of the federal government, on the authority of the State governments, would not excite the

opposition of a single State, or of a few States only. They would be signals of general alarm. Every

government would espouse the common cause. A correspondence would be opened. Plans of resistance

would be concerted. One spirit would animate and conduct the whole. The same combinations, in short,

would result from an apprehension of the federal, as was produced by the dread of a foreign, yoke; and unless

the projected innovations should be voluntarily renounced, the same appeal to a trial of force would be made

in the one case as was made in the other. But what degree of madness could ever drive the federal

government to such an extremity. In the contest with Great Britain, one part of the empire was employed

The more numerous part invaded the rights of the less numerous part. The attempt was unjust and unwise; but

it was not in speculation absolutely chimerical. But what would be the contest in the case we are supposing?

Who would be the parties? A few representatives of the people would be opposed to the people themselves;

or rather one set of representatives would be contending against thirteen sets of representatives, with the

whole body of their common constituents on the side of the latter. The only refuge left for those who

prophesy the downfall of the State governments is the visionary supposition that the federal government may

previously accumulate a military force for the projects of ambition. The reasonings contained in these papers

must have been employed to little purpose indeed, if it could be necessary now to disprove the reality of this

That the people and the States should, for a sufficient period of time, elect an uninterupted succession of men

ready to betray both; that the traitors should, throughout this period, uniformly and systematically pursue

some fixed plan for the extension of the military establishment; that the governments and the people of the

States should silently and patiently behold the gathering storm, and continue to supply the materials, until it

should be prepared to burst on their own heads, must appear to every one more like the incoherent dreams of

a delirious jealousy, or the misjudged exaggerations of a counterfeit zeal, than like the sober apprehensions of

Extravagant as the supposition is, let it however be made. Let a regular army, fully equal to the resources of

the country, be formed; and let it be entirely at the devotion of the federal government; still it would not be

going too far to say, that the State governments, with the people on their side, would be able to repel the

danger. The highest number to which, according to the best computation, a standing army can be carried in

any country, does not exceed one hundredth part of the whole number of souls; or one twentyfifth part of

the number able to bear arms. This proportion would not yield, in the United States, an army of more than

twentyfive or thirty thousand men. To these would be opposed a militia amounting to near half a million of

citizens with arms in their hands, officered by men chosen from among themselves, fighting for their

common liberties, and united and conducted by governments possessing their affections and confidence. It

may well be doubted, whether a militia thus circumstanced could ever be conquered by such a proportion of

regular troops. Those who are best acquainted with the last successful resistance of this country against the

British arms, will be most inclined to deny the possibility of it. Besides the advantage of being armed, which

the Americans possess over the people of almost every other nation, the existence of subordinate

governments, to which the people are attached, and by which the militia officers are appointed, forms a

barrier against the enterprises of ambition, more insurmountable than any which a simple government of any

form can admit of. Notwithstanding the military establishments in the several kingdoms of Europe, which are

carried as far as the public resources will bear, the governments are afraid to trust the people with arms. And

it is not certain, that with this aid alone they would not be able to shake off their yokes. But were the people

to possess the additional advantages of local governments chosen by themselves, who could collect the

national will and direct the national force, and of officers appointed out of the militia, by these governments,

and attached both to them and to the militia, it may be affirmed with the greatest assurance, that the throne of

every tyranny in Europe would be speedily overturned in spite of the legions which surround it. Let us not

insult the free and gallant citizens of America with the suspicion, that they would be less able to defend the

rights of which they would be in actual possession, than the debased subjects of arbitrary power would be to

rescue theirs from the hands of their oppressors. Let us rather no longer insult them with the supposition that

they can ever reduce themselves to the necessity of making the experiment, by a blind and tame submission

to the long train of insidious measures which must precede and produce it. The argument under the present

head may be put into a very concise form, which appears altogether conclusive. Either the mode in which the

federal government is to be constructed will render it sufficiently dependent on the people, or it will not. On

the first supposition, it will be restrained by that dependence from forming schemes obnoxious to their

constituents. On the other supposition, it will not possess the confidence of the people, and its schemes of

usurpation will be easily defeated by the State governments, who will be supported by the people. On

summing up the considerations stated in this and the last paper, they seem to amount to the most convincing

evidence, that the powers proposed to be lodged in the federal government are as little formidable to those

reserved to the individual States, as they are indispensably necessary to accomplish the purposes of the

Union; and that all those alarms which have been sounded, of a meditated and consequential annihilation of

the State governments, must, on the most favorable interpretation, be ascribed to the chimerical fears of the

HAVING reviewed the general form of the proposed government and the general mass of power allotted to it,

I proceed to examine the particular structure of this government, and the distribution of this mass of power

among its constituent parts. One of the principal objections inculcated by the more respectable adversaries to

the Constitution, is its supposed violation of the political maxim, that the legislative, executive, and judiciary

departments ought to be separate and distinct. In the structure of the federal government, no regard, it is said,

seems to have been paid to this essential precaution in favor of liberty. The several departments of power are

distributed and blended in such a manner as at once to destroy all symmetry and beauty of form, and to

expose some of the essential parts of the edifice to the danger of being crushed by the disproportionate weight

of other parts. No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value, or is stamped with the authority of more

The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a

few, or many, and whether hereditary, selfappointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very

definition of tyranny. Were the federal Constitution, therefore, really chargeable with the accumulation of

power, or with a mixture of powers, having a dangerous tendency to such an accumulation, no further

arguments would be necessary to inspire a universal reprobation of the system. I persuade myself, however,

that it will be made apparent to every one, that the charge cannot be supported, and that the maxim on which

it relies has been totally misconceived and misapplied. In order to form correct ideas on this important

subject, it will be proper to investigate the sense in which the preservation of liberty requires that the three

great departments of power should be separate and distinct. The oracle who is always consulted and cited on

this subject is the celebrated Montesquieu. If he be not the author of this invaluable precept in the science of

politics, he has the merit at least of displaying and recommending it most effectually to the attention of

mankind. Let us endeavor, in the first place, to ascertain his meaning on this point. The British Constitution

was to Montesquieu what Homer has been to the didactic writers on epic poetry. As the latter have considered

the work of the immortal bard as the perfect model from which the principles and rules of the epic art were to

be drawn, and by which all similar works were to be judged, so this great political critic appears to have

viewed the Constitution of England as the standard, or to use his own expression, as the mirror of political

liberty; and to have delivered, in the form of elementary truths, the several characteristic principles of that

particular system. That we may be sure, then, not to mistake his meaning in this case, let us recur to the

source from which the maxim was drawn. On the slightest view of the British Constitution, we must perceive

that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments are by no means totally separate and distinct from

each other. The executive magistrate forms an integral part of the legislative authority. He alone has the

prerogative of making treaties with foreign sovereigns, which, when made, have, under certain limitations,

the force of legislative acts. All the members of the judiciary department are appointed by him, can be

removed by him on the address of the two Houses of Parliament, and form, when he pleases to consult them,

one of his constitutional councils. One branch of the legislative department forms also a great constitutional

council to the executive chief, as, on another hand, it is the sole depositary of judicial power in cases of

impeachment, and is invested with the supreme appellate jurisdiction in all other cases. The judges, again, are

so far connected with the legislative department as often to attend and participate in its deliberations, though

not admitted to a legislative vote. From these facts, by which Montesquieu was guided, it may clearly be

inferred that, in saying ``There can be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united in the

same person, or body of magistrates,'' or, ``if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and

executive powers,'' he did not mean that these departments ought to have no PARTIAL AGENCY in, or no

CONTROL over, the acts of each other. His meaning, as his own words import, and still more conclusively

as illustrated by the example in his eye, can amount to no more than this, that where the WHOLE power of

one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the WHOLE power of another department, the

fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted. This would have been the case in the constitution

examined by him, if the king, who is the sole executive magistrate, had possessed also the complete

legislative power, or the supreme administration of justice; or if the entire legislative body had possessed the

supreme judiciary, or the supreme executive authority. This, however, is not among the vices of that

constitution. The magistrate in whom the whole executive power resides cannot of himself make a law,

though he can put a negative on every law; nor administer justice in person, though he has the appointment of

those who do administer it. The judges can exercise no executive prerogative, though they are shoots from the

executive stock; nor any legislative function, though they may be advised with by the legislative councils.

The entire legislature can perform no judiciary act, though by the joint act of two of its branches the judges

may be removed from their offices, and though one of its branches is possessed of the judicial power in the

last resort. The entire legislature, again, can exercise no executive prerogative, though one of its branches

constitutes the supreme executive magistracy, and another, on the impeachment of a third, can try and

condemn all the subordinate officers in the executive department. The reasons on which Montesquieu

grounds his maxim are a further demonstration of his meaning. ``When the legislative and executive powers

are united in the same person or body,'' says he, ``there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may arise

lest THE SAME monarch or senate should ENACT tyrannical laws to EXECUTE them in a tyrannical

manner. '' Again: ``Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject

would be exposed to arbitrary control, for THE JUDGE would then be THE LEGISLATOR.

Were it joined to the executive power, THE JUDGE might behave with all the violence of AN OPPRESSOR.

'' Some of these reasons are more fully explained in other passages; but briefly stated as they are here, they

sufficiently establish the meaning which we have put on this celebrated maxim of this celebrated author. If

we look into the constitutions of the several States, we find that, notwithstanding the emphatical and, in some

instances, the unqualified terms in which this axiom has been laid down, there is not a single instance in

which the several departments of power have been kept absolutely separate and distinct. New Hampshire,

whose constitution was the last formed, seems to have been fully aware of the impossibility and inexpediency

of avoiding any mixture whatever of these departments, and has qualified the doctrine by declaring ``that the

legislative, executive, and judiciary powers ought to be kept as separate from, and independent of, each other

INDISSOLUBLE BOND OF UNITY AND AMITY. '' Her constitution accordingly mixes these departments

in several respects. The Senate, which is a branch of the legislative department, is also a judicial tribunal for

the trial of impeachments. The President, who is the head of the executive department, is the presiding

member also of the Senate; and, besides an equal vote in all cases, has a casting vote in case of a tie. The

executive head is himself eventually elective every year by the legislative department, and his council is

every year chosen by and from the members of the same department. Several of the officers of state are also

appointed by the legislature. And the members of the judiciary department are appointed by the executive

department. The constitution of Massachusetts has observed a sufficient though less pointed caution, in

expressing this fundamental article of liberty. It declares ``that the legislative department shall never exercise

the executive and judicial powers, or either of them; the executive shall never exercise the legislative and

judicial powers, or either of them; the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or

either of them. '' This declaration corresponds precisely with the doctrine of Montesquieu, as it has been

explained, and is not in a single point violated by the plan of the convention. It goes no farther than to

prohibit any one of the entire departments from exercising the powers of another department. In the very

Constitution to which it is prefixed, a partial mixture of powers has been admitted. The executive magistrate

has a qualified negative on the legislative body, and the Senate, which is a part of the legislature, is a court of

impeachment for members both of the executive and judiciary departments. The members of the judiciary

department, again, are appointable by the executive department, and removable by the same authority on the

Lastly, a number of the officers of government are annually appointed by the legislative department. As the

appointment to offices, particularly executive offices, is in its nature an executive function, the compilers of

the Constitution have, in this last point at least, violated the rule established by themselves. I pass over the

constitutions of Rhode Island and Connecticut, because they were formed prior to the Revolution, and even

before the principle under examination had become an object of political attention. The constitution of New

York contains no declaration on this subject; but appears very clearly to have been framed with an eye to the

danger of improperly blending the different departments. It gives, nevertheless, to the executive magistrate, a

partial control over the legislative department; and, what is more, gives a like control to the judiciary

department; and even blends the executive and judiciary departments in the exercise of this control. In its

council of appointment members of the legislative are associated with the executive authority, in the

appointment of officers, both executive and judiciary. And its court for the trial of impeachments and

correction of errors is to consist of one branch of the legislature and the principal members of the judiciary

department. The constitution of New Jersey has blended the different powers of government more than any of

the preceding. The governor, who is the executive magistrate, is appointed by the legislature; is chancellor

and ordinary, or surrogate of the State; is a member of the Supreme Court of Appeals, and president, with a

casting vote, of one of the legislative branches. The same legislative branch acts again as executive council of

the governor, and with him constitutes the Court of Appeals. The members of the judiciary department are

appointed by the legislative department and removable by one branch of it, on the impeachment of the other.

According to the constitution of Pennsylvania, the president, who is the head of the executive department, is

annually elected by a vote in which the legislative department predominates. In conjunction with an executive

council, he appoints the members of the judiciary department, and forms a court of impeachment for trial of

all officers, judiciary as well as executive. The judges of the Supreme Court and justices of the peace seem

also to be removable by the legislature; and the executive power of pardoning in certain cases, to be referred

to the same department. The members of the executive counoil are made EXOFFICIO justices of peace

throughout the State. In Delaware, the chief executive magistrate is annually elected by the legislative

department. The speakers of the two legislative branches are vicepresidents in the executive department.

The executive chief, with six others, appointed, three by each of the legislative branches constitutes the

Supreme Court of Appeals; he is joined with the legislative department in the appointment of the other

judges. Throughout the States, it appears that the members of the legislature may at the same time be justices

of the peace; in this State, the members of one branch of it are EXOFFICIO justices of the peace; as are also

the members of the executive council. The principal officers of the executive department are appointed by the

legislative; and one branch of the latter forms a court of impeachments. All officers may be removed on

address of the legislature. Maryland has adopted the maxim in the most unqualified terms; declaring that the

legislative, executive, and judicial powers of government ought to be forever separate and distinct from each

other. Her constitution, notwithstanding, makes the executive magistrate appointable by the legislative

department; and the members of the judiciary by the executive department. The language of Virginia is still

more pointed on this subject. Her constitution declares, ``that the legislative, executive, and judiciary

departments shall be separate and distinct; so that neither exercise the powers properly belonging to the other;

nor shall any person exercise the powers of more than one of them at the same time, except that the justices

of county courts shall be eligible to either House of Assembly. '' Yet we find not only this express exception,

with respect to the members of the irferior courts, but that the chief magistrate, with his executive council, are

appointable by the legislature; that two members of the latter are triennially displaced at the pleasure of the

legislature; and that all the principal offices, both executive and judiciary, are filled by the same department.

The executive prerogative of pardon, also, is in one case vested in the legislative department. The constitution

of North Carolina, which declares ``that the legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of

government ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other,'' refers, at the same time, to the

legislative department, the appointment not only of the executive chief, but all the principal officers within

both that and the judiciary department. In South Carolina, the constitution makes the executive magistracy

It gives to the latter, also, the appointment of the members of the judiciary department, including even

justices of the peace and sheriffs; and the appointment of officers in the executive department, down to

In the constitution of Georgia, where it is declared ``that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments

shall be separate and distinct, so that neither exercise the powers properly belonging to the other,'' we find

that the executive department is to be filled by appointments of the legislature; and the executive prerogative

of pardon to be finally exercised by the same authority. Even justices of the peace are to be appointed by the

legislature. In citing these cases, in which the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments have not been

kept totally separate and distinct, I wish not to be regarded as an advocate for the particular organizations of

the several State governments. I am fully aware that among the many excellent principles which they

exemplify, they carry strong marks of the haste, and still stronger of the inexperience, under which they were

framed. It is but too obvious that in some instances the fundamental principle under consideration has been

violated by too great a mixture, and even an actual consolidation, of the different powers; and that in no

instance has a competent provision been made for maintaining in practice the separation delineated on paper.

What I have wished to evince is, that the charge brought against the proposed Constitution, of violating the

sacred maxim of free government, is warranted neither by the real meaning annexed to that maxim by its

author, nor by the sense in which it has hitherto been understood in America. This interesting subject will be

IT WAS shown in the last paper that the political apothegm there examined does not require that the

legislative, executive, and judiciary departments should be wholly unconnected with each other. I shall

undertake, in the next place, to show that unless these departments be so far connected and blended as to give

to each a constitutional control over the others, the degree of separation which the maxim requires, as

essential to a free government, can never in practice be duly maintained. It is agreed on all sides, that the

powers properly belonging to one of the departments ought not to be directly and completely administered by

either of the other departments. It is equally evident, that none of them ought to possess, directly or indirectly,

an overruling influence over the others, in the administration of their respective powers. It will not be denied,

that power is of an encroaching nature, and that it ought to be effectually restrained from passing the limits

After discriminating, therefore, in theory, the several classes of power, as they may in their nature be

legislative, executive, or judiciary, the next and most difficult task is to provide some practical security for

What this security ought to be, is the great problem to be solved. Will it be sufficient to mark, with precision,

the boundaries of these departments, in the constitution of the government, and to trust to these parchment

barriers against the encroaching spirit of power? This is the security which appears to have been principally

relied on by the compilers of most of the American constitutions. But experience assures us, that the efficacy

of the provision has been greatly overrated; and that some more adequate defense is indispensably necessary

for the more feeble, against the more powerful, members of the government. The legislative department is

everywhere extending the sphere of its activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex. The

founders of our republics have so much merit for the wisdom which they have displayed, that no task can be

less pleasing than that of pointing out the errors into which they have fallen. A respect for truth, however,

obliges us to remark, that they seem never for a moment to have turned their eyes from the danger to liberty

from the overgrown and allgrasping prerogative of an hereditary magistrate, supported and fortified by an

hereditary branch of the legislative authority. They seem never to have recollected the danger from legislative

usurpations, which, by assembling all power in the same hands, must lead to the same tyranny as is

threatened by executive usurpations. In a government where numerous and extensive prerogatives are placed

in the hands of an hereditary monarch, the executive department is very justly regarded as the source of

danger, and watched with all the jealousy which a zeal for liberty ought to inspire. In a democracy, where a

multitude of people exercise in person the legislative functions, and are continually exposed, by their

incapacity for regular deliberation and concerted measures, to the ambitious intrigues of their executive

magistrates, tyranny may well be apprehended, on some favorable emergency, to start up in the same quarter.

But in a representative republic, where the executive magistracy is carefully limited; both in the extent and

the duration of its power; and where the legislative power is exercised by an assembly, which is inspired, by a

supposed influence over the people, with an intrepid confidence in its own strength; which is sufficiently

numerous to feel all the passions which actuate a multitude, yet not so numerous as to be incapable of

pursuing the objects of its passions, by means which reason prescribes; it is against the enterprising ambition

of this department that the people ought to indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all their precautions. The

legislative department derives a superiority in our governments from other circumstances. Its constitutional

powers being at once more extensive, and less susceptible of precise limits, it can, with the greater facility,

mask, under complicated and indirect measures, the encroachments which it makes on the coordinate

departments. It is not unfrequently a question of real nicety in legislative bodies, whether the operation of a

particular measure will, or will not, extend beyond the legislative sphere. On the other side, the executive

power being restrained within a narrower compass, and being more simple in its nature, and the judiciary

being described by landmarks still less uncertain, projects of usurpation by either of these departments would

immediately betray and defeat themselves. Nor is this all: as the legislative department alone has access to the

pockets of the people, and has in some constitutions full discretion, and in all a prevailing influence, over the

pecuniary rewards of those who fill the other departments, a dependence is thus created in the latter, which

gives still greater facility to encroachments of the former. I have appealed to our own experience for the truth

of what I advance on this subject. Were it necessary to verify this experience by particular proofs, they might

be multiplied without end. I might find a witness in every citizen who has shared in, or been attentive to, the

course of public administrations. I might collect vouchers in abundance from the records and archives of

every State in the Union. But as a more concise, and at the same time equally satisfactory, evidence, I will

refer to the example of two States, attested by two unexceptionable authorities. The first example is that of

Virginia, a State which, as we have seen, has expressly declared in its constitution, that the three great

Jefferson, who, besides his other advantages for remarking the operation of the government, was himself the

chief magistrate of it. In order to convey fully the ideas with which his experience had impressed him on this

subject, it will be necessary to quote a passage of some length from his very interesting ``Notes on the State

of Virginia,'' p. 195. ``All the powers of government, legislative, executive, and judiciary, result to the

legislative body. The concentrating these in the same hands, is precisely the definition of despotic

government. It will be no alleviation, that these powers will be exercised by a plurality of hands, and not by a

single one. One hundred and seventythree despots would surely be as oppressive as one. Let those who

doubt it, turn their eyes on the republic of Venice. As little will it avail us, that they are chosen by ourselves.

An ELECTIVE DESPOTISM was not the government we fought for; but one which should not only be

founded on free principles, but in which the powers of government should be so divided and balanced among

several bodies of magistracy, as that no one could transcend their legal limits, without being effectually

For this reason, that convention which passed the ordinance of government, laid its foundation on this basis,

that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments should be separate and distinct, so that no person

should exercise the powers of more than one of them at the same time. BUT NO BARRIER WAS

PROVIDED BETWEEN THESE SEVERAL POWERS. The judiciary and the executive members were left

dependent on the legislative for their subsistence in office, and some of them for their continuance in it. If,

therefore, the legislature assumes executive and judiciary powers, no opposition is likely to be made; nor, if

made, can be effectual; because in that case they may put their proceedings into the form of acts of Assembly,

which will render them obligatory on the other branches. They have accordingly, IN MANY instances,

DECIDED RIGHTS which should have been left to JUDICIARY CONTROVERSY, and THE DIRECTION

AND FAMILIAR. ''The other State which I shall take for an example is Pennsylvania; and the other

authority, the Council of Censors, which assembled in the years 1783 and 1784. A part of the duty of this

body, as marked out by the constitution, was ``to inquire whether the constitution had been preserved

inviolate in every part; and whether the legislative and executive branches of government had performed their

duty as guardians of the people, or assumed to themselves, or exercised, other or greater powers than they are

entitled to by the constitution. '' In the execution of this trust, the council were necessarily led to a comparison

of both the legislative and executive proceedings, with the constitutional powers of these departments; and

from the facts enumerated, and to the truth of most of which both sides in the council subscribed, it appears

that the constitution had been flagrantly violated by the legislature in a variety of important instances. A great

number of laws had been passed, violating, without any apparent necessity, the rule requiring that all bills of

a public nature shall be previously printed for the consideration of the people; although this is one of the

precautions chiefly relied on by the constitution against improper acts of legislature. The constitutional trial

by jury had been violated, and powers assumed which had not been delegated by the constitution.

Executive powers had been usurped. The salaries of the judges, which the constitution expressly requires to

be fixed, had been occasionally varied; and cases belonging to the judiciary department frequently drawn

within legislative cognizance and determination. Those who wish to see the several particulars falling under

each of these heads, may consult the journals of the council, which are in print. Some of them, it will be

found, may be imputable to peculiar circumstances connected with the war; but the greater part of them may

be considered as the spontaneous shoots of an illconstituted government. It appears, also, that the executive

department had not been innocent of frequent breaches of the constitution. There are three observations,

however, which ought to be made on this head: FIRST, a great proportion of the instances were either

immediately produced by the necessities of the war, or recommended by Congress or the

commanderinchief; SECONDLY, in most of the other instances, they conformed either to the declared or

the known sentiments of the legislative department; THIRDLY, the executive department of Pennsylvania is

distinguished from that of the other States by the number of members composing it. In this respect, it has as

much affinity to a legislative assembly as to an executive council. And being at once exempt from the

restraint of an individual responsibility for the acts of the body, and deriving confidence from mutual

example and joint influence, unauthorized measures would, of course, be more freely hazarded, than where

The conclusion which I am warranted in drawing from these observations is, that a mere demarcation on

parchment of the constitutional limits of the several departments, is not a sufficient guard against those

encroachments which lead to a tyrannical concentration of all the powers of government in the same hands.

THE author of the ``Notes on the State of Virginia,'' quoted in the last paper, has subjoined to that valuable

work the draught of a constitution, which had been prepared in order to be laid before a convention, expected

to be called in 1783, by the legislature, for the establishment of a constitution for that commonwealth. The

plan, like every thing from the same pen, marks a turn of thinking, original, comprehensive, and accurate; and

is the more worthy of attention as it equally displays a fervent attachment to republican government and an

enlightened view of the dangerous propensities against which it ought to be guarded.

One of the precautions which he proposes, and on which he appears ultimately to rely as a palladium to the

weaker departments of power against the invasions of the stronger, is perhaps altogether his own, and as it

immediately relates to the subject of our present inquiry, ought not to be overlooked. His proposition is, ``that

whenever any two of the three branches of government shall concur in opinion, each by the voices of two

thirds of their whole number, that a convention is necessary for altering the constitution, or CORRECTING

BREACHES OF IT, a convention shall be called for the purpose. ''As the people are the only legitimate

fountain of power, and it is from them that the constitutional charter, under which the several branches of

government hold their power, is derived, it seems strictly consonant to the republican theory, to recur to the

same original authority, not only whenever it may be necessary to enlarge, diminish, or newmodel the

powers of the government, but also whenever any one of the departments may commit encroachments on the

chartered authorities of the others. The several departments being perfectly coordinate by the terms of their

common commission, none of them, it is evident, can pretend to an exclusive or superior right of settling the

boundaries between their respective powers; and how are the encroachments of the stronger to be prevented,

or the wrongs of the weaker to be redressed, without an appeal to the people themselves, who, as the grantors

of the commissions, can alone declare its true meaning, and enforce its observance? There is certainly great

force in this reasoning, and it must be allowed to prove that a constitutional road to the decision of the people

ought to be marked out and kept open, for certain great and extraordinary occasions. But there appear to be

insuperable objections against the proposed recurrence to the people, as a provision in all cases for keeping

the several departments of power within their constitutional limits. In the first place, the provision does not

reach the case of a combination of two of the departments against the third. If the legislative authority, which

possesses so many means of operating on the motives of the other departments, should be able to gain to its

interest either of the others, or even one third of its members, the remaining department could derive no

advantage from its remedial provision. I do not dwell, however, on this objection, because it may be thought

to be rather against the modification of the principle, than against the principle itself. In the next place, it may

be considered as an objection inherent in the principle, that as every appeal to the people would carry an

implication of some defect in the government, frequent appeals would, in a great measure, deprive the

government of that veneration which time bestows on every thing, and without which perhaps the wisest and

freest governments would not possess the requisite stability. If it be true that all governments rest on opinion,

it is no less true that the strength of opinion in each individual, and its practical influence on his conduct,

depend much on the number which he supposes to have entertained the same opinion. The reason of man,

like man himself, is timid and cautious when left alone, and acquires firmness and confidence in proportion to

the number with which it is associated. When the examples which fortify opinion are ANCIENT as well as

NUMEROUS, they are known to have a double effect. In a nation of philosophers, this consideration ought to

be disregarded. A reverence for the laws would be sufficiently inculcated by the voice of an enlightened

reason. But a nation of philosophers is as little to be expected as the philosophical race of kings wished for by

Plato. And in every other nation, the most rational government will not find it a superfluous advantage to

have the prejudices of the community on its side. The danger of disturbing the public tranquillity by

interesting too strongly the public passions, is a still more serious objection against a frequent reference of

constitutional questions to the decision of the whole society. Notwithstanding the success which has attended

the revisions of our established forms of government, and which does so much honor to the virtue and

intelligence of the people of America, it must be confessed that the experiments are of too ticklish a nature to

be unnecessarily multiplied. We are to recollect that all the existing constitutions were formed in the midst of

a danger which repressed the passions most unfriendly to order and concord; of an enthusiastic confidence of

the people in their patriotic leaders, which stifled the ordinary diversity of opinions on great national

questions; of a universal ardor for new and opposite forms, produced by a universal resentment and

indignation against the ancient government; and whilst no spirit of party connected with the changes to be

made, or the abuses to be reformed, could mingle its leaven in the operation. The future situations in which

we must expect to be usually placed, do not present any equivalent security against the danger which is

apprehended. But the greatest objection of all is, that the decisions which would probably result from such

appeals would not answer the purpose of maintaining the constitutional equilibrium of the government. We

have seen that the tendency of republican governments is to an aggrandizement of the legislative at the

expense of the other departments. The appeals to the people, therefore, would usually be made by the

executive and judiciary departments. But whether made by one side or the other, would each side enjoy equal

advantages on the trial? Let us view their different situations. The members of the executive and judiciary

departments are few in number, and can be personally known to a small part only of the people. The latter, by

the mode of their appointment, as well as by the nature and permanency of it, are too far removed from the

people to share much in their prepossessions. The former are generally the objects of jealousy, and their

administration is always liable to be discolored and rendered unpopular. The members of the legislative

department, on the other hand, are numberous. They are distributed and dwell among the people at large.

Their connections of blood, of friendship, and of acquaintance embrace a great proportion of the most

influential part of the society. The nature of their public trust implies a personal influence among the people,

and that they are more immediately the confidential guardians of the rights and liberties of the people. With

these advantages, it can hardly be supposed that the adverse party would have an equal chance for a favorable

issue. But the legislative party would not only be able to plead their cause most successfully with the people.

The same influence which had gained them an election into the legislature, would gain them a seat in the

convention. If this should not be the case with all, it would probably be the case with many, and pretty

certainly with those leading characters, on whom every thing depends in such bodies. The convention, in

short, would be composed chiefly of men who had been, who actually were, or who expected to be, members

of the department whose conduct was arraigned. They would consequently be parties to the very question to

be decided by them. It might, however, sometimes happen, that appeals would be made under circumstances

less adverse to the executive and judiciary departments. The usurpations of the legislature might be so

flagrant and so sudden, as to admit of no specious coloring. A strong party among themselves might take side

with the other branches. The executive power might be in the hands of a peculiar favorite of the people. In

such a posture of things, the public decision might be less swayed by prepossessions in favor of the

legislative party. But still it could never be expected to turn on the true merits of the question. It would

inevitably be connected with the spirit of preexisting parties, or of parties springing out of the question

itself. It would be connected with persons of distinguished character and extensive influence in the

community. It would be pronounced by the very men who had been agents in, or opponents of, the measures

to which the decision would relate. The PASSIONS, therefore, not the REASON, of the public would sit in

judgment. But it is the reason, alone, of the public, that ought to control and regulate the government. The

We found in the last paper, that mere declarations in the written constitution are not sufficient to restrain the

several departments within their legal rights. It appears in this, that occasional appeals to the people would be

neither a proper nor an effectual provision for that purpose. How far the provisions of a different nature

contained in the plan above quoted might be adequate, I do not examine. Some of them are unquestionably

founded on sound political principles, and all of them are framed with singular ingenuity and precision.

IT MAY be contended, perhaps, that instead of OCCASIONAL appeals to the people, which are liable to the

objections urged against them, PERIODICAL appeals are the proper and adequate means of PREVENTING

AND CORRECTING INFRACTIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION. It will be attended to, that in the

examination of these expedients, I confine myself to their aptitude for ENFORCING the Constitution, by

keeping the several departments of power within their due bounds, without particularly considering them as

provisions for ALTERING the Constitution itself. In the first view, appeals to the people at fixed periods

appear to be nearly as ineligible as appeals on particular occasions as they emerge.

If the periods be separated by short intervals, the measures to be reviewed and rectified will have been of

recent date, and will be connected with all the circumstances which tend to vitiate and pervert the result of

occasional revisions. If the periods be distant from each other, the same remark will be applicable to all

recent measures; and in proportion as the remoteness of the others may favor a dispassionate review of them,

this advantage is inseparable from inconveniences which seem to counterbalance it. In the first place, a

distant prospect of public censure would be a very feeble restraint on power from those excesses to which it

might be urged by the force of present motives. Is it to be imagined that a legislative assembly, consisting of

a hundred or two hundred members, eagerly bent on some favorite object, and breaking through the restraints

of the Constitution in pursuit of it, would be arrested in their career, by considerations drawn from a censorial

revision of their conduct at the future distance of ten, fifteen, or twenty years? In the next place, the abuses

would often have completed their mischievous effects before the remedial provision would be applied. And

in the last place, where this might not be the case, they would be of long standing, would have taken deep

root, and would not easily be extirpated. The scheme of revising the constitution, in order to correct recent

breaches of it, as well as for other purposes, has been actually tried in one of the States. One of the objects of

the Council of Censors which met in Pennsylvania in 1783 and 1784, was, as we have seen, to inquire,

``whether the constitution had been violated, and whether the legislative and executive departments had

encroached upon each other. '' This important and novel experiment in politics merits, in several points of

view, very particular attention. In some of them it may, perhaps, as a single experiment, made under

circumstances somewhat peculiar, be thought to be not absolutely conclusive. But as applied to the case

under consideration, it involves some facts, which I venture to remark, as a complete and satisfactory

illustration of the reasoning which I have employed. First. It appears, from the names of the gentlemen who

composed the council, that some, at least, of its most active members had also been active and leading

Secondly. It appears that the same active and leading members of the council had been active and influential

members of the legislative and executive branches, within the period to be reviewed; and even patrons or

opponents of the very measures to be thus brought to the test of the constitution. Two of the members had

been vicepresidents of the State, and several other members of the executive council, within the seven

preceding years. One of them had been speaker, and a number of others distinguished members, of the

legislative assembly within the same period. Thirdly. Every page of their proceedings witnesses the effect of

all these circumstances on the temper of their deliberations. Throughout the continuance of the council, it was

split into two fixed and violent parties. The fact is acknowledged and lamented by themselves. Had this not

been the case, the face of their proceedings exhibits a proof equally satisfactory. In all questions, however

unimportant in themselves, or unconnected with each other, the same names stand invariably contrasted on

the opposite columns. Every unbiased observer may infer, without danger of mistake, and at the same time

without meaning to reflect on either party, or any individuals of either party, that, unfortunately, PASSION,

not REASON, must have presided over their decisions. When men exercise their reason coolly and freely on

a variety of distinct questions, they inevitably fall into different opinions on some of them. When they are

governed by a common passion, their opinions, if they are so to be called, will be the same.

Fourthly. It is at least problematical, whether the decisions of this body do not, in several instances,

misconstrue the limits prescribed for the legislative and executive departments, instead of reducing and

Fifthly. I have never understood that the decisions of the council on constitutional questions, whether rightly

or erroneously formed, have had any effect in varying the practice founded on legislative constructions. It

even appears, if I mistake not, that in one instance the contemporary legislature denied the constructions of

the council, and actually prevailed in the contest. This censorial body, therefore, proves at the same time, by

its researches, the existence of the disease, and by its example, the inefficacy of the remedy. This conclusion

cannot be invalidated by alleging that the State in which the experiment was made was at that crisis, and had

been for a long time before, violently heated and distracted by the rage of party. Is it to be presumed, that at

any future septennial epoch the same State will be free from parties? Is it to be presumed that any other State,

at the same or any other given period, will be exempt from them? Such an event ought to be neither presumed

nor desired; because an extinction of parties necessarily implies either a universal alarm for the public safety,

or an absolute extinction of liberty. Were the precaution taken of excluding from the assemblies elected by

the people, to revise the preceding administration of the government, all persons who should have been

concerned with the government within the given period, the difficulties would not be obviated. The important

task would probably devolve on men, who, with inferior capacities, would in other respects be little better

Although they might not have been personally concerned in the administration, and therefore not immediately

agents in the measures to be examined, they would probably have been involved in the parties connected with

TO WHAT expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for maintaining in practice the necessary partition of

power among the several departments, as laid down in the Constitution? The only answer that can be given is,

that as all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so contriving

the interior structure of the government as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be

the means of keeping each other in their proper places. Without presuming to undertake a full development of

this important idea, I will hazard a few general observations, which may perhaps place it in a clearer light,

and enable us to form a more correct judgment of the principles and structure of the government planned by

the convention. In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers

of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty,

it is evident that each department should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so constituted

that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the

others. Were this principle rigorously adhered to, it would require that all the appointments for the supreme

executive, legislative, and judiciary magistracies should be drawn from the same fountain of authority, the

people, through channels having no communication whatever with one another. Perhaps such a plan of

constructing the several departments would be less difficult in practice than it may in contemplation appear.

Some difficulties, however, and some additional expense would attend the execution of it. Some deviations,

therefore, from the principle must be admitted. In the constitution of the judiciary department in particular, it

might be inexpedient to insist rigorously on the principle: first, because peculiar qualifications being essential

in the members, the primary consideration ought to be to select that mode of choice which best secures these

qualifications; secondly, because the permanent tenure by which the appointments are held in that

department, must soon destroy all sense of dependence on the authority conferring them. It is equally evident,

that the members of each department should be as little dependent as possible on those of the others, for the

emoluments annexed to their offices. Were the executive magistrate, or the judges, not independent of the

legislature in this particular, their independence in every other would be merely nominal. But the great

security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to

those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist

encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made

commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the

man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature,

that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but

the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If

angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In

framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must

first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A

dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught

mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the

defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public.

We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim is to

divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other that the

private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights. These inventions of prudence

cannot be less requisite in the distribution of the supreme powers of the State. But it is not possible to give to

each department an equal power of selfdefense. In republican government, the legislative authority

necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different

branches; and to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little

connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the

society will admit. It may even be necessary to guard against dangerous encroachments by still further

precautions. As the weight of the legislative authority requires that it should be thus divided, the weakness of

the executive may require, on the other hand, that it should be fortified. An absolute negative on the

legislature appears, at first view, to be the natural defense with which the executive magistrate should be

armed. But perhaps it would be neither altogether safe nor alone sufficient. On ordinary occasions it might

not be exerted with the requisite firmness, and on extraordinary occasions it might be perfidiously abused.

May not this defect of an absolute negative be supplied by some qualified connection between this weaker

department and the weaker branch of the stronger department, by which the latter may be led to support the

constitutional rights of the former, without being too much detached from the rights of its own department? If

the principles on which these observations are founded be just, as I persuade myself they are, and they be

applied as a criterion to the several State constitutions, and to the federal Constitution it will be found that if

the latter does not perfectly correspond with them, the former are infinitely less able to bear such a test. There

are, moreover, two considerations particularly applicable to the federal system of America, which place that

system in a very interesting point of view. First. In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people

is submitted to the administration of a single government; and the usurpations are guarded against by a

division of the government into distinct and separate departments. In the compound republic of America, the

power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion

allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the

rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be

controlled by itself. Second. It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the

oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different

interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the

rights of the minority will be insecure. There are but two methods of providing against this evil: the one by

creating a will in the community independent of the majority that is, of the society itself; the other, by

comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination

of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable. The first method prevails in all governments

possessing an hereditary or selfappointed authority. This, at best, is but a precarious security; because a

power independent of the society may as well espouse the unjust views of the major, as the rightful interests

of the minor party, and may possibly be turned against both parties. The second method will be exemplified

in the federal republic of the United States. Whilst all authority in it will be derived from and dependent on

the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the

rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority.

In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the

one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in

both cases will depend on the number of interests and sects; and this may be presumed to depend on the

extent of country and number of people comprehended under the same government. This view of the subject

must particularly recommend a proper federal system to all the sincere and considerate friends of republican

government, since it shows that in exact proportion as the territory of the Union may be formed into more

circumscribed Confederacies, or States oppressive combinations of a majority will be facilitated: the best

security, under the republican forms, for the rights of every class of citizens, will be diminished: and

consequently the stability and independence of some member of the government, the only other security,

must be proportionately increased. Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has

been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit. In a society under the

forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to

reign as in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger;

and as, in the latter state, even the stronger individuals are prompted, by the uncertainty of their condition, to

submit to a government which may protect the weak as well as themselves; so, in the former state, will the

more powerful factions or parties be gradnally induced, by a like motive, to wish for a government which will

protect all parties, the weaker as well as the more powerful. It can be little doubted that if the State of Rhode

Island was separated from the Confederacy and left to itself, the insecurity of rights under the popular form of

government within such narrow limits would be displayed by such reiterated oppressions of factious

majorities that some power altogether independent of the people would soon be called for by the voice of the

very factions whose misrule had proved the necessity of it. In the extended republic of the United States, and

among the great variety of interests, parties, and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the

whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those of justice and the general good;

whilst there being thus less danger to a minor from the will of a major party, there must be less pretext, also,

to provide for the security of the former, by introducing into the government a will not dependent on the

latter, or, in other words, a will independent of the society itself. It is no less certain than it is important,

notwithstanding the contrary opinions which have been entertained, that the larger the society, provided it lie

within a practical sphere, the more duly capable it will be of selfgovernment. And happily for the

REPUBLICAN CAUSE, the practicable sphere may be carried to a very great extent, by a judicious

FROM the more general inquiries pursued in the four last papers, I pass on to a more particular examination

of the several parts of the government. I shall begin with the House of Representatives. The first view to be

taken of this part of the government relates to the qualifications of the electors and the elected. Those of the

former are to be the same with those of the electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.

The definition of the right of suffrage is very justly regarded as a fundamental article of republican

government. It was incumbent on the convention, therefore, to define and establish this right in the

Constitution. To have left it open for the occasional regulation of the Congress, would have been improper

for the reason just mentioned. To have submitted it to the legislative discretion of the States, would have been

improper for the same reason; and for the additional reason that it would have rendered too dependent on the

State governments that branch of the federal government which ought to be dependent on the people alone.

To have reduced the different qualifications in the different States to one uniform rule, would probably have

been as dissatisfactory to some of the States as it would have been difficult to the convention. The provision

made by the convention appears, therefore, to be the best that lay within their option.

It must be satisfactory to every State, because it is conformable to the standard already established, or which

may be established, by the State itself. It will be safe to the United States, because, being fixed by the State

constitutions, it is not alterable by the State governments, and it cannot be feared that the people of the States

will alter this part of their constitutions in such a manner as to abridge the rights secured to them by the

federal Constitution. The qualifications of the elected, being less carefully and properly defined by the State

constitutions, and being at the same time more susceptible of uniformity, have been very properly considered

and regulated by the convention. A representative of the United States must be of the age of twentyfive

years; must have been seven years a citizen of the United States; must, at the time of his election, be an

inhabitant of the State he is to represent; and, during the time of his service, must be in no office under the

United States. Under these reasonable limitations, the door of this part of the federal government is open to

merit of every description, whether native or adoptive, whether young or old, and without regard to poverty

or wealth, or to any particular profession of religious faith. The term for which the representatives are to be

elected falls under a second view which may be taken of this branch. In order to decide on the propriety of

this article, two questions must be considered: first, whether biennial elections will, in this case, be safe;

secondly, whether they be necessary or useful. First. As it is essential to liberty that the government in

general should have a common interest with the people, so it is particularly essential that the branch of it

under consideration should have an immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with, the people.

Frequent elections are unquestionably the only policy by which this dependence and sympathy can be

effectually secured. But what particular degree of frequency may be absolutely necessary for the purpose,

does not appear to be susceptible of any precise calculation, and must depend on a variety of circumstances

with which it may be connected. Let us consult experience, the guide that ought always to be followed

whenever it can be found. The scheme of representation, as a substitute for a meeting of the citizens in

person, being at most but very imperfectly known to ancient polity, it is in more modern times only that we

are to expect instructive examples. And even here, in order to avoid a research too vague and diffusive, it will

be proper to confine ourselves to the few examples which are best known, and which bear the greatest

analogy to our particular case. The first to which this character ought to be applied, is the House of Commons

in Great Britain. The history of this branch of the English Constitution, anterior to the date of Magna Charta,

is too obscure to yield instruction. The very existence of it has been made a question among political

antiquaries. The earliest records of subsequent date prove that parliaments were to SIT only every year; not

that they were to be ELECTED every year. And even these annual sessions were left so much at the

discretion of the monarch, that, under various pretexts, very long and dangerous intermissions were often

contrived by royal ambition. To remedy this grievance, it was provided by a statute in the reign of Charles II.

, that the intermissions should not be protracted beyond a period of three years. On the accession of William

, when a revolution took place in the government, the subject was still more seriously resumed, and it was

declared to be among the fundamental rights of the people that parliaments ought to be held FREQUENTLY.

By another statute, which passed a few years later in the same reign, the term ``frequently,'' which had

alluded to the triennial period settled in the time of Charles II. , is reduced to a precise meaning, it being

expressly enacted that a new parliament shall be called within three years after the termination of the former.

The last change, from three to seven years, is well known to have been introduced pretty early in the present

century, under on alarm for the Hanoverian succession. From these facts it appears that the greatest frequency

of elections which has been deemed necessary in that kingdom, for binding the representatives to their

constituents, does not exceed a triennial return of them. And if we may argue from the degree of liberty

retained even under septennial elections, and all the other vicious ingredients in the parliamentary

constitution, we cannot doubt that a reduction of the period from seven to three years, with the other

necessary reforms, would so far extend the influence of the people over their representatives as to satisfy us

that biennial elections, under the federal system, cannot possibly be dangerous to the requisite dependence of

the House of Representatives on their constituents. Elections in Ireland, till of late, were regulated entirely by

the discretion of the crown, and were seldom repeated, except on the accession of a new prince, or some other

was continued throughout his whole reign, a period of about thirtyfive years. The only dependence of the

representatives on the people consisted in the right of the latter to supply occasional vacancies by the election

of new members, and in the chance of some event which might produce a general new election.

The ability also of the Irish parliament to maintain the rights of their constituents, so far as the disposition

might exist, was extremely shackled by the control of the crown over the subjects of their deliberation. Of

late these shackles, if I mistake not, have been broken; and octennial parliaments have besides been

established. What effect may be produced by this partial reform, must be left to further experience. The

example of Ireland, from this view of it, can throw but little light on the subject. As far as we can draw any

conclusion from it, it must be that if the people of that country have been able under all these disadvantages

to retain any liberty whatever, the advantage of biennial elections would secure to them every degree of

liberty, which might depend on a due connection between their representatives and themselves. Let us bring

our inquiries nearer home. The example of these States, when British colonies, claims particular attention, at

the same time that it is so well known as to require little to be said on it. The principle of representation, in

one branch of the legislature at least, was established in all of them. But the periods of election were

different. They varied from one to seven years. Have we any reason to infer, from the spirit and conduct of

the representatives of the people, prior to the Revolution, that biennial elections would have been dangerous

to the public liberties? The spirit which everywhere displayed itself at the commencement of the struggle, and

which vanquished the obstacles to independence, is the best of proofs that a sufficient portion of liberty had

been everywhere enjoyed to inspire both a sense of its worth and a zeal for its proper enlargement This

remark holds good, as well with regard to the then colonies whose elections were least frequent, as to those

whose elections were most frequent Virginia was the colony which stood first in resisting the parliamentary

usurpations of Great Britain; it was the first also in espousing, by public act, the resolution of independence.

In Virginia, nevertheless, if I have not been misinformed, elections under the former government were

septennial. This particular example is brought into view, not as a proof of any peculiar merit, for the priority

in those instances was probably accidental; and still less of any advantage in SEPTENNIAL elections, for

when compared with a greater frequency they are inadmissible; but merely as a proof, and I conceive it to be

a very substantial proof, that the liberties of the people can be in no danger from BIENNIAL elections. The

conclusion resulting from these examples will be not a little strengthened by recollecting three circumstances.

The first is, that the federal legislature will possess a part only of that supreme legislative authority which is

vested completely in the British Parliament; and which, with a few exceptions, was exercised by the colonial

assemblies and the Irish legislature. It is a received and wellfounded maxim, that where no other

circumstances affect the case, the greater the power is, the shorter ought to be its duration; and, conversely,

the smaller the power, the more safely may its duration be protracted. In the second place, it has, on another

occasion, been shown that the federal legislature will not only be restrained by its dependence on its people,

as other legislative bodies are, but that it will be, moreover, watched and controlled by the several collateral

legislatures, which other legislative bodies are not. And in the third place, no comparison can be made

between the means that will be possessed by the more permanent branches of the federal government for

seducing, if they should be disposed to seduce, the House of Representatives from their duty to the people,

and the means of influence over the popular branch possessed by the other branches of the government above

cited. With less power, therefore, to abuse, the federal representatives can be less tempted on one side, and

I SHALL here, perhaps, be reminded of a current observation, ``that where annual elections end, tyranny

begins. '' If it be true, as has often been remarked, that sayings which become proverbial are generally

founded in reason, it is not less true, that when once established, they are often applied to cases to which the

reason of them does not extend. I need not look for a proof beyond the case before us. What is the reason on

which this proverbial observation is founded? No man will subject himself to the ridicule of pretending that

any natural connection subsists between the sun or the seasons, and the period within which human virtue can

bear the temptations of power. Happily for mankind, liberty is not, in this respect, confined to any single

point of time; but lies within extremes, which afford sufficient latitude for all the variations which may be

required by the various situations and circumstances of civil society. The election of magistrates might be, if

it were found expedient, as in some instances it actually has been, daily, weekly, or monthly, as well as

annual; and if circumstances may require a deviation from the rule on one side, why not also on the other

side? Turning our attention to the periods established among ourselves, for the election of the most numerous

branches of the State legislatures, we find them by no means coinciding any more in this instance, than in the

elections of other civil magistrates. In Connecticut and Rhode Island, the periods are halfyearly. In the other

States, South Carolina excepted, they are annual. In South Carolina they are biennial as is proposed in the

federal government. Here is a difference, as four to one, between the longest and shortest periods; and yet it

would be not easy to show, that Connecticut or Rhode Island is better governed, or enjoys a greater share of

rational liberty, than South Carolina; or that either the one or the other of these States is distinguished in these

respects, and by these causes, from the States whose elections are different from both. In searching for the

grounds of this doctrine, I can discover but one, and that is wholly inapplicable to our case. The important

distinction so well understood in America, between a Constitution established by the people and unalterable

by the government, and a law established by the government and alterable by the government, seems to have

been little understood and less observed in any other country. Wherever the supreme power of legislation has

resided, has been supposed to reside also a full power to change the form of the government. Even in Great

Britain, where the principles of political and civil liberty have been most discussed, and where we hear most

of the rights of the Constitution, it is maintained that the authority of the Parliament is transcendent and

uncontrollable, as well with regard to the Constitution, as the ordinary objects of legislative provision. They

have accordingly, in several instances, actually changed, by legislative acts, some of the most fundamental

articles of the government. They have in particular, on several occasions, changed the period of election; and,

on the last occasion, not only introduced septennial in place of triennial elections, but by the same act,

continued themselves in place four years beyond the term for which they were elected by the people. An

attention to these dangerous practices has produced a very natural alarm in the votaries of free government, of

which frequency of elections is the cornerstone; and has led them to seek for some security to liberty,

against the danger to which it is exposed. Where no Constitution, paramount to the government, either

existed or could be obtained, no constitutional security, similar to that established in the United States, was to

be attempted. Some other security, therefore, was to be sought for; and what better security would the case

admit, than that of selecting and appealing to some simple and familiar portion of time, as a standard for

measuring the danger of innovations, for fixing the national sentiment, and for uniting the patriotic exertions?

The most simple and familiar portion of time, applicable to the subject was that of a year; and hence the

doctrine has been inculcated by a laudable zeal, to erect some barrier against the gradual innovations of an

unlimited government, that the advance towards tyranny was to be calculated by the distance of departure

from the fixed point of annual elections. But what necessity can there be of applying this expedient to a

government limited, as the federal government will be, by the authority of a paramount Constitution? Or who

will pretend that the liberties of the people of America will not be more secure under biennial elections,

unalterably fixed by such a Constitution, than those of any other nation would be, where elections were

annual, or even more frequent, but subject to alterations by the ordinary power of the government? The

second question stated is, whether biennial elections be necessary or useful. The propriety of answering this

question in the affirmative will appear from several very obvious considerations. No man can be a competent

legislator who does not add to an upright intention and a sound judgment a certain degree of knowledge of

the subjects on which he is to legislate. A part of this knowledge may be acquired by means of information

which lie within the compass of men in private as well as public stations. Another part can only be attained,

or at least thoroughly attained, by actual experience in the station which requires the use of it. The period of

service, ought, therefore, in all such cases, to bear some proportion to the extent of practical knowledge

requisite to the due performance of the service. The period of legislative service established in most of the

States for the more numerous branch is, as we have seen, one year. The question then may be put into this

simple form: does the period of two years bear no greater proportion to the knowledge requisite for federal

legislation than one year does to the knowledge requisite for State legislation? The very statement of the

question, in this form, suggests the answer that ought to be given to it. In a single State, the requisite

knowledge relates to the existing laws which are uniform throughout the State, and with which all the citizens

are more or less conversant; and to the general affairs of the State, which lie within a small compass, are not

very diversified, and occupy much of the attention and conversation of every class of people. The great

theatre of the United States presents a very different scene. The laws are so far from being uniform, that they

vary in every State; whilst the public affairs of the Union are spread throughout a very extensive region, and

are extremely diversified by t e local affairs connected with them, and can with difficulty be correctly learnt

in any other place than in the central councils to which a knowledge of them will be brought by the

representatives of every part of the empire. Yet some knowledge of the affairs, and even of the laws, of all the

States, ought to be possessed by the members from each of the States. How can foreign trade be properly

regulated by uniform laws, without some acquaintance with the commerce, the ports, the usages, and the

regulatious of the different States? How can the trade between the different States be duly regulated, without

some knowledge of their relative situations in these and other respects? How can taxes be judiciously

imposed and effectually collected, if they be not accommodated to the different laws and local circumstances

relating to these objects in the different States? How can uniform regulations for the militia be duly provided,

without a similar knowledge of many internal circumstances by which the States are distinguished from each

other? These are the principal objects of federal legislation, and suggest most forcibly the extensive

information which the representatives ought to acquire. The other interior objects will require a proportional

degree of information with regard to them. It is true that all these difficulties will, by degrees, be very much

diminished. The most laborious task will be the proper inauguration of the government and the primeval

formation of a federal code. Improvements on the first draughts will every year become both easier and

fewer. Past transactions of the government will be a ready and accurate source of information to new

members. The affairs of the Union will become more and more objects of curiosity and conversation among

the citizens at large. And the increased intercourse among those of different States will contribute not a little

to diffuse a mutual knowledge of their affairs, as this again will contribute to a general assimilation of their

manners and laws. But with all these abatements, the business of federal legislation must continue so far to

exceed, both in novelty and difficulty, the legislative business of a single State, as to justify the longer period

of service assigned to those who are to transact it. A branch of knowledge which belongs to the acquirements

of a federal representative, and which has not been mentioned is that of foreign affairs. In regulating our own

commerce he ought to be not only acquainted with the treaties between the United States and other nations,

but also with the commercial policy and laws of other nations. He ought not to be altogether ignorant of the

law of nations; for that, as far as it is a proper object of municipal legislation, is submitted to the federal

And although the House of Representatives is not immediately to participate in foreign negotiations and

arrangements, yet from the necessary connection between the several branches of public affairs, those

particular branches will frequently deserve attention in the ordinary course of legislation, and will sometimes

demand particular legislative sanction and cooperation. Some portion of this knowledge may, no doubt, be

acquired in a man's closet; but some of it also can only be derived from the public sources of information; and

all of it will be acquired to best effect by a practical attention to the subject during the period of actual service

There are other considerations, of less importance, perhaps, but which are not unworthy of notice. The

distance which many of the representatives will be obliged to travel, and the arrangements rendered necessary

by that circumstance, might be much more serious objections with fit men to this service, if limited to a

single year, than if extended to two years. No argument can be drawn on this subject, from the case of the

delegates to the existing Congress. They are elected annually, it is true; but their reelection is considered by

the legislative assemblies almost as a matter of course. The election of the representatives by the people

would not be governed by the same principle. A few of the members, as happens in all such assemblies, will

possess superior talents; will, by frequent reelections, become members of long standing; will be thoroughly

masters of the public business, and perhaps not unwilling to avail themselves of those advantages. The

greater the proportion of new members, and the less the information of the bulk of the members the more apt

will they be to fall into the snares that may be laid for them. This remark is no less applicable to the relation

which will subsist between the House of Representatives and the Senate. It is an inconvenience mingled with

the advantages of our frequent elections even in single States, where they are large, and hold but one

legislative session in a year, that spurious elections cannot be investigated and annulled in time for the

decision to have its due effect. If a return can be obtained, no matter by what unlawful means, the irregular

member, who takes his seat of course, is sure of holding it a sufficient time to answer his purposes. Hence, a

very pernicious encouragement is given to the use of unlawful means, for obtaining irregular returns. Were

elections for the federal legislature to be annual, this practice might become a very serious abuse, particularly

in the more distant States. Each house is, as it necessarily must be, the judge of the elections, qualifications,

and returns of its members; and whatever improvements may be suggested by experience, for simplifying and

accelerating the process in disputed cases, so great a portion of a year would unavoidably elapse, before an

illegitimate member could be dispossessed of his seat, that the prospect of such an event would be little check

to unfair and illicit means of obtaining a seat. All these considerations taken together warrant us in affirming,

that biennial elections will be as useful to the affairs of the public as we have seen that they will be safe to the

THE next view which I shall take of the House of Representatives relates to the appointment of its members

to the several States which is to be determined by the same rule with that of direct taxes. It is not contended

that the number of people in each State ought not to be the standard for regulating the proportion of those

who are to represent the people of each State. The establishment of the same rule for the appointment of

taxes, will probably be as little contested; though the rule itself in this case, is by no means founded on the

same principle. In the former case, the rule is understood to refer to the personal rights of the people, with

In the latter, it has reference to the proportion of wealth, of which it is in no case a precise measure, and in

ordinary cases a very unfit one. But notwithstanding the imperfection of the rule as applied to the relative

wealth and contributions of the States, it is evidently the least objectionable among the practicable rules, and

had too recently obtained the general sanction of America, not to have found a ready preference with the

convention. All this is admitted, it will perhaps be said; but does it follow, from an admission of numbers for

the measure of representation, or of slaves combined with free citizens as a ratio of taxation, that slaves ought

to be included in the numerical rule of representation? Slaves are considered as property, not as persons. They

ought therefore to be comprehended in estimates of taxation which are founded on property, and to be

excluded from representation which is regulated by a census of persons. This is the objection, as I understand

it, stated in its full force. I shall be equally candid in stating the reasoning which may be offered on the

opposite side. ``We subscribe to the doctrine,'' might one of our Southern brethren observe, ``that

representation relates more immediately to persons, and taxation more immediately to property, and we join

in the application of this distinction to the case of our slaves. But we must deny the fact, that slaves are

considered merely as property, and in no respect whatever as persons. The true state of the case is, that they

partake of both these qualities: being considered by our laws, in some respects, as persons, and in other

respects as property. In being compelled to labor, not for himself, but for a master; in being vendible by one

master to another master; and in being subject at all times to be restrained in his liberty and chastised in his

body, by the capricious will of another, the slave may appear to be degraded from the human rank, and

classed with those irrational animals which fall under the legal denomination of property. In being protected,

on the other hand, in his life and in his limbs, against the violence of all others, even the master of his labor

and his liberty; and in being punishable himself for all violence committed against others, the slave is no less

evidently regarded by the law as a member of the society, not as a part of the irrational creation; as a moral

person, not as a mere article of property. The federal Constitution, therefore, decides with great propriety on

the case of our slaves, when it views them in the mixed character of persons and of property. This is in fact

their true character. It is the character bestowed on them by the laws under which they live; and it will not be

denied, that these are the proper criterion; because it is only under the pretext that the laws have transformed

the negroes into subjects of property, that a place is disputed them in the computation of numbers; and it is

admitted, that if the laws were to restore the rights which have been taken away, the negroes could no longer

be refused an equal share of representation with the other inhabitants. ``This question may be placed in

another light. It is agreed on all sides, that numbers are the best scale of wealth and taxation, as they are the

only proper scale of representation. Would the convention have been impartial or consistent, if they had

rejected the slaves from the list of inhabitants, when the shares of representation were to be calculated, and

inserted them on the lists when the tariff of contributions was to be adjusted? Could it be reasonably

expected, that the Southern States would concur in a system, which considered their slaves in some degree as

men, when burdens were to be imposed, but refused to consider them in the same light, when advantages

were to be conferred? Might not some surprise also be expressed, that those who reproach the Southern States

with the barbarous policy of considering as property a part of their human brethren, should themselves

contend, that the government to which all the States are to be parties, ought to consider this unfortunate race

more completely in the unnatural light of property, than the very laws of which they complain? ``It may be

replied, perhaps, that slaves are not included in the estimate of representatives in any of the States possessing

them. They neither vote themselves nor increase the votes of their masters. Upon what principle, then, ought

they to be taken into the federal estimate of representation? In rejecting them altogether, the Constitution

would, in this respect, have followed the very laws which have been appealed to as the proper guide. ``This

objection is repelled by a single abservation. It is a fundamental principle of the proposed Constitution, that

as the aggregate number of representatives allotted to the several States is to be determined by a federal rule,

founded on the aggregate number of inhabitants, so the right of choosing this allotted number in each State is

to be exercised by such part of the inhabitants as the State itself may designate. The qualifications on which

the right of suffrage depend are not, perhaps, the same in any two States. In some of the States the difference

is very material. In every State, a certain proportion of inhabitants are deprived of this right by the

constitution of the State, who will be included in the census by which the federal Constitution apportions the

In this point of view the Southern States might retort the complaint, by insisting that the principle laid down

by the convention required that no regard should be had to the policy of particular States towards their own

inhabitants; and consequently, that the slaves, as inhabitants, should have been admitted into the census

according to their full number, in like manner with other inhabitants, who, by the policy of other States, are

not admitted to all the rights of citizens. A rigorous adherence, however, to this principle, is waived by those

who would be gainers by it. All that they ask is that equal moderation be shown on the other side. Let the

case of the slaves be considered, as it is in truth, a peculiar one. Let the compromising expedient of the

Constitution be mutually adopted, which regards them as inhabitants, but as debased by servitude below the

equal level of free inhabitants, which regards the SLAVE as divested of two fifths of the MAN. ``After all,

may not another ground be taken on which this article of the Constitution will admit of a still more ready

defense? We have hitherto proceeded on the idea that representation related to persons only, and not at all to

property. But is it a just idea? Government is instituted no less for protection of the property, than of the

persons, of individuals. The one as well as the other, therefore, may be considered as represented by those

who are charged with the government. Upon this principle it is, that in several of the States, and particularly

in the State of New York, one branch of the government is intended more especially to be the guardian of

property, and is accordingly elected by that part of the society which is most interested in this object of

government. In the federal Constitution, this policy does not prevail. The rights of property are committed

into the same hands with the personal rights. Some attention ought, therefore, to be paid to property in the

choice of those hands. ``For another reason, the votes allowed in the federal legislature to the people of each

State, ought to bear some proportion to the comparative wealth of the States. States have not, like individuals,

an influence over each other, arising from superior advantages of fortune. If the law allows an opulent citizen

but a single vote in the choice of his representative, the respect and consequence which he derives from his

fortunate situation very frequently guide the votes of others to the objects of his choice; and through this

imperceptible channel the rights of property are conveyed into the public representation. A State possesses no

such influence over other States. It is not probable that the richest State in the Confederacy will ever

influence the choice of a single representative in any other State. Nor will the representatives of the larger and

richer States possess any other advantage in the federal legislature, over the representatives of other States,

than what may result from their superior number alone. As far, therefore, as their superior wealth and weight

may justly entitle them to any advantage, it ought to be secured to them by a superior share of representation.

The new Constitution is, in this respect, materially different from the existing Confederation, as well as from

that of the United Netherlands, and other similar confederacies. In each of the latter, the efficacy of the

federal resolutions depends on the subsequent and voluntary resolutions of the states composing the union.

Hence the states, though possessing an equal vote in the public councils, have an unequal influence,

corresponding with the unequal importance of these subsequent and voluntary resolutions. Under the

proposed Constitution, the federal acts will take effect without the necessary intervention of the individual

States. They will depend merely on the majority of votes in the federal legislature, and consequently each

vote, whether proceeding from a larger or smaller State, or a State more or less wealthy or powerful, will

have an equal weight and efficacy: in the same manner as the votes individually given in a State legislature,

by the representatives of unequal counties or other districts, have each a precise equality of value and effect;

or if there be any difference in the case, it proceeds from the difference in the personal character of the

individual representative, rather than from any regard to the extent of the district from which he comes. ''Such

is the reasoning which an advocate for the Southern interests might employ on this subject; and although it

may appear to be a little strained in some points, yet, on the whole, I must confess that it fully reconciles me

to the scale of representation which the convention have established. In one respect, the establishment of a

common measure for representation and taxation will have a very salutary effect. As the accuracy of the

census to be obtained by the Congress will necessarily depend, in a considerable degree on the disposition, if

not on the cooperation, of the States, it is of great importance that the States should feel as little bias as

possible, to swell or to reduce the amount of their numbers. Were their share of representation alone to be

governed by this rule, they would have an interest in exaggerating their inhabitants. Were the rule to decide

their share of taxation alone, a contrary temptation would prevail. By extending the rule to both objects, the

States will have opposite interests, which will control and balance each other, and produce the requisite

THE number of which the House of Representatives is to consist, forms another and a very interesting point

of view, under which this branch of the federal legislature may be contemplated.

Scarce any article, indeed, in the whole Constitution seems to be rendered more worthy of attention, by the

weight of character and the apparent force of argument with which it has been assailed.

The charges exhibited against it are, first, that so small a number of representatives will be an unsafe

depositary of the public interests; secondly, that they will not possess a proper knowledge of the local

circumstances of their numerous constituents; thirdly, that they will be taken from that class of citizens which

will sympathize least with the feelings of the mass of the people, and be most likely to aim at a permanent

elevation of the few on the depression of the many; fourthly, that defective as the number will be in the first

instance, it will be more and more disproportionate, by the increase of the people, and the obstacles which

will prevent a correspondent increase of the representatives. In general it may be remarked on this subject,

that no political problem is less susceptible of a precise solution than that which relates to the number most

convenient for a representative legislature; nor is there any point on which the policy of the several States is

more at variance, whether we compare their legislative assemblies directly with each other, or consider the

proportions which they respectively bear to the number of their constituents. Passing over the difference

between the smallest and largest States, as Delaware, whose most numerous branch consists of twentyone

representatives, and Massachusetts, where it amounts to between three and four hundred, a very considerable

difference is observable among States nearly equal in population. The number of representatives in

Pennsylvania is not more than one fifth of that in the State last mentioned. New York, whose population is to

that of South Carolina as six to five, has little more than one third of the number of representatives. As great a

disparity prevails between the States of Georgia and Delaware or Rhode Island. In Pennsylvania, the

representatives do not bear a greater proportion to their constituents than of one for every four or five

thousand. In Rhode Island, they bear a proportion of at least one for every thousand. And according to the

constitution of Georgia, the proportion may be carried to one to every ten electors; and must unavoidably far

exceed the proportion in any of the other States. Another general remark to be made is, that the ratio between

the representatives and the people ought not to be the same where the latter are very numerous as where they

are very few. Were the representatives in Virginia to be regulated by the standard in Rhode Island, they

would, at this time, amount to between four and five hundred; and twenty or thirty years hence, to a thousand.

On the other hand, the ratio of Pennsylvania, if applied to the State of Delaware, would reduce the

representative assembly of the latter to seven or eight members. Nothing can be more fallacious than to found

our political calculations on arithmetical principles. Sixty or seventy men may be more properly trusted with

a given degree of power than six or seven. But it does not follow that six or seven hundred would be

proportionably a better depositary. And if we carry on the supposition to six or seven thousand, the whole

reasoning ought to be reversed. The truth is, that in all cases a certain number at least seems to be necessary

to secure the benefits of free consultation and discussion, and to guard against too easy a combination for

improper purposes; as, on the other hand, the number ought at most to be kept within a certain limit, in order

to avoid the confusion and intemperance of a multitude. In all very numerous assemblies, of whatever

Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob. It is

necessary also to recollect here the observations which were applied to the case of biennial elections. For the

same reason that the limited powers of the Congress, and the control of the State legislatures, justify less

frequent elections than the public safely might otherwise require, the members of the Congress need be less

numerous than if they possessed the whole power of legislation, and were under no other than the ordinary

restraints of other legislative bodies. With these general ideas in our mind, let us weigh the objections which

have been stated against the number of members proposed for the House of Representatives. It is said, in the

first place, that so small a number cannot be safely trusted with so much power. The number of which this

branch of the legislature is to consist, at the outset of the government, will be sixtyfive. Within three years a

census is to be taken, when the number may be augmented to one for every thirty thousand inhabitants; and

within every successive period of ten years the census is to be renewed, and augmentations may continue to

be made under the above limitation. It will not be thought an extravagant conjecture that the first census will,

at the rate of one for every thirty thousand, raise the number of representatives to at least one hundred.

Estimating the negroes in the proportion of three fifths, it can scarcely be doubted that the population of the

United States will by that time, if it does not already, amount to three millions. At the expiration of

twentyfive years, according to the computed rate of increase, the number of representatives will amount to

two hundred, and of fifty years, to four hundred. This is a number which, I presume, will put an end to all

fears arising from the smallness of the body. I take for granted here what I shall, in answering the fourth

objection, hereafter show, that the number of representatives will be augmented from time to time in the

manner provided by the Constitution. On a contrary supposition, I should admit the objection to have very

great weight indeed. The true question to be decided then is, whether the smallness of the number, as a

temporary regulation, be dangerous to the public liberty? Whether sixtyfive members for a few years, and a

hundred or two hundred for a few more, be a safe depositary for a limited and wellguarded power of

legislating for the United States? I must own that I could not give a negative answer to this question, without

first obliterating every impression which I have received with regard to the present genius of the people of

America, the spirit which actuates the State legislatures, and the principles which are incorporated with the

political character of every class of citizens I am unable to conceive that the people of America, in their

present temper, or under any circumstances which can speedily happen, will choose, and every second year

repeat the choice of, sixtyfive or a hundred men who would be disposed to form and pursue a scheme of

tyranny or treachery. I am unable to conceive that the State legislatures, which must feel so many motives to

watch, and which possess so many means of counteracting, the federal legislature, would fail either to detect

or to defeat a conspiracy of the latter against the liberties of their common constituents. I am equally unable

to conceive that there are at this time, or can be in any short time, in the United States, any sixtyfive or a

hundred men capable of recommending themselves to the choice of the people at large, who would either

desire or dare, within the short space of two years, to betray the solemn trust committed to them. What

change of circumstances, time, and a fuller population of our country may produce, requires a prophetic spirit

to declare, which makes no part of my pretensions. But judging from the circumstances now before us, and

from the probable state of them within a moderate period of time, I must pronounce that the liberties of

America cannot be unsafe in the number of hands proposed by the federal Constitution. From what quarter

can the danger proceed? Are we afraid of foreign gold? If foreign gold could so easily corrupt our federal

rulers and enable them to ensnare and betray their constituents, how has it happened that we are at this time a

free and independent nation? The Congress which conducted us through the Revolution was a less numerous

body than their successors will be; they were not chosen by, nor responsible to, their fellowcitizens at large;

though appointed from year to year, and recallable at pleasure, they were generally continued for three years,

They held their consultations always under the veil of secrecy; they had the sole transaction of our affairs

with foreign nations; through the whole course of the war they had the fate of their country more in their

hands than it is to be hoped will ever be the case with our future representatives; and from the greatness of the

prize at stake, and the eagerness of the party which lost it, it may well be supposed that the use of other

means than force would not have been scrupled. Yet we know by happy experience that the public trust was

not betrayed; nor has the purity of our public councils in this particular ever suffered, even from the whispers

of calumny. Is the danger apprehended from the other branches of the federal government? But where are the

means to be found by the President, or the Senate, or both? Their emoluments of office, it is to be presumed,

will not, and without a previous corruption of the House of Representatives cannot, more than suffice for very

different purposes; their private fortunes, as they must allbe American citizens, cannot possibly be sources of

danger. The only means, then, which they can possess, will be in the dispensation of appointments. Is it here

that suspicion rests her charge? Sometimes we are told that this fund of corruption is to be exhausted by the

President in subduing the virtue of the Senate. Now, the fidelity of the other House is to be the victim. The

improbability of such a mercenary and perfidious combination of the several members of government,

standing on as different foundations as republican principles will well admit, and at the same time

accountable to the society over which they are placed, ought alone to quiet this apprehension. But,

fortunately, the Constitution has provided a still further safeguard. The members of the Congress are rendered

ineligible to any civil offices that may be created, or of which the emoluments may be increased, during the

No offices therefore can be dealt out to the existing members but such as may become vacant by ordinary

casualties: and to suppose that these would be sufficient to purchase the guardians of the people, selected by

the people themselves, is to renounce every rule by which events ought to be calculated, and to substitute an

indiscriminate and unbounded jealousy, with which all reasoning must be vain. The sincere friends of liberty,

who give themselves up to the extravagancies of this passion, are not aware of the injury they do their own

cause. As there is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires a certain degree of circumspection and

distrust, so there are other qualities in human nature which justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence.

Republican government presupposes the existence of these qualities in a higher degree than any other form.

Were the pictures which have been drawn by the political jealousy of some among us faithful likenesses of

the human character, the inference would be, that there is not sufficient virtue among men for

selfgovernment; and that nothing less than the chains of despotism can restrain them from destroying and

THE SECOND charge against the House of Representatives is, that it will be too small to possess a due

knowledge of the interests of its constituents. As this objection evidently proceeds from a comparison of the

proposed number of representatives with the great extent of the United States, the number of their inhabitants,

and the diversity of their interests, without taking into view at the same time the circumstances which will

distinguish the Congress from other legislative bodies, the best answer that can be given to it will be a brief

explanation of these peculiarities. It is a sound and important principle that the representative ought to be

acquainted with the interests and circumstances of his constituents. But this principle can extend no further

than to those circumstances and interests to which the authority and care of the representative relate. An

ignorance of a variety of minute and particular objects, which do not lie within the compass of legislation, is

consistent with every attribute necessary to a due performance of the legislative trust. In determining the

extent of information required in the exercise of a particular authority, recourse then must be had to the

objects within the purview of that authority. What are to be the objects of federal legislation? Those which

are of most importance, and which seem most to require local knowledge, are commerce, taxation, and the

militia. A proper regulation of commerce requires much information, as has been elsewhere remarked; but as

far as this information relates to the laws and local situation of each individual State, a very few

representatives would be very sufficient vehicles of it to the federal councils. Taxation will consist, in a great

measure, of duties which will be involved in the regulation of commerce. So far the preceding remark is

applicable to this object. As far as it may consist of internal collections, a more diffusive knowledge of the

circumstances of the State may be necessary. But will not this also be possessed in sufficient degree by a very

few intelligent men, diffusively elected within the State? Divide the largest State into ten or twelve districts,

and it will be found that there will be no peculiar local interests in either, which will not be within the

knowledge of the representative of the district. Besides this source of information, the laws of the State,

framed by representatives from every part of it, will be almost of themselves a sufficient guide. In every State

there have been made, and must continue to be made, regulations on this subject which will, in many cases,

leave little more to be done by the federal legislature, than to review the different laws, and reduce them in

one general act. A skillful individual in his closet with all the local codes before him, might compile a law on

some subjects of taxation for the whole union, without any aid from oral information, and it may be expected

that whenever internal taxes may be necessary, and particularly in cases requiring uniformity throughout the

States, the more simple objects will be preferred. To be fully sensible of the facility which will be given to

this branch of federal legislation by the assistance of the State codes, we need only suppose for a moment that

this or any other State were divided into a number of parts, each having and exercising within itself a power

of local legislation. Is it not evident that a degree of local information and preparatory labor would be found

in the several volumes of their proceedings, which would very much shorten the labors of the general

legislature, and render a much smaller number of members sufficient for it? The federal councils will derive

great advantage from another circumstance. The representatives of each State will not only bring with them a

considerable knowledge of its laws, and a local knowledge of their respective districts, but will probably in

all cases have been members, and may even at the very time be members, of the State legislature, where all

the local information and interests of the State are assembled, and from whence they may easily be conveyed

by a very few hands into the legislature of the United States. The observations made on the subject of

taxation apply with greater force to the case of the militia. For however different the rules of discipline may

be in different States, they are the same throughout each particular State; and depend on circumstances which

can differ but little in different parts of the same State. The attentive reader will discern that the reasoning

here used, to prove the sufficiency of a moderate number of representatives, does not in any respect

contradict what was urged on another occasion with regard to the extensive information which the

representatives ought to possess, and the time that might be necessary for acquiring it. This information, so

far as it may relate to local objects, is rendered necessary and difficult, not by a difference of laws and local

circumstances within a single State, but of those among different States. Taking each State by itself, its laws

are the same, and its interests but little diversified. A few men, therefore, will possess all the knowledge

requisite for a proper representation of them. Were the interests and affairs of each individual State perfectly

simple and uniform, a knowledge of them in one part would involve a knowledge of them in every other, and

the whole State might be competently represented by a single member taken from any part of it. On a

comparison of the different States together, we find a great dissimilarity in their laws, and in many other

circumstances connected with the objects of federal legislation, with all of which the federal representatives

ought to have some acquaintance. Whilst a few representatives, therefore, from each State, may bring with

them a due knowledge of their own State, every representative will have much information to acquire

The changes of time, as was formerly remarked, on the comparative situation of the different States, will have

an assimilating effect. The effect of time on the internal affairs of the States, taken singly, will be just the

contrary. At present some of the States are little more than a society of husbandmen. Few of them have made

much progress in those branches of industry which give a variety and complexity to the affairs of a nation.

These, however, will in all of them be the fruits of a more advanced population, and will require, on the part

of each State, a fuller representation. The foresight of the convention has accordingly taken care that the

progress of population may be accompanied with a proper increase of the representative branch of the

government. The experience of Great Britain, which presents to mankind so many political lessons, both of

the monitory and exemplary kind, and which has been frequently consulted in the course of these inquiries,

corroborates the result of the reflections which we have just made. The number of inhabitants in the two

kingdoms of England and Scotland cannot be stated at less than eight millions. The representatives of these

Of this number, one ninth are elected by three hundred and sixtyfour persons, and one half, by five thousand

seven hundred and twentythree persons. 1 It cannot be supposed that the half thus elected, and who do not

even reside among the people at large, can add any thing either to the security of the people against the

government, or to the knowledge of their circumstances and interests in the legislative councils. On the

contrary, it is notorious, that they are more frequently the representatives and instruments of the executive

magistrate, than the guardians and advocates of the popular rights. They might therefore, with great propriety,

be considered as something more than a mere deduction from the real representatives of the nation. We will,

however, consider them in this light alone, and will not extend the deduction to a considerable number of

others, who do not reside among their constitutents, are very faintly connected with them, and have very little

particular knowledge of their affairs. With all these concessions, two hundred and seventynine persons only

will be the depository of the safety, interest, and happiness of eight millions that is to say, there will be one

representative only to maintain the rights and explain the situation OF TWENTYEIGHT THOUSAND SIX

HUNDRED AND SEVENTY constitutents, in an assembly exposed to the whole force of executive

influence, and extending its authority to every object of legislation within a nation whose affairs are in the

highest degree diversified and complicated. Yet it is very certain, not only that a valuable portion of freedom

has been preserved under all these circumstances, but that the defects in the British code are chargeable, in a

very small proportion, on the ignorance of the legislature concerning the circumstances of the people.

Allowing to this case the weight which is due to it, and comparing it with that of the House of

Representatives as above explained it seems to give the fullest assurance, that a representative for every

THIRTY THOUSAND INHABITANTS will render the latter both a safe and competent guardian of the

interests which will be confided to it. PUBLIUS. Burgh's ``Political Disquisitions. ''

THE THIRD charge against the House of Representatives is, that it will be taken from that class of citizens

which will have least sympathy with the mass of the people, and be most likely to aim at an ambitious

sacrifice of the many to the aggrandizement of the few. Of all the objections which have been framed against

Whilst the objection itself is levelled against a pretended oligarchy, the principle of it strikes at the very root

of republican government. The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers

men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the society; and in

the next place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they continue to hold

their public trust. The elective mode of obtaining rulers is the characteristic policy of republican government.

The means relied on in this form of government for preventing their degeneracy are numerous and various.

The most effectual one, is such a limitation of the term of appointments as will maintain a proper

responsibility to the people. Let me now ask what circumstance there is in the constitution of the House of

Representatives that violates the principles of republican government, or favors the elevation of the few on

the ruins of the many? Let me ask whether every circumstance is not, on the contrary, strictly conformable to

these principles, and scrupulously impartial to the rights and pretensions of every class and description of

citizens? Who are to be the electors of the federal representatives? Not the rich, more than the poor; not the

learned, more than the ignorant; not the haughty heirs of distinguished names, more than the humble sons of

obscurity and unpropitious fortune. The electors are to be the great body of the people of the United States.

They are to be the same who exercise the right in every State of electing the corresponding branch of the

legislature of the State. Who are to be the objects of popular choice? Every citizen whose merit may

recommend him to the esteem and confidence of his country. No qualification of wealth, of birth, of religious

faith, or of civil profession is permitted to fetter the judgement or disappoint the inclination of the people. If

we consider the situation of the men on whom the free suffrages of their fellowcitizens may confer the

representative trust, we shall find it involving every security which can be devised or desired for their fidelity

to their constituents. In the first place, as they will have been distinguished by the preference of their

fellowcitizens, we are to presume that in general they will be somewhat distinguished also by those qualities

which entitle them to it, and which promise a sincere and scrupulous regard to the nature of their

engagements. In the second place, they will enter into the public service under circumstances which cannot

fail to produce a temporary affection at least to their constituents. There is in every breast a sensibility to

marks of honor, of favor, of esteem, and of confidence, which, apart from all considerations of interest, is

Ingratitude is a common topic of declamation against human nature; and it must be confessed that instances

of it are but too frequent and flagrant, both in public and in private life. But the universal and extreme

indignation which it inspires is itself a proof of the energy and prevalence of the contrary sentiment.

In the third place, those ties which bind the representative to his constituents are strengthened by motives of a

more selfish nature. His pride and vanity attach him to a form of government which favors his pretensions

and gives him a share in its honors and distinctions. Whatever hopes or projects might be entertained by a

few aspiring characters, it must generally happen that a great proportion of the men deriving their

advancement from their influence with the people, would have more to hope from a preservation of the favor,

than from innovations in the government subversive of the authority of the people. All these securities,

however, would be found very insufficient without the restraint of frequent elections. Hence, in the fourth

place, the House of Representatives is so constituted as to support in the members an habitual recollection of

their dependence on the people. Before the sentiments impressed on their minds by the mode of their

elevation can be effaced by the exercise of power, they will be compelled to anticipate the moment when

their power is to cease, when their exercise of it is to be reviewed, and when they must descend to the level

from which they were raised; there forever to remain unless a faithful discharge of their trust shall have

established their title to a renewal of it. I will add, as a fifth circumstance in the situation of the House of

Representatives, restraining them from oppressive measures, that they can make no law which will not have

its full operation on themselves and their friends, as well as on the great mass of the society. This has always

been deemed one of the strongest bonds by which human policy can connect the rulers and the people

together. It creates between them that communion of interests and sympathy of sentiments, of which few

governments have furnished examples; but without which every government degenerates into tyranny. If it be

asked, what is to restrain the House of Representatives from making legal discriminations in favor of

themselves and a particular class of the society? I answer: the genius of the whole system; the nature of just

and constitutional laws; and above all, the vigilant and manly spirit which actuates the people of America, a

spirit which nourishes freedom, and in return is nourished by it. If this spirit shall ever be so far debased as to

tolerate a law not obligatory on the legislature, as well as on the people, the people will be prepared to

tolerate any thing but liberty. Such will be the relation between the House of Representatives and their

constituents. Duty, gratitude, interest, ambition itself, are the chords by which they will be bound to fidelity

It is possible that these may all be insufficient to control the caprice and wickedness of man. But are they not

all that government will admit, and that human prudence can devise? Are they not the genuine and the

characteristic means by which republican government provides for the liberty and happiness of the people?

Are they not the identical means on which every State government in the Union relies for the attainment of

these important ends? What then are we to understand by the objection which this paper has combated? What

are we to say to the men who profess the most flaming zeal for republican government, yet boldly impeach

the fundamental principle of it; who pretend to be champions for the right and the capacity of the people to

choose their own rulers, yet maintain that they will prefer those only who will immediately and infallibly

betray the trust committed to them? Were the objection to be read by one who had not seen the mode

prescribed by the Constitution for the choice of representatives, he could suppose nothing less than that some

unreasonable qualification of property was annexed to the right of suffrage; or that the right of eligibility was

limited to persons of particular families or fortunes; or at least that the mode prescribed by the State

constitutions was in some respect or other, very grossly departed from. We have seen how far such a

supposition would err, as to the two first points. Nor would it, in fact, be less erroneous as to the last. The

only difference discoverable between the two cases is, that each representative of the United States will be

elected by five or six thousand citizens; whilst in the individual States, the election of a representative is left

to about as many hundreds. Will it be pretended that this difference is sufficient to justify an attachment to

the State governments, and an abhorrence to the federal government? If this be the point on which the

objection turns, it deserves to be examined. Is it supported by REASON? This cannot be said, without

maintaining that five or six thousand citizens are less capable of choosing a fit representative, or more liable

to be corrupted by an unfit one, than five or six hundred. Reason, on the contrary, assures us, that as in so

great a number a fit representative would be most likely to be found, so the choice would be less likely to be

diverted from him by the intrigues of the ambitious or the ambitious or the bribes of the rich. Is the

CONSEQUENCE from this doctrine admissible? If we say that five or six hundred citizens are as many as

can jointly exercise their right of suffrage, must we not deprive the people of the immediate choice of their

public servants, in every instance where the administration of the government does not require as many of

them as will amount to one for that number of citizens? Is the doctrine warranted by FACTS? It was shown in

the last paper, that the real representation in the British House of Commons very little exceeds the proportion

of one for every thirty thousand inhabitants. Besides a variety of powerful causes not existing here, and which

favor in that country the pretensions of rank and wealth, no person is eligible as a representative of a county,

unless he possess real estate of the clear value of six hundred pounds sterling per year; nor of a city or

borough, unless he possess a like estate of half that annual value. To this qualification on the part of the

county representatives is added another on the part of the county electors, which restrains the right of suffrage

to persons having a freehold estate of the annual value of more than twenty pounds sterling, according to the

present rate of money. Notwithstanding these unfavorable circumstances, and notwithstanding some very

unequal laws in the British code, it cannot be said that the representatives of the nation have elevated the few

on the ruins of the many. But we need not resort to foreign experience on this subject. Our own is explicit and

decisive. The districts in New Hampshire in which the senators are chosen immediately by the people, are

nearly as large as will be necessary for her representatives in the Congress. Those of Massachusetts are larger

In the last State the members of Assembly for the cities and counties of New York and Albany are elected by

very nearly as many voters as will be entitled to a representative in the Congress, calculating on the number

of sixtyfive representatives only. It makes no difference that in these senatorial districts and counties a

number of representatives are voted for by each elector at the same time. If the same electors at the same time

are capable of choosing four or five representatives, they cannot be incapable of choosing one. Pennsylvania

is an additional example. Some of her counties, which elect her State representatives, are almost as large as

her districts will be by which her federal representatives will be elected. The city of Philadelphia is supposed

to contain between fifty and sixty thousand souls. It will therefore form nearly two districts for the choice of

federal representatives. It forms, however, but one county, in which every elector votes for each of its

representatives in the State legislature. And what may appear to be still more directly to our purpose, the

whole city actually elects a SINGLE MEMBER for the executive council. This is the case in all the other

counties of the State. Are not these facts the most satisfactory proofs of the fallacy which has been employed

against the branch of the federal government under consideration? Has it appeared on trial that the senators of

New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and New York, or the executive council of Pennsylvania, or the members of

the Assembly in the two last States, have betrayed any peculiar disposition to sacrifice the many to the few,

or are in any respect less worthy of their places than the representatives and magistrates appointed in other

States by very small divisions of the people? But there are cases of a stronger complexion than any which I

One branch of the legislature of Connecticut is so constituted that each member of it is elected by the whole

State. So is the governor of that State, of Massachusetts, and of this State, and the president of New

Hampshire. I leave every man to decide whether the result of any one of these experiments can be said to

countenance a suspicion, that a diffusive mode of choosing representatives of the people tends to elevate

THE remaining charge against the House of Representatives, which I am to examine, is grounded on a

supposition that the number of members will not be augmented from time to time, as the progress of

population may demand. It has been admitted, that this objection, if well supported, would have great weight.

The following observations will show that, like most other objections against the Constitution, it can only

proceed from a partial view of the subject, or from a jealousy which discolors and disfigures every object

which is beheld. 1. Those who urge the objection seem not to have recollected that the federal Constitution

will not suffer by a comparison with the State constitutions, in the security provided for a gradual

augmentation of the number of representatives. The number which is to prevail in the first instance is

declared to be temporary. Its duration is limited to the short term of three years. Within every successive term

of ten years a census of inhabitants is to be repeated. The unequivocal objects of these regulations are, first, to

readjust, from time to time, the apportionment of representatives to the number of inhabitants, under the

single exception that each State shall have one representative at least; secondly, to augment the number of

representatives at the same periods, under the sole limitation that the whole number shall not exceed one for

every thirty thousand inhabitants. If we review the constitutions of the several States, we shall find that some

of them contain no determinate regulations on this subject, that others correspond pretty much on this point

with the federal Constitution, and that the most effectual security in any of them is resolvable into a mere

directory provision. 2. As far as experience has taken place on this subject, a gradual increase of

representatives under the State constitutions has at least kept pace with that of the constituents, and it appears

that the former have been as ready to concur in such measures as the latter have been to call for them. 3.

There is a peculiarity in the federal Constitution which insures a watchful attention in a majority both of the

people and of their representatives to a constitutional augmentation of the latter. The peculiarity lies in this,

that one branch of the legislature is a representation of citizens, the other of the States: in the former,

consequently, the larger States will have most weight; in the latter, the advantage will be in favor of the

smaller States. From this circumstance it may with certainty be inferred that the larger States will be

strenuous advocates for increasing the number and weight of that part of the legislature in which their

influence predominates. And it so happens that four only of the largest will have a majority of the whole

votes in the House of Representatives. Should the representatives or people, therefore, of the smaller States

oppose at any time a reasonable addition of members, a coalition of a very few States will be sufficient to

overrule the opposition; a coalition which, notwithstanding the rivalship and local prejudices which might

prevent it on ordinary occasions, would not fail to take place, when not merely prompted by common interest,

but justified by equity and the principles of the Constitution. It may be alleged, perhaps, that the Senate

would be prompted by like motives to an adverse coalition; and as their concurrence would be indispensable,

the just and constitutional views of the other branch might be defeated. This is the difficulty which has

probably created the most serious apprehensions in the jealous friends of a numerous representation.

Fortunately it is among the difficulties which, existing only in appearance, vanish on a close and accurate

inspection. The following reflections will, if I mistake not, be admitted to be conclusive and satisfactory on

this point. Notwithstanding the equal authority which will subsist between the two houses on all legislative

subjects, except the originating of money bills, it cannot be doubted that the House, composed of the greater

number of members, when supported by the more powerful States, and speaking the known and determined

sense of a majority of the people, will have no small advantage in a question depending on the comparative

firmness of the two houses. This advantage must be increased by the consciousness, felt by the same side of

being supported in its demands by right, by reason, and by the Constitution; and the consciousness, on the

opposite side, of contending against the force of all these solemn considerations. It is farther to be considered,

that in the gradation between the smallest and largest States, there are several, which, though most likely in

general to arrange themselves among the former are too little removed in extent and population from the

latter, to second an opposition to their just and legitimate pretensions. Hence it is by no means certain that a

majority of votes, even in the Senate, would be unfriendly to proper augmentations in the number of

representatives. It will not be looking too far to add, that the senators from all the new States may be gained

over to the just views of the House of Representatives, by an expedient too obvious to be overlooked. As

these States will, for a great length of time, advance in population with peculiar rapidity, they will be

interested in frequent reapportionments of the representatives to the number of inhabitants. The large States,

therefore, who will prevail in the House of Representatives, will have nothing to do but to make

reapportionments and augmentations mutually conditions of each other; and the senators from all the most

growing States will be bound to contend for the latter, by the interest which their States will feel in the

former. These considerations seem to afford ample security on this subject, and ought alone to satisfy all the

doubts and fears which have been indulged with regard to it. Admitting, however, that they should all be

insufficient to subdue the unjust policy of the smaller States, or their predominant influence in the councils of

the Senate, a constitutional and infallible resource still remains with the larger States, by which they will be

able at all times to accomplish their just purposes. The House of Representatives cannot only refuse, but they

alone can propose, the supplies requisite for the support of government. They, in a word, hold the purse that

powerful instrument by which we behold, in the history of the British Constitution, an infant and humble

representation of the people gradually enlarging the sphere of its activity and importance, and finally

reducing, as far as it seems to have wished, all the overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of the

government. This power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most complete and effectual weapon

with which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the people, for obtaining a redress of

every grievance, and for carrying into effect every just and salutary measure. But will not the House of

Representatives be as much interested as the Senate in maintaining the government in its proper functions,

and will they not therefore be unwilling to stake its existence or its reputation on the pliancy of the Senate?

Or, if such a trial of firmness between the two branches were hazarded, would not the one be as likely first to

yield as the other? These questions will create no difficulty with those who reflect that in all cases the smaller

the number, and the more permanent and conspicuous the station, of men in power, the stronger must be the

interest which they will individually feel in whatever concerns the government. Those who represent the

dignity of their country in the eyes of other nations, will be particularly sensible to every prospect of public

danger, or of dishonorable stagnation in public affairs. To those causes we are to ascribe the continual

triumph of the British House of Commons over the other branches of the government, whenever the engine of

a money bill has been employed. An absolute inflexibility on the side of the latter, although it could not have

failed to involve every department of the state in the general confusion, has neither been apprehended nor

experienced. The utmost degree of firmness that can be displayed by the federal Senate or President, will not

be more than equal to a resistance in which they will be supported by constitutional and patriotic principles.

In this review of the Constitution of the House of Representatives, I have passed over the circumstances of

economy, which, in the present state of affairs, might have had some effect in lessening the temporary

number of representatives, and a disregard of which would probably have been as rich a theme of

declamation against the Constitution as has been shown by the smallness of the number proposed. I omit also

any remarks on the difficulty which might be found, under present circumstances, in engaging in the federal

service a large number of such characters as the people will probably elect. One observation, however, I must

be permitted to add on this subject as claiming, in my judgment, a very serious attention. It is, that in all

legislative assemblies the greater the number composing them may be, the fewer will be the men who will in

fact direct their proceedings. In the first place, the more numerous an assembly may be, of whatever

characters composed, the greater is known to be the ascendency of passion over reason. In the next place, the

larger the number, the greater will be the proportion of members of limited information and of weak

capacities. Now, it is precisely on characters of this description that the eloquence and address of the few are

known to act with all their force. In the ancient republics, where the whole body of the people assembled in

person, a single orator, or an artful statesman, was generally seen to rule with as complete a sway as if a

sceptre had been placed in his single hand. On the same principle, the more multitudinous a representative

assembly may be rendered, the more it will partake of the infirmities incident to collective meetings of the

Ignorance will be the dupe of cunning, and passion the slave of sophistry and declamation. The people can

never err more than in supposing that by multiplying their representatives beyond a certain limit, they

strengthen the barrier against the government of a few. Experience will forever admonish them that, on the

counteract their own views by every addition to their representatives. The countenance of the government

may become more democratic, but the soul that animates it will be more oligarchic. The machine will be

enlarged, but the fewer, and often the more secret, will be the springs by which its motions are directed. As

connected with the objection against the number of representatives, may properly be here noticed, that which

has been suggested against the number made competent for legislative business. It has been said that more

than a majority ought to have been required for a quorum; and in particular cases, if not in all, more than a

majority of a quorum for a decision. That some advantages might have resulted from such a precaution,

cannot be denied. It might have been an additional shield to some particular interests, and another obstacle

generally to hasty and partial measures. But these considerations are outweighed by the inconveniences in the

opposite scale. In all cases where justice or the general good might require new laws to be passed, or active

measures to be pursued, the fundamental principle of free government would be reversed. It would be no

longer the majority that would rule: the power would be transferred to the minority. Were the defensive

privilege limited to particular cases, an interested minority might take advantage of it to screen themselves

from equitable sacrifices to the general weal, or, in particular emergencies, to extort unreasonable

indulgences. Lastly, it would facilitate and foster the baneful practice of secessions; a practice which has

shown itself even in States where a majority only is required; a practice subversive of all the principles of

order and regular government; a practice which leads more directly to public convulsions, and the ruin of

popular governments, than any other which has yet been displayed among us. PUBLIUS.

THE natural order of the subject leads us to consider, in this place, that provision of the Constitution which

authorizes the national legislature to regulate, in the last resort, the election of its own members. It is in these

words: ``The TIMES, PLACES, and MANNER of holding elections for senators and representatives shall be

prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may, at any time, by law, make or alter

SUCH REGULATIONS, except as to the PLACES of choosing senators. ''1 This provision has not only been

declaimed against by those who condemn the Constitution in the gross, but it has been censured by those who

have objected with less latitude and greater moderation; and, in one instance it has been thought

exceptionable by a gentleman who has declared himself the advocate of every other part of the system. I am

greatly mistaken, notwithstanding, if there be any article in the whole plan more completely defensible than

this. Its propriety rests upon the evidence of this plain proposition, that EVERY GOVERNMENT OUGHT

TO CONTAIN IN ITSELF THE MEANS OF ITS OWN PRESERVATION. Every just reasoner will, at first

sight, approve an adherence to this rule, in the work of the convention; and will disapprove every deviation

from it which may not appear to have been dictated by the necessity of incorporating into the work some

particular ingredient, with which a rigid conformity to the rule was incompatible. Even in this case, though he

may acquiesce in the necessity, yet he will not cease to regard and to regret a departure from so fundamental

a principle, as a portion of imperfection in the system which may prove the seed of future weakness, and

perhaps anarchy. It will not be alleged, that an election law could have been framed and inserted in the

Constitution, which would have been always applicable to every probable change in the situation of the

country; and it will therefore not be denied, that a discretionary power over elections ought to exist

somewhere. It will, I presume, be as readily conceded, that there were only three ways in which this power

could have been reasonably modified and disposed: that it must either have been lodged wholly in the

national legislature, or wholly in the State legislatures, or primarily in the latter and ultimately in the former.

The last mode has, with reason, been preferred by the convention. They have submitted the regulation of

elections for the federal government, in the first instance, to the local administrations; which, in ordinary

cases, and when no improper views prevail, may be both more convenient and more satisfactory; but they

have reserved to the national authority a right to interpose, whenever extraordinary circumstances might

render that interposition necessary to its safety. Nothing can be more evident, than that an exclusive power of

regulating elections for the national government, in the hands of the State legislatures, would leave the

existence of the Union entirely at their mercy. They could at any moment annihilate it, by neglecting to

provide for the choice of persons to administer its affairs. It is to little purpose to say, that a neglect or

omission of this kind would not be likely to take place. The constitutional possibility of the thing, without an

equivalent for the risk, is an unanswerable objection. Nor has any satisfactory reason been yet assigned for

incurring that risk. The extravagant surmises of a distempered jealousy can never be dignified with that

character. If we are in a humor to presume abuses of power, it is as fair to presume them on the part of the

State governments as on the part of the general government. And as it is more consonant to the rules of a just

theory, to trust the Union with the care of its own existence, than to transfer that care to any other hands, if

abuses of power are to be hazarded on the one side or on the other, it is more rational to hazard them where

the power would naturally be placed, than where it would unnaturally be placed. Suppose an article had been

introduced into the Constitution, empowering the United States to regulate the elections for the particular

States, would any man have hesitated to condemn it, both as an unwarrantable transposition of power, and as

a premeditated engine for the destruction of the State governments? The violation of principle, in this case,

would have required no comment; and, to an unbiased observer, it will not be less apparent in the project of

subjecting the existence of the national government, in a similar respect, to the pleasure of the State

governments. An impartial view of the matter cannot fail to result in a conviction, that each, as far as

possible, ought to depend on itself for its own preservation. As an objection to this position, it may be

remarked that the constitution of the national Senate would involve, in its full extent, the danger which it is

suggested might flow from an exclusive power in the State legislatures to regulate the federal elections. It

may be alleged, that by declining the appointment of Senators, they might at any time give a fatal blow to the

Union; and from this it may be inferred, that as its existence would be thus rendered dependent upon them in

so essential a point, there can be no objection to intrusting them with it in the particular case under

consideration. The interest of each State, it may be added, to maintain its representation in the national

councils, would be a complete security against an abuse of the trust. This argument, though specious, will

not, upon examination, be found solid. It is certainly true that the State legislatures, by forbearing the

appointment of senators, may destroy the national government. But it will not follow that, because they have

a power to do this in one instance, they ought to have it in every other. There are cases in which the

pernicious tendency of such a power may be far more decisive, without any motive equally cogent with that

which must have regulated the conduct of the convention in respect to the formation of the Senate, to

recommend their admission into the system. So far as that construction may expose the Union to the

possibility of injury from the State legislatures, it is an evil; but it is an evil which could not have been

avoided without excluding the States, in their political capacities, wholly from a place in the organization of

the national government. If this had been done, it would doubtless have been interpreted into an entire

dereliction of the federal principle; and would certainly have deprived the State governments of that absolute

safeguard which they will enjoy under this provision. But however wise it may have been to have submitted

in this instance to an inconvenience, for the attainment of a necessary advantage or a greater good, no

inference can be drawn from thence to favor an accumulation of the evil, where no necessity urges, nor any

greater good invites. It may be easily discerned also that the national government would run a much greater

risk from a power in the State legislatures over the elections of its House of Representatives, than from their

power of appointing the members of its Senate. The senators are to be chosen for the period of six years;

there is to be a rotation, by which the seats of a third part of them are to be vacated and replenished every two

years; and no State is to be entitled to more than two senators; a quorum of the body is to consist of sixteen

members. The joint result of these circumstances would be, that a temporary combination of a few States to

intermit the appointment of senators, could neither annul the existence nor impair the activity of the body;

and it is not from a general and permanent combination of the States that we can have any thing to fear. The

first might proceed from sinister designs in the leading members of a few of the State legislatures; the last

would suppose a fixed and rooted disaffection in the great body of the people, which will either never exist at

all, or will, in all probability, proceed from an experience of the inaptitude of the general government to the

advancement of their happiness in which event no good citizen could desire its continuance. But with regard

to the federal House of Representatives, there is intended to be a general election of members once in two

years. If the State legislatures were to be invested with an exclusive power of regulating these elections, every

period of making them would be a delicate crisis in the national situation, which might issue in a dissolution

of the Union, if the leaders of a few of the most important States should have entered into a previous

conspiracy to prevent an election. I shall not deny, that there is a degree of weight in the observation, that the

interests of each State, to be represented in the federal councils, will be a security against the abuse of a

power over its elections in the hands of the State legislatures. But the security will not be considered as

complete, by those who attend to the force of an obvious distinction between the interest of the people in the

public felicity, and the interest of their local rulers in the power and consequence of their offices. The people

of America may be warmly attached to the government of the Union, at times when the particular rulers of

particular States, stimulated by the natural rivalship of power, and by the hopes of personal aggrandizement,

and supported by a strong faction in each of those States, may be in a very opposite temper. This diversity of

sentiment between a majority of the people, and the individuals who have the greatest credit in their councils,

is exemplified in some of the States at the present moment, on the present question. The scheme of separate

confederacies, which will always nultiply the chances of ambition, will be a never failing bait to all such

influential characters in the State administrations as are capable of preferring their own emolument and

advancement to the public weal. With so effectual a weapon in their hands as the exclusive power of

regulating elections for the national government, a combination of a few such men, in a few of the most

considerable States, where the temptation will always be the strongest, might accomplish the destruction of

the Union, by seizing the opportunity of some casual dissatisfaction among the people (and which perhaps

they may themselves have excited), to discontinue the choice of members for the federal House of

Representatives. It ought never to be forgotten, that a firm union of this country, under an efficient

government, will probably be an increasing object of jealousy to more than one nation of Europe; and that

enterprises to subvert it will sometimes originate in the intrigues of foreign powers, and will seldom fail to be

patronized and abetted by some of them. Its preservation, therefore ought in no case that can be avoided, to

be committed to the guardianship of any but those whose situation will uniformly beget an immediate interest

in the faithful and vigilant performance of the trust. PUBLIUS. Ist clause, 4th section, of the Ist article.

WE HAVE seen, that an uncontrollable power over the elections to the federal government could not, without

hazard, be committed to the State legislatures. Let us now see, what would be the danger on the other side;

that is, from confiding the ultimate right of regulating its own elections to the Union itself. It is not pretended,

that this right would ever be used for the exclusion of any State from its share in the representation. The

interest of all would, in this respect at least, be the security of all. But it is alleged, that it might be employed

in such a manner as to promote the election of some favorite class of men in exclusion of others, by confining

the places of election to particular districts, and rendering it impracticable to the citizens at large to partake in

the choice. Of all chimerical suppositions, this seems to be the most chimerical. On the one hand, no rational

calculation of probabilities would lead us to imagine that the disposition which a conduct so violent and

extraordinary would imply, could ever find its way into the national councils; and on the other, it may be

concluded with certainty, that if so improper a spirit should ever gain admittance into them, it would display

The improbability of the attempt may be satisfactorily inferred from this single reflection, that it could never

be made without causing an immediate revolt of the great body of the people, headed and directed by the

State governments. It is not difficult to conceive that this characteristic right of freedom may, in certain

turbulent and factious seasons, be violated, in respect to a particular class of citizens, by a victorious and

overbearing majority; but that so fundamental a privilege, in a country so situated and enlightened, should be

invaded to the prejudice of the great mass of the people, by the deliberate policy of the government, without

In addition to this general reflection, there are considerations of a more precise nature, which forbid all

apprehension on the subject. The dissimilarity in the ingredients which will compose the national

government, and Ustill more in the manner in which they will be brought into action in its various branches,

must form a powerful obstacle to a concert of views in any partial scheme of elections. There is sufficient

diversity in the state of property, in the genius, manners, and habits of the people of the different parts of the

Union, to occasion a material diversity of disposition in their representatives towards the different ranks and

conditions in society. And though an intimate intercourse under the same government will promote a gradual

assimilation in some of these respects, yet there are causes, as well physical as moral, which may, in a greater

or less degree, permanently nourish different propensities and inclinations in this respect. But the

circumstance which will be likely to have the greatest influence in the matter, will be the dissimilar modes of

constituting the several component parts of the government. The House of Representatives being to be

elected immediately by the people, the Senate by the State legislatures, the President by electors chosen for

that purpose by the people, there would be little probability of a common interest to cement these different

As to the Senate, it is impossible that any regulation of ``time and manner,'' which is all that is proposed to be

submitted to the national government in respect to that body, can affect the spirit which will direct the choice

of its members. The collective sense of the State legislatures can never be influenced by extraneous

circumstances of that sort; a consideration which alone ought to satisfy us that the discrimination

apprehended would never be attempted. For what inducement could the Senate have to concur in a preference

in which itself would not be included? Or to what purpose would it be established, in reference to one branch

of the legislature, if it could not be extended to the other? The composition of the one would in this case

counteract that of the other. And we can never suppose that it would embrace the appointments to the Senate,

unless we can at the same time suppose the voluntary cooperation of the State legislatures. If we make the

latter supposition, it then becomes immaterial where the power in question is placed whether in their hands or

But what is to be the object of this capricious partiality in the national councils? Is it to be exercised in a

discrimination between the different departments of industry, or between the different kinds of property, or

between the different degrees of property? Will it lean in favor of the landed interest, or the moneyed interest,

or the mercantile interest, or the manufacturing interest? Or, to speak in the fashionable language of the

adversaries to the Constitution, will it court the elevation of ``the wealthy and the wellborn,'' to the

exclusion and debasement of all the rest of the society? If this partiality is to be exerted in favor of those who

are concerned in any particular description of industry or property, I presume it will readily be admitted, that

the competition for it will lie between landed men and merchants. And I scruple not to affirm, that it is

infinitely less likely that either of them should gain an ascendant in the national councils, than that the one or

the other of them should predominate in all the local councils. The inference will be, that a conduct tending to

give an undue preference to either is much less to be dreaded from the former than from the latter.

The several States are in various degrees addicted to agriculture and commerce. In most, if not all of them,

agriculture is predominant. In a few of them, however, commerce nearly divides its empire, and in most of

them has a considerable share of influence. In proportion as either prevails, it will be conveyed into the

national representation; and for the very reason, that this will be an emanation from a greater variety of

interests, and in much more various proportions, than are to be found in any single State, it will be much less

apt to espouse either of them with a decided partiality, than the representation of any single State.

In a country consisting chiefly of the cultivators of land, where the rules of an equal representation obtain, the

landed interest must, upon the whole, preponderate in the government. As long as this interest prevails in

most of the State legislatures, so long it must maintain a correspondent superiority in the national Senate,

which will generally be a faithful copy of the majorities of those assemblies. It cannot therefore be presumed,

that a sacrifice of the landed to the mercantile class will ever be a favorite object of this branch of the federal

legislature. In applying thus particularly to the Senate a general observation suggested by the situation of the

country, I am governed by the consideration, that the credulous votaries of State power cannot, upon their

own principles, suspect, that the State legislatures would be warped from their duty by any external influence.

But in reality the same situation must have the same effect, in the primative composition at least of the

federal House of Representatives: an improper bias towards the mercantile class is as little to be expected

In order, perhaps, to give countenance to the objection at any rate, it may be asked, is there not danger of an

opposite bias in the national government, which may dispose it to endeavor to secure a monopoly of the

federal administration to the landed class? As there is little likelihood that the supposition of such a bias will

have any terrors for those who would be immediately injured by it, a labored answer to this question will be

dispensed with. It will be sufficient to remark, first, that for the reasons elsewhere assigned, it is less likely

that any decided partiality should prevail in the councils of the Union than in those of any of its members.

Secondly, that there would be no temptation to violate the Constitution in favor of the landed class, because

that class would, in the natural course of things, enjoy as great a preponderancy as itself could desire. And

thirdly, that men accustomed to investigate the sources of public prosperity upon a large scale, must be too

well convinced of the utility of commerce, to be inclined to inflict upon it so deep a wound as would result

from the entire exclusion of those who would best understand its interest from a share in the management of

them. The importance of commerce, in the view of revenue alone, must effectually guard it against the

enmity of a body which would be continually importuned in its favor, by the urgent calls of public necessity.

I the rather consult brevity in discussing the probability of a preference founded upon a discrimination

between the different kinds of industry and property, because, as far as I understand the meaning of the

objectors, they contemplate a discrimination of another kind. They appear to have in view, as the objects of

the preference with which they endeavor to alarm us, those whom they designate by the description of ``the

wealthy and the wellborn.'' These, it seems, are to be exalted to an odious preeminence over the rest of

their fellowcitizens. At one time, however, their elevation is to be a necessary consequence of the smallness

of the representative body; at another time it is to be effected by depriving the people at large of the

But upon what principle is the discrimination of the places of election to be made, in order to answer the

purpose of the meditated preference? Are ``the wealthy and the wellborn,'' as they are called, confined to

particular spots in the several States? Have they, by some miraculous instinct or foresight, set apart in each of

them a common place of residence? Are they only to be met with in the towns or cities? Or are they, on the

contrary, scattered over the face of the country as avarice or chance may have happened to cast their own lot

or that of their predecessors? If the latter is the case, (as every intelligent man knows it to be,1) is it not

evident that the policy of confining the places of election to particular districts would be as subversive of its

own aim as it would be exceptionable on every other account? The truth is, that there is no method of

securing to the rich the preference apprehended, but by prescribing qualifications of property either for those

who may elect or be elected. But this forms no part of the power to be conferred upon the national

government. Its authority would be expressly restricted to the regulation of the TIMES, the PLACES, the

MANNER of elections. The qualifications of the persons who may choose or be chosen, as has been

remarked upon other occasions, are defined and fixed in the Constitution, and are unalterable by the

Let it, however, be admitted, for argument sake, that the expedient suggested might be successful; and let it at

the same time be equally taken for granted that all the scruples which a sense of duty or an apprehension of

the danger of the experiment might inspire, were overcome in the breasts of the national rulers, still I imagine

it will hardly be pretended that they could ever hope to carry such an enterprise into execution without the aid

of a military force sufficient to subdue the resistance of the great body of the people. The improbability of the

existence of a force equal to that object has been discussed and demonstrated in different parts of these

papers; but that the futility of the objection under consideration may appear in the strongest light, it shall be

conceded for a moment that such a force might exist, and the national government shall be supposed to be in

the actual possession of it. What will be the conclusion? With a disposition to invade the essential rights of

the community, and with the means of gratifying that disposition, is it presumable that the persons who were

actuated by it would amuse themselves in the ridiculous task of fabricating election laws for securing a

preference to a favorite class of men? Would they not be likely to prefer a conduct better adapted to their own

immediate aggrandizement? Would they not rather boldly resolve to perpetuate themselves in office by one

decisive act of usurpation, than to trust to precarious expedients which, in spite of all the precautions that

might accompany them, might terminate in the dismission, disgrace, and ruin of their authors? Would they

not fear that citizens, not less tenacious than conscious of their rights, would flock from the remote extremes

of their respective States to the places of election, to voerthrow their tyrants, and to substitute men who

THE more candid opposers of the provision respecting elections, contained in the plan of the convention,

when pressed in argument, will sometimes concede the propriety of that provision; with this qualification,

however, that it ought to have been accompanied with a declaration, that all elections should be had in the

counties where the electors resided. This, say they, was a necessary precaution against an abuse of the power.

A declaration of this nature would certainly have been harmless; so far as it would have had the effect of

quieting apprehensions, it might not have been undesirable. But it would, in fact, have afforded little or no

additional security against the danger apprehended; and the want of it will never be considered, by an

impartial and judicious examiner, as a serious, still less as an insuperable, objection to the plan.

The different views taken of the subject in the two preceding papers must be sufficient to satisfy all

dispassionate and discerning men, that if the public liberty should ever be the victim of the ambition of the

national rulers, the power under examination, at least, will be guiltless of the sacrifice.

If those who are inclined to consult their jealousy only, would exercise it in a careful inspection of the several

State constitutions, they would find little less room for disquietude and alarm, from the latitude which most

of them allow in respect to elections, than from the latitude which is proposed to be allowed to the national

government in the same respect. A review of their situation, in this particular, would tend greatly to remove

any ill impressions which may remain in regard to this matter. But as that view would lead into long and

tedious details, I shall content myself with the single example of the State in which I write. The constitution

of New York makes no other provision for LOCALITY of elections, than that the members of the Assembly

shall be elected in the COUNTIES; those of the Senate, in the great districts into which the State is or may be

divided: these at present are four in number, and comprehend each from two to six counties. It may readily be

perceived that it would not be more difficult to the legislature of New York to defeat the suffrages of the

citizens of New York, by confining elections to particular places, than for the legislature of the United States

to defeat the suffrages of the citizens of the Union, by the like expedient. Suppose, for instance, the city of

Albany was to be appointed the sole place of election for the county and district of which it is a part, would

not the inhabitants of that city speedily become the only electors of the members both of the Senate and

Assembly for that county and district? Can we imagine that the electors who reside in the remote

subdivisions of the counties of Albany, Saratoga, Cambridge, etc., or in any part of the county of

Montgomery, would take the trouble to come to the city of Albany, to give their votes for members of the

Assembly or Senate, sooner than they would repair to the city of New York, to participate in the choice of the

members of the federal House of Representatives? The alarming indifference discoverable in the exercise of

so invaluable a privilege under the existing laws, which afford every facility to it, furnishes a ready answer to

this question. And, abstracted from any experience on the subject, we can be at no loss to determine, that

when the place of election is at an INCONVENIENT DISTANCE from the elector, the effect upon his

conduct will be the same whether that distance be twenty miles or twenty thousand miles. Hence it must

appear, that objections to the particular modification of the federal power of regulating elections will, in

substance, apply with equal force to the modification of the like power in the constitution of this State; and

for this reason it will be impossible to acquit the one, and to condemn the other. A similar comparison would

lead to the same conclusion in respect to the constitutions of most of the other States.

If it should be said that defects in the State constitutions furnish no apology for those which are to be found in

the plan proposed, I answer, that as the former have never been thought chargeable with inattention to the

security of liberty, where the imputations thrown on the latter can be shown to be applicable to them also, the

presumption is that they are rather the cavilling refinements of a predetermined opposition, than the

wellfounded inferences of a candid research after truth. To those who are disposed to consider, as innocent

omissions in the State constitutions, what they regard as unpardonable blemishes in the plan of the

convention, nothing can be said; or at most, they can only be asked to assign some substantial reason why the

representatives of the people in a single State should be more impregnable to the lust of power, or other

sinister motives, than the representatives of the people of the United States? If they cannot do this, they ought

at least to prove to us that it is easier to subvert the liberties of three millions of people, with the advantage of

local governments to head their opposition, than of two hundred thousand people who are destitute of that

advantage. And in relation to the point immediately under consideration, they ought to convince us that it is

less probable that a predominant faction in a single State should, in order to maintain its superiority, incline to

a preference of a particular class of electors, than that a similar spirit should take possession of the

representatives of thirteen States, spread over a vast region, and in several respects distinguishable from each

Hitherto my observations have only aimed at a vindication of the provision in question, on the ground of

theoretic propriety, on that of the danger of placing the power elsewhere, and on that of the safety of placing

it in the manner proposed. But there remains to be mentioned a positive advantage which will result from this

disposition, and which could not as well have been obtained from any other: I allude to the circumstance of

uniformity in the time of elections for the federal House of Representatives. It is more than possible that this

uniformity may be found by experience to be of great importance to the public welfare, both as a security

against the perpetuation of the same spirit in the body, and as a cure for the diseases of faction. If each State

may choose its own time of election, it is possible there may be at least as many different periods as there are

months in the year. The times of election in the several States, as they are now established for local purposes,

vary between extremes as wide as March and November. The consequence of this diversity would be that

there could never happen a total dissolution or renovation of the body at one time. If an improper spirit of any

kind should happen to prevail in it, that spirit would be apt to infuse itself into the new members, as they

come forward in succession. The mass would be likely to remain nearly the same, assimilating constantly to

itself its gradual accretions. There is a contagion in example which few men have sufficient force of mind to

resist. I am inclined to think that treble the duration in office, with the condition of a total dissolution of the

body at the same time, might be less formidable to liberty than one third of that duration subject to gradual

Uniformity in the time of elections seems not less requisite for executing the idea of a regular rotation in the

Senate, and for conveniently assembling the legislature at a stated period in each year.

It may be asked, Why, then, could not a time have been fixed in the Constitution? As the most zealous

adversaries of the plan of the convention in this State are, in general, not less zealous admirers of the

constitution of the State, the question may be retorted, and it may be asked, Why was not a time for the like

purpose fixed in the constitution of this State? No better answer can be given than that it was a matter which

might safely be entrusted to legislative discretion; and that if a time had been appointed, it might, upon

experiment, have been found less convenient than some other time. The same answer may be given to the

question put on the other side. And it may be added that the supposed danger of a gradual change being

merely speculative, it would have been hardly advisable upon that speculation to establish, as a fundamental

point, what would deprive several States of the convenience of having the elections for their own

HAVING examined the constitution of the House of Representatives, and answered such of the objections

against it as seemed to merit notice, I enter next on the examination of the Senate.

The heads into which this member of the government may be considered are: I. The qualification of senators;

II. The appointment of them by the State legislatures; III. The equality of representation in the Senate; IV.

The number of senators, and the term for which they are to be elected; V. The powers vested in the Senate.

I. The qualifications proposed for senators, as distinguished from those of representatives, consist in a more

advanced age and a longer period of citizenship. A senator must be thirty years of age at least; as a

representative must be twentyfive. And the former must have been a citizen nine years; as seven years are

required for the latter. The propriety of these distinctions is explained by the nature of the senatorial trust,

which, requiring greater extent of information and tability of character, requires at the same time that the

senator should have reached a period of life most likely to supply these advantages; and which, participating

immediately in transactions with foreign nations, ought to be exercised by none who are not thoroughly

weaned from the prepossessions and habits incident to foreign birth and education. The term of nine years

appears to be a prudent mediocrity between a total exclusion of adopted citizens, whose merits and talents

may claim a share in the public confidence, and an indiscriminate and hasty admission of them, which might

II. It is equally unnecessary to dilate on the appointment of senators by the State legislatures. Among the

various modes which might have been devised for constituting this branch of the government, that which has

been proposed by the convention is probably the most congenial with the public opinion. It is recommended

by the double advantage of favoring a select appointment, and of giving to the State governments such an

agency in the formation of the federal government as must secure the authority of the former, and may form a

III. The equality of representation in the Senate is another point, which, being evidently the result of

compromise between the opposite pretensions of the large and the small States, does not call for much

discussion. If indeed it be right, that among a people thoroughly incorporated into one nation, every district

ought to have a PROPORTIONAL share in the government, and that among independent and sovereign

States, bound together by a simple league, the parties, however unequal in size, ought to have an EQUAL

share in the common councils, it does not appear to be without some reason that in a compound republic,

partaking both of the national and federal character, the government ought to be founded on a mixture of the

principles of proportional and equal representation. But it is superfluous to try, by the standard of theory, a

part of the Constitution which is allowed on all hands to be the result, not of theory, but ``of a spirit of amity,

and that mutual deference and concession which the peculiarity of our political situation rendered

indispensable.'' A common government, with powers equal to its objects, is called for by the voice, and still

more loudly by the political situation, of America. A government founded on principles more consonant to

the wishes of the larger States, is not likely to be obtained from the smaller States. The only option, then, for

the former, lies between the proposed government and a government still more objectionable. Under this

alternative, the advice of prudence must be to embrace the lesser evil; and, instead of indulging a fruitless

anticipation of the possible mischiefs which may ensue, to contemplate rather the advantageous consequences

In this spirit it may be remarked, that the equal vote allowed to each State is at once a constitutional

recognition of the portion of sovereignty remaining in the individual States, and an instrument for preserving

that residuary sovereignty. So far the equality ought to be no less acceptable to the large than to the small

States; since they are not less solicitous to guard, by every possible expedient, against an improper

Another advantage accruing from this ingredient in the constitution of the Senate is, the additional

impediment it must prove against improper acts of legislation. No law or resolution can now be passed

without the concurrence, first, of a majority of the people, and then, of a majority of the States. It must be

acknowledged that this complicated check on legislation may in some instances be injurious as well as

beneficial; and that the peculiar defense which it involves in favor of the smaller States, would be more

rational, if any interests common to them, and distinct from those of the other States, would otherwise be

exposed to peculiar danger. But as the larger States will always be able, by their power over the supplies, to

defeat unreasonable exertions of this prerogative of the lesser States, and as the faculty and excess of

lawmaking seem to be the diseases to which our governments are most liable, it is not impossible that this

part of the Constitution may be more convenient in practice than it appears to many in contemplation.

IV. The number of senators, and the duration of their appointment, come next to be considered. In order to

form an accurate judgment on both of these points, it will be proper to inquire into the purposes which are to

be answered by a senate; and in order to ascertain these, it will be necessary to review the inconveniences

First. It is a misfortune incident to republican government, though in a less degree than to other governments,

that those who administer it may forget their obligations to their constituents, and prove unfaithful to their

important trust. In this point of view, a senate, as a second branch of the legislative assembly, distinct from,

and dividing the power with, a first, must be in all cases a salutary check on the government. It doubles the

security to the people, by requiring the concurrence of two distinct bodies in schemes of usurpation or

perfidy, where the ambition or corruption of one would otherwise be sufficient. This is a precaution founded

on such clear principles, and now so well understood in the United States, that it would be more than

superfluous to enlarge on it. I will barely remark, that as the improbability of sinister combinations will be in

proportion to the dissimilarity in the genius of the two bodies, it must be politic to distinguish them from each

other by every circumstance which will consist with a due harmony in all proper measures, and with the

Secondly. The necessity of a senate is not less indicated by the propensity of all single and numerous

assemblies to yield to the impulse of sudden and violent passions, and to be seduced by factious leaders into

Examples on this subject might be cited without number; and from proceedings within the United States, as

well as from the history of other nations. But a position that will not be contradicted, need not be proved. All

that need be remarked is, that a body which is to correct this infirmity ought itself to be free from it, and

consequently ought to be less numerous. It ought, moreover, to possess great firmness, and consequently

Thirdly. Another defect to be supplied by a senate lies in a want of due acquaintance with the objects and

principles of legislation. It is not possible that an assembly of men called for the most part from pursuits of a

private nature, continued in appointment for a short time, and led by no permanent motive to devote the

intervals of public occupation to a study of the laws, the affairs, and the comprehensive interests of their

country, should, if left wholly to themselves, escape a variety of important errors in the exercise of their

legislative trust. It may be affirmed, on the best grounds, that no small share of the present embarrassments of

America is to be charged on the blunders of our governments; and that these have proceeded from the heads

rather than the hearts of most of the authors of them. What indeed are all the repealing, explaining, and

amending laws, which fill and disgrace our voluminous codes, but so many monuments of deficient wisdom;

so many impeachments exhibited by each succeeding against each preceding session; so many admonitions to

the people, of the value of those aids which may be expected from a wellconstituted senate? A good

government implies two things: first, fidelity to the object of government, which is the happiness of the

people; secondly, a knowledge of the means by which that object can be best attained. Some governments are

deficient in both these qualities; most governments are deficient in the first. I scruple not to assert, that in

American governments too little attention has been paid to the last. The federal Constitution avoids this error;

and what merits particular notice, it provides for the last in a mode which increases the security for the first.

Fourthly. The mutability in the public councils arising from a rapid succession of new members, however

qualified they may be, points out, in the strongest manner, the necessity of some stable institution in the

government. Every new election in the States is found to change one half of the representatives. From this

change of men must proceed a change of opinions; and from a change of opinions, a change of measures. But

a continual change even of good measures is inconsistent with every rule of prudence and every prospect of

success. The remark is verified in private life, and becomes more just, as well as more important, in national

To trace the mischievous effects of a mutable government would fill a volume. I will hint a few only, each of

In the first place, it forfeits the respect and confidence of other nations, and all the advantages connected with

national character. An individual who is observed to be inconstant to his plans, or perhaps to carry on his

affairs without any plan at all, is marked at once, by all prudent people, as a speedy victim to his own

unsteadiness and folly. His more friendly neighbors may pity him, but all will decline to connect their

fortunes with his; and not a few will seize the opportunity of making their fortunes out of his. One nation is to

another what one individual is to another; with this melancholy distinction perhaps, that the former, with

fewer of the benevolent emotions than the latter, are under fewer restraints also from taking undue advantage

from the indiscretions of each other. Every nation, consequently, whose affairs betray a want of wisdom and

stability, may calculate on every loss which can be sustained from the more systematic policy of their wiser

neighbors. But the best instruction on this subject is unhappily conveyed to America by the example of her

own situation. She finds that she is held in no respect by her friends; that she is the derision of her enemies;

and that she is a prey to every nation which has an interest in speculating on her fluctuating councils and

The internal effects of a mutable policy are still more calamitous. It poisons the blessing of liberty itself. It

will be of little avail to the people, that the laws are made by men of their own choice, if the laws be so

voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that they cannot be understood; if they be repealed or

revised before they are promulgated, or undergo such incessant changes that no man, who knows what the

law is today, can guess what it will be tomorrow. Law is defined to be a rule of action; but how can that be

a rule, which is little known, and less fixed? Another effect of public instability is the unreasonable advantage

it gives to the sagacious, the enterprising, and the moneyed few over the industrious and uniformed mass of

Every new regulation concerning commerce or revenue, or in any way affecting the value of the different

species of property, presents a new harvest to those who watch the change, and can trace its consequences; a

harvest, reared not by themselves, but by the toils and cares of the great body of their fellowcitizens. This is

a state of things in which it may be said with some truth that laws are made for the FEW, not for the MANY.

In another point of view, great injury results from an unstable government. The want of confidence in the

public councils damps every useful undertaking, the success and profit of which may depend on a

continuance of existing arrangements. What prudent merchant will hazard his fortunes in any new branch of

commerce when he knows not but that his plans may be rendered unlawful before they can be executed?

What farmer or manufacturer will lay himself out for the encouragement given to any particular cultivation or

establishment, when he can have no assurance that his preparatory labors and advances will not render him a

victim to an inconstant government? In a word, no great improvement or laudable enterprise can go forward

But the most deplorable effect of all is that diminution of attachment and reverence which steals into the

hearts of the people, towards a political system which betrays so many marks of infirmity, and disappoints so

many of their flattering hopes. No government, any more than an individual, will long be respected without

being truly respectable; nor be truly respectable, without possessing a certain portion of order and stability.

A FIFTH desideratum, illustrating the utility of a senate, is the want of a due sense of national character.

Without a select and stable member of the government, the esteem of foreign powers will not only be

forfeited by an unenlightened and variable policy, proceeding from the causes already mentioned, but the

national councils will not possess that sensibility to the opinion of the world, which is perhaps not less

An attention to the judgment of other nations is important to every government for two reasons: the one is,

that, independently of the merits of any particular plan or measure, it is desirable, on various accounts, that it

should appear to other nations as the offspring of a wise and honorable policy; the second is, that in doubtful

cases, particularly where the national councils may be warped by some strong passion or momentary interest,

the presumed or known opinion of the impartial world may be the best guide that can be followed. What has

not America lost by her want of character with foreign nations; and how many errors and follies would she

not have avoided, if the justice and propriety of her measures had, in every instance, been previously tried by

the light in which they would probably appear to the unbiased part of mankind? Yet however requisite a

sense of national character may be, it is evident that it can never be sufficiently possessed by a numerous and

changeable body. It can only be found in a number so small that a sensible degree of the praise and blame of

public measures may be the portion of each individual; or in an assembly so durably invested with public

trust, that the pride and consequence of its members may be sensibly incorporated with the reputation and

prosperity of the community. The halfyearly representatives of Rhode Island would probably have been

little affected in their deliberations on the iniquitous measures of that State, by arguments drawn from the

light in which such measures would be viewed by foreign nations, or even by the sister States; whilst it can

scarcely be doubted that if the concurrence of a select and stable body had been necessary, a regard to

national character alone would have prevented the calamities under which that misguided people is now

I add, as a SIXTH defect the want, in some important cases, of a due responsibility in the government to the

people, arising from that frequency of elections which in other cases produces this responsibility. This remark

will, perhaps, appear not only new, but paradoxical. It must nevertheless be acknowledged, when explained,

Responsibility, in order to be reasonable, must be limited to objects within the power of the responsible party,

and in order to be effectual, must relate to operations of that power, of which a ready and proper judgment

can be formed by the constituents. The objects of government may be divided into two general classes: the

one depending on measures which have singly an immediate and sensible operation; the other depending on a

succession of wellchosen and wellconnected measures, which have a gradual and perhaps unobserved

operation. The importance of the latter description to the collective and permanent welfare of every country,

needs no explanation. And yet it is evident that an assembly elected for so short a term as to be unable to

provide more than one or two links in a chain of measures, on which the general welfare may essentially

depend, ought not to be answerable for the final result, any more than a steward or tenant, engaged for one

year, could be justly made to answer for places or improvements which could not be accomplished in less

Nor is it possible for the people to estimate the SHARE of influence which their annual assemblies may

respectively have on events resulting from the mixed transactions of several years. It is sufficiently difficult

to preserve a personal responsibility in the members of a NUMEROUS body, for such acts of the body as

The proper remedy for this defect must be an additional body in the legislative department, which, having

sufficient permanency to provide for such objects as require a continued attention, and a train of measures,

Thus far I have considered the circumstances which point out the necessity of a wellconstructed Senate only

as they relate to the representatives of the people. To a people as little blinded by prejudice or corrupted by

flattery as those whom I address, I shall not scruple to add, that such an institution may be sometimes

necessary as a defense to the people against their own temporary errors and delusions. As the cool and

deliberate sense of the community ought, in all governments, and actually will, in all free governments,

ultimately prevail over the views of its rulers; so there are particular moments in public affairs when the

people, stimulated by some irregular passion, or some illicit advantage, or misled by the artful

misrepresentations of interested men, may call for measures which they themselves will afterwards be the

most ready to lament and condemn. In these critical moments, how salutary will be the interference of some

temperate and respectable body of citizens, in order to check the misguided career, and to suspend the blow

meditated by the people against themselves, until reason, justice, and truth can regain their authority over the

public mind? What bitter anguish would not the people of Athens have often escaped if their government had

contained so provident a safeguard against the tyranny of their own passions? Popular liberty might then have

escaped the indelible reproach of decreeing to the same citizens the hemlock on one day and statues on the

It may be suggested, that a people spread over an extensive region cannot, like the crowded inhabitants of a

small district, be subject to the infection of violent passions, or to the danger of combining in pursuit of

unjust measures. I am far from denying that this is a distinction of peculiar importance. I have, on the

contrary, endeavored in a former paper to show, that it is one of the principal recommendations of a

confederated republic. At the same time, this advantage ought not to be considered as superseding the use of

auxiliary precautions. It may even be remarked, that the same extended situation, which will exempt the

people of America from some of the dangers incident to lesser republics, will expose them to the

inconveniency of remaining for a longer time under the influence of those misrepresentations which the

It adds no small weight to all these considerations, to recollect that history informs us of no longlived

republic which had not a senate. Sparta, Rome, and Carthage are, in fact, the only states to whom that

character can be applied. In each of the two first there was a senate for life. The constitution of the senate in

the last is less known. Circumstantial evidence makes it probable that it was not different in this particular

from the two others. It is at least certain, that it had some quality or other which rendered it an anchor against

popular fluctuations; and that a smaller council, drawn out of the senate, was appointed not only for life, but

filled up vacancies itself. These examples, though as unfit for the imitation, as they are repugnant to the

genius, of America, are, notwithstanding, when compared with the fugitive and turbulent existence of other

ancient republics, very instructive proofs of the necessity of some institution that will blend stability with

liberty. I am not unaware of the circumstances which distinguish the American from other popular

governments, as well ancient as modern; and which render extreme circumspection necessary, in reasoning

from the one case to the other. But after allowing due weight to this consideration, it may still be maintained,

that there are many points of similitude which render these examples not unworthy of our attention. Many of

the defects, as we have seen, which can only be supplied by a senatorial institution, are common to a

numerous assembly frequently elected by the people, and to the people themselves. There are others peculiar

The people can never wilfully betray their own interests; but they may possibly be betrayed by the

representatives of the people; and the danger will be evidently greater where the whole legislative trust is

lodged in the hands of one body of men, than where the concurrence of separate and dissimilar bodies is

The difference most relied on, between the American and other republics, consists in the principle of

representation; which is the pivot on which the former move, and which is supposed to have been unknown to

The use which has been made of this difference, in reasonings contained in former papers, will have shown

that I am disposed neither to deny its existence nor to undervalue its importance. I feel the less restraint,

therefore, in observing, that the position concerning the ignorance of the ancient governments on the subject

of representation, is by no means precisely true in the latitude commonly given to it. Without entering into a

disquisition which here would be misplaced, I will refer to a few known facts, in support of what I advance.

In the most pure democracies of Greece, many of the executive functions were performed, not by the people

themselves, but by officers elected by the people, and REPRESENTING the people in their EXECUTIVE

Prior to the reform of Solon, Athens was governed by nine Archons, annually ELECTED BY THE PEOPLE

AT LARGE. The degree of power delegated to them seems to be left in great obscurity.

Subsequent to that period, we find an assembly, first of four, and afterwards of six hundred members,

annually ELECTED BY THE PEOPLE; and PARTIALLY representing them in their LEGISLATIVE

capacity, since they were not only associated with the people in the function of making laws, but had the

exclusive right of originating legislative propositions to the people. The senate of Carthage, also, whatever

might be its power, or the duration of its appointment, appears to have been ELECTIVE by the suffrages of

the people. Similar instances might be traced in most, if not all the popular governments of antiquity.

Lastly, in Sparta we meet with the Ephori, and in Rome with the Tribunes; two bodies, small indeed in

numbers, but annually ELECTED BY THE WHOLE BODY OF THE PEOPLE, and considered as the

REPRESENTATIVES of the people, almost in their PLENIPOTENTIARY capacity. The Cosmi of Crete

were also annually ELECTED BY THE PEOPLE, and have been considered by some authors as an

institution analogous to those of Sparta and Rome, with this difference only, that in the election of that

representative body the right of suffrage was communicated to a part only of the people.

From these facts, to which many others might be added, it is clear that the principle of representation was

neither unknown to the ancients nor wholly overlooked in their political constitutions.

The true distinction between these and the American governments, lies IN THE TOTAL EXCLUSION OF

THE PEOPLE, IN THEIR COLLECTIVE CAPACITY, from any share in the LATTER, and not in the

TOTAL EXCLUSION OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE from the administration of the

FORMER. The distinction, however, thus qualified, must be admitted to leave a most advantageous

superiority in favor of the United States. But to insure to this advantage its full effect, we must be careful not

to separate it from the other advantage, of an extensive territory. For it cannot be believed, that any form of

representative government could have succeeded within the narrow limits occupied by the democracies of

In answer to all these arguments, suggested by reason, illustrated by examples, and enforced by our own

experience, the jealous adversary of the Constitution will probably content himself with repeating, that a

senate appointed not immediately by the people, and for the term of six years, must gradually acquire a

dangerous preeminence in the government, and finally transform it into a tyrannical aristocracy.

To this general answer, the general reply ought to be sufficient, that liberty may be endangered by the abuses

of liberty as well as by the abuses of power; that there are numerous instances of the former as well as of the

latter; and that the former, rather than the latter, are apparently most to be apprehended by the United States.

Before such a revolution can be effected, the Senate, it is to be observed, must in the first place corrupt itself;

must next corrupt the State legislatures; must then corrupt the House of Representatives; and must finally

corrupt the people at large. It is evident that the Senate must be first corrupted before it can attempt an

establishment of tyranny. Without corrupting the State legislatures, it cannot prosecute the attempt, because

the periodical change of members would otherwise regenerate the whole body. Without exerting the means of

corruption with equal success on the House of Representatives, the opposition of that coequal branch of the

government would inevitably defeat the attempt; and without corrupting the people themselves, a succession

of new representatives would speedily restore all things to their pristine order. Is there any man who can

seriously persuade himself that the proposed Senate can, by any possible means within the compass of human

address, arrive at the object of a lawless ambition, through all these obstructions? If reason condemns the

suspicion, the same sentence is pronounced by experience. The constitution of Maryland furnishes the most

apposite example. The Senate of that State is elected, as the federal Senate will be, indirectly by the people,

and for a term less by one year only than the federal Senate. It is distinguished, also, by the remarkable

prerogative of filling up its own vacancies within the term of its appointment, and, at the same time, is not

under the control of any such rotation as is provided for the federal Senate. There are some other lesser

distinctions, which would expose the former to colorable objections, that do not lie against the latter. If the

federal Senate, therefore, really contained the danger which has been so loudly proclaimed, some symptoms

at least of a like danger ought by this time to have been betrayed by the Senate of Maryland, but no such

symptoms have appeared. On the contrary, the jealousies at first entertained by men of the same description

with those who view with terror the correspondent part of the federal Constitution, have been gradually

extinguished by the progress of the experiment; and the Maryland constitution is daily deriving, from the

salutary operation of this part of it, a reputation in which it will probably not be rivalled by that of any State

But if any thing could silence the jealousies on this subject, it ought to be the British example. The Senate

there instead of being elected for a term of six years, and of being unconfined to particular families or

fortunes, is an hereditary assembly of opulent nobles. The House of Representatives, instead of being elected

for two years, and by the whole body of the people, is elected for seven years, and, in very great proportion,

by a very small proportion of the people. Here, unquestionably, ought to be seen in full display the

aristocratic usurpations and tyranny which are at some future period to be exemplified in the United States.

Unfortunately, however, for the antifederal argument, the British history informs us that this hereditary

assembly has not been able to defend itself against the continual encroachments of the House of

Representatives; and that it no sooner lost the support of the monarch, than it was actually crushed by the

As far as antiquity can instruct us on this subject, its examples support the reasoning which we have

employed. In Sparta, the Ephori, the annual representatives of the people, were found an overmatch for the

senate for life, continually gained on its authority and finally drew all power into their own hands. The

Tribunes of Rome, who were the representatives of the people, prevailed, it is well known, in almost every

contest with the senate for life, and in the end gained the most complete triumph over it.

The fact is the more remarkable, as unanimity was required in every act of the Tribunes, even after their

It proves the irresistible force possessed by that branch of a free government, which has the people on its side.

To these examples might be added that of Carthage, whose senate, according to the testimony of Polybius,

instead of drawing all power into its vortex, had, at the commencement of the second Punic War, lost almost

Besides the conclusive evidence resulting from this assemblage of facts, that the federal Senate will never be

able to transform itself, by gradual usurpations, into an independent and aristocratic body, we are warranted

in believing, that if such a revolution should ever happen from causes which the foresight of man cannot

guard against, the House of Representatives, with the people on their side, will at all times be able to bring

back the Constitution to its primitive form and principles. Against the force of the immediate representatives

of the people, nothing will be able to maintain even the constitutional authority of the Senate, but such a

display of enlightened policy, and attachment to the public good, as will divide with that branch of the

legislature the affections and support of the entire body of the people themselves.

IT IS a just and not a new observation, that enemies to particular persons, and opponents to particular

measures, seldom confine their censures to such things only in either as are worthy of blame. Unless on this

principle, it is difficult to explain the motives of their conduct, who condemn the proposed Constitution in the

aggregate, and treat with severity some of the most unexceptionable articles in it.

The second section gives power to the President, ``BY AND WITH THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF

CONCUR.'' The power of making treaties is an important one, especially as it relates to war, peace, and

commerce; and it should not be delegated but in such a mode, and with such precautions, as will afford the

highest security that it will be exercised by men the best qualified for the purpose, and in the manner most

conducive to the public good. The convention appears to have been attentive to both these points: they have

directed the President to be chosen by select bodies of electors, to be deputed by the people for that express

purpose; and they have committed the appointment of senators to the State legislatures. This mode has, in

such cases, vastly the advantage of elections by the people in their collective capacity, where the activity of

party zeal, taking the advantage of the supineness, the ignorance, and the hopes and fears of the unwary and

interested, often places men in office by the votes of a small proportion of the electors.

As the select assemblies for choosing the President, as well as the State legislatures who appoint the senators,

will in general be composed of the most enlightened and respectable citizens, there is reason to presume that

their attention and their votes will be directed to those men only who have become the most distinguished by

their abilities and virtue, and in whom the people perceive just grounds for confidence. The Constitution

manifests very particular attention to this object. By excluding men under thirtyfive from the first office,

and those under thirty from the second, it confines the electors to men of whom the people have had time to

form a judgment, and with respect to whom they will not be liable to be deceived by those brilliant

appearances of genius and patriotism, which, like transient meteors, sometimes mislead as well as dazzle.

If the observation be well founded, that wise kings will always be served by able ministers, it is fair to argue,

that as an assembly of select electors possess, in a greater degree than kings, the means of extensive and

accurate information relative to men and characters, so will their appointments bear at least equal marks of

discretion and discernment. The inference which naturally results from these considerations is this, that the

President and senators so chosen will always be of the number of those who best understand our national

interests, whether considered in relation to the several States or to foreign nations, who are best able to

promote those interests, and whose reputation for integrity inspires and merits confidence. With such men the

Although the absolute necessity of system, in the conduct of any business, is universally known and

acknowledged, yet the high importance of it in national affairs has not yet become sufficiently impressed on

the public mind. They who wish to commit the power under consideration to a popular assembly, composed

of members constantly coming and going in quick succession, seem not to recollect that such a body must

necessarily be inadequate to the attainment of those great objects, which require to be steadily contemplated

in all their relations and circumstances, and which can only be approached and achieved by measures which

not only talents, but also exact information, and often much time, are necessary to concert and to execute. It

was wise, therefore, in the convention to provide, not only that the power of making treaties should be

committed to able and honest men, but also that they should continue in place a sufficient time to become

perfectly acquainted with our national concerns, and to form and introduce a a system for the management of

them. The duration prescribed is such as will give them an opportunity of greatly extending their political

information, and of rendering their accumulating experience more and more beneficial to their country. Nor

has the convention discovered less prudence in providing for the frequent elections of senators in such a way

as to obviate the inconvenience of periodically transferring those great affairs entirely to new men; for by

leaving a considerable residue of the old ones in place, uniformity and order, as well as a constant succession

There are a few who will not admit that the affairs of trade and navigation should be regulated by a system

cautiously formed and steadily pursued; and that both our treaties and our laws should correspond with and

be made to promote it. It is of much consequence that this correspondence and conformity be carefully

maintained; and they who assent to the truth of this position will see and confess that it is well provided for

It seldom happens in the negotiation of treaties, of whatever nature, but that perfect SECRECY and

immediate DESPATCH are sometimes requisite. These are cases where the most useful intelligence may be

obtained, if the persons possessing it can be relieved from apprehensions of discovery. Those apprehensions

will operate on those persons whether they are actuated by mercenary or friendly motives; and there

doubtless are many of both descriptions, who would rely on the secrecy of the President, but who would not

confide in that of the Senate, and still less in that of a large popular Assembly. The convention have done

well, therefore, in so disposing of the power of making treaties, that although the President must, in forming

them, act by the advice and consent of the Senate, yet he will be able to manage the business of intelligence

They who have turned their attention to the affairs of men, must have perceived that there are tides in them;

tides very irregular in their duration, strength, and direction, and seldom found to run twice exactly in the

same manner or measure. To discern and to profit by these tides in national affairs is the business of those

who preside over them; and they who have had much experience on this head inform us, that there frequently

are occasions when days, nay, even when hours, are precious. The loss of a battle, the death of a prince, the

removal of a minister, or other circumstances intervening to change the present posture and aspect of affairs,

As in the field, so in the cabinet, there are moments to be seized as they pass, and they who preside in either

should be left in capacity to improve them. So often and so essentially have we heretofore suffered from the

want of secrecy and despatch, that the Constitution would have been inexcusably defective, if no attention

had been paid to those objects. Those matters which in negotiations usually require the most secrecy and the

most despatch, are those preparatory and auxiliary measures which are not otherwise important in a national

view, than as they tend to facilitate the attainment of the objects of the negotiation. For these, the President

will find no difficulty to provide; and should any circumstance occur which requires the advice and consent

of the Senate, he may at any time convene them. Thus we see that the Constitution provides that our

negotiations for treaties shall have every advantage which can be derived from talents, information, integrity,

and deliberate investigations, on the one hand, and from secrecy and despatch on the other.

But to this plan, as to most others that have ever appeared, objections are contrived and urged.

Some are displeased with it, not on account of any errors or defects in it, but because, as the treaties, when

made, are to have the force of laws, they should be made only by men invested with legislative authority.

These gentlemen seem not to consider that the judgments of our courts, and the commissions constitutionally

given by our governor, are as valid and as binding on all persons whom they concern, as the laws passed by

our legislature. All constitutional acts of power, whether in the executive or in the judicial department, have

as much legal validity and obligation as if they proceeded from the legislature; and therefore, whatever name

be given to the power of making treaties, or however obligatory they may be when made, certain it is, that the

people may, with much propriety, commit the power to a distinct body from the legislature, the executive, or

the judicial. It surely does not follow, that because they have given the power of making laws to the

legislature, that therefore they should likewise give them the power to do every other act of sovereignty by

Others, though content that treaties should be made in the mode proposed, are averse to their being the

They insist, and profess to believe, that treaties like acts of assembly, should be repealable at pleasure. This

idea seems to be new and peculiar to this country, but new errors, as well as new truths, often appear. These

gentlemen would do well to reflect that a treaty is only another name for a bargain, and that it would be

impossible to find a nation who would make any bargain with us, which should be binding on them

ABSOLUTELY, but on us only so long and so far as we may think proper to be bound by it. They who make

laws may, without doubt, amend or repeal them; and it will not be disputed that they who make treaties may

alter or cancel them; but still let us not forget that treaties are made, not by only one of the contracting parties,

but by both; and consequently, that as the consent of both was essential to their formation at first, so must it

ever afterwards be to alter or cancel them. The proposed Constitution, therefore, has not in the least extended

the obligation of treaties. They are just as binding, and just as far beyond the lawful reach of legislative acts

However useful jealousy may be in republics, yet when like bile in the natural, it abounds too much in the

body politic, the eyes of both become very liable to be deceived by the delusive appearances which that

malady casts on surrounding objects. From this cause, probably, proceed the fears and apprehensions of

some, that the President and Senate may make treaties without an equal eye to the interests of all the States.

Others suspect that two thirds will oppress the remaining third, and ask whether those gentlemen are made

sufficiently responsible for their conduct; whether, if they act corruptly, they can be punished; and if they

make disadvantageous treaties, how are we to get rid of those treaties? As all the States are equally

represented in the Senate, and by men the most able and the most willing to promote the interests of their

constituents, they will all have an equal degree of influence in that body, especially while they continue to be

careful in appointing proper persons, and to insist on their punctual attendance. In proportion as the United

States assume a national form and a national character, so will the good of the whole be more and more an

object of attention, and the government must be a weak one indeed, if it should forget that the good of the

whole can only be promoted by advancing the good of each of the parts or members which compose the

whole. It will not be in the power of the President and Senate to make any treaties by which they and their

families and estates will not be equally bound and affected with the rest of the community; and, having no

private interests distinct from that of the nation, they will be under no temptations to neglect the latter.

As to corruption, the case is not supposable. He must either have been very unfortunate in his intercourse

with the world, or possess a heart very susceptible of such impressions, who can think it probable that the

President and two thirds of the Senate will ever be capable of such unworthy conduct. The idea is too gross

and too invidious to be entertained. But in such a case, if it should ever happen, the treaty so obtained from us

would, like all other fraudulent contracts, be null and void by the law of nations.

With respect to their responsibility, it is difficult to conceive how it could be increased. Every consideration

that can influence the human mind, such as honor, oaths, reputations, conscience, the love of country, and

family affections and attachments, afford security for their fidelity. In short, as the Constitution has taken the

utmost care that they shall be men of talents and integrity, we have reason to be persuaded that the treaties

they make will be as advantageous as, all circumstances considered, could be made; and so far as the fear of

punishment and disgrace can operate, that motive to good behavior is amply afforded by the article on the

THE remaining powers which the plan of the convention allots to the Senate, in a distinct capacity, are

comprised in their participation with the executive in the appointment to offices, and in their judicial

As in the business of appointments the executive will be the principal agent, the provisions relating to it will

most properly be discussed in the examination of that department. We will, therefore, conclude this head with

A wellconstituted court for the trial of impeachments is an object not more to be desired than difficult to be

obtained in a government wholly elective. The subjects of its jurisdiction are those offenses which proceed

from the misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from the abuse or violation of some public trust.

They are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to

injuries done immediately to the society itself. The prosecution of them, for this reason, will seldom fail to

agitate the passions of the whole community, and to divide it into parties more or less friendly or inimical to

the accused. In many cases it will connect itself with the preexisting factions, and will enlist all their

animosities, partialities, influence, and interest on one side or on the other; and in such cases there will

always be the greatest danger that the decision will be regulated more by the comparative strength of parties,

The delicacy and magnitude of a trust which so deeply concerns the political reputation and existence of

every man engaged in the administration of public affairs, speak for themselves. The difficulty of placing it

rightly, in a government resting entirely on the basis of periodical elections, will as readily be perceived,

when it is considered that the most conspicuous characters in it will, from that circumstance, be too often the

leaders or the tools of the most cunning or the most numerous faction, and on this account, can hardly be

expected to possess the requisite neutrality towards those whose conduct may be the subject of scrutiny.

The convention, it appears, thought the Senate the most fit depositary of this important trust. Those who can

best discern the intrinsic difficulty of the thing, will be least hasty in condemning that opinion, and will be

most inclined to allow due weight to the arguments which may be supposed to have produced it.

What, it may be asked, is the true spirit of the institution itself? Is it not designed as a method of NATIONAL

INQUEST into the conduct of public men? If this be the design of it, who can so properly be the inquisitors

for the nation as the representatives of the nation themselves? It is not disputed that the power of originating

the inquiry, or, in other words, of preferring the impeachment, ought to be lodged in the hands of one branch

of the legislative body. Will not the reasons which indicate the propriety of this arrangement strongly plead

for an admission of the other branch of that body to a share of the inquiry? The model from which the idea of

this institution has been borrowed, pointed out that course to the convention. In Great Britain it is the

province of the House of Commons to prefer the impeachment, and of the House of Lords to decide upon it.

Several of the State constitutions have followed the example. As well the latter, as the former, seem to have

regarded the practice of impeachments as a bridle in the hands of the legislative body upon the executive

servants of the government. Is not this the true light in which it ought to be regarded? Where else than in the

Senate could have been found a tribunal sufficiently dignified, or sufficiently independent? What other body

would be likely to feel CONFIDENCE ENOUGH IN ITS OWN SITUATION, to preserve, unawed and

uninfluenced, the necessary impartiality between an INDIVIDUAL accused, and the REPRESENTATIVES

OF THE PEOPLE, HIS ACCUSERS? Could the Supreme Court have been relied upon as answering this

description? It is much to be doubted, whether the members of that tribunal would at all times be endowed

with so eminent a portion of fortitude, as would be called for in the execution of so difficult a task; and it is

still more to be doubted, whether they would possess the degree of credit and authority, which might, on

certain occasions, be indispensable towards reconciling the people to a decision that should happen to clash

with an accusation brought by their immediate representatives. A deficiency in the first, would be fatal to the

accused; in the last, dangerous to the public tranquillity. The hazard in both these respects, could only be

avoided, if at all, by rendering that tribunal more numerous than would consist with a reasonable attention to

economy. The necessity of a numerous court for the trial of impeachments, is equally dictated by the nature

of the proceeding. This can never be tied down by such strict rules, either in the delineation of the offense by

the prosecutors, or in the construction of it by the judges, as in common cases serve to limit the discretion of

courts in favor of personal security. There will be no jury to stand between the judges who are to pronounce

the sentence of the law, and the party who is to receive or suffer it. The awful discretion which a court of

impeachments must necessarily have, to doom to honor or to infamy the most confidential and the most

distinguished characters of the community, forbids the commitment of the trust to a small number of persons.

These considerations seem alone sufficient to authorize a conclusion, that the Supreme Court would have

been an improper substitute for the Senate, as a court of impeachments. There remains a further

consideration, which will not a little strengthen this conclusion. It is this: The punishment which may be the

consequence of conviction upon impeachment, is not to terminate the chastisement of the offender. After

having been sentenced to a prepetual ostracism from the esteem and confidence, and honors and emoluments

of his country, he will still be liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law. Would it be

proper that the persons who had disposed of his fame, and his most valuable rights as a citizen in one trial,

should, in another trial, for the same offense, be also the disposers of his life and his fortune? Would there not

be the greatest reason to apprehend, that error, in the first sentence, would be the parent of error in the second

sentence? That the strong bias of one decision would be apt to overrule the influence of any new lights which

might be brought to vary the complexion of another decision? Those who know anything of human nature,

will not hesitate to answer these questions in the affirmative; and will be at no loss to perceive, that by

making the same persons judges in both cases, those who might happen to be the objects of prosecution

would, in a great measure, be deprived of the double security intended them by a double trial. The loss of life

and estate would often be virtually included in a sentence which, in its terms, imported nothing more than

dismission from a present, and disqualification for a future, office. It may be said, that the intervention of a

jury, in the second instance, would obviate the danger. But juries are frequently influenced by the opinions of

judges. They are sometimes induced to find special verdicts, which refer the main question to the decision of

the court. Who would be willing to stake his life and his estate upon the verdict of a jury acting under the

auspices of judges who had predetermined his guilt? Would it have been an improvement of the plan, to have

united the Supreme Court with the Senate, in the formation of the court of impeachments? This union would

certainly have been attended with several advantages; but would they not have been overbalanced by the

signal disadvantage, already stated, arising from the agency of the same judges in the double prosecution to

which the offender would be liable? To a certain extent, the benefits of that union will be obtained from

making the chief justice of the Supreme Court the president of the court of impeachments, as is proposed to

be done in the plan of the convention; while the inconveniences of an entire incorporation of the former into

the latter will be substantially avoided. This was perhaps the prudent mean. I forbear to remark upon the

additional pretext for clamor against the judiciary, which so considerable an augmentation of its authority

Would it have been desirable to have composed the court for the trial of impeachments, of persons wholly

distinct from the other departments of the government? There are weighty arguments, as well against, as in

favor of, such a plan. To some minds it will not appear a trivial objection, that it could tend to increase the

complexity of the political machine, and to add a new spring to the government, the utility of which would at

best be questionable. But an objection which will not be thought by any unworthy of attention, is this: a court

formed upon such a plan, would either be attended with a heavy expense, or might in practice be subject to a

variety of casualties and inconveniences. It must either consist of permanent officers, stationary at the seat of

government, and of course entitled to fixed and regular stipends, or of certain officers of the State

governments to be called upon whenever an impeachment was actually depending. It will not be easy to

imagine any third mode materially different, which could rationally be proposed. As the court, for reasons

already given, ought to be numerous, the first scheme will be reprobated by every man who can compare the

extent of the public wants with the means of supplying them. The second will be espoused with caution by

those who will seriously consider the difficulty of collecting men dispersed over the whole Union; the injury

to the innocent, from the procrastinated determination of the charges which might be brought against them;

the advantage to the guilty, from the opportunities which delay would afford to intrigue and corruption; and

in some cases the detriment to the State, from the prolonged inaction of men whose firm and faithful

execution of their duty might have exposed them to the persecution of an intemperate or designing majority

in the House of Representatives. Though this latter supposition may seem harsh, and might not be likely often

to be verified, yet it ought not to be forgotten that the demon of faction will, at certain seasons, extend his

But though one or the other of the substitutes which have been examined, or some other that might be

devised, should be thought preferable to the plan in this respect, reported by the convention, it will not follow

that the Constitution ought for this reason to be rejected. If mankind were to resolve to agree in no institution

of government, until every part of it had been adjusted to the most exact standard of perfection, society would

soon become a general scene of anarchy, and the world a desert. Where is the standard of perfection to be

found? Who will undertake to unite the discordant opinions of a whole commuity, in the same judgment of it;

and to prevail upon one conceited projector to renounce his INFALLIBLE criterion for the FALLIBLE

criterion of his more CONCEITED NEIGHBOR? To answer the purpose of the adversaries of the

Constitution, they ought to prove, not merely that particular provisions in it are not the best which might have

A REVIEW of the principal objections that have appeared against the proposed court for the trial of

impeachments, will not improbably eradicate the remains of any unfavorable impressions which may still

The FIRST of these objections is, that the provision in question confounds legislative and judiciary

authorities in the same body, in violation of that important and wellestablished maxim which requires a

separation between the different departments of power. The true meaning of this maxim has been discussed

and ascertained in another place, and has been shown to be entirely compatible with a partial intermixture of

those departments for special purposes, preserving them, in the main, distinct and unconnected. This partial

intermixture is even, in some cases, not only proper but necessary to the mutual defense of the several

members of the government against each other. An absolute or qualified negative in the executive upon the

acts of the legislative body, is admitted, by the ablest adepts in political science, to be an indispensable barrier

against the encroachments of the latter upon the former. And it may, perhaps, with no less reason be

contended, that the powers relating to impeachments are, as before intimated, an essential check in the hands

of that body upon the encroachments of the executive. The division of them between the two branches of the

legislature, assigning to one the right of accusing, to the other the right of judging, avoids the inconvenience

of making the same persons both accusers and judges; and guards against the danger of persecution, from the

prevalency of a factious spirit in either of those branches. As the concurrence of two thirds of the Senate will

be requisite to a condemnation, the security to innocence, from this additional circumstance, will be as

It is curious to observe, with what vehemence this part of the plan is assailed, on the principle here taken

notice of, by men who profess to admire, without exception, the constitution of this State; while that

constitution makes the Senate, together with the chancellor and judges of the Supreme Court, not only a court

of impeachments, but the highest judicatory in the State, in all causes, civil and criminal. The proportion, in

point of numbers, of the chancellor and judges to the senators, is so inconsiderable, that the judiciary

authority of New York, in the last resort, may, with truth, be said to reside in its Senate. If the plan of the

convention be, in this respect, chargeable with a departure from the celebrated maxim which has been so

often mentioned, and seems to be so little understood, how much more culpable must be the constitution of

New York?1 A SECOND objection to the Senate, as a court of impeachments, is, that it contributes to an

undue accumulation of power in that body, tending to give to the government a countenance too aristocratic.

The Senate, it is observed, is to have concurrent authority with the Executive in the formation of treaties and

in the appointment to offices: if, say the objectors, to these prerogatives is added that of deciding in all cases

of impeachment, it will give a decided predominancy to senatorial influence. To an objection so little precise

in itself, it is not easy to find a very precise answer. Where is the measure or criterion to which we can

appeal, for determining what will give the Senate too much, too little, or barely the proper degree of

influence? Will it not be more safe, as well as more simple, to dismiss such vague and uncertain calculations,

to examine each power by itself, and to decide, on general principles, where it may be deposited with most

advantage and least inconvenience? If we take this course, it will lead to a more intelligible, if not to a more

certain result. The disposition of the power of making treaties, which has obtained in the plan of the

convention, will, then, if I mistake not, appear to be fully justified by the considerations stated in a former

number, and by others which will occur under the next head of our inquiries. The expediency of the junction

of the Senate with the Executive, in the power of appointing to offices, will, I trust, be placed in a light not

less satisfactory, in the disquisitions under the same head. And I flatter myself the observations in my last

paper must have gone no inconsiderable way towards proving that it was not easy, if practicable, to find a

more fit receptacle for the power of determining impeachments, than that which has been chosen. If this be

truly the case, the hypothetical dread of the too great weight of the Senate ought to be discarded from our

But this hypothesis, such as it is, has already been refuted in the remarks applied to the duration in office

prescribed for the senators. It was by them shown, as well on the credit of historical examples, as from the

reason of the thing, that the most POPULAR branch of every government, partaking of the republican genius,

by being generally the favorite of the people, will be as generally a full match, if not an overmatch, for every

But independent of this most active and operative principle, to secure the equilibrium of the national House

of Representatives, the plan of the convention has provided in its favor several important counterpoises to the

additional authorities to be conferred upon the Senate. The exclusive privilege of originating money bills will

belong to the House of Representatives. The same house will possess the sole right of instituting

impeachments: is not this a complete counterbalance to that of determining them? The same house will be the

umpire in all elections of the President, which do not unite the suffrages of a majority of the whole number of

electors; a case which it cannot be doubted will sometimes, if not frequently, happen. The constant possibility

of the thing must be a fruitful source of influence to that body. The more it is contemplated, the more

important will appear this ultimate though contingent power, of deciding the competitions of the most

illustrious citizens of the Union, for the first office in it. It would not perhaps be rash to predict, that as a

mean of influence it will be found to outweigh all the peculiar attributes of the Senate.

A THIRD objection to the Senate as a court of impeachments, is drawn from the agency they are to have in

the appointments to office. It is imagined that they would be too indulgent judges of the conduct of men, in

The principle of this objection would condemn a practice, which is to be seen in all the State governments, if

not in all the governments with which we are acquainted: I mean that of rendering those who hold offices

during pleasure, dependent on the pleasure of those who appoint them. With equal plausibility might it be

alleged in this case, that the favoritism of the latter would always be an asylum for the misbehavior of the

former. But that practice, in contradiction to this principle, proceeds upon the presumption, that the

responsibility of those who appoint, for the fitness and competency of the persons on whom they bestow their

choice, and the interest they will have in the respectable and prosperous administration of affairs, will inspire

a sufficient disposition to dismiss from a share in it all such who, by their conduct, shall have proved

Though facts may not always correspond with this presumption, yet if it be, in the main, just, it must destroy

the supposition that the Senate, who will merely sanction the choice of the Executive, should feel a bias,

towards the objects of that choice, strong enough to blind them to the evidences of guilt so extraordinary, as

If any further arguments were necessary to evince the improbability of such a bias, it might be found in the

It will be the office of the President to NOMINATE, and, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to

APPOINT. There will, of course, be no exertion of CHOICE on the part of the Senate. They may defeat one

choice of the Executive, and oblige him to make another; but they cannot themselves CHOOSE, they can

only ratify or reject the choice of the President. They might even entertain a preference to some other person,

at the very moment they were assenting to the one proposed, because there might be no positive ground of

opposition to him; and they could not be sure, if they withheld their assent, that the subsequent nomination

would fall upon their own favorite, or upon any other person in their estimation more meritorious than the

one rejected. Thus it could hardly happen, that the majority of the Senate would feel any other complacency

towards the object of an appointment than such as the appearances of merit might inspire, and the proofs of

A FOURTH objection to the Senate in the capacity of a court of impeachments, is derived from its union with

the Executive in the power of making treaties. This, it has been said, would constitute the senators their own

judges, in every case of a corrupt or perfidious execution of that trust. After having combined with the

Executive in betraying the interests of the nation in a ruinous treaty, what prospect, it is asked, would there be

of their being made to suffer the punishment they would deserve, when they were themselves to decide upon

the accusation brought against them for the treachery of which they have been guilty? This objection has been

circulated with more earnestness and with greater show of reason than any other which has appeared against

this part of the plan; and yet I am deceived if it does not rest upon an erroneous foundation.

The security essentially intended by the Constitution against corruption and treachery in the formation of

treaties, is to be sought for in the numbers and characters of those who are to make them. The JOINT

AGENCY of the Chief Magistrate of the Union, and of two thirds of the members of a body selected by the

collective wisdom of the legislatures of the several States, is designed to be the pledge for the fidelity of the

national councils in this particular. The convention might with propriety have meditated the punishment of

the Executive, for a deviation from the instructions of the Senate, or a want of integrity in the conduct of the

negotiations committed to him; they might also have had in view the punishment of a few leading individuals

in the Senate, who should have prostituted their influence in that body as the mercenary instruments of

foreign corruption: but they could not, with more or with equal propriety, have contemplated the

impeachment and punishment of two thirds of the Senate, consenting to an improper treaty, than of a majority

of that or of the other branch of the national legislature, consenting to a pernicious or unconstitutional law, a

principle which, I believe, has never been admitted into any government. How, in fact, could a majority in the

House of Representatives impeach themselves? Not better, it is evident, than two thirds of the Senate might

try themselves. And yet what reason is there, that a majority of the House of Representatives, sacrificing the

interests of the society by an unjust and tyrannical act of legislation, should escape with impunity, more than

two thirds of the Senate, sacrificing the same interests in an injurious treaty with a foreign power? The truth

is, that in all such cases it is essential to the freedom and to the necessary independence of the deliberations of

the body, that the members of it should be exempt from punishment for acts done in a collective capacity; and

the security to the society must depend on the care which is taken to confide the trust to proper hands, to

make it their interest to execute it with fidelity, and to make it as difficult as possible for them to combine in

So far as might concern the misbehavior of the Executive in perverting the instructions or contravening the

views of the Senate, we need not be apprehensive of the want of a disposition in that body to punish the abuse

of their confidence or to vindicate their own authority. We may thus far count upon their pride, if not upon

their virtue. And so far even as might concern the corruption of leading members, by whose arts and

influence the majority may have been inveigled into measures odious to the community, if the proofs of that

corruption should be satisfactory, the usual propensity of human nature will warrant us in concluding that

there would be commonly no defect of inclination in the body to divert the public resentment from

themselves by a ready sacrifice of the authors of their mismanagement and disgrace.

In that of New Jersey, also, the final judiciary authority is in a branch of the legislature. In New Hampshire,

Massachusetts, Pennsylvanis, and South Carolina, one branch of the legislature is the court for the trial of

THE constitution of the executive department of the proposed government, claims next our attention.

There is hardly any part of the system which could have been atten ed with greater difficulty in the

arrangement of it than this; and there is, perhaps, none which has been inveighed against with less candor or

Here the writers against the Constitution seem to have taken pains to signalize their talent of

misrepresentation. Calculating upon the aversion of the people to monarchy, they have endeavored to enlist

all their jealousies and apprehensions in opposition to the intended President of the United States; not merely

as the embryo, but as the fullgrown progeny, of that detested parent. To establish the pretended affinity,

they have not scrupled to draw resources even from the regions of fiction. The authorities of a magistrate, in

few instances greater, in some instances less, than those of a governor of New York, have been magnified

into more than royal prerogatives. He has been decorated with attributes superior in dignity and splendor to

those of a king of Great Britain. He has been shown to us with the diadem sparkling on his brow and the

imperial purple flowing in his train. He has been seated on a throne surrounded with minions and mistresses,

giving audience to the envoys of foreign potentates, in all the supercilious pomp of majesty. The images of

Asiatic despotism and voluptuousness have scarcely been wanting to crown the exaggerated scene. We have

been taught to tremble at the terrific visages of murdering janizaries, and to blush at the unveiled mysteries of

Attempts so extravagant as these to disfigure or, it might rather be said, to metamorphose the object, render it

necessary to take an accurate view of its real nature and form: in order as well to ascertain its true aspect and

genuine appearance, as to unmask the disingenuity and expose the fallacy of the counterfeit resemblances

In the execution of this task, there is no man who would not find it an arduous effort either to behold with

moderation, or to treat with seriousness, the devices, not less weak than wicked, which have been contrived to

pervert the public opinion in relation to the subject. They so far exceed the usual though unjustifiable licenses

of party artifice, that even in a disposition the most candid and tolerant, they must force the sentiments which

favor an indulgent construction of the conduct of political adversaries to give place to a voluntary and

unreserved indignation. It is impossible not to bestow the imputation of deliberate imposture and deception

upon the gross pretense of a similitude between a king of Great Britain and a magistrate of the character

marked out for that of the President of the United States. It is still more impossible to withhold that

imputation from the rash and barefaced expedients which have been employed to give success to the

In one instance, which I cite as a sample of the general spirit, the temerity has proceeded so far as to ascribe

to the President of the United States a power which by the instrument reported is EXPRESSLY allotted to the

Executives of the individual States. I mean the power of filling casual vacancies in the Senate.

This bold experiment upon the discernment of his countrymen has been hazarded by a writer who (whatever

may be his real merit) has had no inconsiderable share in the applauses of his party1; and who, upon this false

and unfounded suggestion, has built a series of observations equally false and unfounded. Let him now be

confronted with the evidence of the fact, and let him, if he be able, justify or extenuate the shameful outrage

The second clause of the second section of the second article empowers the President of the United States ``to

nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint ambassadors, other public

ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other OFFICERS of United States whose

appointments are NOT in the Constitution OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR, and WHICH SHALL BE

ESTABLISHED BY LAW.'' Immediately after this clause follows another in these words: ``The President

shall have power to fill up ?? VACANCIES that may happen DURING THE RECESS OF THE SENATE, by

granting commissions which shall EXPIRE AT THE END OF THEIR NEXT SESSION.'' It is from this last

provision that the pretended power of the President to fill vacancies in the Senate has been deduced. A slight

attention to the connection of the clauses, and to the obvious meaning of the terms, will satisfy us that the

The first of these two clauses, it is clear, only provides a mode for appointing such officers, ``whose

appointments are NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR in the Constitution, and which SHALL BE

ESTABLISHED BY LAW''; of course it cannot extend to the appointments of senators, whose appointments

The last of these two clauses, it is equally clear, cannot be understood to comprehend the power of filling

vacancies in the Senate, for the following reasons: First. The relation in which that clause stands to the other,

which declares the general mode of appointing officers of the United States, denotes it to be nothing more

than a supplement to the other, for the purpose of establishing an auxiliary method of appointment, in cases to

which the general method was inadequate. The ordinary power of appointment is confined to the President

and Senate JOINTLY, and can therefore only be exercised during the session of the Senate; but as it would

have been improper to oblige this body to be continually in session for the appointment of officers and as

vacancies might happen IN THEIR RECESS, which it might be necessary for the public service to fill

without delay, the succeeding clause is evidently intended to authorize the President, SINGLY, to make

temporary appointments ``during the recess of the Senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at the

end of their next session.'' Secondly. If this clause is to be considered as supplementary to the one which

precedes, the VACANCIES of which it speaks must be construed to relate to the ``officers'' described in the

preceding one; and this, we have seen, excludes from its description the members of the Senate. Thirdly. The

time within which the power is to operate, ``during the recess of the Senate,'' and the duration of the

appointments, ``to the end of the next session'' of that body, conspire to elucidate the sense of the provision,

which, if it had been intended to comprehend senators, would naturally have referred the temporary power of

filling vacancies to the recess of the State legislatures, who are to make the permanent appointments, and not

to the recess of the national Senate, who are to have no concern in those appointments; and would have

extended the duration in office of the temporary senators to the next session of the legislature of the State, in

whose representation the vacancies had happened, instead of making it to expire at the end of the ensuing

session of the national Senate. The circumstances of the body authorized to make the permanent

appointments would, of course, have governed the modification of a power which related to the temporary

appointments; and as the national Senate is the body, whose situation is alone contemplated in the clause

upon which the suggestion under examination has been founded, the vacancies to which it alludes can only be

deemed to respect those officers in whose appointment that body has a concurrent agency with the President.

But lastly, the first and second clauses of the third section of the first article, not only obviate all possibility of

doubt, but destroy the pretext of misconception. The former provides, that ``the Senate of the United States

shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen BY THE LEGISLATURE THEREOF for six

years''; and the latter directs, that, ``if vacancies in that body should happen by resignation or otherwise,

DURING THE RECESS OF THE LEGISLATURE OF ANY STATE, the Executive THEREOF may make

temporary appointments until the NEXT MEETING OF THE LEGISLATURE, which shall then fill such

vacancies.'' Here is an express power given, in clear and unambiguous terms, to the State Executives, to fill

casual vacancies in the Senate, by temporary appointments; which not only invalidates the supposition, that

the clause before considered could have been intended to confer that power upon the President of the United

States, but proves that this supposition, destitute as it is even of the merit of plausibility, must have originated

in an intention to deceive the people, too palpable to be obscured by sophistry, too atrocious to be palliated

I have taken the pains to select this instance of misrepresentation, and to place it in a clear and strong light, as

an unequivocal proof of the unwarrantable arts which are practiced to prevent a fair and impartial judgment

of the real merits of the Constitution submitted to the consideration of the people. Nor have I scrupled, in so

flagrant a case, to allow myself a severity of animadversion little congenial with the general spirit of these

papers. I hesitate not to submit it to the decision of any candid and honest adversary of the proposed

government, whether language can furnish epithets of too much asperity, for so shameless and so prostitute

THE mode of appointment of the Chief Magistrate of the United States is almost the only part of the system,

of any consequence, which has escaped without severe censure, or which has received the slightest mark of

approbation from its opponents. The most plausible of these, who has appeared in print, has even deigned to

admit that the election of the President is pretty well guarded.1 I venture somewhat further, and hesitate not

to affirm, that if the manner of it be not perfect, it is at least excellent. It unites in an eminent degree all the

It was desirable that the sense of the people should operate in the choice of the person to whom so important

a trust was to be confided. This end will be answered by committing the right of making it, not to any

preestablished body, but to men chosen by the people for the special purpose, and at the particular

It was equally desirable, that the immediate election should be made by men most capable of analyzing the

qualities adapted to the station, and acting under circumstances favorable to deliberation, and to a judicious

combination of all the reasons and inducements which were proper to govern their choice. A small number of

persons, selected by their fellowcitizens from the general mass, will be most likely to possess the

It was also peculiarly desirable to afford as little opportunity as possible to tumult and disorder. This evil was

not least to be dreaded in the election of a magistrate, who was to have so important an agency in the

administration of the government as the President of the United States. But the precautions which have been

so happily concerted in the system under consideration, promise an effectual security against this mischief.

The choice of SEVERAL, to form an intermediate body of electors, will be much less apt to convulse the

community with any extraordinary or violent movements, than the choice of ONE who was himself to be the

final object of the public wishes. And as the electors, chosen in each State, are to assemble and vote in the

State in which they are chosen, this detached and divided situation will expose them much less to heats and

ferments, which might be communicated from them to the people, than if they were all to be convened at one

Nothing was more to be desired than that every practicable obstacle should be opposed to cabal, intrigue, and

These most deadly adversaries of republican government might naturally have been expected to make their

approaches from more than one querter, but chiefly from the desire in foreign powers to gain an improper

ascendant in our councils. How could they better gratify this, than by raising a creature of their own to the

chief magistracy of the Union? But the convention have guarded against all danger of this sort, with the most

provident and judicious attention. They have not made the appointment of the President to depend on any

preexisting bodies of men, who might be tampered with beforehand to prostitute their votes; but they have

referred it in the first instance to an immediate act of the people of America, to be exerted in the choice of

persons for the temporary and sole purpose of making the appointment. And they have excluded from

eligibility to this trust, all those who from situation might be suspected of too great devotion to the President

in office. No senator, representative, or other person holding a place of trust or profit under the United States,

can be of the numbers of the electors. Thus without corrupting the body of the people, the immediate agents

in the election will at least enter upon the task free from any sinister bias. Their transient existence, and their

detached situation, already taken notice of, afford a satisfactory prospect of their continuing so, to the

conclusion of it. The business of corruption, when it is to embrace so considerable a number of men, requires

time as well as means. Nor would it be found easy suddenly to embark them, dispersed as they would be over

thirteen States, in any combinations founded upon motives, which though they could not properly be

Another and no less important desideratum was, that the Executive should be independent for his continuance

in office on all but the people themselves. He might otherwise be tempted to sacrifice his duty to his

complaisance for those whose favor was necessary to the duration of his official consequence. This advantage

will also be secured, by making his reelection to depend on a special body of representatives, deputed by the

All these advantages will happily combine in the plan devised by the convention; which is, that the people of

each State shall choose a number of persons as electors, equal to the number of senators and representatives

of such State in the national government, who shall assemble within the State, and vote for some fit person as

President. Their votes, thus given, are to be transmitted to the seat of the national government, and the person

who may happen to have a majority of the whole number of votes will be the President. But as a majority of

the votes might not always happen to centre in one man, and as it might be unsafe to permit less than a

majority to be conclusive, it is provided that, in such a contingency, the House of Representatives shall select

out of the candidates who shall have the five highest number of votes, the man who in their opinion may be

The process of election affords a moral certainty, that the office of President will never fall to the lot of any

Talents for low intrigue, and the little arts of popularity, may alone suffice to elevate a man to the first honors

in a single State; but it will require other talents, and a different kind of merit, to establish him in the esteem

and confidence of the whole Union, or of so considerable a portion of it as would be necessary to make him a

successful candidate for the distinguished office of President of the United States. It will not be too strong to

say, that there will be a constant probability of seeing the station filled by characters preeminent for ability

and virtue. And this will be thought no inconsiderable recommendation of the Constitution, by those who are

able to estimate the share which the executive in every government must necessarily have in its good or ill

administration. Though we cannot acquiesce in the political heresy of the poet who says: ``For forms of

government let fools contest That which is best administered is best,'' yet we may safely pronounce, that the

true test of a good government is its aptitude and tendency to produce a good administration.

The VicePresident is to be chosen in the same manner with the President; with this difference, that the

Senate is to do, in respect to the former, what is to be done by the House of Representatives, in respect to the

The appointment of an extraordinary person, as VicePresident, has been objected to as superfluous, if not

mischievous. It has been alleged, that it would have been preferable to have authorized the Senate to elect out

of their own body an officer answering that description. But two considerations seem to justify the ideas of

the convention in this respect. One is, that to secure at all times the possibility of a definite resolution of the

body, it is necessary that the President should have only a casting vote. And to take the senator of any State

from his seat as senator, to place him in that of President of the Senate, would be to exchange, in regard to the

State from which he came, a constant for a contingent vote. The other consideration is, that as the

VicePresident may occasionally become a substitute for the President, in the supreme executive magistracy,

all the reasons which recommend the mode of election prescribed for the one, apply with great if not with

equal force to the manner of appointing the other. It is remarkable that in this, as in most other instances, the

objection which is made would lie against the constitution of this State. We have a LieutenantGovernor,

chosen by the people at large, who presides in the Senate, and is the constitutional substitute for the

Governor, in casualties similar to those which would authorize the VicePresident to exercise the authorities

I PROCEED now to trace the real characters of the proposed Executive, as they are marked out in the plan of

This will serve to place in a strong light the unfairness of the representations which have been made in regard

The first thing which strikes our attention is, that the executive authority, with few exceptions, is to be vested

in a single magistrate. This will scarcely, however, be considered as a point upon which any comparison can

be grounded; for if, in this particular, there be a resemblance to the king of Great Britain, there is not less a

resemblance to the Grand Seignior, to the khan of Tartary, to the Man of the Seven Mountains, or to the

That magistrate is to be elected for FOUR years; and is to be reeligible as often as the people of the United

States shall think him worthy of their confidence. In these circumstances there is a total dissimilitude between

HIM and a king of Great Britain, who is an HEREDITARY monarch, possessing the crown as a patrimony

descendible to his heirs forever; but there is a close analogy between HIM and a governor of New York, who

is elected for THREE years, and is reeligible without limitation or intermission. If we consider how much

less time would be requisite for establishing a dangerous influence in a single State, than for establishing a

like influence throughout the United States, we must conclude that a duration of FOUR years for the Chief

Magistrate of the Union is a degree of permanency far less to be dreaded in that office, than a duration of

The President of the United States would be liable to be impeached, tried, and, upon conviction of treason,

bribery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors, removed from office; and would afterwards be liable to

prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law. The person of the king of Great Britain is sacred

and inviolable; there is no constitutional tribunal to which he is amenable; no punishment to which he can be

subjected without involving the crisis of a national revolution. In this delicate and important circumstance of

personal responsibility, the President of Confederated America would stand upon no better ground than a

governor of New York, and upon worse ground than the governors of Maryland and Delaware.

The President of the United States is to have power to return a bill, which shall have passed the two branches

of the legislature, for reconsideration; and the bill so returned is to become a law, if, upon that

reconsideration, it be approved by two thirds of both houses. The king of Great Britain, on his part, has an

absolute negative upon the acts of the two houses of Parliament. The disuse of that power for a considerable

time past does not affect the reality of its existence; and is to be ascribed wholly to the crown's having found

the means of substituting influence to authority, or the art of gaining a majority in one or the other of the two

houses, to the necessity of exerting a prerogative which could seldom be exerted without hazarding some

degree of national agitation. The qualified negative of the President differs widely from this absolute negative

of the British sovereign; and tallies exactly with the revisionary authority of the council of revision of this

State, of which the governor is a constituent part. In this respect the power of the President would exceed that

of the governor of New York, because the former would possess, singly, what the latter shares with the

chancellor and judges; but it would be precisely the same with that of the governor of Massachusetts, whose

constitution, as to this article, seems to have been the original from which the convention have copied.

The President is to be the ``commanderinchief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia

of the several States, when called into the actual service of the United States. He is to have power to grant

reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, EXCEPT IN CASES OF IMPEACHMENT; to

recommend to the consideration of Congress such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; to

convene, on extraordinary occasions, both houses of the legislature, or either of them, and, in case of

disagreement between them WITH RESPECT TO THE TIME OF ADJOURNMENT, to adjourn them to

such time as he shall think proper; to take care that the laws be faithfully executed; and to commission all

officers of the United States.'' In most of these particulars, the power of the President will resemble equally

that of the king of Great Britain and of the governor of New York. The most material points of difference are

these: First. The President will have only the occasional command of such part of the militia of the nation as

by legislative provision may be called into the actual service of the Union. The king of Great Britain and the

governor of New York have at all times the entire command of all the militia within their several

jurisdictions. In this article, therefore, the power of the President would be inferior to that of either the

monarch or the governor. Secondly. The President is to be commanderinchief of the army and navy of the

United States. In this respect his authority would be nominally the same with that of the king of Great Britain,

but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and

direction of the military and naval forces, as first General and admiral of the Confederacy; while that of the

British king extends to the DECLARING of war and to the RAISING and REGULATING of fleets and

armies, all which, by the Constitution under consideration, would appertain to the legislature.1 The governor

of New York, on the other hand, is by the constitution of the State vested only with the command of its

militia and navy. But the constitutions of several of the States expressly declare their governors to be

commandersinchief, as well of the army as navy; and it may well be a question, whether those of New

Hampshire and Massachusetts, in particular, do not, in this instance, confer larger powers upon their

respective governors, than could be claimed by a President of the United States. Thirdly.

The power of the President, in respect to pardons, would extend to all cases, EXCEPT THOSE OF

IMPEACHMENT. The governor of New York may pardon in all cases, even in those of impeachment, except

for treason and murder. Is not the power of the governor, in this article, on a calculation of political

consequences, greater than that of the President? All conspiracies and plots against the government, which

have not been matured into actual treason, may be screened from punishment of every kind, by the

interposition of the prerogative of pardoning. If a governor of New York, therefore, should be at the head of

any such conspiracy, until the design had been ripened into actual hostility he could insure his accomplices

and adherents an entire impunity. A President of the Union, on the other hand, though he may even pardon

treason, when prosecuted in the ordinary course of law, could shelter no offender, in any degree, from the

effects of impeachment and conviction. Would not the prospect of a total indemnity for all the preliminary

steps be a greater temptation to undertake and persevere in an enterprise against the public liberty, than the

mere prospect of an exemption from death and confiscation, if the final execution of the design, upon an

actual appeal to arms, should miscarry? Would this last expectation have any influence at all, when the

probability was computed, that the person who was to afford that exemption might himself be involved in the

consequences of the measure, and might be incapacitated by his agency in it from affording the desired

impunity? The better to judge of this matter, it will be necessary to recollect, that, by the proposed

Constitution, the offense of treason is limited ``to levying war upon the United States, and adhering to their

enemies, giving them aid and comfort''; and that by the laws of New York it is confined within similar

Fourthly. The President can only adjourn the national legislature in the single case of disagreement about the

The governor of New York may also prorogue the legislature of this State for a limited time; a power which,

The President is to have power, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two

thirds of the senators present concur. The king of Great Britain is the sole and absolute representative of the

nation in all foreign transactions. He can of his own accord make treaties of peace, commerce, alliance, and

of every other description. It has been insinuated, that his authority in this respect is not conclusive, and that

his conventions with foreign powers are subject to the revision, and stand in need of the ratification, of

Parliament. But I believe this doctrine was never heard of, until it was broached upon the present occasion.

Every jurist2 of that kingdom, and every other man acquainted with its Constitution, knows, as an established

fact, that the prerogative of making treaties exists in the crown in its utomst plentitude; and that the compacts

entered into by the royal authority have the most complete legal validity and perfection, independent of any

other sanction. The Parliament, it is true, is sometimes seen employing itself in altering the existing laws to

conform them to the stipulations in a new treaty; and this may have possibly given birth to the imagination,

that its cooperation was necessary to the obligatory efficacy of the treaty. But this parliamentary

interposition proceeds from a different cause: from the necessity of adjusting a most artificial and intricate

system of revenue and commercial laws, to the changes made in them by the operation of the treaty; and of

adapting new provisions and precautions to the new state of things, to keep the machine from running into

disorder. In this respect, therefore, there is no comparison between the intended power of the President and

the actual power of the British sovereign. The one can perform alone what the other can do only with the

concurrence of a branch of the legislature. It must be admitted, that, in this instance, the power of the federal

Executive would exceed that of any State Executive. But this arises naturally from the sovereign power which

relates to treaties. If the Confederacy were to be dissolved, it would become a question, whether the

Executives of the several States were not solely invested with that delicate and important prerogative.

The President is also to be authorized to receive ambassadors and other public ministers. This, though it has

been a rich theme of declamation, is more a matter of dignity than of authority. It is a circumstance which

will be without consequence in the administration of the government; and it was far more convenient that it

should be arranged in this manner, than that there should be a necessity of convening the legislature, or one of

its branches, upon every arrival of a foreign minister, though it were merely to take the place of a departed

The President is to nominate, and, WITH THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE, to appoint

ambassadors and other public ministers, judges of the Supreme Court, and in general all officers of the United

States established by law, and whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by the Constitution. The

king of Great Britain is emphatically and truly styled the fountain of honor. He not only appoints to all

offices, but can create offices. He can confer titles of nobility at pleasure; and has the disposal of an immense

number of church preferments. There is evidently a great inferiority in the power of the President, in this

particular, to that of the British king; nor is it equal to that of the governor of New York, if we are to interpret

the meaning of the constitution of the State by the practice which has obtained under it. The power of

appointment is with us lodged in a council, composed of the governor and four members of the Senate,

The governor CLAIMS, and has frequently EXERCISED, the right of nomination, and is ENTITLED to a

If he really has the right of nominating, his authority is in this respect equal to that of the President, and

exceeds it in the article of the casting vote. In the national government, if the Senate should be divided, no

appointment could be made; in the government of New York, if the council should be divided, the governor

can turn the scale, and confirm his own nomination.3 If we compare the publicity which must necessarily

attend the mode of appointment by the President and an entire branch of the national legislature, with the

privacy in the mode of appointment by the governor of New York, closeted in a secret apartment with at most

four, and frequently with only two persons; and if we at the same time consider how much more easy it must

be to influence the small number of which a council of appointment consists, than the considerable number of

which the national Senate would consist, we cannot hesitate to pronounce that the power of the chief

magistrate of this State, in the disposition of offices, must, in practice, be greatly superior to that of the Chief

Hence it appears that, except as to the concurrent authority of the President in the article of treaties, it would

be difficult to determine whether that magistrate would, in the aggregate, possess more or less power than the

Governor of New York. And it appears yet more unequivocally, that there is no pretense for the parallel

But to render the contrast in this respect still more striking, it may be of use to throw the principal

The President of the United States would be an officer elected by the people for FOUR years; the king of

Great Britain is a perpetual and HEREDITARY prince. The one would be amenable to personal punishment

and disgrace; the person of the other is sacred and inviolable. The one would have a QUALIFIED negative

The one would have a right to command the military and naval forces of the nation; the other, in addition to

this right, possesses that of DECLARING war, and of RAISING and REGULATING fleets and armies by his

own authority. The one would have a concurrent power with a branch of the legislature in the formation of

treaties; the other is the SOLE POSSESSOR of the power of making treaties. The one would have a like

concurrent authority in appointing to offices; the other is the sole author of all appointments. The one can

confer no privileges whatever; the other can make denizens of aliens, noblemen of commoners; can erect

corporations with all the rights incident to corporate bodies. The one can prescribe no rules concerning the

commerce or currency of the nation; the other is in several respects the arbiter of commerce, and in this

capacity can establish markets and fairs, can regulate weights and measures, can lay embargoes for a limited

time, can coin money, can authorize or prohibit the circulation of foreign coin. The one has no particle of

spiritual jurisdiction; the other is the supreme head and governor of the national church! What answer shall

we give to those who would persuade us that things so unlike resemble each other? The same that ought to be

given to those who tell us that a government, the whole power of which would be in the hands of the elective

and periodical servants of the people, is an aristocracy, a monarchy, and a despotism.

1 A writer in a Pennsylvania paper, under the signature of TAMONY, has asserted that the king of Great

Britain oweshis prerogative as commanderinchief to an annual mutiny bill. The truth is, on the contrary,

that his prerogative, in this respect, is immenmorial, and was only disputed, ``contrary to all reason and

precedent,'' as Blackstone vol. i., page 262, expresses it, by the Long Parliament of Charles I. but by the

statute the 13th of Charles II., chap. 6, it was declared to be in the king alone, for that the sole supreme

government and command of the militia within his Majesty's realms and dominions, and of all forces by sea

and land, and of all forts and places of strength, EVER WAS AND IS the undoubted right of his Majesty and

his royal predecessors, kings and queens of England, and that both or either house of Parliament cannot nor

3 Candor, however, demands an acknowledgment that I do not think the claim of the governor to a right of

Yet it is always justifiable to reason from the practice of a government, till its propriety has been

And independent of this claim, when we take into view the other considerations, and pursue them through all

THERE is an idea, which is not without its advocates, that a vigorous Executive is inconsistent with the

genius of republican government. The enlightened wellwishers to this species of government must at least

hope that the supposition is destitute of foundation; since they can never admit its truth, without at the same

Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. It is essential to the

protection of the community against foreign attacks; it is not less essential to the steady administration of the

laws; to the protection of property against those irregular and highhanded combinations which sometimes

interrupt the ordinary course of justice; to the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of

ambition, of faction, and of anarchy. Every man the least conversant in Roman story, knows how often that

republic was obliged to take refuge in the absolute power of a single man, under the formidable title of

Dictator, as well against the intrigues of ambitious individuals who aspired to the tyranny, and the seditions

of whole classes of the community whose conduct threatened the existence of all government, as against the

There can be no need, however, to multiply arguments or examples on this head. A feeble Executive implies

a feeble execution of the government. A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution; and a

government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in practice, a bad government.

Taking it for granted, therefore, that all men of sense will agree in the necessity of an energetic Executive, it

will only remain to inquire, what are the ingredients which constitute this energy? How far can they be

combined with those other ingredients which constitute safety in the republican sense? And how far does this

combination characterize the plan which has been reported by the convention? The ingredients which

constitute energy in the Executive are, first, unity; secondly, duration; thirdly, an adequate provision for its

The ingredients which constitute safety in the repub lican sense are, first, a due dependence on the people,

Those politicians and statesmen who have been the most celebrated for the soundness of their principles and

for the justice of their views, have declared in favor of a single Executive and a numerous legislature. They

have with great propriety, considered energy as the most necessary qualification of the former, and have

regarded this as most applicable to power in a single hand, while they have, with equal propriety, considered

the latter as best adapted to deliberation and wisdom, and best calculated to conciliate the confidence of the

Decision, activity, secrecy, and despatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one man in a much

more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number; and in proportion as the number is

This unity may be destroyed in two ways: either by vesting the power in two or more magistrates of equal

dignity and authority; or by vesting it ostensibly in one man, subject, in whole or in part, to the control and

cooperation of others, in the capacity of counsellors to him. Of the first, the two Consuls of Rome may serve

as an example; of the last, we shall find examples in the constitutions of several of the States. New York and

New Jersey, if I recollect right, are the only States which have intrusted the executive authority wholly to

single men.1 Both these methods of destroying the unity of the Executive have their partisans; but the

votaries of an executive council are the most numerous. They are both liable, if not to equal, to similar

The experience of other nations will afford little instruction on this head. As far, however, as it teaches any

thing, it teaches us not to be enamoured of plurality in the Executive. We have seen that the Achaeans, on an

experiment of two Praetors, were induced to abolish one. The Roman history records many instances of

mischiefs to the republic from the dissensions between the Consuls, and between the military Tribunes, who

were at times substituted for the Consuls. But it gives us no specimens of any peculiar advantages derived to

the state from the circumstance of the plurality of those magistrates. That the dissensions between them were

not more frequent or more fatal, is a matter of astonishment, until we advert to the singular position in which

the republic was almost continually placed, and to the prudent policy pointed out by the circumstances of the

state, and pursued by the Consuls, of making a division of the government between them. The patricians

engaged in a perpetual struggle with the plebeians for the preservation of their ancient authorities and

dignities; the Consuls, who were generally chosen out of the former body, were commonly united by the

personal interest they had in the defense of the privileges of their order. In addition to this motive of union,

after the arms of the republic had considerably expanded the bounds of its empire, it became an established

custom with the Consuls to divide the administration between themselves by lot one of them remaining at

Rome to govern the city and its environs, the other taking the command in the more distant provinces. This

expedient must, no doubt, have had great influence in preventing those collisions and rivalships which might

But quitting the dim light of historical research, attaching ourselves purely to the dictates of reason and good

se se, we shall discover much greater cause to reject than to approve the idea of plurality in the Executive,

Wherever two or more persons are engaged in any common enterprise or pursuit, there is always danger of

difference of opinion. If it be a public trust or office, in which they are clothed with equal dignity and

authority, there is peculiar danger of personal emulation and even animosity. From either, and especially

from all these causes, the most bitter dissensions are apt to spring. Whenever these happen, they lessen the

respectability, weaken the authority, and distract the plans and operation of those whom they divide. If they

should unfortunately assail the supreme executive magistracy of a country, consisting of a plurality of

persons, they might impede or frustrate the most important measures of the government, in the most critical

emergencies of the state. And what is still worse, they might split the community into the most violent and

irreconcilable factions, adhering differently to the different individuals who composed the magistracy.

Men often oppose a thing, merely because they have had no agency in planning it, or because it may have

been planned by those whom they dislike. But if they have been consulted, and have happened to disapprove,

opposition then becomes, in their estimation, an indispensable duty of selflove. They seem to think

themselves bound in honor, and by all the motives of personal infallibility, to defeat the success of what has

been resolved upon contrary to their sentiments. Men of upright, benevolent tempers have too many

opportunities of remarking, with horror, to what desperate lengths this disposition is sometimes carried, and

how often the great interests of society are sacrificed to the vanity, to the conceit, and to the obstinacy of

individuals, who have credit enough to make their passions and their caprices interesting to mankind. Perhaps

the question now before the public may, in its consequences, afford melancholy proofs of the effects of this

Upon the principles of a free government, inconveniences from the source just mentioned must necessarily be

submitted to in the formation of the legislature; but it is unnecessary, and therefore unwise, to introduce them

It is here too that they may be most pernicious. In the legislature, promptitude of decision is oftener an evil

than a benefit. The differences of opinion, and the jarrings of parties in that department of the government,

though they may sometimes obstruct salutary plans, yet often promote deliberation and circumspection, and

serve to check excesses in the majority. When a resolution too is once taken, the opposition must be at an

That resolution is a law, and resistance to it punishable. But no favorable circumstances palliate or atone for

the disadvantages of dissension in the executive department. Here, they are pure and unmixed. There is no

point at which they cease to operate. They serve to embarrass and weaken the execution of the plan or

measure to which they relate, from the first step to the final conclusion of it. They constantly counteract those

qualities in the Executive which are the most necessary ingredients in its composition, vigor and expedition,

and this without anycounterbalancing good. In the conduct of war, in which the energy of the Executive is the

bulwark of the national security, every thing would be to be apprehended from its plurality.

It must be confessed that these observations apply with principal weight to the first case supposed that is, to a

plurality of magistrates of equal dignity and authority a scheme, the advocates for which are not likely to

form a numerous sect; but they apply, though not with equal, yet with considerable weight to the project of a

council, whose concurrence is made constitutionally necessary to the operations of the ostensible Executive.

An artful cabal in that council would be able to distract and to enervate the whole system of administration. If

no such cabal should exist, the mere diversity of views and opinions would alone be sufficient to tincture the

exercise of the executive authority with a spirit of habitual feebleness and dilatoriness.

But one of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the Executive, and which lies as much against the last as

the first plan, is, that it tends to conceal faults and destroy responsibility. Responsibility is of two kinds to

censure and to punishment. The first is the more important of the two, especially in an elective office. Man, in

public trust, will much oftener act in such a manner as to render him unworthy of being any longer trusted,

than in such a manner as to make him obnoxious to legal punishment. But the multiplication of the Executive

adds to the difficulty of detection in either case. It often becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to

determine on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures,

ought really to fall. It is shifted from one to another with so much dexterity, and under such plausible

appearances, that the public opinion is left in suspense about the real author. The circumstances which may

have led to any national miscarriage or misfortune are sometimes so complicated that, where there are a

number of actors who may have had different degrees and kinds of agency, though we may clearly see upon

the whole that there has been mismanagement, yet it may be impracticable to pronounce to whose account the

``I was overruled by my council. The council were so divided in their opinions that it was impossible to

obtain any better resolution on the point.'' These and similar pretexts are constantly at hand, whether true or

false. And who is there that will either take the trouble or incur the odium, of a strict scrunity into the secret

springs of the transaction? Should there be found a citizen zealous enough to undertake the unpromising task,

if there happen to be collusion between the parties concerned, how easy it is to clothe the circumstances with

so much ambiguity, as to render it uncertain what was the precise conduct of any of those parties? In the

single instance in which the governor of this State is coupled with a council that is, in the appointment to

Scandalous appointments to important offices have been made. Some cases, indeed, have been so flagrant

that ALL PARTIES have agreed in the impropriety of the thing. When inquiry has been made, the blame has

been laid by the governor on the members of the council, who, on their part, have charged it upon his

nomination; while the people remain altogether at a loss to determine, by whose influence their interests have

been committed to hands so unqualified and so manifestly improper. In tenderness to individuals, I forbear to

It is evident from these considerations, that the plurality of the Executive tends to deprive the people of the

two greatest securities they can have for the faithful exercise of any delegated power, first, the restraints of

public opinion, which lose their efficacy, as well on account of the division of the censure attendant on bad

measures among a number, as on account of the uncertainty on whom it ought to fall; and, secondly, the

opportunity of discovering with facility and clearness the misconduct of the persons they trust, in order either

to their removal from office or to their actual punishment in cases which admit of it.

In England, the king is a perpetual magistrate; and it is a maxim which has obtained for the sake of the pub lic

Nothing, therefore, can be wiser in that kingdom, than to annex to the king a constitutional council, who may

be responsible to the nation for the advice they give. Without this, there would be no responsibility whatever

in the executive department an idea inadmissible in a free government. But even there the king is not bound

by the resolutions of his council, though they are answerable for the advice they give. He is the absolute

master of his own conduct in the exercise of his office, and may observe or disregard the counsel given to

But in a republic, where every magistrate ought to be personally responsible for his behavior in office the

reason which in the British Constitution dictates the propriety of a council, not only ceases to apply, but turns

against the institution. In the monarchy of Great Britain, it furnishes a substitute for the prohibited

responsibility of the chief magistrate, which serves in some degree as a hostage to the national justice for his

good behavior. In the American republic, it would serve to destroy, or would greatly diminish, the intended

The idea of a council to the Executive, which has so generally obtained in the State constitutions, has been

derived from that maxim of republican jealousy which considers power as safer in the hands of a number of

men than of a single man. If the maxim should be admitted to be applicable to the case, I should contend that

the advantage on that side would not counterbalance the numerous disadvantages on the opposite side. But I

do not think the rule at all applicable to the executive power. I clearly concur in opinion, in this particular,

with a writer whom the celebrated Junius pronounces to be ``deep, solid, and ingenious,'' that ``the executive

power is more easily confined when it is ONE'';2 that it is far more safe there should be a single object for the

jealousy and watchfulness of the people; and, in a word, that all multiplication of the Executive is rather

A little consideration will satisfy us, that the species of security sought for in the multiplication of the

Executive, is nattainable. Numbers must be so great as to render combination difficult, or they are rather a

The united credit and influence of several individuals must be more formidable to liberty, than the credit and

influence of either of them separately. When power, therefore, is placed in the hands of so small a number of

men, as to admit of their interests and views being easily combined in a common enterprise, by an artful

leader, it becomes more liable to abuse, and more dangerous when abused, than if it be lodged in the hands of

one man; who, from the very circumstance of his being alone, will be more narrowly watched and more

readily suspected, and who cannot unite so great a mass of influence as when he is associated with others.

The Decemvirs of Rome, whose name denotes their number,3 were more to be dreaded in their usurpation

than any ONE of them would have been. No person would think of proposing an Executive much more

numerous than that body; from six to a dozen have been suggested for the number of the council. The

extreme of these numbers, is not too great for an easy combination; and from such a combination America

would have more to fear, than from the ambition of any single individual. A council to a magistrate, who is

himself responsible for what he does, are generally nothing better than a clog upon his good intentions, are

often the instruments and accomplices of his bad and are almost always a cloak to his faults.

I forbear to dwell upon the subject of expense; though it be evident that if the council should be numerous

enough to answer the principal end aimed at by the institution, the salaries of the members, who must be

drawn from their homes to reside at the seat of government, would form an item in the catalogue of public

expenditures too serious to be incurred for an object of equivocal utility. I will only add that, prior to the

appearance of the Constitution, I rarely met with an intelligent man from any of the States, who did not

admit, as the result of experience, that the UNITY of the executive of this State was one of the best of the

1 New York has no council except for the single purpose of appointing to offices; New Jersey has a council

whom the governor may consult. But I think, from the terms of the constitution, their resolutions do not bind